Competition Law in Container Depot Access

1. Introduction

Container depots are important infrastructure in the logistics and maritime-supply chain.

They may provide facilities and services such as:

receiving and releasing containers;

container storage;

examination and customs-related handling;

stuffing and de-stuffing;

movement of containers between ports and inland locations;

empty-container storage;

rail and road connectivity;

handling of export and import cargo;

reefer-container services;

weighing and documentation;

container maintenance and repair.

In India, comparable facilities include Inland Container Depots (ICDs), Container Freight Stations (CFSs) and container terminals.

Competition law becomes particularly important where access to such facilities is difficult to duplicate or where a port, terminal operator, railway-linked operator, shipping company, or logistics undertaking controls strategically important infrastructure.

The principal competition concerns include:

refusal of access;

discriminatory access;

excessive access charges;

tying access to other services;

exclusive arrangements;

preferential treatment of affiliated logistics providers;

denial of market access;

discriminatory berthing or handling arrangements;

foreclosure of competing CFSs or ICDs;

coordinated pricing by logistics associations;

vertical integration between ports, terminals and inland facilities; and

mergers creating excessive control over logistics infrastructure.

The Competition Commission of India expressly recognizes refusal to deal, exclusive arrangements and abuse involving denial of market access as competition-law concerns under the Competition Act, 2002.

2. What Is Container Depot Access?

Container depot access means the ability of shipping lines, freight forwarders, container train operators, exporters, importers, CFS operators, transporters and other logistics providers to use relevant depot infrastructure on commercially and competitively reasonable terms.

Access may involve:

physical access;

storage access;

rail access;

road access;

gate access;

customs-processing access;

handling access;

reefer facilities;

empty-container facilities;

documentation systems;

information systems.

A competition dispute can therefore concern not merely whether access is technically available, but also whether the terms of access make effective competition impossible.

3. Why Container Depots Can Raise Competition Issues

Container logistics often involves infrastructure that is:

expensive to construct;

geographically constrained;

connected to ports or railways;

subject to regulatory approvals;

difficult to replicate quickly;

dependent on land availability;

dependent on road and rail connectivity.

Consequently, a competitor may technically be allowed to enter the market while being unable to compete effectively because it cannot obtain access to a strategically important depot or terminal.

The U.S. Department of Justice has recognized that control of important port terminals can create competitive concerns where a vertically integrated operator could deny competitors access or offer access on inferior terms.

4. Relevant Market

The first step is to define the relevant market.

Possible markets include:

A. Container depot services

The relevant market may comprise inland storage and handling facilities.

B. Container Freight Station services

CFS services may constitute a separate relevant market depending upon substitutability.

C. Container terminal services

A container terminal performs functions closely connected with vessel-side operations.

D. Container rail operations

Rail transportation of containers may constitute another market.

E. Integrated logistics

In certain circumstances, the relevant competitive assessment may involve several vertically related markets.

The CCI has considered CFS services at a particular port as a potentially distinct market. In a combination involving container-logistics businesses, the CCI recorded the parties' proposed market as the market for CFS services at Chennai port, while separately examining container rail operations and other logistics markets.

5. Geographic Market

Container-depot markets are frequently geographically constrained.

A CFS located near Chennai Port may not be a perfect substitute for a CFS hundreds of kilometres away.

Relevant considerations include:

distance from port;

road connectivity;

rail connectivity;

customs jurisdiction;

cargo type;

shipping routes;

transport cost;

congestion;

available capacity;

turnaround time.

Thus, a competition authority may examine a depot market at:

one port;

a port cluster;

a metropolitan logistics region;

a wider transport corridor;

a national level.

6. Essential-Facility Concept

The essential-facility doctrine becomes relevant where a dominant undertaking controls infrastructure that competitors genuinely cannot reasonably duplicate.

However, not every useful facility is an essential facility.

Generally relevant questions include:

Is the facility controlled by a dominant undertaking?

Is access indispensable or merely convenient?

Is duplication technically possible?

Is duplication economically feasible?

Is there a realistic alternative facility?

Can access be provided without compromising legitimate operational requirements?

Would refusal eliminate or substantially restrict effective competition?

Is there an objective justification for refusal?

The Indian CCI has expressly discussed these issues in the CONCOR proceedings.

7. Case 1 — Container Corporation of India / CONCOR Proceedings

Competition Commission of India — Case Nos. 64/2010, 2/2011 and 12/2011

This is one of the most directly relevant Indian authorities concerning container infrastructure access.

The dispute concerned Container Corporation of India (CONCOR) and the availability of its terminals to private container train operators.

The Director General considered whether CONCOR's terminals, particularly terminals constructed on Indian Railway land, constituted infrastructure essential for competing in the relevant market.

The investigation took the view that access to some CONCOR terminals was important because private container train operators could face significant costs and difficulties in developing equivalent facilities.

The DG therefore considered the essential-facility doctrine and access at reasonable charges.

The CCI, however, adopted a more cautious approach and emphasized that the doctrine should apply only in appropriate circumstances, including where:

access is technically feasible;

duplication is not reasonably possible;

lack of access eliminates effective competition;

access can be supplied on reasonable terms.

The CCI considered that private operators could develop their own terminals and therefore did not accept that the essential-facility doctrine automatically required access to CONCOR's facilities.

Importance

This is particularly important for container depots because it demonstrates that:

Scarcity alone does not automatically make a depot an essential facility.

The ability of competitors to construct alternative facilities is a crucial consideration.

8. Case 2 — Dhruv Suri v Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone Ltd.

Case No. 18/2009, CCI

This is another highly relevant Indian port-access authority.

The case concerned Mundra Port, where the port operator controlled marine and infrastructure services provided to vessels.

There were two container terminals at the port, one operated by the port operator and another by Mundra International Container Terminal.

The allegation was that the port operator was offering rebates on marine and infrastructure charges to shipping lines that chose the operator's own terminal.

The informant alleged that the conduct amounted to leveraging dominance in one market into another related market.

The CCI investigated the allegations under the Competition Act framework. The case is useful for understanding vertical leveraging between port infrastructure and container-terminal services.

Principle

A vertically integrated port operator should not use control over an upstream or infrastructure service to disadvantage an independently operated competing terminal or logistics facility.

This principle can apply by analogy to:

port-to-CFS relationships;

depot access;

container handling;

rail connectivity;

vessel berthing;

inland logistics.

9. Case 3 — Indian Competition Review v Gateway Terminals India Pvt. Ltd.

CCI Case Nos. 47 and 56 of 2016

This is directly relevant to the relationship between container terminals and CFSs.

The informants alleged that Gateway Terminals India Limited, operating at Jawaharlal Nehru Port, had abused a dominant position by:

favouring particular CFSs;

diverting traffic;

denying market access to competing CFSs;

conditioning berthing windows on use of preferred CFSs;

tying container-terminal services with CFS services.

The proposed relevant market was container-terminal services at JNPT.

The CCI examined the allegations and closed the proceedings under Section 26(2).

Therefore, this case did not establish an infringement.

Its significance lies in the competition questions it identifies:

Can a dominant container-terminal operator use control over terminal access to favour its own or preferred downstream CFS providers?

That is directly analogous to disputes involving container-depot access.

10. Case 4 — Vikas Verma v Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd.

CCI Case No. 02 of 2021

This proceeding concerned allegations under Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act involving Adani Ports and Dighi Port.

The CCI ultimately closed the information under Section 26(2), finding no prima facie case on the material before it.

The Commission emphasized an important principle:

The mere existence of dominance is not itself an abuse.

There must be abusive conduct falling within Section 4.

Relevance

This principle is crucial in container-depot disputes.

A depot or port operator may possess a strong market position without automatically violating competition law.

A complainant generally needs to establish conduct such as:

discriminatory access;

exclusion;

unfair pricing;

denial of market access;

tying;

foreclosure;

other abusive conduct.

11. Case 5 — Silvano Raso and Others, Case C-163/96

Court of Justice of the European Union

Raso concerned port operations and special or exclusive rights.

The case involved a monopoly concerning the supply of temporary labour to port users.

The CJEU held that merely creating a dominant position through exclusive rights is not automatically contrary to competition law. However, Member-State-created exclusive rights become problematic where their exercise leads, or is liable to lead, to abuse of the dominant position.

The case therefore establishes an important principle concerning state-created monopolies in port infrastructure and services.

Application to container depots

If a government or port authority grants exclusive control over a strategically important depot, terminal or logistics facility, the legal analysis cannot stop at the existence of the concession.

The regulatory framework and the operator's subsequent conduct must also be examined.

12. Case 6 — Coe Clerici Logistics v Commission

Case T-52/00, General Court of the European Union

This case concerned competition complaints relating to port services and Articles 82 and 86 EC, the predecessors of Articles 102 and 106 TFEU.

The General Court addressed the procedural and institutional aspects of complaints concerning competition rules applicable to public undertakings and port authorities.

The case is useful because it illustrates that port-related competition disputes can involve both:

commercial conduct of port operators; and

public authority decisions concerning port infrastructure.

The fact that an infrastructure provider has a public or concession-based status does not automatically remove the economic activities associated with port services from competition-law analysis.

13. Case 7 — ACCC v NSW Ports Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd

[2023] FCAFC 16 — Federal Court of Australia, Full Court

This is a significant modern port-competition authority.

The dispute concerned provisions in port commitment deeds relating to container volumes and the potential development of another container terminal at Newcastle.

The arrangements required compensation to port operators if specified container volumes moved to a possible competing terminal.

The ACCC alleged that the provisions restricted competition.

The Federal Court ultimately rejected the ACCC's case, and the Full Court appeal was unsuccessful.

The case nevertheless provides an important analytical example of how contractual arrangements involving future container-terminal capacity and competitive entry can be examined under competition law.

Relevance

Container-depot access is not limited to present-day physical refusal.

Competition law may also examine arrangements that discourage:

development of alternative terminals;

expansion of competing facilities;

diversion of cargo;

entry into a port-related logistics market.

14. Case 8 — Siyakhuphuka Investment Holdings v Transnet

South African Competition Appeal Court

This case involved allegations concerning Transnet and access to the market for port-terminal services.

The appellant alleged that Transnet's control and strategic position in relation to port infrastructure had competitive consequences and argued that the conduct constituted abuse of dominance.

The case demonstrates the importance of distinguishing:

genuine competition-law complaints; from

attempts to use competition proceedings simply to obtain a regulatory licence or concession.

The Competition Appeal Court considered whether the complaint was properly characterized as competition conduct or was effectively an attempt to secure a port concession through competition proceedings.

Application

A business cannot necessarily establish a competition-law right to use a depot merely by asserting that the depot is important.

There must be a legally and economically sustainable competition claim.

15. Case 9 — P&O Australia Ports v Board of Trustees, JNPT

Bombay High Court, 2003

This case concerned competition and concentration in the development of container terminals at Jawaharlal Nehru Port.

JNPT excluded the existing private terminal operator and its associated entities from bidding for another terminal in order to avoid excessive concentration and promote competition.

The litigation illustrates the relationship between:

port infrastructure;

terminal concessions;

concentration;

competitive entry;

prevention of monopoly.

The case is important in understanding why port authorities may structure concessions to preserve intra-port competition.

16. Case 10 — Trailer Owner Associations / National Association of Container Freight Stations

CCI Case No. 04 of 2018

This is another highly relevant Indian competition proceeding.

The CCI found ten Trailer Owner Associations to have contravened Sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) read with Section 3(1) of the Competition Act.

The dispute arose from conduct affecting trailer tariffs and restrictions concerning the ability of CFS operators and their associated entities to use their own trailers for container movement.

The CCI concluded that the associations had facilitated collective decisions involving:

price fixation; and

restriction of provision of services.

The Commission issued a cease-and-desist direction.

Importance

This authority shows that competition issues around container depots can arise outside the depot owner itself.

Transport associations, CFS operators and logistics providers can also violate competition law when collective arrangements restrict access to transportation services.

17. Refusal of Access

Refusal of access can take several forms.

Absolute refusal

"No competing operator may use our depot."

Selective refusal

"We provide access to affiliated operators but not independent competitors."

Conditional refusal

"Access is available only if you purchase our transport services."

Capacity-based refusal

"The depot is full," even though capacity is made available selectively to affiliated enterprises.

Technical refusal

A competitor is technically permitted to enter but is given impractical operating conditions.

Competition law may distinguish legitimate capacity management from exclusionary conduct.

18. Discriminatory Access

Discrimination can occur through:

different handling charges;

different storage charges;

different gate timings;

priority berthing;

preferential rail slots;

different documentation requirements;

different security deposits;

discriminatory credit terms;

different turnaround times.

The crucial question is whether similarly situated competitors receive materially different treatment without objective justification.

19. Excessive Access Charges

A dominant infrastructure operator may potentially face competition scrutiny if it charges competitors excessive or discriminatory prices for access.

However, high prices alone do not automatically constitute abuse.

The assessment may require consideration of:

costs;

investment;

capacity;

market power;

comparable facilities;

regulatory pricing;

profitability;

discriminatory treatment;

competitive effects.

20. Tying of Depot Access

Suppose a dominant depot operator states:

"You may use our container depot only if you purchase our inland transportation services."

This may raise tying concerns.

The analysis would consider:

whether two separate products/services exist;

whether the operator has market power in the tying market;

whether customers are effectively forced to purchase the tied service;

whether competition in the tied market is harmed;

whether there is an objective or efficiency justification.

The allegations in Gateway Terminals concerning terminal services and preferred CFS arrangements demonstrate the relevance of this type of vertical analysis in container logistics.

21. Self-Preferencing

A vertically integrated logistics company may operate:

a port;

container terminal;

CFS;

ICD;

rail service;

trucking company.

A competition problem may arise if it uses control of one facility to give its own downstream operation preferential treatment.

Examples include:

faster gate processing for affiliated CFSs;

priority cargo release;

preferential berthing;

lower handling charges;

preferential train slots;

exclusive data access.

This is a classic vertical-foreclosure concern.

22. Foreclosure of Competing CFSs

A container terminal can potentially affect competition among CFS operators.

If a terminal operator directs almost all cargo to selected CFSs, competing CFSs may lose sufficient volume to remain viable.

The competitive analysis may consider:

percentage of cargo affected;

duration;

number of alternative terminals;

number of CFSs;

market shares;

switching possibilities;

contractual restrictions.

This issue was directly raised in the Gateway Terminals proceedings.

23. Exclusive Dealing

An ICD or CFS operator may enter an exclusive arrangement with:

a shipping line;

freight forwarder;

port terminal;

container train operator;

trucking company.

For example:

A shipping line agrees to route all empty-container returns through one affiliated depot.

Exclusive dealing is not automatically unlawful.

The analysis depends on:

market power;

duration;

market coverage;

alternatives;

foreclosure;

efficiencies.

24. Container Depot and Essential Facilities

The CONCOR case provides an important Indian framework.

The DG considered some CONCOR terminals potentially essential to effective competition.

The CCI, however, emphasized that essential-facility treatment should be used cautiously and requires consideration of whether competitors can create their own alternatives.

Thus:

Scarce facility

Not necessarily an essential facility.

Expensive facility

Not necessarily an essential facility.

Strategically located facility

Not necessarily an essential facility.

Truly indispensable and non-duplicable facility

Potentially capable of attracting essential-facility analysis.

This distinction is fundamental.

25. Capacity Constraints

Container depots often experience capacity constraints.

A refusal caused by genuine capacity limitations may be legitimate.

However, competition authorities may ask:

Is capacity genuinely exhausted?

Are affiliated customers receiving priority?

Is capacity being deliberately withheld?

Are competitors offered discriminatory slots?

Are expansion possibilities being blocked?

The distinction is between objective capacity management and strategic capacity foreclosure.

26. Access and Rail Infrastructure

Container depots often depend on rail connectivity.

If a dominant undertaking controls:

the depot;

railway siding;

train services;

loading facilities;

it may potentially leverage control across related markets.

The Indian CONCOR proceedings demonstrate the importance of access to rail-linked container infrastructure and the competitive implications of terminal ownership.

27. Port-to-Depot Vertical Integration

A port operator may also control:

container terminals;

CFSs;

ICDs;

inland transportation;

warehousing;

logistics platforms.

Vertical integration can create efficiencies:

lower transaction costs;

faster cargo movement;

integrated tracking;

reduced handling;

better capacity utilisation.

But it may also create foreclosure opportunities.

A competition authority may therefore examine whether the integrated company can:

raise rivals' costs or deny them access to strategically important infrastructure.

28. Information Discrimination

Modern depots generate large quantities of information.

Examples include:

container arrival times;

cargo volumes;

shipping schedules;

storage availability;

customer identities;

freight patterns;

competitor utilisation.

A vertically integrated depot operator could potentially use non-public information to favour an affiliated logistics business.

Competition analysis may therefore extend beyond physical access to information access.

29. Trade Association Conduct

Container logistics associations can facilitate legitimate industry coordination.

However, competitors should not use associations to agree on:

tariffs;

access charges;

customer allocation;

output;

service restrictions;

refusal to deal.

The CCI's 2022 decision involving Trailer Owner Associations is an important warning because the Commission found collective tariff fixation and restrictions on service provision contrary to Section 3.

30. Merger Control

Competition concerns may also arise when a company acquires:

a port;

a container terminal;

an ICD;

a CFS;

a container rail operator;

a logistics provider.

The CCI has examined horizontal and vertical overlaps involving:

container terminal services;

CFS services;

container rail operations;

inland container depots.

For example, the CCI has identified CFS services at Chennai as a potentially distinct market and considered vertical relationships between container rail operations and ICD/PFT facilities.

The Commission also considers combinations where port operators acquire control over additional ports. The acquisition of Gangavaram Port by Adani Ports, for example, was reviewed under Section 31 of the Competition Act.

31. Port Concentration

Port infrastructure can produce particularly important concentration concerns because:

ports require enormous capital;

land is geographically constrained;

maritime routes are fixed;

alternative ports may be far away;

infrastructure takes years to develop.

A high concentration level therefore deserves careful analysis.

However, concentration alone does not establish an infringement.

There must be an appreciable adverse effect or abuse under the applicable competition-law provisions.

32. Competition Act, 2002 — India

For Indian container-depot disputes, the principal provisions include:

Section 3

Deals with anti-competitive agreements.

Relevant arrangements may involve:

price fixing;

market allocation;

output/service restrictions;

bid rigging;

vertical restraints;

exclusive dealing;

refusal to deal;

tying.

The CCI confirms that Section 3 covers both horizontal and vertical agreements.

Section 4

Deals with abuse of dominant position.

Relevant conduct can include:

unfair conditions;

unfair prices;

limiting services;

discriminatory conditions;

denial of market access;

leveraging dominance into another market.

The CCI expressly identifies denial of market access and leveraging as forms of conduct covered by Section 4.

Sections 5 and 6

These provisions concern combinations and merger control where acquisitions involving ports, terminals, CFSs, ICDs or logistics businesses may affect competition.

33. Denial of Market Access

One of the strongest potential competition concerns is denial of market access.

For example:

A dominant port terminal refuses an independent CFS access to container traffic while directing equivalent traffic to its affiliated CFS.

The relevant question is whether this conduct substantially restricts the ability of the independent CFS to compete.

This is particularly relevant under Section 4 because the CCI expressly identifies denial of market access as potentially abusive conduct.

34. Legitimate Reasons for Refusing Access

A depot operator may have legitimate reasons for refusing or restricting access.

Examples include:

safety requirements;

customs restrictions;

capacity constraints;

security concerns;

technical incompatibility;

environmental requirements;

inadequate documentation;

operational congestion;

non-payment;

objectively justified credit risk.

Competition law should not transform every commercial disagreement into an antitrust violation.

The critical question is whether the justification is genuine and applied consistently.

35. Reasonable Access Terms

Where access is appropriate, reasonable terms may include:

transparent tariff schedules;

objective eligibility requirements;

non-discriminatory access;

published capacity rules;

predictable gate procedures;

transparent booking systems;

reasonable security requirements;

reasonable storage charges;

objective priority criteria.

Such arrangements can reduce disputes and make competition more effective.

36. Digital Container Depots

Technology increasingly affects depot access.

Modern facilities may use:

digital gate systems;

appointment platforms;

automated booking;

electronic documentation;

tracking systems;

digital customs interfaces;

algorithmic capacity allocation.

Competition issues can arise if the operator:

denies rival access to the platform;

gives affiliates preferential booking;

restricts interoperability;

withholds operational data;

uses an algorithm to discriminate against competitors.

Thus, future competition disputes may concern digital access as much as physical access.

37. Consumer and Supply-Chain Effects

Although container-depot disputes occur upstream, their effects can reach consumers.

Restricted depot access may cause:

higher freight costs;

longer delivery times;

congestion;

reduced reliability;

higher warehousing costs;

fewer logistics providers;

reduced service innovation.

Therefore, competition authorities may consider the effects on the broader supply chain.

38. Compliance Checklist for Depot Operators

A depot or terminal operator should ask:

Access

Are competitors given objective access criteria?

Are access requests processed consistently?

Pricing

Are charges transparent?

Are similarly situated users charged similarly?

Capacity

Are capacity limitations genuine?

Are affiliated companies receiving unexplained priority?

Vertical integration

Does the operator also own CFSs, ICDs, rail or trucking businesses?

Could the operator use one service to disadvantage rivals?

Exclusivity

Are exclusive contracts necessary?

How long do they last?

What proportion of the market do they cover?

Data

Is sensitive competitor information protected?

Can affiliated businesses obtain preferential access to information?

Trade associations

Are competitors discussing tariffs or customer allocation?

Expansion

Are contractual arrangements preventing new depot or terminal entry?

39. Case-Law Summary

40. Important Distinctions

Ordinary commercial refusal

A depot refuses access because:

capacity is genuinely unavailable;

safety requirements are unmet;

the customer has unpaid charges.

This does not automatically constitute an antitrust violation.

Potentially problematic refusal

A dominant operator:

gives capacity to its affiliate;

refuses the same capacity to competitors;

provides no objective justification.

This can raise competition concerns.

Potentially stronger case

A dominant infrastructure operator:

controls an indispensable facility;

competitors cannot reasonably duplicate it;

refuses access;

gives no objective justification;

and the refusal substantially eliminates effective competition.

This presents a much more significant abuse-of-dominance question.

41. Key Legal Principles

Principle 1 — Infrastructure control can create market power

A strategically located container depot or terminal may give its operator substantial market power.

Principle 2 — Dominance is not itself unlawful

The CCI has repeatedly emphasized that dominance must be accompanied by abusive conduct before Section 4 is violated.

Principle 3 — Essential facilities are exceptional

The CONCOR proceedings show that a facility is not automatically essential merely because it is expensive or strategically useful.

Principle 4 — Vertical integration requires scrutiny

A port or terminal operator controlling downstream CFS/ICD operations may have incentives to favour its own facilities.

Principle 5 — Discrimination can be important

Different access terms for affiliated and independent operators can raise competition concerns.

Principle 6 — Tying can restrict competition

Making depot access conditional upon purchasing another service can potentially amount to an anti-competitive vertical restraint.

Principle 7 — Collective action can be unlawful

Container and logistics associations cannot use their collective power to fix tariffs or restrict services.

Principle 8 — Entry conditions matter

Competition authorities may consider whether contractual or infrastructure arrangements prevent new terminals, depots or logistics providers from entering.

Principle 9 — Port concessions do not eliminate competition law

The Raso principle demonstrates that state-created exclusive rights do not immunize an undertaking from competition-law scrutiny where their exercise produces abusive consequences.

Principle 10 — Future infrastructure can matter

The NSW Ports litigation demonstrates that arrangements affecting potential future container-terminal competition can themselves become competition-law issues.

Conclusion

Competition law in container depot access is fundamentally concerned with ensuring that control over strategically important logistics infrastructure does not become a mechanism for excluding competitors.

The strongest issues arise where a port, terminal, ICD, CFS or integrated logistics undertaking controls infrastructure that competitors cannot reasonably reproduce and uses that position to:

refuse access;

impose discriminatory conditions;

charge discriminatory or potentially unfair access prices;

favour affiliated CFSs or ICDs;

tie access to other logistics services;

restrict transportation alternatives;

exchange or exploit sensitive competitor information;

impose exclusionary contracts; or

prevent development of competing infrastructure.

Indian authorities are particularly useful in this field. The CONCOR proceedings directly examined the essential-facility question for container terminals. Dhruv Suri v Mundra Port addressed potential leveraging between port infrastructure and competing container terminals. Gateway Terminals involved allegations concerning preference for particular CFSs and denial of access to competing CFSs. The Trailer Owner Associations/NACFS matter demonstrates the separate risk of collective price fixing and service restrictions in container logistics.

The broader international authorities reinforce the same general framework: Raso addresses special rights and port monopolies; Coe Clerici concerns competition complaints involving port services; NSW Ports illustrates the importance of future container-terminal competition; and Siyakhuphuka demonstrates the need to distinguish a genuine competition complaint from an attempt to obtain a regulatory concession through competition proceedings.

Accordingly, the central legal question is:

Is the container depot or terminal operator exercising ordinary commercial control over its infrastructure, or is it using control over a strategically important facility to materially restrict competitors' ability to access the market?

That distinction is central to applying Sections 3 and 4 of the Indian Competition Act, as well as comparable competition-law regimes internationally.