Constitutional limits on administrative adjudication
Separation of Powers Issues in Adjudication: Overview
What is Separation of Powers?
The U.S. Constitution divides government power among three branches:
Legislative (Congress): Makes laws.
Executive (President and agencies): Enforces laws.
Judicial (Courts): Interprets laws.
This separation ensures no branch becomes too powerful.
Adjudication and Separation of Powers
Adjudication involves resolving disputes through a formal decision, often by an administrative agency or court.
Separation of powers issues arise when administrative agencies (part of the executive branch) exercise adjudicative powers that resemble judicial functions.
Key questions include:
Can agencies act as judges in disputes?
Are there limits on agency powers to prevent conflicts with judicial or executive powers?
What procedural safeguards are required to maintain separation?
Important Cases Addressing Separation of Powers in Adjudication
1. Crowell v. Benson (1932)
Facts: The U.S. Employees’ Compensation Commission adjudicated workers’ compensation claims.
Issue: Could Congress vest adjudicative powers in an administrative agency with limited judicial review?
Holding: The Supreme Court upheld the agency’s power to make findings of fact but required courts to retain authority to review questions of law.
Reasoning: Agencies may adjudicate but must not infringe on the judicial power reserved to courts.
Significance: Established the “hybrid” model of administrative adjudication, balancing agency fact-finding with judicial oversight.
2. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. (1944)
Facts: The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) conducted adjudications regarding unfair labor practices.
Issue: Whether the procedures used by the NLRB violated due process or separation of powers.
Holding: The Court held the procedures constitutional, affirming agency power to adjudicate with proper procedural safeguards.
Significance: Confirmed that agencies can perform adjudicative functions without violating separation of powers, provided judicial review exists.
3. Chadha v. INS (1983)
Facts: Congress enacted a one-house legislative veto over deportation decisions.
Issue: Whether legislative veto violated separation of powers.
Holding: The Court struck down the legislative veto, holding it violated the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment.
Significance: Although focusing on legislative-executive relations, Chadha emphasized strict adherence to separation of powers, limiting congressional interference in executive adjudication.
4. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010)
Facts: The PCAOB members were removable only for cause by SEC Commissioners, who themselves could only be removed for cause.
Issue: Whether this “double for-cause” removal protection violated separation of powers.
Holding: The Court held it violated the Constitution’s separation of powers by restricting presidential removal power excessively.
Significance: The decision affects administrative adjudication by emphasizing presidential control over executive officers involved in adjudication.
5. Lucia v. SEC (2018)
Facts: SEC administrative law judges (ALJs) conducted adjudications; their appointment was challenged.
Issue: Whether SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States” requiring presidential appointment under the Appointments Clause.
Holding: The Court ruled SEC ALJs are officers and must be appointed in accordance with the Constitution.
Significance: Reinforces constitutional limits on agency adjudicators, protecting separation of powers by requiring proper appointment.
6. Stern v. Marshall (2011)
Facts: Bankruptcy courts (Article I courts) issued final judgments in certain state law counterclaims.
Issue: Whether non-Article III courts can issue final judgments on claims traditionally within the judicial power.
Holding: The Court ruled bankruptcy courts cannot issue final judgments on some claims without Article III judicial oversight.
Significance: Reinforces the need to preserve judicial power within Article III courts, limiting agency or non-Article III adjudication in certain cases.
Summary Table
| Case | Issue | Holding/Principle |
|---|---|---|
| Crowell v. Benson (1932) | Agency adjudication and judicial review | Agencies can decide facts; courts decide law |
| NLRB v. Hearst (1944) | Agency adjudication procedures | Agencies can adjudicate with procedural safeguards |
| Chadha v. INS (1983) | Legislative veto over executive decisions | Legislative veto violates separation of powers |
| Free Enterprise Fund (2010) | Removal protections of agency officials | Excessive limits on removal violate separation of powers |
| Lucia v. SEC (2018) | Appointment of agency adjudicators | ALJs are officers; must be constitutionally appointed |
| Stern v. Marshall (2011) | Bankruptcy court final adjudications | Non-Article III courts limited in final adjudicative power |
Why These Cases Matter
They show a delicate balance between agency efficiency and constitutional safeguards.
Ensure judicial power remains independent and not fully delegated.
Protect executive control over administrative adjudicators.
Clarify the procedural safeguards necessary for due process and separation of powers.
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