Skidmore deference in rulemaking interpretation
Skidmore Deference in Rulemaking Interpretation
What is Skidmore Deference?
Skidmore deference is a principle in administrative law where courts give respectful consideration to an agency’s interpretation of a statute or rule, based on the agency’s expertise, thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness, but the agency’s interpretation is not binding.
It contrasts with Chevron deference, where courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutes.
Origin of Skidmore Deference
Derived from the 1944 Supreme Court case Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Skidmore deference applies mainly to interpretative rules or policy statements, which do not have the force of law.
It allows courts to weigh agency interpretations like persuasive authority, considering factors like:
The thoroughness of agency’s reasoning.
Validity of its methodology.
Consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.
Persuasiveness and overall logic.
Key Cases on Skidmore Deference in Rulemaking Interpretation
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944)
Facts: The Department of Labor interpreted the Fair Labor Standards Act regarding overtime pay.
Issue: Whether the agency’s interpretation in an administrative bulletin was binding.
Holding: The Supreme Court held that agency interpretations not promulgated through formal rulemaking are not controlling but merit respect according to their persuasiveness.
Significance: Established the principle that agency interpretations are influential but not binding — courts consider the weight of the agency’s reasoning rather than automatic deference.
2. United States v. Mead Corp. (2001)
Facts: The U.S. Customs Service issued a tariff classification ruling without formal rulemaking or adjudication.
Issue: Whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applies to informal agency interpretations.
Holding: The Court held that Chevron deference applies only when Congress explicitly or implicitly delegates authority for the agency to make rules with force of law.
For informal interpretations, Skidmore deference applies.
Significance: Clarified that not all agency interpretations qualify for Chevron deference; informal agency rulings get Skidmore deference based on persuasiveness.
3. Christensen v. Harris County (2000)
Facts: The Department of Labor issued an opinion letter interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act concerning compensatory time.
Issue: Whether the opinion letter deserved Chevron or Skidmore deference.
Holding: The Court ruled that the opinion letter was not entitled to Chevron deference but might receive Skidmore deference.
Significance: Reinforced that informal agency interpretations like opinion letters are not binding but can be persuasive depending on their quality.
4. Gonzalez v. Oregon (2006)
Facts: The Attorney General issued a rule interpreting the Controlled Substances Act to prohibit physician-assisted suicide.
Issue: Whether courts should defer to the Attorney General’s interpretation.
Holding: The Court declined to apply Chevron deference, finding no clear delegation of authority.
It also gave less weight to the agency’s interpretation since it was inconsistent with previous views.
Significance: Showed that under Skidmore, courts weigh consistency and reasonableness in agency rule interpretations.
5. King v. Burwell (2015)
Facts: Interpretation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) regarding tax credits for insurance purchased on federal exchanges.
Issue: Whether to defer to IRS interpretation.
Holding: The Court refused Chevron deference, applying traditional tools of statutory interpretation instead.
While not explicitly Skidmore, the case demonstrates limits on judicial deference and careful scrutiny of agency interpretations.
Significance: Indicates courts can reject agency interpretations if they conflict with statutory text or congressional intent.
6. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association (2015)
Facts: The Department of Labor changed its interpretation of a rule without formal notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Issue: Whether such interpretative rules require notice-and-comment.
Holding: The Court ruled that interpretative rules are exempt from notice-and-comment but agencies must follow APA when changing legislative rules.
Significance: Reinforces the distinction between legislative rules (binding) and interpretative rules (which receive Skidmore deference).
Summary Table of Skidmore-Related Cases
Case | Year | Agency Interpretation Type | Deference Applied | Significance |
---|---|---|---|---|
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. | 1944 | Interpretative bulletin | Persuasive (Skidmore) | Established the principle of respectful but non-binding deference |
United States v. Mead | 2001 | Informal tariff ruling | Skidmore | Chevron applies only when Congress delegates authority; otherwise Skidmore |
Christensen v. Harris | 2000 | Opinion letter | Skidmore | Opinion letters get persuasive, not controlling weight |
Gonzalez v. Oregon | 2006 | Regulatory interpretation | Skidmore | Weighed agency consistency and reasonableness |
King v. Burwell | 2015 | Statutory interpretation by IRS | No deference (rejected Chevron) | Courts carefully scrutinize agency interpretations |
Perez v. MBA | 2015 | Interpretative rule | Skidmore | Interpretative rules exempt from notice-and-comment but not binding |
Summary of Skidmore Deference Principles
Applies primarily to interpretative rules, policy statements, and informal agency guidance.
Agency interpretation is not binding on courts but is evaluated based on:
Thoroughness and validity of reasoning.
Consistency with earlier and later positions.
Persuasiveness and logic.
Expertise of the agency.
Courts retain discretion to accept or reject the agency’s view.
Provides flexibility and encourages agencies to explain and justify their positions clearly.
Conclusion
Skidmore deference recognizes the value of agency expertise but preserves judicial authority to review agency interpretations with a critical eye. It is distinct from Chevron deference and applies mainly to informal or interpretative rules.
This nuanced balance allows courts to respect agency insight without surrendering their duty to interpret the law properly.
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