P. Rama Chandra Rao vs State of Karnataka
- ByPravleen Kaur --
- 04 May 2025 --
- 0 Comments
I. Introduction
The case deals with the issue of whether the Supreme Court, in its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused, can prescribe time limits or bars of limitation beyond which a criminal trial or proceedings cannot continue, even though the legislature and statutes have not chosen to do so. The case arose from appeals against the acquittal of accused persons facing corruption charges by special courts, as there was a failure to commence the trial despite the lapse of two years from the framing of charges. The High Court allowed the appeals by the State without issuing notice to the respective accused. [¶1]
II. Background
The judgment traces the development of the right to speedy trial as an integral part of the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, through various landmark cases such as Hussainara Khatoon and Maneka Gandhi. [¶1]
In A.R. Antulay's case, a Constitution Bench declined to prescribe time limits for the conclusion of criminal proceedings, holding that it is neither advisable nor feasible to do so. However, subsequent cases like Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma prescribed such time limits, leading to the present reference before a larger Bench. [¶2-¶5]
III. Causes of Delay in Criminal Trials
The judgment discusses various factors contributing to the delay in criminal trials, such as poor judge-population ratio, inadequate appointment of public prosecutors, non-service of summons/warrants, non-production of undertrial prisoners, and adjournments sought by counsel. It emphasizes the need for collective action by the legislature, judiciary, executive, and Bar to achieve the goal of speedy justice. [¶6-¶8]
IV. Judicial Legislation and Binding Precedents
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Lahoti, holds that prescribing time limits tantamounts to impermissible legislation by the judiciary, which is beyond its power. It also violates the doctrine of binding precedents, as the decisions in Common Cause and Raj Deo Sharma run counter to the Constitution Bench decision in A.R. Antulay's case. [¶9-¶11]
"Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of legislation properly meant for the legislature." [¶9]
The majority opinion reaffirms the dictum in A.R. Antulay's case and holds that the guidelines laid down therein adequately take care of the right to speedy trial. It states that the criminal courts should exercise their available powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate this right. [¶12]
V. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Raju, in his partly dissenting opinion, agrees with the conclusion but expresses reservations about the observations regarding the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. He emphasizes that the Supreme Court, as the ultimate repository of judicial power, should not disown its jurisdiction when the Constitution and fundamental rights are at stake. [¶13-¶15]
VI. Conclusion
The appeals are allowed, and the High Court is directed to hear and decide the appeals afresh after noticing the accused-respondents, consistently with the principles laid down in the judgment. The Court clarifies that the decision shall not be grounds for reopening cases where acquittal or discharge has already achieved finality based on the overruled decisions. [¶16-¶17]
The judgment reminds the Union and State Governments of their constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary by providing requisite funds, manpower, and infrastructure. [¶12(6)]
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