1. Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) – The Foundation Case

This is the most important case in this area.

Facts:

• A patient (Prosenjit Poddar) told his psychologist at UC Berkeley that he intended to kill a woman, Tatiana Tarasoff.
• The psychologist informed campus police, who briefly detained him but released him.
• No one warned Tatiana or her family.
• Later, Poddar killed Tatiana.

Issue:

Did the therapist have a legal duty to warn the potential victim?

Judgment:

The California Supreme Court held:

• When a therapist determines, or should determine, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to another, there is a duty to use reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim.

Key Principle:

“The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.”

Impact:

This created the Tarasoff Duty, which can include:

• Warning the potential victim
• Notifying law enforcement
• Taking reasonable steps to prevent harm

2. Tarasoff v. Regents (1976) – Rehearing / 1976 Expansion (“Tarasoff II”)

After rehearing, the court refined the rule.

Key clarification:

• The duty is not limited to “warning only”
• The therapist must take reasonable protective actions, not just issue a warning

Significance:

This broadened liability:

• Even if no warning is given, failure to take protective steps can result in negligence

3. Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980)

Facts:

• A juvenile offender with a history of violence was released from custody.
• Authorities believed he might kill a child in the neighborhood.
• They did NOT warn specific individuals.
• Shortly after release, he killed a child living nearby.

Issue:

Does a duty to warn exist when the victim is not identifiable?

Judgment:

The court held:

• No duty existed because the victim was not identifiable or foreseeable as a specific individual
• The risk was too general (“a child in the neighborhood”)

Principle Established:

Duty to warn generally applies only when:

• The victim is specifically identifiable, not a broad group

4. Brady v. Hopper (1983)

Facts:

• A patient threatened violence during therapy sessions.
• Therapist took no specific protective action.
• The patient later harmed someone.

Issue:

Was there liability for failure to warn?

Judgment:

The court ruled:

• No liability because there was no clear, specific threat to an identifiable victim

Principle:

General threats or vague expressions of violence are insufficient to trigger duty.

Importance:

Reinforces limitation: specificity matters

5. Jablonski v. United States (1983)

Facts:

• A patient with violent tendencies had previously threatened his girlfriend.
• He was released from psychiatric custody without full review of prior records.
• He later killed his girlfriend.

Issue:

Did professionals fail in their duty to protect a foreseeable victim?

Judgment:

The court held:

• Liability existed because professionals should have reviewed past records showing danger
• A proper assessment would have identified foreseeable risk

Principle:

Duty to protect includes:

• Proper evaluation of patient history
• Not just reacting to immediate threats

6. Ewing v. Goldstein (2004)

Facts:

• A patient’s father reported to a therapist that the patient had made violent statements.
• The therapist did not warn the victim or police.
• The patient later killed a coworker.

Issue:

Does third-party information trigger duty to warn?

Judgment:

Yes.

The court ruled:

• Even if the threat is communicated indirectly (via family or third party), it can trigger Tarasoff duty
• Therapist must act if credible threat information exists

Principle:

Duty arises from credible information, not just direct patient communication.

7. McIntosh v. Milano (1979) – New Jersey Approach

Facts:

• A psychiatrist treated a patient with violent tendencies.
• Patient later harmed a neighbor.
• No warning was given.

Judgment:

The court held:

• Psychiatrists may have a duty to warn identifiable victims when danger is foreseeable

Principle:

New Jersey adopted Tarasoff-like duty:

• Duty depends on foreseeability of harm

8. Hedlund v. Superior Court (1983)

Facts:

• A patient threatened a specific person.
• Therapist warned the intended victim but not the victim’s child.
• The child was later injured.

Judgment:

Court held:

• Duty can extend beyond the directly threatened person to those foreseeably at risk (like family members)

Principle:

Duty is not strictly limited to named victims—it can extend to foreseeable secondary victims

Overall Legal Principles Derived from These Cases

Across these decisions, courts generally agree on these conditions:

1. Identifiable Victim Requirement (in many jurisdictions)

• Duty is stronger when the victim is specific

2. Serious and Credible Threat

• Mere anger or vague statements are not enough

3. Reasonable Professional Judgment

• Therapist must act as a reasonable professional would

4. Scope of Duty Varies by State

• Some states impose mandatory warning laws
• Others make it permissive (discretion-based)

5. Protection Methods May Vary

• Warning victim
• Notifying police
• Hospitalization
• Increasing supervision

Conclusion

The “Duty to Warn Third Parties” is not a single rigid rule but a judicially developed balancing doctrine between:

• Patient confidentiality
• Public safety
• Professional responsibility
• Foreseeability of harm

It began with Tarasoff and evolved through later cases that refined when and how far the duty extends.