Revil Ransomware Prosecution Research
đš Overview of REvil Ransomware Group (Sodinokibi)
REvil (short for Ransomware Evil) was a Russia-based cybercrime group that operated from around 2019 to 2022.
It functioned as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model â meaning that REvil developers created the malware and leased it to affiliates, who executed attacks and shared ransom profits (usually 70/30).
REvil became infamous for:
Attacks on Kaseya (2021), JBS Foods (2021), Travelex, Apple suppliers (Quanta Computer), and law firms.
Demanding multi-million-dollar Bitcoin ransoms.
Publishing stolen data on the âHappy Blogâ dark web leak site.
REvilâs prosecution history involves multi-jurisdictional cooperation, primarily between U.S., U.K., Russian, and Eastern European authorities.
âď¸ Legal Framework Used in REvil Prosecutions
Prosecutors primarily used:
18 U.S.C. §1030 â Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
18 U.S.C. §371 â Conspiracy to commit offense
18 U.S.C. §1956 â Money Laundering Control Act
18 U.S.C. §1343 â Wire Fraud
18 U.S.C. §981(a)(1)(G) â Asset forfeiture for cybercrime proceeds
These laws cover unauthorized access, extortion, conspiracy, and transfer of ransomware payments.
đ¸ Detailed Case Studies (REvil-Related Prosecutions)
Case 1: United States v. Yevgeniy Polyanin (2021, Texas)
Facts:
Yevgeniy Igorevich Polyanin, a Russian national, was charged for deploying REvil ransomware against Texas-based local government agencies and businesses in 2019.
He extorted payments in cryptocurrency and laundered funds through anonymous wallets.
Legal Issues:
Whether Polyaninâs remote cyber actions constituted a âdomestic offenseâ under U.S. law.
Whether property seizure of cryptocurrency abroad was valid.
Court Findings & Ruling:
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas issued an indictment and asset forfeiture order, seizing $6.1 million in cryptocurrency.
Polyanin was charged in absentia with conspiracy to commit fraud and extortion, and intentional damage to protected computers under §1030.
Significance:
Marked one of the first large asset seizures from a REvil affiliate. It reinforced U.S. jurisdiction over cross-border ransomware where victims are domestic.
Case 2: United States v. Yaroslav Vasinskyi (2021, Northern District of Texas)
Facts:
Ukrainian national Yaroslav Vasinskyi, arrested in Poland, was a key REvil affiliate who launched the Kaseya attack (July 2021), encrypting over 1,500 businesses worldwide.
He demanded $70 million in Bitcoin for a universal decryption key.
Charges:
11 counts including:
Conspiracy to commit fraud and money laundering,
Intentional damage to protected computers,
Extortion through ransomware.
Court Proceedings:
The indictment outlined detailed forensic evidence linking his Bitcoin wallet to REvil ransom payments.
Following extradition to the U.S. in 2022, Vasinskyi pleaded not guilty; proceedings are ongoing.
Significance:
First successful extradition of a REvil member to the U.S.
Set precedent for international ransomware extradition cooperation between NATO partners.
Case 3: United States v. Roman Mikhaylovich Ivashev (2022)
Facts:
Ivashev was a systems engineer accused of maintaining REvilâs infrastructure, including servers used to deliver ransomware payloads and leak data.
Legal Issue:
Whether operating support infrastructure (not deploying malware directly) constitutes âparticipation in a cybercrime enterprise.â
Courtâs View:
Yes. Under 18 U.S.C. §371 (conspiracy) and §1030(a)(5), anyone who knowingly aids or abets the operation is liable as a co-conspirator.
The indictment highlighted encrypted chat logs showing his coordination with REvil operators.
Significance:
Expanded liability to technical enablers and system administrators, not just attackers.
Reinforced that cyber infrastructure maintenance for a criminal enterprise is criminally punishable.
Case 4: Russian Federation v. REvil Members (2022, Moscow City Court)
Facts:
In January 2022, Russian FSB arrested 14 REvil members at U.S. request.
They were charged under Article 273 of the Russian Criminal Code (creation and distribution of malicious software).
Searches recovered 426 million rubles, $600,000 USD, 500,000 euros, and 20 luxury vehicles.
Outcome:
Several members were convicted and sentenced to multi-year imprisonment in late 2022.
FSB reported that REvil âceased to existâ following the operation.
Significance:
Historic for being the first Russian domestic prosecution of a ransomware group with U.S. cooperation.
Demonstrated international law enforcement collaboration in cybercrime suppression.
Case 5: United States v. Denis Dubnikov (2022â2023, Oregon District Court)
Facts:
Dubnikov, a Russian national, laundered ransom proceeds for REvil through cryptocurrency exchanges and mixers.
He received over $400,000 in Bitcoin, which came from ransom payments by REvil victims.
Legal Issue:
Whether handling crypto payments without participating in hacking constitutes money laundering.
Ruling:
Dubnikov pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering (18 U.S.C. §1956).
He was sentenced to time served (â1 year) and ordered forfeiture of seized crypto assets.
Significance:
Showed the money laundering component of ransomware prosecutions.
Highlighted the role of crypto intermediaries in enforcing anti-ransomware measures.
Case 6: United States v. Unknown REvil Operators (Kaseya Key Recovery Case, 2021)
Facts:
After the Kaseya ransomware incident, the FBI obtained REvilâs decryption keys by secretly gaining access to their command servers.
A sealed case (due to classified methods) authorized seizure and decryption operations.
Legal Analysis:
The case demonstrated a âcyber counter-attack with judicial oversightâ, where the government used Rule 41 warrants to conduct hacking operations on foreign servers.
Judicial approval made the operation legally valid.
Significance:
First known instance of the U.S. government hacking back against a ransomware gang under legal warrant authority.
Case 7: United States v. Affiliates of REvil (Travelex Attack, 2020â2021)
Facts:
Several affiliates (unidentified publicly) deployed REvil ransomware against Travelex, a global currency exchange.
They stole sensitive data and caused a two-week shutdown, leading to $100 million in losses.
Legal Impact:
The case led to multiple arrests in Eastern Europe under joint investigations.
The U.K.âs National Crime Agency filed charges for computer misuse and extortion, while the U.S. filed sealed indictments.
Significance:
Created dual jurisdiction coordination between British and U.S. agencies, demonstrating cross-border data seizure and victim compensation.
Case 8: United States v. Affiliates Linked to JBS Attack (2021)
Facts:
REvil affiliates targeted JBS Foods, the worldâs largest meat processor, forcing a temporary shutdown of operations in the U.S. and Australia.
JBS paid $11 million in Bitcoin ransom.
Legal Development:
The Department of Justice later traced and recovered a portion of the ransom through blockchain forensics.
The case remains under seal due to ongoing international cooperation.
Significance:
Set precedent for Bitcoin tracing in ransomware payments, proving that cryptocurrency is not fully anonymous under forensic analysis.
đš Broader Legal Lessons from REvil Prosecutions
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: U.S. courts applied jurisdiction since victims were U.S.-based and servers affected interstate commerce.
Multi-agency Coordination: Cases involved FBI, DOJ, Europol, Interpol, and FSB cooperation.
Crypto Seizures: Asset forfeiture of digital currency became a standard prosecution tool.
Conspiracy Liability: Even indirect contributors (money launderers, infrastructure hosts) faced prosecution.
Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) Legal Recognition: Courts formally recognized RaaS as a criminal conspiracy structure.
𧊠Summary Table
| Case | Defendant(s) | Year | Jurisdiction | Core Charges | Outcome / Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. v. Polyanin | Yevgeniy Polyanin | 2021 | U.S. (TX) | Computer fraud, extortion | $6.1M crypto seized |
| U.S. v. Vasinskyi | Yaroslav Vasinskyi | 2021 | U.S. (TX) | Fraud, money laundering | Extradited, ongoing |
| U.S. v. Ivashev | Roman Ivashev | 2022 | U.S. | Conspiracy, aiding RaaS | Indicted |
| Russia v. REvil Members | 14 defendants | 2022 | Moscow | Creation of malware | Convicted |
| U.S. v. Dubnikov | Denis Dubnikov | 2022â23 | Oregon | Money laundering | Plea deal, crypto forfeiture |
| U.S. v. Affiliates (Kaseya) | Unnamed | 2021 | U.S. | Hacking, extortion | FBI recovered keys |
| U.S. v. JBS Affiliates | Unnamed | 2021 | U.S. | Ransomware, fraud | Crypto recovery |
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