Zero-Password Banking Authentication Legal Risks Spain Cybersecurity Law
ZERO-PASSWORD BANKING AUTHENTICATION: LEGAL RISKS UNDER SPANISH CYBERSECURITY LAW, REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND CASE LAWS
1. Introduction
Zero-password banking authentication refers to authentication systems that allow customers to access banking services and authorise financial transactions without entering a conventional password. Instead of relying on memorised passwords, these systems may use biometric identification, cryptographic passkeys, device-based authentication, digital certificates, behavioural biometrics, hardware security keys or other passwordless technologies.
Spanish banks increasingly operate in an environment where customers access financial services through mobile applications, internet banking platforms, digital wallets and electronic payment systems. These developments have encouraged the adoption of authentication technologies that seek to improve convenience while reducing risks associated with stolen, reused or weak passwords.
However, removing conventional passwords does not automatically make banking systems more secure. Passwordless authentication introduces its own legal and cybersecurity risks, including biometric-data breaches, identity theft, compromised devices, account takeover, unauthorised transactions, inadequate authentication design, cybersecurity failures and disputes concerning the allocation of financial losses.
In Spain, zero-password banking authentication is governed by a combination of European Union payment-services legislation, data-protection law, cybersecurity requirements, banking supervision rules, consumer-protection legislation and civil liability principles.
The most important regulatory framework includes the Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2), the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Spain's Organic Law 3/2018, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), the EU Digital Identity Framework and applicable Banco de España and European Banking Authority requirements.
An important legal distinction must be made: Spanish legislation does not generally prohibit passwordless banking authentication. Rather, banks must ensure that the authentication method satisfies applicable security, strong customer authentication, privacy, operational resilience and consumer-protection obligations.
2. Meaning and Technical Structure of Zero-Password Banking Authentication
Zero-password authentication is an authentication approach in which a customer does not need to enter a conventional password to establish identity or access a financial service.
Instead, authentication may depend on one or more alternative mechanisms.
A. Biometric authentication
Biometric authentication identifies a customer through physical or behavioural characteristics, including:
Fingerprint recognition.
Facial recognition.
Iris recognition.
Voice recognition.
Behavioural biometric analysis.
For example, a banking application may permit a customer to log in using a fingerprint stored and processed through a supported mobile-device security system.
B. Passkey authentication
Passkeys use cryptographic key pairs rather than conventional passwords.
The private key remains within a protected device or credential-management environment, while the corresponding public key is registered with the relevant service.
The customer authenticates through a local device mechanism, such as a fingerprint, facial recognition or device PIN.
C. Device-based authentication
A banking application may recognise a previously registered device and use cryptographic credentials or secure hardware to authenticate the customer.
D. Digital certificates
Digital certificates may establish the identity of a user or organisation through public-key cryptography.
Spain has an established digital identification environment involving electronic certificates and recognised electronic identification systems.
E. Behavioural authentication
Some systems analyse patterns such as typing behaviour, device usage, navigation patterns and transaction characteristics.
These systems may help identify suspicious activity, although they create additional privacy and data-protection concerns.
F. Risk-based authentication
Banks may evaluate device characteristics, location-related signals, transaction history and other indicators to determine whether additional verification is necessary.
Risk-based analysis cannot, however, be used to bypass mandatory strong customer authentication where the law requires it.
3. Legal Status of Passwordless Banking Authentication in Spain
Spanish law does not establish a general requirement that banking customers must authenticate themselves using conventional passwords.
The relevant legal question is whether the authentication arrangement satisfies applicable legal requirements.
The main legal principles are:
Authentication must meet applicable payment-services security requirements.
Strong customer authentication must be applied where required.
Electronic payment transactions must satisfy the relevant authentication and authorisation rules.
Personal data must be processed lawfully and securely.
Biometric information must receive appropriate protection.
Financial institutions must manage operational and cybersecurity risks.
Consumers must receive legally required information and protection.
Banks must maintain appropriate incident-response and fraud-management procedures.
Therefore, passwordless authentication can be legally acceptable when its technical and organisational design complies with the applicable regulatory framework.
4. PSD2 and Strong Customer Authentication
One of the most important legal instruments governing passwordless banking authentication is Directive (EU) 2015/2366, commonly known as the Revised Payment Services Directive or PSD2.
PSD2 was implemented in Spain principally through Royal Decree-Law 19/2018, of 23 November, on payment services and other urgent financial measures.
The directive establishes security requirements for electronic payment transactions and introduces the concept of strong customer authentication (SCA).
A. Article 97: Strong Customer Authentication
Article 97 of PSD2 requires payment service providers to apply strong customer authentication in specified circumstances, including:
When a payer accesses a payment account online.
When a payer initiates an electronic payment transaction.
When a payer carries out an action through a remote channel that may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuse.
The authentication method must satisfy the applicable legal requirements and any relevant exemptions.
B. Authentication factors
Strong customer authentication generally requires authentication based on at least two independent elements belonging to different categories:
Knowledge: Something only the user knows.
Possession: Something only the user possesses.
Inherence: Something the user is.
Examples include:
A device PIN combined with a fingerprint.
A registered device combined with biometric verification.
A cryptographic possession credential combined with an independently verified inherence factor.
A biometric authentication method by itself does not automatically satisfy the two-element SCA requirement.
Similarly, a device being recognised by a bank does not automatically establish that every required authentication element has been satisfied.
C. Independence of authentication elements
The authentication elements must be independent in accordance with the applicable technical and regulatory requirements.
A compromise of one element should not compromise the reliability of the others.
This is particularly important for passwordless banking because some systems use a single mobile device to provide several authentication functions.
If a device is compromised, the bank must consider whether the authentication arrangement continues to satisfy the independence and security requirements.
5. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 establishes Regulatory Technical Standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure communication under PSD2.
It is particularly important for passwordless banking authentication.
A. Article 4: Authentication Code
The regulation establishes requirements relating to the creation and use of authentication codes.
The authentication process must satisfy applicable security requirements and protect the integrity and confidentiality of the authentication elements.
B. Article 5: Dynamic Linking
For remote electronic payment transactions, the authentication code must be linked dynamically to the amount and the payee agreed to by the payer.
This means that authentication should not merely confirm that a customer has accessed an account.
It must also protect the integrity of the particular transaction where dynamic linking is required.
For example, if a customer authenticates a payment of €100 to a particular recipient, the authentication mechanism must not permit an attacker to alter the transaction to €1,000 or redirect it to another recipient without the required authentication.
C. Article 9: Independence of Elements
The regulation establishes requirements intended to ensure that authentication elements remain independent.
This is especially relevant where a bank uses a single smartphone for device recognition, biometric verification and payment approval.
D. Article 22: Monitoring Transactions
The regulation requires payment service providers to maintain transaction-monitoring mechanisms capable of detecting unauthorised or fraudulent payment transactions.
Monitoring should consider relevant risk factors, including abnormal transaction patterns and compromised authentication credentials.
Legal significance: Passwordless authentication must form part of a broader security architecture. The use of biometric or cryptographic technology does not remove the need for transaction monitoring and fraud detection.
6. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Biometric Authentication
Biometric authentication creates significant data-protection risks.
The principal legal instrument is Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation.
A. Article 4(14): Definition of Biometric Data
The GDPR defines biometric data as personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person that allows or confirms unique identification.
Examples include fingerprint templates and facial-recognition data used for identification.
B. Article 6: Lawfulness of Processing
A bank must establish an appropriate lawful basis for processing personal data.
Depending on the circumstances, this may include contractual necessity, compliance with a legal obligation, legitimate interests or another applicable basis.
Consent should not be assumed to be the appropriate legal basis in every banking authentication arrangement.
C. Article 9: Special Categories of Personal Data
Biometric data is subject to Article 9 when processed for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person.
Such processing is generally prohibited unless an applicable exception is satisfied.
One possible exception is explicit consent under Article 9(2)(a), subject to the other requirements of the GDPR.
Another may apply where processing is necessary for substantial public interest under Union or Member State law and appropriate safeguards are established.
The exact legal basis depends on the specific authentication arrangement and the applicable national legal framework.
D. Article 25: Data Protection by Design and by Default
Banks must incorporate data-protection safeguards into authentication systems from the design stage.
Examples include:
Avoiding unnecessary collection of biometric information.
Using secure biometric templates.
Limiting access to authentication data.
Applying encryption.
Restricting retention periods.
Separating authentication data from unrelated customer information.
E. Article 32: Security of Processing
Banks must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect personal data.
Relevant measures may include encryption, confidentiality controls, access restrictions, system resilience and regular security testing.
F. Article 35: Data Protection Impact Assessment
A Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) may be required where biometric authentication or other processing is likely to result in a high risk to individuals' rights and freedoms.
A bank introducing large-scale biometric authentication should carefully assess whether a DPIA is legally required.
Legal risk: If biometric information is unlawfully collected, inadequately secured or processed without a valid legal basis, the bank may face GDPR enforcement, compensation claims and reputational damage.
7. Spanish Organic Law 3/2018 on Personal Data Protection and Digital Rights
Organic Law 3/2018, of 5 December, on Personal Data Protection and Guarantee of Digital Rights (LOPDGDD), supplements the GDPR in Spain.
It establishes national provisions concerning personal-data processing and the protection of digital rights.
For passwordless banking, the law is relevant to:
Processing of customer identification data.
Data security.
Rights of data subjects.
Regulatory supervision.
Administrative enforcement.
Cooperation with the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD).
The AEPD is responsible for supervising compliance with applicable Spanish data-protection requirements within its competence.
A bank introducing biometric authentication must therefore consider both the GDPR and the relevant provisions of Organic Law 3/2018.
8. Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)
Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, known as the Digital Operational Resilience Act, became applicable on 17 January 2025.
DORA establishes a harmonised framework for digital operational resilience in the financial sector.
It is highly relevant to passwordless banking because authentication systems depend on digital infrastructure, software, devices, cryptographic services and external technology providers.
A. ICT Risk Management
DORA requires financial entities to establish an ICT risk-management framework.
Relevant risks include:
Authentication-system failure.
Cryptographic key compromise.
Biometric processing vulnerabilities.
Malware infections.
Device compromise.
Cloud-service disruptions.
Third-party technology failures.
B. ICT Incident Management
Financial institutions must establish processes for detecting, managing, classifying and reporting major ICT-related incidents in accordance with applicable requirements.
C. Digital Operational Resilience Testing
Banks must conduct appropriate testing to assess the resilience of their digital systems.
Testing may include vulnerability assessments, penetration testing and other security exercises proportionate to the institution's risk profile.
D. Third-Party ICT Risk
Banks may depend on external providers for biometric identification, cloud infrastructure, passkey management and authentication technology.
DORA strengthens oversight of ICT third-party risks and establishes an EU oversight framework for critical ICT third-party providers.
Legal significance: A bank cannot transfer all responsibility for authentication security to an external technology provider. It remains responsible for meeting its applicable regulatory obligations.
9. NIS2 Directive and Spanish Cybersecurity Requirements
Directive (EU) 2022/2555, commonly known as the NIS2 Directive, strengthens cybersecurity obligations across important sectors.
The financial sector is relevant to its scope, although the relationship between NIS2 and financial-sector cybersecurity obligations must be assessed in light of the applicable EU rules and DORA's sector-specific framework.
DORA operates as a sector-specific Union legal framework for covered financial entities and takes precedence over overlapping NIS2 requirements to the extent established by the applicable legislation.
For Spanish banks, cybersecurity compliance must therefore be assessed primarily through the applicable financial-sector rules, including DORA, together with other relevant national and European cybersecurity provisions.
The legal risks associated with passwordless authentication include:
Weak authentication infrastructure.
Failure to manage vulnerabilities.
Insufficient incident response.
Inadequate security governance.
Failure to supervise relevant service providers.
Weak operational continuity arrangements.
10. Electronic Identification and Trust Services Regulation (eIDAS)
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 established the original European framework for electronic identification and trust services.
It was significantly amended by Regulation (EU) 2024/1183, which introduced the European Digital Identity Framework.
The eIDAS framework is relevant to passwordless authentication because it addresses electronic identification, authentication and trust services.
It covers matters such as:
Electronic identification schemes.
Electronic signatures.
Electronic seals.
Authentication certificates.
Trust service providers.
Cross-border recognition of qualifying electronic identification arrangements.
A passwordless authentication system may use an electronic identification or trust-service component.
However, using biometric authentication or a passkey does not automatically make a system a qualified electronic identification or trust service under eIDAS.
The relevant legal classification depends on the technical arrangement and whether the applicable regulatory conditions are satisfied.
11. Legal Risks of Zero-Password Banking Authentication in Spain
A. Account Takeover
Account takeover occurs when an attacker obtains control over a customer's banking account without proper authorisation.
In a passwordless environment, attacks may involve:
Compromised mobile devices.
Stolen authentication tokens.
Malware.
SIM-swapping attacks.
Fraudulent biometric enrolment.
Session hijacking.
Social engineering.
A bank may face regulatory and civil liability if inadequate security controls allow unauthorised access.
B. Biometric Data Breaches
Biometric information presents particular risks because it is closely connected to an individual's physical identity.
Unlike a conventional password, a fingerprint or facial characteristic cannot easily be replaced after compromise.
A biometric data breach may therefore have long-term consequences.
Banks must implement appropriate data-protection and cybersecurity safeguards.
C. Authentication Factor Independence
A passwordless system may rely on a single smartphone for device possession and biometric verification.
If the device is compromised, both authentication elements may become vulnerable.
Banks must ensure that the authentication arrangement satisfies the applicable independence requirements under PSD2 and Delegated Regulation 2018/389.
D. False Acceptance and False Rejection
Biometric systems may incorrectly identify an unauthorised person or reject a legitimate customer.
False acceptance can result in unauthorised account access.
False rejection can prevent customers from accessing their accounts and may disproportionately affect individuals whose biometric characteristics cannot be reliably recognised.
Banks should provide appropriate alternative authentication procedures and customer-support mechanisms.
E. Unauthorised Payment Transactions
Where an attacker uses a passwordless banking system to initiate an unauthorised payment, questions may arise concerning the allocation of financial losses.
PSD2 and its Spanish implementing legislation establish important rules governing unauthorised payment transactions.
Under Article 72 of PSD2, the payment service provider bears the burden of proving that a payment transaction was authenticated, accurately recorded and entered in the accounts, and was not affected by a technical breakdown or other deficiency.
The mere recorded use of a payment instrument is not necessarily sufficient to prove that the payer authorised the transaction or acted fraudulently or with gross negligence.
Under Article 73, the payer's payment service provider must generally refund an unauthorised transaction immediately and, at the latest, by the end of the following business day after becoming aware of or being notified of the transaction, subject to the statutory exceptions.
The precise allocation of liability depends on the facts, the applicable legal provisions and any relevant exceptions.
F. Third-Party Technology Failures
Banks may use external providers for biometric recognition, device security, authentication software and cloud infrastructure.
If an external provider experiences a security failure, the bank may still face regulatory consequences for weaknesses in its outsourcing and ICT risk-management arrangements.
DORA requires financial entities to maintain appropriate oversight of ICT third-party risks.
G. Inadequate Customer Consent
Where biometric information is processed on the basis of consent, banks must ensure that consent satisfies GDPR requirements.
Consent must be freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous, and explicit where required by Article 9.
A customer should not automatically be treated as having given valid biometric consent merely because the customer activates a banking application's fingerprint feature.
H. Discrimination and Accessibility
Biometric systems may create difficulties for customers with disabilities, age-related biometric changes or other circumstances affecting recognition.
Financial institutions should ensure that authentication arrangements are accessible and provide suitable alternatives.
I. Insufficient Transaction Transparency
Authentication establishes identity or verifies an authentication process; it does not necessarily establish that the customer understood or agreed to every contractual consequence of a transaction.
Banks must continue to satisfy applicable information, transparency and consumer-protection obligations.
12. Civil and Contractual Liability of Spanish Banks
Spanish banks may face civil or contractual liability where defective authentication systems result in customer losses.
Relevant legal provisions include:
Article 1101 of the Spanish Civil Code
Article 1101 provides for liability where persons, in performing their obligations, act with fraud, negligence or delay, or otherwise contravene the terms of their obligations.
A bank may face contractual liability if it fails to perform applicable security or payment-service obligations.
Article 1258 of the Spanish Civil Code
Article 1258 provides that contracts are perfected by consent and bind the parties not only to what is expressly agreed but also to the consequences arising from good faith, usage and law.
This provision may be relevant to the bank's obligations concerning proper performance, security and cooperation with customers.
Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code
Article 1902 establishes general liability for damage caused to another through an act or omission involving fault or negligence.
It may be relevant where an unlawful or negligent authentication-system failure causes compensable damage.
The application of these provisions depends on the contractual relationship, the payment-services framework and the specific circumstances of the incident.
13. Case Laws Relevant to Passwordless Banking Authentication and Cybersecurity
There is currently no established body of Spanish or CJEU case law specifically deciding the legality of zero-password banking authentication as a separate authentication category.
The following judgments are relevant by analogy because they establish principles concerning unauthorised transactions, authentication evidence, payment-service security, data protection and institutional liability.
Case 1: Česká spořitelna, a.s. v Feichter
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-419/11
Judgment date: 14 March 2013
Legal issue: Interpretation of obligations arising from financial instruments and banking relationships.
Background:
The dispute concerned the interpretation of jurisdictional rules relating to a financial instrument and the relationship between the parties.
Judgment:
The CJEU examined the applicable legal framework governing the financial relationship and the interpretation of relevant contractual obligations.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
The case is not a direct cybersecurity or authentication judgment. It provides only broader context for the interpretation of financial contractual relationships.
For disputes involving passwordless authentication, the more directly relevant legal provisions are PSD2 and its implementing rules.
Case 2: DenizBank AG v Verein für Konsumenteninformation
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-287/19
Judgment date: 11 November 2020
Legal issue: Payment instruments and contactless payment transactions.
Background:
The case concerned contactless payment instruments and the application of provisions of the Payment Services Directive to payment transactions.
Judgment:
The CJEU examined the treatment of contactless payment instruments under the EU payment-services framework, including the relevant rules on payment authorisation and contractual arrangements.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
The judgment is important for understanding the legal treatment of electronic payment mechanisms that do not necessarily involve conventional password entry.
It illustrates that the legal classification of a payment instrument and the applicable authentication obligations depend on the relevant PSD2 provisions and technical circumstances.
Case 3: Verein für Konsumenteninformation v INKO, Inkasso GmbH
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-127/15
Judgment date: 27 October 2016
Legal issue: Consumer protection and financial obligations.
Background:
The case concerned consumer-protection rules in relation to debt recovery arrangements.
Judgment:
The CJEU examined the application of EU consumer-protection legislation to the contractual arrangement.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
The case is not directly concerned with authentication security. It provides a broader illustration of the importance of consumer rights in financial relationships.
Case 4: Peter Paul and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-222/02
Judgment date: 12 October 2004
Legal issue: Banking supervision and liability of supervisory authorities.
Background:
The case concerned losses suffered by depositors following the failure of a bank and questions about the liability of national banking supervisory authorities.
Judgment:
The CJEU examined the European deposit-guarantee framework and the legal responsibilities of national supervisory authorities.
It held that the relevant EU legislation did not generally establish an individual right to compensation from supervisory authorities for inadequate supervision, subject to applicable national law.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
The judgment provides context for the distinction between supervisory responsibilities and individual customer compensation.
A bank's cybersecurity obligations must be distinguished from the public authorities' broader responsibilities for financial supervision.
Case 5: Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-582/14
Judgment date: 19 October 2016
Legal issue: Personal data and identification information.
Background:
The case concerned whether dynamic IP addresses could constitute personal data under EU data-protection law.
Judgment:
The CJEU held that dynamic IP addresses may constitute personal data where the controller has legal means reasonably likely to be used to identify the individual through additional information.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
The judgment is relevant to the processing of device identifiers, technical authentication data and digital activity records.
Banking authentication systems may process information that identifies or can be linked to an individual, even where that information is not a conventional name or account number.
The case supports the principle that digital authentication information must be assessed under applicable data-protection rules.
Case 6: Österreichische Post AG v UI
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-300/21
Judgment date: 4 May 2023
Legal issue: Compensation for non-material damage under the GDPR.
Background:
The case concerned the conditions under which an individual may claim compensation for non-material damage resulting from a GDPR infringement.
Judgment:
The CJEU held that a mere infringement of the GDPR is insufficient by itself to establish a right to compensation. The claimant must demonstrate damage, an infringement and a causal link between them.
However, EU law does not impose a minimum seriousness threshold for non-material damage.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
If a bank unlawfully processes or exposes biometric authentication information, affected customers may seek compensation where the legal requirements are satisfied.
The judgment clarifies that a GDPR infringement does not automatically establish compensation, but genuine non-material damage may be recoverable.
Case 7: Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-319/20
Judgment date: 28 April 2022
Legal issue: Data protection and consumer-protection enforcement.
Background:
The case concerned the relationship between GDPR enforcement and actions brought by consumer-protection organisations.
Judgment:
The CJEU examined the circumstances in which consumer-protection organisations may bring proceedings concerning alleged data-protection infringements.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
The judgment is relevant because biometric authentication and digital identity systems involve consumer data and may raise issues that affect large groups of banking customers.
It illustrates the possibility of collective or representative enforcement where the applicable legal conditions are satisfied.
Case 8: Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union
Case: C-618/10
Judgment date: 14 June 2012
Legal issue: Unfair contractual terms and consumer protection.
Background:
The dispute concerned a consumer credit agreement containing potentially unfair contractual terms.
Judgment:
The CJEU held that national courts must be able to examine unfair contractual terms and provide effective protection to consumers.
Relevance to passwordless banking:
The judgment demonstrates that digital authentication does not eliminate the consumer's right to challenge unfair contractual conditions.
A customer who authenticates a transaction through a biometric mechanism does not automatically lose the right to challenge an unfair or unlawful contractual arrangement.
14. Spanish Data Protection Agency and Biometric Authentication
The Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) plays an important role in supervising personal-data processing in Spain.
Its regulatory guidance concerning biometric processing is particularly relevant to financial institutions introducing fingerprint and facial-recognition systems.
Banks must examine whether biometric processing is necessary, proportionate and supported by a valid legal basis.
They should consider:
Whether biometric identification is necessary for the stated purpose.
Whether a less intrusive authentication method is available.
Whether Article 9 GDPR applies.
Whether an appropriate Article 9 exception exists.
Whether a DPIA is required.
Whether biometric information is retained unnecessarily.
Whether customers have appropriate alternative authentication methods.
Whether technical safeguards are sufficient.
The AEPD's guidance and enforcement approach should be considered when designing biometric authentication systems.
A bank should not assume that customer convenience alone provides sufficient legal justification for processing special-category biometric data.
15. Regulatory Responsibilities of Spanish Banking Institutions
Banks implementing zero-password authentication must maintain appropriate governance and compliance arrangements.
Their responsibilities include:
A. Authentication Governance
Banks should document the authentication methods used, their security characteristics and their compliance with SCA requirements.
B. Cybersecurity Risk Assessment
Institutions should identify threats involving malware, device compromise, credential theft, biometric spoofing and cryptographic vulnerabilities.
C. Fraud Detection
Banks should monitor suspicious transactions and maintain mechanisms for detecting unusual payment activity.
D. Customer Notification
Where required, customers must receive appropriate information concerning security incidents, payment transactions and changes affecting their accounts.
E. Incident Reporting
Banks must comply with applicable ICT and payment-services incident-reporting requirements.
F. Data Protection
Banks must ensure lawful processing, data minimisation, appropriate security and compliance with data-subject rights.
G. Alternative Authentication
Customers should have appropriate alternative authentication arrangements where biometric verification is unavailable or unsuitable.
H. Third-Party Oversight
Banks must assess and manage risks arising from authentication technology providers and other ICT service providers.
16. Liability for Unauthorised Transactions Under Spanish Law
Unauthorised transactions are among the most important legal issues arising from passwordless banking.
The applicable framework is principally based on PSD2 and Royal Decree-Law 19/2018.
The following principles are particularly important.
A. Customer notification
Payment service users must notify their payment service provider without undue delay after becoming aware of an unauthorised or incorrectly executed payment transaction, subject to the applicable statutory time limits and conditions.
B. Burden of proof
Under the PSD2 framework, the payment service provider bears the burden of proving authentication and proper recording of the transaction.
C. Recorded authentication is not conclusive
The fact that a biometric identifier, passkey or registered device was used does not necessarily prove that the customer authorised the transaction.
D. Refund obligations
The payment service provider generally must refund an unauthorised transaction immediately and no later than the end of the following business day after becoming aware of or being notified of it, subject to the statutory exceptions.
E. Customer liability
The customer's liability may depend on whether the customer acted fraudulently, intentionally or with gross negligence, and on the specific circumstances covered by the applicable legislation.
The exact allocation of losses must be determined under the relevant provisions rather than by relying solely on the bank's authentication logs.
17. Practical Compliance Requirements for Spanish Banks
A legally compliant passwordless banking system should incorporate the following safeguards:
Strong cryptographic authentication.
Compliance with PSD2 strong customer authentication requirements.
Dynamic linking for applicable remote payment transactions.
Independence of authentication elements.
Secure biometric processing.
GDPR-compliant legal bases.
Data protection by design and default.
Appropriate data-protection impact assessments.
Regular vulnerability testing.
Fraud detection and transaction monitoring.
Secure device registration and recovery procedures.
Customer notification and complaint mechanisms.
Appropriate ICT third-party risk management.
DORA-compliant operational resilience.
Accessible alternative authentication arrangements.
Clear customer information concerning authentication and payment security.
The implementation of these controls should be proportionate to the bank's activities, technology architecture and risk profile.
18. Critical Legal Analysis
Zero-password banking authentication represents an important development in the modernisation of Spain's financial services sector.
It can reduce dependence on weak or reused passwords, improve customer convenience and support stronger cryptographic security.
However, it also creates new legal challenges.
The most important challenge concerns the relationship between technological authentication and legal authorisation.
A biometric match or successful passkey verification may demonstrate that a particular authentication process occurred. It does not necessarily prove that the customer personally authorised a transaction or understood its consequences.
This distinction is especially important under PSD2, which places evidentiary and refund obligations on payment service providers in relation to unauthorised transactions.
The second major challenge concerns biometric privacy. Biometric data is difficult to replace following compromise and is subject to special protection under the GDPR when processed for unique identification.
The third challenge concerns operational resilience. Passwordless authentication systems depend on devices, cryptographic services, software and external technology providers. Their failure can affect both individual customers and the wider financial system.
DORA therefore plays an important role in ensuring that financial institutions manage digital operational risks through appropriate governance, incident management, testing and third-party oversight.
Finally, financial institutions must recognise that authentication security and consumer protection are separate but interconnected obligations. A secure login process does not excuse unfair contractual terms, inadequate disclosures or failure to refund an unauthorised payment where the law requires it.
19. Recommendations for Strengthening Zero-Password Banking Regulation in Spain
The following measures can improve the legal and cybersecurity framework:
Establish clear governance standards for biometric and passkey-based authentication.
Ensure that all authentication methods satisfy PSD2 and the applicable technical standards.
Strengthen independent security testing of authentication systems.
Improve protection of biometric templates and cryptographic credentials.
Require appropriate alternative authentication methods for vulnerable customers.
Strengthen monitoring of account takeover and social-engineering attacks.
Improve customer awareness concerning fraudulent authentication requests.
Ensure compliance with GDPR requirements before introducing biometric processing.
Strengthen oversight of external authentication and cloud-service providers.
Improve incident reporting and customer communication.
Clarify internal procedures for handling disputed passwordless transactions.
Regularly review authentication architecture in light of emerging cybersecurity threats.
These measures should be implemented consistently with European payment-services, data-protection and digital operational resilience legislation.
20. Conclusion
Zero-password banking authentication is an important development in Spain's digital financial services environment. It offers potential security and convenience advantages through biometrics, passkeys, cryptographic credentials and device-based identification.
However, the removal of conventional passwords does not remove the legal obligations imposed on banks.
PSD2 and Royal Decree-Law 19/2018 establish the principal payment-services framework, including strong customer authentication, transaction security and protections against unauthorised payments.
The GDPR and Organic Law 3/2018 govern the processing and protection of personal and biometric data, while DORA establishes important requirements concerning digital operational resilience and ICT risk management.
The eIDAS framework provides additional legal foundations for electronic identification and trust services.
Relevant CJEU decisions concerning payment instruments, consumer protection, data protection and institutional liability demonstrate that authentication evidence must be evaluated within the wider legal framework.
The central legal principle is that successful technological authentication does not automatically establish customer authorisation, eliminate a bank's security responsibilities or remove consumer-protection rights.
Spanish banks must therefore ensure that passwordless authentication systems are secure, transparent, proportionate, privacy-compliant and consistent with applicable payment-services legislation.
A properly regulated passwordless banking environment can improve the security and efficiency of financial services while maintaining consumer confidence and legal accountability.
21. Selected Legal Instruments and References
A. Spanish Legislation
Spanish Constitution, 1978.
Law 10/2014, of 26 June, on the regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions.
Royal Decree-Law 19/2018, of 23 November, on payment services and other urgent financial measures.
Organic Law 3/2018, of 5 December, on Personal Data Protection and Guarantee of Digital Rights.
Law 5/2019, of 15 March, regulating real estate credit contracts.
Law 7/2020, of 13 November, for the digital transformation of the financial system.
B. European Union Legislation
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 — General Data Protection Regulation.
Directive (EU) 2015/2366 — Revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2).
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 — Regulatory Technical Standards on Strong Customer Authentication and Common and Secure Communication.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 — Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA).
Directive (EU) 2022/2555 — NIS2 Directive.
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 — Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS).
Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 — European Digital Identity Framework.
Directive 2014/65/EU — Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II).
C. Selected Case Laws
CJEU, Peter Paul and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-222/02, 12 October 2004.
CJEU, Banco Español de Crédito SA v Calderón Camino, Case C-618/10, 14 June 2012.
CJEU, DenizBank AG v Verein für Konsumenteninformation, Case C-287/19, 11 November 2020.
CJEU, Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-582/14, 19 October 2016.
CJEU, Österreichische Post AG v UI, Case C-300/21, 4 May 2023.
CJEU, Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen, Case C-319/20, 28 April 2022.
CJEU, Aziz v Catalunyacaixa, Case C-415/11, 14 March 2013.
Legal Disclaimer: This document is prepared for academic and general legal research purposes. It does not constitute individual legal advice. The judgments discussed are relevant to payment services, data protection, consumer protection and banking supervision; they should not be interpreted as direct judicial decisions approving or prohibiting zero-password banking authentication. The legality of a particular authentication system depends on its technical design, legal basis, security controls and compliance with the applicable Spanish and European regulatory framework.

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