Competition Law in Customer Support Software — China

1. Introduction

Customer-support software includes CRM and help-desk systems, ticketing platforms, live-chat tools, call-centre software, AI customer-service systems, chatbot platforms, knowledge-base software, customer-data platforms, and omnichannel support systems.

Competition concerns arise because these products increasingly operate as digital platforms and data-intensive ecosystems. A leading provider may control customer-service data, APIs, integrations, app marketplaces, workflow rules, analytics, or AI models, creating the possibility of exclusionary conduct.

In China, the principal legal framework is the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), supplemented by the Platform Economy Anti-Monopoly Guidelines, the 2026 Internet Platform Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidelines, and, where appropriate, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.

The 2026 SAMR Guidelines specifically identify data, algorithms, technology, platform rules, interfaces, data sharing and access to essential data/models/platforms as potential competition-law risk areas.

2. Relevant Markets in Customer-Support Software

The relevant market may need to be defined narrowly or broadly depending on the facts.

Possible product markets include:

1. Customer-support/help-desk software
2. CRM software
3. Call-centre/contact-centre software
4. Live-chat software
5. AI chatbot/customer-service software
6. Knowledge-management software
7. Customer-data platforms
8. Omnichannel customer-service platforms
9. API/integration services
10. Customer-support software for particular industries

A distinction may also be made between:

• enterprise and SME software;
• cloud/SaaS and on-premises software;
• general-purpose and industry-specific software;
• human-agent and AI-assisted support;
• domestic and international services.

China's platform guidelines require relevant markets to be examined according to the particular circumstances, taking account of platform characteristics rather than applying a mechanical market definition.

3. Market Power in Customer-Support Software

Market share is important, but it is not the only consideration.

The 2026 Internet Platform Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidelines identify factors including:

• market share;
• competitive conditions;
• ability to control the market;
• financial and technological strength;
• dependence of platform participants;
• barriers to entry;
• platform characteristics;
• network effects. 

For customer-support software, additional indicators can include:

• number of enterprise customers;
• number of support agents using the system;
• volume of tickets processed;
• quantity of customer data stored;
• switching costs;
• number of integrations;
• API access;
• proprietary workflow formats;
• AI-model dependence;
• interoperability;
• customer lock-in;
• availability of alternative platforms.

A provider can therefore acquire significant competitive importance even if its conventional revenue share does not appear exceptionally high.

4. Major Competition-Law Issues

A. API and Interoperability Restrictions

A dominant customer-support platform could restrict competitors' access to:

• APIs;
• customer databases;
• ticket histories;
• messaging interfaces;
• integration tools;
• authentication systems;
• CRM interfaces.

For example, suppose a dominant help-desk provider allows its own CRM product unrestricted access to ticket data but charges competing CRM providers excessive API fees or blocks access altogether.

This could raise concerns about refusal to deal, discriminatory treatment, or exclusionary conduct, depending upon market power and competitive effects.

The 2026 SAMR guidelines expressly identify closing interfaces and interrupting data sharing as potential forms of problematic refusal to deal by a dominant platform, and also refer to control over data, models and application platforms that may constitute necessary facilities.

5. Data Access and Customer-Data Lock-In

Customer-support systems generate valuable data:

• customer identity;
• purchase history;
• complaints;
• support tickets;
• behavioural information;
• chat transcripts;
• call records;
• satisfaction scores;
• customer preferences.

A dominant provider could potentially make migration difficult by:

• preventing bulk export;
• restricting API calls;
• charging unreasonable migration fees;
• using proprietary formats;
• withholding historical ticket data;
• disabling integrations after cancellation.

This creates a data portability and switching-cost problem.

The competition-law question is not simply whether a company owns data. It is whether control over the data is being used by a firm with substantial market power in a manner that excludes competitors without sufficient justification.

6. Tying and Bundling

A customer-support provider might require customers purchasing help-desk software also to purchase:

• its CRM;
• payment system;
• cloud storage;
• telephony;
• AI chatbot;
• analytics system;
• advertising service.

For example:

"You may purchase our enterprise customer-support platform only if you also purchase our CRM and cloud telephony package."

If the products are separate products and the supplier possesses substantial market power, such conduct may raise concerns under the AML's rules concerning tying or imposing unreasonable additional conditions.

The classic Chinese internet precedent is particularly relevant here.

7. Self-Preferencing

A customer-support platform may operate an app marketplace containing third-party:

• CRM applications;
• chatbot applications;
• analytics tools;
• call-centre integrations;
• AI applications.

The platform operator could theoretically rank or recommend its own applications above competing applications.

Potential mechanisms include:

• preferential search ranking;
• default installation;
• preferential API access;
• lower integration fees for its own products;
• superior access to customer data;
• restricting competitor functionality.

The 2026 compliance guidance specifically identifies data, algorithms, platform rules and technology as areas requiring antitrust compliance.

8. Exclusive Dealing

A dominant customer-support software provider could require enterprise customers to:

• use its support system exclusively;
• avoid competing CRM systems;
• avoid third-party chatbots;
• purchase all support-related services from it;
• use only its approved integrations.

Exclusive arrangements can sometimes produce efficiencies, but where a dominant undertaking uses them to foreclose competitors, they may constitute abuse of dominance.

The Meituan case is especially useful by analogy.

9. Discriminatory Treatment

A dominant software provider might provide:

Such differential treatment is not automatically unlawful. The competition-law assessment would consider market power, the competitive relationship, justification and effects.

China's platform guidelines expressly recognise differential treatment as a possible abuse of dominant position.

10. Algorithmic Pricing and Customer-Support Software

Customer-support software can itself facilitate algorithmic coordination.

For example, competing call-centre service providers might use the same software to determine:

• service fees;
• commissions;
• response charges;
• staffing prices;
• discounts.

If competing businesses use a common technological system to coordinate competitively sensitive information, the technology does not immunise the conduct from the AML.

The 2026 SAMR guidance specifically warns against using algorithms, shared data pools, cloud platforms, AI and interoperability arrangements to exchange competitively sensitive information or coordinate pricing.

11. Six Important Chinese Case Laws / Precedents

Because there are relatively few published Chinese antitrust decisions dealing specifically with standalone customer-support SaaS, the following cases provide the principal analogies from China's digital-platform, software, data and technology markets.

Case 1 — Qihoo 360 v. Tencent

Beijing Qihoo 360 Technology Co. v. Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Co.

This is one of China's most important internet antitrust cases.

Qihoo alleged that Tencent abused dominance in instant-messaging software and services, including restrictive conduct and bundling.

The Supreme People's Court emphasised the importance of properly defining the relevant market and assessing actual competitive conditions. The court ultimately found that Qihoo had not established Tencent's dominance in the relevant market.

The case is particularly important for customer-support software because a court should not automatically assume that a popular software product constitutes the relevant market.

Customer-support relevance:

• CRM versus help-desk markets;
• SaaS versus on-premises systems;
• substitutability;
• bundling;
• market dominance;
• ecosystem competition.

Case 2 — Qihoo v. Tencent: QQ Software Bundling

The same Tencent litigation also concerned allegations involving the bundling of Tencent's software products.

The case illustrates an important principle: software integration does not automatically equal unlawful tying. The legal analysis must consider market definition, dominance and competitive effects.

For customer-support software, a similar issue could arise where a dominant vendor bundles:

help-desk + CRM + chatbot + cloud telephony.

The fact that all components are technologically integrated does not by itself establish an antitrust violation.

The Supreme People's Court's discussion of the Tencent dispute is particularly relevant to the analysis of software ecosystems.

Case 3 — Alibaba "Choose One" Case

Alibaba Group Holding Limited — Abuse of Dominant Market Position

The Alibaba case involved exclusive dealing/"choose-one" arrangements imposed on platform merchants.

The case established the importance of examining whether a platform with substantial market power uses contractual and technological mechanisms to prevent business partners from dealing with competing platforms.

Customer-support application:

A dominant customer-service software provider could face similar scrutiny if it tells enterprise customers:

"You cannot simultaneously use a competing customer-support platform."

The issue becomes particularly significant where switching costs, data dependency and network effects make leaving the platform difficult.

Case 4 — Meituan "Choose One" Case

Meituan — Abuse of Dominant Position in Online Food-Delivery Platform Services

SAMR found that Meituan had used mechanisms including differential rates, delayed merchant onboarding, deposits and data/algorithmic techniques to encourage exclusive arrangements.

SAMR concluded that the conduct constituted abuse of dominance through unjustified restrictions requiring counterparties to deal exclusively with Meituan. It imposed a RMB 3.442 billion fine and required repayment of exclusive-cooperation deposits.

Customer-support relevance:

This is highly useful for analysing:

• SaaS exclusivity;
• API restrictions;
• customer lock-in;
• differentiated access;
• algorithmic enforcement;
• contractual exclusivity.

Case 5 — Tencent Music / China Music Group

Tencent's acquisition of China Music Group

SAMR examined Tencent's acquisition of China Music Group and found significant competitive concerns in China's online music-platform market.

The combined entity controlled a very substantial share of exclusive music-library resources. SAMR required Tencent to eliminate exclusive copyright arrangements and prohibited preferential conditions for upstream rights holders.

Customer-support relevance:

The case illustrates how control over a critical input can create competitive problems.

For customer-support software, analogous critical inputs could include:

• customer-service datasets;
• proprietary APIs;
• AI training data;
• integration infrastructure;
• identity/authentication systems;
• specialised support models.

Case 6 — Tencent / Huya and DouYu Merger

Tencent-controlled Huya/DouYu merger

SAMR prohibited the proposed merger between Huya and DouYu.

The authority examined:

• market shares;
• market power;
• concentration;
• barriers to entry;
• technological development;
• effects on consumers and other operators;
• potential vertical foreclosure.

SAMR considered that the transaction could strengthen Tencent's position and facilitate vertical closure between upstream game-operation services and downstream game-streaming markets.

Customer-support relevance:

This is important for SaaS consolidation.

A merger involving:

CRM + help desk + cloud infrastructure + AI customer-service platform

could create both horizontal and vertical competition concerns.

12. Additional Relevant Precedent — VIPshop

VIPshop (China) Unfair-Competition Case

SAMR investigated VIPshop's use of a monitoring system and technological tools to identify brands simultaneously selling on competing platforms.

The company used platform technology, traffic restrictions, blocking and product delisting mechanisms to reduce competing sales channels. SAMR found the conduct contrary to Article 12 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and imposed a RMB 3 million penalty.

Although this was unfair competition rather than a pure AML abuse-of-dominance decision, it is highly relevant to customer-support software because it demonstrates that technology-driven exclusion can attract scrutiny even outside conventional monopoly cases.

13. Customer-Support Software and Refusal to Deal

A particularly difficult question concerns refusal to provide access to:

• APIs;
• customer data;
• integration tools;
• authentication;
• software development kits;
• interoperability functions.

Under China's 2026 platform guidance, a dominant platform's unjustified conduct may include closing interfaces, interrupting data sharing, restricting access, or controlling data/models/platforms that may constitute necessary facilities.

However, a refusal is not automatically unlawful.

Relevant questions include:

1. Is the provider dominant?
2. Is the requested input genuinely important to competition?
3. Can competitors reasonably obtain it elsewhere?
4. Is access technically feasible?
5. Is there a legitimate security or privacy justification?
6. Would compulsory access reduce innovation incentives?
7. Would refusal materially exclude competitors?

14. Customer Data and Privacy

Competition law cannot be considered independently from China's data-regulation framework.

Customer-support platforms may process:

• personal information;
• communications;
• purchase records;
• complaints;
• call recordings;
• sensitive business information.

Therefore, a competition-law remedy requiring data sharing must also account for applicable privacy and data-security obligations.

A company cannot necessarily defend exclusionary conduct merely by labelling information "confidential"; conversely, competition law does not automatically create a right to receive another company's personal data.

15. Mergers and Acquisitions

Customer-support software is particularly susceptible to ecosystem acquisitions.

Examples include:

• CRM provider acquiring help-desk provider;
• cloud company acquiring contact-centre software;
• AI company acquiring chatbot provider;
• payment platform acquiring customer-service software;
• messaging company acquiring CRM software.

The Huya/DouYu case illustrates China's willingness to examine vertical foreclosure and ecosystem effects in digital markets.

The Tencent Music case similarly demonstrates the importance of examining control over important inputs following a digital acquisition.

16. 2026 Compliance Position

China's 2026 Internet Platform Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidelines are particularly relevant to customer-support software.

They warn platforms against:

Horizontal coordination

• exchanging sensitive pricing information;
• sharing customer lists;
• coordinating commissions;
• coordinating through algorithms;
• using AI to facilitate collusion.

Vertical restrictions

• resale-price restrictions;
• algorithmic price controls;
• platform rules restricting trading conditions.

Refusal to deal

• closing interfaces;
• restricting data sharing;
• blocking accounts;
• imposing unreasonable technical conditions.

Dominance

• discriminatory treatment;
• tying;
• unreasonable trading conditions;
• exclusionary conduct;
• control over important data, models or platforms. 

17. Hypothetical Example

Assume Company A operates China's largest enterprise customer-support platform.

It provides:

CRM + ticketing + chatbot + AI analytics + customer database + API marketplace.

It then acquires a competing CRM provider and begins:

1. giving its own CRM unlimited API access;
2. restricting rival CRM APIs;
3. charging rivals ten times more for data access;
4. preventing customers from exporting historical tickets;
5. requiring customers to use its own chatbot;
6. ranking its own applications above competing applications;
7. offering discounts only to customers agreeing not to use competing help-desk systems.

Potential legal theories could include:

Whether any particular conduct violates the AML would depend on dominance, relevant-market definition, legitimate justification and actual or likely effects on competition.

18. Remedies

Possible Chinese antitrust remedies can include:

• cessation of unlawful conduct;
• modification of contractual conditions;
• removal of exclusivity requirements;
• restoration of access;
• interoperability measures;
• data-access commitments where legally appropriate;
• non-discrimination requirements;
• divestiture in merger cases;
• behavioural commitments;
• monetary penalties.

The Tencent Music case demonstrates that SAMR can impose structural or behavioural measures designed to restore competitive access to important inputs.

19. Key Compliance Checklist

A customer-support software company operating in China should examine:

Market power

• What is the relevant product market?
• How large is the firm's share?
• Are customers dependent on the platform?

Data

• Can customers export their data?
• Are APIs available on reasonable terms?
• Is historical data portable?

Interoperability

• Are rival CRM systems allowed to integrate?
• Are third-party applications technically disadvantaged?

Contracting

• Are exclusivity provisions necessary?
• Are customers prohibited from using competing services?

Bundling

• Are CRM, chatbot, telephony and support tools tied together?
• Are separate products technically or contractually inseparable?

Algorithms

• Do algorithms coordinate prices?
• Is competitively sensitive information shared?
• Does ranking favour affiliated products?

M&A

• Does an acquisition remove an important competitor?
• Does it combine complementary levels of the ecosystem?
• Could the transaction increase foreclosure?

20. Conclusion

Competition law in China's customer-support software sector is increasingly concerned not merely with software prices, but with control over the broader digital ecosystem—particularly data, APIs, interoperability, algorithms, platform rules, customer dependency and technological infrastructure.

The most useful Chinese precedents include Qihoo v. Tencent, Alibaba's exclusive-dealing case, Meituan's "choose-one" case, Tencent Music/China Music Group, Huya/DouYu, and VIPshop. Together they demonstrate several recurring competition-law themes: market definition, software bundling, exclusivity, data and technology-based foreclosure, vertical integration, discriminatory access and digital-platform market power.

The central legal question for customer-support software is therefore not simply whether a provider has a successful product, but whether a firm possessing substantial market power is using control over customer data, APIs, interoperability, algorithms or contractual relationships to exclude competing providers without sufficient competitive justification.