Case Brief: Indian Young Lawyers Association and Others v. The State of Kerala and Others
Case Brief: Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. The State of Kerala & Ors.
Case Name: Indian Young Lawyers Association and Others v. The State of Kerala and Others
Citation: (2018) 10 SCC 1 (Also known as the Sabarimala Temple Entry Case)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: A five-judge Constitution Bench comprising Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice R.F. Nariman, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, and Justice Indu Malhotra.
Date of Decision: September 28, 2018
Facts of the Case:
The case revolved around the long-standing practice at the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala, which prohibited women of menstruating age (between 10 and 50 years old) from entering the temple. The prohibition was based on the belief that the deity, Lord Ayyappa, is a "Naishtik Brahmachari" (a celibate) and that the entry of menstruating women would violate his vow of celibacy. This custom was legally sanctioned by Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965, which allowed for the exclusion of women "at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship."
A public interest litigation (PIL) was filed by the Indian Young Lawyers Association, challenging the constitutional validity of this practice and the corresponding rule.
Issues Before the Court:
Whether the exclusionary practice, based on a biological factor exclusive to women, amounted to discrimination and violated fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 17 of the Constitution.
Whether the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constituted a separate "religious denomination" under Article 26, which would grant them the right to manage their own religious affairs, including the exclusion of women.
Whether the practice of excluding women was an "essential religious practice" protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.
Whether Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules was ultra vires the parent Act and also violated Part III of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties:
Petitioners (Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors.):
The practice was a form of gender discrimination, violating the right to equality (Article 14) and the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex (Article 15).
The notion of "purity and pollution" associated with menstruation was a form of untouchability (Article 17), which is absolutely prohibited.
The practice was not an essential religious practice, as women's entry to the temple had not been consistently prohibited throughout history. The petitioners argued that any practice that violated fundamental rights could not be considered "essential."
The devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination and are simply a part of the Hindu fold, and therefore, their practices are subject to the social reform mandate under Article 25(2)(b).
Respondents (Travancore Devaswom Board & others):
The restriction was not a form of discrimination, as it was not based on gender but on the unique identity of the deity as a "Naishtik Brahmachari."
The devotees of Lord Ayyappa constitute a distinct religious denomination and have the right to manage their internal affairs, including this practice, under Article 26 of the Constitution.
The practice was an "essential religious practice" that had been followed for centuries and was integral to the faith of the devotees.
The right to equality under Article 14 cannot be applied to religious matters, which are governed by Articles 25 and 26.
Decision of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court, in a 4:1 majority verdict, ruled that the ban on the entry of women of menstruating age into the Sabarimala Temple was unconstitutional.
Majority Opinion (by CJI Misra, Justices Nariman, Khanwilkar, and Chandrachud):
Violation of Fundamental Rights: The Court held that the exclusionary practice was a clear violation of Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(d), and 21. It was a form of gender discrimination based on a biological attribute and violated the dignity, autonomy, and freedom of women. Justice Chandrachud, in his concurring opinion, went further to state that the practice of excluding women based on notions of "purity and pollution" was a form of untouchability, which is outlawed under Article 17.
No Separate Religious Denomination: The majority held that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do not constitute a separate religious denomination. They are simply a part of the Hindu religion. Consequently, they cannot claim the protection of Article 26, which is available only to religious denominations.
Not an Essential Religious Practice: The Court found that the practice of excluding women was not an "essential religious practice" as required for protection under Article 25. There was no compelling evidence to show that this practice was fundamental to the religion itself or had been consistently followed since time immemorial. The Court emphasized that an essential religious practice must be one that is fundamental to the faith and without which the religion would lose its identity.
Constitutional Morality: The majority emphasized the principle of "constitutional morality," stating that religious practices, even if they are ancient, must align with the values of the Constitution, such as equality, dignity, and liberty. Any custom that is contrary to constitutional morality must be struck down.
Dissenting Opinion (by Justice Indu Malhotra):
Non-Interference with Religious Matters: Justice Malhotra was the lone dissenting judge. She argued that issues of faith and religious sentiment should not be interfered with by the courts, even if a practice seems irrational or illogical from an outsider's perspective. She contended that it is not for the courts to determine which religious practices are "essential."
Separate Religious Denomination: She found that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa do constitute a separate religious denomination, and therefore, their rights under Article 26 to manage their internal affairs should be protected.
No Violation of Article 17: She held that the practice was not a form of untouchability as contemplated by Article 17, which she argued was intended to abolish discrimination against Dalits and not against women.
Right to Equality and Religious Freedom: Justice Malhotra also argued that the right to equality under Article 14 cannot override a citizen's right to freedom of religion under Article 25.
Significance of the Judgment:
Judicial Activism vs. Religious Freedom: The case represents a classic clash between constitutional rights, particularly the right to equality, and religious freedom. The majority decision firmly placed constitutional morality and fundamental rights above customs and traditions.
Expansion of Article 17: The judgment, especially Justice Chandrachud's opinion, expanded the interpretation of untouchability to include social exclusion based on notions of "purity and pollution," challenging traditional caste-based interpretations.
Definition of "Essential Religious Practice": The ruling provided a crucial test for what constitutes an essential religious practice, reinforcing that such practices must not violate fundamental rights.
The Review Petitions and Referral to a Larger Bench: The 2018 decision sparked widespread protests and review petitions. In 2019, a different five-judge bench, while not staying the original judgment, referred the broader legal issues (like the interplay between Articles 25 and 26, and the scope of judicial review in religious matters) to a larger, seven-judge Constitution Bench. This indicates the ongoing legal and social complexities of the issue. The 2018 verdict remains technically the law until the larger bench delivers its final ruling.
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