1. Human Authorship Requirement

Most copyright systems require human authorship. If choreography is generated autonomously by AI without meaningful human creative control, copyright protection becomes doubtful.

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (U.S. Supreme Court, 1884)

Facts: The case concerned a photograph taken by Napoleon Sarony. The defendant argued that photographs were mechanical reproductions and not protected works.

Holding: The Court held that copyright protects works that are the result of intellectual conception by a human author.

Relevance to AI Choreography:
If a choreographer uses AI merely as a tool—like a camera—the human who selects movements, edits sequences, and structures the dance could qualify as the author. However, if AI independently designs the full choreography without human creative input, protection becomes uncertain.

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. (U.S. Supreme Court, 1991)

Principle Established: Copyright requires originality, meaning:

Independent creation

A minimal degree of creativity

Application to AI Choreography:
If an AI system recombines existing dance moves from its training data without independent human creativity, courts may question originality. However, if a human meaningfully curates, modifies, and arranges AI-suggested sequences, that arrangement may satisfy the originality threshold.

Naruto v. Slater (U.S. Court of Appeals, 2018)

Facts: A monkey took a selfie using a photographer’s camera. PETA argued the monkey owned copyright.

Holding: The court ruled that non-human entities cannot hold copyright.

Relevance:
If choreography is autonomously created by AI without human authorship, under similar reasoning, no copyright exists. AI cannot be recognized as an author under current U.S. law.

Thaler v. Perlmutter (U.S. District Court, 2023)

Facts: Stephen Thaler sought copyright registration for artwork created solely by his AI system.

Holding: The court reaffirmed that copyright requires human authorship.

Application to Choreography:
Fully autonomous AI-generated dance routines would likely be denied copyright registration in the U.S. unless a human demonstrates substantial creative involvement.

2. Choreography as a Protected Category

Choreographic works are explicitly protected in many jurisdictions.

Under the U.S. Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §102(a)(4)), “choreographic works” are protected if original and fixed.

Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc. (U.S. Court of Appeals, 1986)

Facts: Photographs of the Nutcracker ballet were published without authorization.

Holding: The court recognized choreography as copyrightable and ruled that even still images can infringe if they capture protected choreographic expression.

Significance for AI:
If AI generates choreography similar to an existing ballet or performance, even partial copying of distinctive sequences may constitute infringement.

3. Fixation Requirement

Choreography must be fixed in a tangible medium (video recording, notation, digital file).

Kelley v. Chicago Park District (U.S. Court of Appeals, 2011)

Issue: Whether a living garden installation was copyrightable.

Holding: The work lacked sufficient fixation and stability.

Relevance to Dance:
If AI generates spontaneous choreography that is never recorded or notated, it may fail fixation requirements. However, once recorded in video or digital format, fixation is satisfied.

4. Substantial Similarity and Infringement Risks

AI systems are trained on large datasets, potentially including copyrighted dance performances.

Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton (U.S. Court of Appeals, 2000)

Principle: Even subconscious copying can constitute infringement.

Application:
If AI generates choreography substantially similar to a known performance—even without deliberate copying—liability may arise, especially if distinctive sequences are replicated.

Designer Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd (House of Lords, UK, 2000)

Principle: Courts assess whether a “substantial part” of the original work is taken.

Relevance:
If AI reproduces a substantial expressive portion of a choreographic routine, infringement may occur even if the full performance is not copied.

5. Joint Authorship and AI-Assisted Creation

Where humans collaborate with AI, courts may examine the level of creative control.

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (U.S. Supreme Court, 1989)

Principle: Authorship depends on creative control and intent.

Application:
If a choreographer:

Selects prompts

Chooses from AI outputs

Edits sequences

Directs dancers

The human likely qualifies as the author. AI would be treated as a tool, not a co-author.

6. Indian Perspective

Under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, choreography (as “dramatic work”) is protected if original and fixed.

Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak

The Supreme Court adopted the “modicum of creativity” standard.

Application:
If a human meaningfully modifies AI-generated choreography, Indian courts may recognize authorship. Fully autonomous AI choreography would raise unresolved legal questions.

7. Key Legal Issues Summarized

(A) Who is the Author?

AI alone → likely no copyright (U.S., UK position).

Human-guided AI → human author recognized.

(B) Is the Work Original?

Must show independent human creativity.

Mere algorithmic recombination may fail originality.

(C) Is It Fixed?

Must be recorded or documented.

(D) Does It Infringe Existing Works?

Risk of substantial similarity.

Training data controversies remain unresolved in many jurisdictions.

8. Comparative Jurisdictional Note

Some jurisdictions (e.g., UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 §9(3)) recognize computer-generated works with the “person making arrangements” as author. However, courts have not yet extensively tested this provision in choreography cases.

Conclusion

AI-generated choreography challenges traditional copyright doctrines centered on human creativity. Based on established precedents:

Purely autonomous AI choreography is unlikely to receive copyright protection in the U.S.

Human-guided AI choreography can be protected if sufficient creative control is demonstrated.

Fixation is mandatory.

Substantial similarity analysis applies if AI output resembles existing works.

Ownership depends on contractual and authorship determinations.

As AI becomes increasingly integrated into performance arts, legislatures and courts may refine these doctrines, but under current jurisprudence, human creative contribution remains the decisive factor.