Competition Law in Customs Brokerage — China

Customs brokerage is a regulated intermediary service through which customs brokers, on behalf of importers and exporters, prepare declarations, submit documents, coordinate customs formalities, and sometimes provide related logistics or compliance services. Under China's Customs Law, importers/exporters may complete customs formalities themselves or entrust registered customs brokers; brokers must be registered and cannot unlawfully declare on behalf of others or exceed their permitted business scope.

Competition-law issues arise where customs brokers coordinate prices, divide customers or ports, collectively refuse clients, impose exclusivity, discriminate between similarly situated traders, or use control over customs-related data or platforms to foreclose competing brokers.

1. Applicable Chinese legal framework

The principal statute is the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (AML), as amended in 2022.

The important provisions are:

• Article 15 — defines an "undertaking" and the relevant market.
• Article 16 — defines monopoly agreements.
• Article 17 — prohibits horizontal monopoly agreements, including price fixing, output restrictions, market/customer allocation and collective boycotts.
• Article 18 — regulates vertical monopoly agreements, including resale-price restrictions.
• Article 19 — prohibits an undertaking from organizing or materially assisting other undertakings in concluding monopoly agreements.
• Article 21 — prohibits trade associations from organizing monopolistic practices.
• Article 22 — prohibits abuse of a dominant market position, including unjustified refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, tying, unreasonable trading conditions and discriminatory treatment.
• The amended law also expressly addresses the use of data, algorithms, technology and platform rules in abusive conduct. 

For customs brokerage, these rules operate alongside the Customs Law, which establishes the regulatory status and responsibilities of customs brokers.

2. Relevant market in customs brokerage

The first question is normally whether there is a properly identifiable relevant product/service market and geographic market.

Possible service-market definitions include:

1. customs declaration services;
2. import customs brokerage;
3. export customs brokerage;
4. customs brokerage for particular categories of goods;
5. bonded-zone customs brokerage;
6. port-specific customs clearance;
7. integrated customs brokerage and freight-forwarding services;
8. electronic customs-declaration platforms.

The geographic market could be:

• national;
• provincial;
• port-specific;
• customs-district specific; or
• a narrower market where regulatory requirements or operational conditions make substitution difficult.

The Supreme People's Court has emphasized that relevant-market definition is an analytical tool rather than an end in itself. In Qihoo v. Tencent, the Court held that where direct evidence can sufficiently establish market power and competitive effects, it may not always be necessary to define the relevant market with absolute precision.

That principle can be important where a customs broker allegedly controls a specialized customs-clearance gateway, port system, or indispensable electronic interface.

3. Horizontal price fixing among customs brokers

The most obvious competition problem occurs where competing customs brokers agree upon:

• minimum brokerage fees;
• standard declaration charges;
• port-handling charges;
• documentation fees;
• inspection-related service charges;
• after-hours fees;
• special-cargo fees;
• discounts or rebates;
• commission rates.

For example, if ten customs brokers in a particular port association agree:

"No member shall charge less than RMB X per customs declaration."

that can constitute a horizontal price-fixing arrangement.

Article 17 expressly prohibits competing undertakings from agreeing to fix or change prices.

Why this is particularly serious

Customs brokerage is an intermediary service where price competition can be an important competitive parameter. A common tariff established by competing brokers can eliminate price competition even if brokers continue competing over speed, technology or customer service.

4. Customer and territory allocation

Customs brokers may unlawfully divide the market by agreeing:

• Broker A handles Client Group X;
• Broker B handles Client Group Y;
• one broker handles northern ports;
• another handles southern ports;
• particular brokers handle specific industries;
• each broker receives exclusive access to particular importers/exporters.

Such arrangements can constitute market or customer allocation.

For example, if competing brokers at Shanghai, Ningbo and Shenzhen agree that each will service particular multinational customers and will not solicit the others' clients, the arrangement could fall within the prohibition on dividing markets or customers.

5. Collective refusal to deal

A particularly important issue is collective refusal to provide customs brokerage.

Suppose an importer changes from Broker A to Broker B. If several competing brokers agree:

"We will not provide customs declaration services to this importer."

the conduct may amount to a joint boycott.

Article 17 expressly identifies joint boycotting of transactions as prohibited horizontal conduct.

This is especially problematic where the customer has limited alternatives because:

• the customs broker has specialized authorization;
• the broker possesses essential operational expertise;
• the customer must use a particular customs system;
• the relevant port has few brokers; or
• the broker controls an important interface or data source.

6. Abuse of dominance by a major customs broker

Not every large customs broker is automatically dominant.

Dominance must be established by examining factors such as:

• market share;
• financial and technological strength;
• control over customers;
• dependence of trading partners;
• barriers to entry;
• access to customs infrastructure;
• ability to influence transaction conditions.

The AML prohibits a dominant undertaking from, among other things:

• unjustifiably refusing to deal;
• imposing exclusive dealing;
• tying products or services;
• imposing unreasonable conditions;
• applying discriminatory transaction conditions. 

Thus, a customs broker serving a very large share of a specialized port market could potentially face Article 22 scrutiny.

7. Exclusive dealing

A dominant customs broker might require an importer to use only:

• its customs brokerage service;
• its freight-forwarding service;
• its warehouse;
• its transport provider;
• its customs software;
• its designated insurance provider.

If the broker has substantial market power and lacks legitimate justification, such exclusivity can restrict competing brokers' access to customers.

The 2026 Supreme People's Court case concerning a vegetable wholesale market provides a useful modern illustration of this principle. The Court found that an operator with a dominant position used contractual restrictions and substantially increased service charges to force a trader to choose between competing markets. The Court treated the conduct as prohibited exclusive dealing.

Application to customs brokerage: a dominant customs-service operator cannot simply use contractual penalties or discriminatory fees to prevent customers from using competing brokers.

8. Tying and bundling

Customs brokerage may be bundled with:

• freight forwarding;
• warehousing;
• transportation;
• insurance;
• customs software;
• inspection services;
• documentation services;
• bonded-zone services.

Bundling is not automatically unlawful.

The competition concern becomes stronger where a dominant broker makes access to an indispensable customs service conditional upon purchasing another service.

Example

A dominant customs broker tells an importer:

"We will process your customs declarations only if you also purchase our warehousing and transportation services."

If the broker has dominance and there is no legitimate justification, this could constitute prohibited tying or an unreasonable trading condition under Article 22.

9. Discriminatory pricing

Suppose a dominant customs broker provides identical customs brokerage services to two similarly situated importers but charges:

• Importer A: RMB 100 per declaration;
• Importer B: RMB 250 per declaration,

without objective justification.

This may raise discriminatory treatment concerns.

The analysis would consider whether the customers are genuinely similarly situated and whether there are legitimate reasons for the difference, such as:

• customs complexity;
• cargo type;
• compliance risk;
• volume;
• service-level requirements;
• documentation requirements;
• credit risk.

A mere difference in price is therefore not automatically discriminatory conduct.

10. Customs brokerage data and digital platforms

Modern customs brokerage increasingly depends upon:

• electronic customs declarations;
• trade databases;
• automated classification;
• AI-assisted tariff classification;
• customs-management software;
• API interfaces;
• shipment tracking;
• importer/exporter databases.

This creates new competition issues.

A dominant platform or broker could potentially:

• deny competing brokers API access;
• provide inferior data access to competitors;
• use customers' transaction data to disadvantage competing brokers;
• restrict interoperability;
• prevent customers from exporting their own data;
• use algorithmic pricing to discriminate between customers.

The 2022 AML specifically provides that a dominant undertaking must not exploit data, algorithms, technology or platform rules to engage in prohibited abuses.

The Supreme People's Court's later judicial guidance on refusal to deal is also significant: refusal to open technology, data or platform interfaces can be examined under the rules governing refusal to deal, with attention to technical and economic feasibility, substitutability, dependency and effects on competition.

11. Trade associations of customs brokers

Customs-broker associations require particular attention.

An association may legitimately:

• establish ethical standards;
• provide compliance guidance;
• promote professional training;
• develop technical standards;
• represent the industry.

It should not organize competing brokers to:

• fix fees;
• divide customers;
• restrict output;
• boycott particular importers;
• exclude new brokers;
• coordinate commercial terms.

Article 21 of the current AML prohibits trade associations from organizing undertakings to engage in monopolistic practices.

Therefore, a "recommended customs brokerage tariff" becomes legally sensitive if it operates as a mechanism for eliminating price competition rather than as a genuinely non-binding professional reference.

12. Administrative restrictions and customs authorities

Competition problems can also arise from administrative conduct, rather than private conduct by customs brokers.

The AML prohibits administrative departments and organizations exercising public-administration functions from abusing administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition.

Potential examples include an authority:

• requiring importers to use a particular broker;
• restricting access to local customs brokerage markets;
• giving preferential access to a local broker;
• imposing discriminatory requirements on non-local brokers;
• creating unnecessary licensing barriers;
• directing businesses toward designated service providers.

The distinction is important:

Private monopolistic conduct → AML provisions concerning monopoly agreements or abuse of dominance.

Government-created competitive restriction → provisions concerning abuse of administrative power.

The Supreme People's Court has recognized that where allegedly anticompetitive conduct results directly from an administrative authority's exercise of public power, the administrative conduct may need to be addressed as a prerequisite to the private antitrust claim. Chaoyang Deyao Heating Co. v. Guodian Power Chaoyang Thermal Power Co. is relevant on this issue.

13. Six important case laws

The following cases are particularly useful for analysing customs brokerage even though several concern other industries. They establish principles transferable to customs brokerage.

Case 1 — Qihoo v. Tencent

Beijing Qihoo Technology Co. v. Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co. & Tencent Computer System Co.

This was China's landmark Supreme People's Court abuse-of-dominance case.

The Court examined:

• relevant-market definition;
• market power;
• network effects;
• refusal/restriction of compatibility;
• tying;
• competitive effects.

The Court emphasized that market definition should serve the substantive competitive analysis rather than become a purely formal exercise.

Relevance to customs brokerage: useful where a major broker operates an electronic customs platform or controls an important interface through which competitors must interact.

Case 2 — Mizhen Producers Horizontal Monopoly Agreement Case

Yunnan Yi Mou Rundian Rice Noodle Co. v. Yunnan Run Mou Food Co. & Others, SPC, (2023) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 653.

The Supreme People's Court found arrangements involving price fixing and joint refusal to deal.

The defendants coordinated prices and used contractual mechanisms to prevent market participants from dealing with competing producers. The Court treated the arrangements as a horizontal monopoly agreement.

Relevance to customs brokerage: directly analogous to competing brokers coordinating brokerage fees and collectively refusing to service customers using rival brokers.

Case 3 — Cable Digital Television Service Case

Abuse of Dominant Position by a Public Utility Providing Cable Digital Television Scrambling-Signal Services, SPC, (2023) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 383.

The operator was the only undertaking capable of providing the relevant service throughout the relevant area. The Court examined its dominance and held that requiring customers to use its designated set-top boxes constituted prohibited tying where there was no legitimate justification.

Relevance to customs brokerage: illustrates how a firm controlling an indispensable service can face scrutiny if it uses that position to force customers to purchase related services or products.

Case 4 — Natural Gas Bundling Case

Haidiang Hua Mou Gas Appliance Trading Co. v. Qinghai Minhe Chuan Mou Petroleum & Natural Gas Co., SPC, (2023) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 1547.

The natural-gas company required customers to purchase its designated gas appliances as a condition of obtaining gas connection. The regulatory authority had already found a violation involving tying by a dominant undertaking. The Supreme People's Court addressed the subsequent damages litigation and evidentiary issues.

Relevance to customs brokerage: illustrates the legal risk of conditioning access to an essential brokerage/customs-related service upon purchasing another service.

Case 5 — Vegetable Wholesale Market Exclusive-Dealing Case

Tan Mou v. A Vegetable Products Company, Supreme People's Court, 2026 typical antitrust case.

The operator of a major vegetable wholesale market accounted for a very large proportion of the local market. It contractually restricted traders from operating in a competing market and imposed substantially higher service charges when a trader violated the restriction. The Supreme People's Court treated the conduct as an abuse involving exclusive dealing.

Relevance to customs brokerage: highly useful by analogy where a dominant customs broker imposes punitive fees or termination provisions on importers that switch to competing brokers.

Case 6 — Eight Dyeing Enterprises v. Electricity Company

Eight Dyeing Enterprises v. an Electricity Company — Abuse of Dominant Position Case, included among the Supreme People's Court's 2026 antitrust typical cases.

The Supreme People's Court addressed alleged unfairly high pricing and emphasized that short-term price fluctuations alone do not necessarily establish unfairly high pricing.

Relevance to customs brokerage: important where a dominant customs broker sharply increases brokerage fees. The legal analysis should distinguish a legitimate price increase caused by higher costs or increased service complexity from an unfairly high price attributable to market power.

14. Additional useful case: administrative restrictions

Chaoyang Deyao Heating Co. v. Guodian Power Chaoyang Thermal Power Co.

SPC, (2020) Zui Gao Fa Zhi Min Zhong No. 934

The case concerned alleged refusal to deal resulting from administrative intervention. The Supreme People's Court explained that where the challenged conduct is caused by an administrative authority's exercise of public power, the administrative conduct may constitute a necessary preliminary issue in the antitrust litigation.

Customs relevance: particularly important because customs brokerage operates within a highly regulated administrative environment. A restriction may originate from customs authorities rather than from the broker itself.

15. Practical competition-law risk matrix

16. Competition issues in customs brokerage agreements

A customs brokerage agreement should therefore be examined for clauses concerning:

A. Exclusivity

Avoid unnecessarily broad provisions requiring the importer/exporter to use only one broker.

B. Minimum charges

A broker may set its own prices, but competing brokers should not coordinate minimum or common prices.

C. Non-compete clauses

These should be narrowly justified and should not become mechanisms for foreclosure of competing customs brokers.

D. Data ownership and access

Contracts should clarify who controls:

• customs declarations;
• shipment information;
• classification information;
• transaction records;
• electronic interfaces.

E. Termination

A dominant broker should be particularly careful with termination rights that effectively prevent customers from switching to competitors.

F. Bundling

Bundled brokerage, logistics and warehousing services should be assessed for foreclosure effects where the broker has significant market power.

17. Penalties and enforcement

The AML provides administrative sanctions for monopoly agreements, abuse of dominance and other prohibited conduct. The 2022 amendments strengthened the enforcement framework, including rules concerning monopoly agreements, dominant-position abuse and concentrations.

A particularly important feature is that organizing or materially assisting a monopoly agreement can itself attract liability. This is relevant to a customs-broker association, logistics platform or intermediary that facilitates coordination among competing brokers.

18. Overall legal position

Customs brokerage in China is therefore a regulated but competitive commercial service. The fact that customs brokers operate under Customs Law requirements does not create a general exemption from competition law. The Customs Law regulates who may perform customs declaration functions and the responsibilities of brokers, while the AML regulates conduct that eliminates or restricts competition.

The principal competition-law risks are:

1. price fixing among customs brokers;
2. allocation of customers or ports;
3. collective refusal to deal;
4. exclusive dealing;
5. tying customs brokerage to logistics or warehousing;
6. discriminatory treatment by a dominant broker;
7. control of customs-related data or APIs;
8. trade-association coordination;
9. anticompetitive administrative restrictions; and
10. anticompetitive mergers involving major customs-brokerage networks.

The most useful judicial principles come from Qihoo v. Tencent, the Mizhen Producers case, the Cable Digital Television case, the Natural Gas Bundling case, the Vegetable Wholesale Market case, and the Dyeing Enterprises/Electricity case. Collectively, they demonstrate how Chinese competition law approaches market definition, dominance, exclusive dealing, tying, refusal to deal, price fixing and unfair pricing—issues that can arise directly in customs brokerage markets.