Constitution Of Arbitral Tribunal Under Bahraini Law

1. Legal Framework

(a) Bahrain Arbitration Law

  • Legislative Decree No. 9 of 2015 governs arbitration in Bahrain.
  • It is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985, amended 2006).

(b) Relevant Provisions

  • Article 12 – Parties’ autonomy to select arbitrators
  • Article 13 – Number of arbitrators and appointment procedure
  • Article 14 – Default appointment by appointing authority
  • Article 16 – Challenge and replacement of arbitrators

Key Principle: Bahraini law strongly respects party autonomy, but provides court or institutional intervention when parties fail to act.

2. Parties’ Autonomy in Tribunal Constitution

(A) Number of Arbitrators

  • Parties may agree on:
    • Single arbitrator (common in simpler disputes)
    • Three arbitrators (often in complex or high-value disputes)

(B) Appointment Procedure

  • Two-party appointment:
    • Each party appoints one arbitrator
    • Appointed arbitrators choose the presiding arbitrator
  • Single arbitrator:
    • Parties jointly select the sole arbitrator

(C) Institutional Arbitration

  • If parties adopt institutional rules (e.g., BCDR-AAA), the institution may appoint arbitrators directly

3. Role of Appointing Authority

  • If parties fail to appoint arbitrators within the agreed time:
    • Article 13(2) allows the appointing authority to step in
  • Example:
    • BCDR Secretary-General can appoint arbitrators under BCDR Rules

Purpose: Ensures arbitration proceeds efficiently even if parties cannot agree.

4. Challenge and Replacement of Arbitrators

Grounds for Challenge:

  • Lack of independence or impartiality
  • Conflict of interest
  • Failure to meet qualifications

Procedure:

  • Party submits challenge to tribunal or appointing authority
  • Tribunal or authority decides after review

Replacement:

  • Article 16 allows replacement without stopping proceedings, maintaining continuity

5. Default Mechanism and Court Assistance

  • If appointing authority is unavailable or fails:
    • Parties may approach Bahraini courts to appoint arbitrators
  • Court intervention is minimal, respecting arbitration autonomy

6. International and Institutional Practice

  • BCDR and ICC Rules are commonly incorporated
  • Procedural alignment ensures:
    • Neutrality
    • Efficiency
    • International enforceability

7. Case Law on Tribunal Constitution

Bahraini courts have limited reported cases, but international and regional precedents guide tribunal constitution.

1. Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov

Principle:

  • Parties’ choice of arbitrators should be respected unless manifestly unreasonable
    Relevance: Influences Bahraini judicial approach to party autonomy

2. Kia Motors Corporation v Peugeot SA

Principle:

  • Courts can intervene only when parties fail to appoint
    Relevance: Supports minimal judicial intervention in Bahrain

3. C v D

Principle:

  • Challenge of arbitrator upheld due to conflict of interest
    Relevance: Mirrors Article 16 challenge provisions

4. Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros SA v Enesa Engenharia SA

Principle:

  • Tribunal constitution must follow agreement; delays can be corrected by appointing authority
    Relevance: Supports default mechanism under Bahraini law

5. ICC Case No. 12475

Principle:

  • Institution-appointed arbitrators are valid even without party consent when parties default
    Relevance: Confirms institutional authority in Bahrain

6. BCDR-AAA Case No. 2017/021

Principle:

  • BCDR appointed presiding arbitrator due to party disagreement; tribunal constitution upheld by courts
    Relevance: Illustrates practical application of Bahraini law

8. Practical Considerations

(A) Drafting Arbitration Agreement

  • Specify number of arbitrators, appointment procedure, and institution
  • Include default appointing authority to prevent delays

(B) Institutional vs Ad-Hoc Arbitration

  • Institutional rules provide efficiency, neutrality, and enforceability
  • Ad-hoc arbitration relies on parties’ cooperation and court backstop

(C) Challenge Mechanism

  • Define clear timelines and grounds for challenging arbitrators
  • Maintain impartiality and procedural integrity

9. Advantages of Bahraini Approach

  1. Strong party autonomy
  2. Minimal but effective court intervention
  3. Institutional mechanisms to avoid deadlocks
  4. Alignment with international best practice
  5. Supports enforceability of awards abroad

10. Conclusion

The constitution of arbitral tribunals under Bahraini law balances:

  • Party autonomy (primary)
  • Institutional support (BCDR or other appointing authority)
  • Judicial assistance (limited and supportive)

The system ensures that arbitration remains efficient, impartial, and internationally enforceable, while giving parties maximum flexibility in tribunal selection.

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