Appointment Of Arbitrators Through Courts In Bahrain

1. Legal Framework

(a) Bahrain Arbitration Law

  • Legislative Decree No. 9 of 2015 governs arbitration in Bahrain.
  • Based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985, amended 2006).

(b) Relevant Articles

  • Article 12 – Parties’ freedom to choose arbitrators
  • Article 13 – Default mechanism for appointing arbitrators via appointing authority
  • Article 14 – Court intervention when parties or authorities fail
  • Article 16 – Challenge and replacement of arbitrators

Key Principle: Courts act only as a backup; primary authority lies with the parties and the appointing institution.

2. Circumstances Requiring Court Appointment

Bahraini courts may step in when:

  1. Parties fail to agree on the number or identity of arbitrators within the stipulated timeframe.
  2. Appointing authority is unavailable or refuses appointment.
  3. Deadlock occurs between co-arbitrators (e.g., choosing a presiding arbitrator).

Purpose: Ensure that arbitration proceeds without undue delay, upholding the principle of efficient dispute resolution.

3. Procedure for Court Appointment

Step 1: Application to Court

  • Party files a request to the Bahraini Court of First Instance, specifying:
    • Arbitration agreement
    • Number of arbitrators
    • Proposed arbitrator(s) (if any)

Step 2: Court Review

  • Court verifies:
    • Existence of valid arbitration agreement
    • Failure of parties or appointing authority to act

Step 3: Court Appointment

  • Court appoints arbitrator(s) directly or directs appointing authority to do so.
  • Decision is binding and cannot be challenged unless bias or procedural irregularity is proven.

4. Legal Principles Applied by Bahraini Courts

  1. Minimal Intervention: Courts avoid interfering in parties’ substantive choice.
  2. Neutrality: Court-appointed arbitrators must be independent and impartial.
  3. Efficiency: Appointments are made to prevent delays in arbitration.
  4. International Practice Alignment: Bahrain follows UNCITRAL and ICC/BCDR norms.

5. Interaction With Institutional Arbitration

  • When parties adopt BCDR or ICC rules, the institution usually acts as appointing authority.
  • Courts intervene only if the institution fails to appoint, ensuring continuity.
  • This hybrid approach provides both flexibility and certainty.

6. Challenge and Replacement of Court-Appointed Arbitrators

  • Article 16 of Bahraini Arbitration Law allows challenge on:
    • Independence or impartiality
    • Conflict of interest
  • Tribunal or court may replace arbitrator without halting proceedings.

7. Case Laws on Court Appointment of Arbitrators

1. BCDR-AAA Case No. 2016/014

Principle: Court appointed presiding arbitrator after co-arbitrators deadlocked.
Relevance: Demonstrates supportive court role in institutional arbitration.

2. Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros SA v Enesa Engenharia SA

Principle: Courts may appoint arbitrators if parties fail, respecting arbitration agreement.
Relevance: Influences Bahraini courts’ minimal intervention principle.

3. ICC Case No. 12475

Principle: Institution-appointed arbitrator valid even without party consent when parties default.
Relevance: Supports the combination of institutional and court appointments in Bahrain.

4. Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov

Principle: Courts should uphold parties’ choices unless manifestly unreasonable.
Relevance: Guides Bahraini courts in preserving party autonomy.

5. BCDR-AAA Case No. 2017/021

Principle: Court intervened to appoint sole arbitrator after party non-cooperation.
Relevance: Confirms practical application of Article 14.

6. C v D

Principle: Challenge of court-appointed arbitrator allowed for proven conflict of interest.
Relevance: Reinforces independence requirement in Bahrain.

8. Practical Scenarios

Scenario 1: Co-arbitrators Deadlocked

  • Court appoints presiding arbitrator to continue proceedings.

Scenario 2: Party Refuses to Appoint

  • Court appoints arbitrator directly or via appointing authority.

Scenario 3: Institutional Failure

  • Court intervenes to avoid delay, ensuring arbitration continues.

9. Drafting Recommendations

  1. Arbitration Agreement Clause:
    • Specify number of arbitrators, appointment procedure, and appointing authority.
  2. Fallback Mechanism:
    • Include court appointment as a last resort.
  3. Institutional Rules:
    • Adopt BCDR or ICC rules to streamline appointments.
  4. Challenge Mechanism:
    • Define timelines and grounds for challenging arbitrators.

10. Advantages of Court Appointment Mechanism

  • Ensures continuity of arbitration despite party deadlock.
  • Respects party autonomy while maintaining efficiency.
  • Aligns with international best practices for arbitration.
  • Provides certainty for enforcement of awards later.

11. Conclusion

The court appointment of arbitrators in Bahrain is:

  • A supportive mechanism to prevent delays
  • Guided by principles of minimal intervention, neutrality, and efficiency
  • Effective both for ad-hoc and institutional arbitration

Courts act as a safety net, ensuring arbitration can proceed even when parties or institutions fail to appoint arbitrators, preserving the integrity and enforceability of the arbitral process.

LEAVE A COMMENT