The Child Is Not at Fault”: Statutory Fiction, Inheritance, and Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act
- ByDivya Raju --
- 04 Nov 2026 --
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“The Child Is Not at Fault”: Statutory Fiction, Inheritance, and Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act
Introduction
A child does not choose the circumstances of their birth. Yet, for generations, children born from marriages that were legally invalid often faced social stigma and difficulties in claiming their rightful place within the family. The law may declare a marriage void or allow it to be annulled, but should the child born from that relationship also suffer the consequences?
This question lies at the heart of Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The provision recognises the legitimacy of children born from void and certain voidable marriages, ensuring that the legal status of a child is not entirely determined by the validity of the parents’ marriage. However, the protection is not unlimited. Section 16(3) restricts the child's rights to the property of their parents and does not extend them to the property of other persons.
For years, courts disagreed over whether this protection included a share in ancestral joint family property or was limited to the parents' self-acquired property. The Supreme Court finally addressed this question in its landmark three-judge Bench decision in Revana Siddappa & Ors. v. Mallikarjun & Ors. (2023).
The judgment clarified an important distinction: children covered by Section 16 are not coparceners by birth, but they are entitled to inherit the share of their deceased parent in Mitakshara joint family property. This article examines the statutory framework, the evolution of judicial interpretation, the impact of the 2023 judgment and the practical challenges that remain.
1. Understanding the Legal Background: Void and Voidable Marriages
Before examining Section 16, it is important to understand the difference between void and voidable marriages under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Void Marriages – Section 11
A void marriage is one that is treated as legally invalid from the beginning. Under Section 11, a marriage solemnized after the commencement of the Act may be declared null and void if it violates the conditions specified under Section 5(i), (iv) or (v).
These conditions include:
- One of the parties having a living spouse at the time of marriage.
- The parties being within the prohibited degrees of relationship, unless a valid custom permits the marriage.
- The parties being sapindas of each other, unless a valid custom permits the marriage.
- Such a marriage does not acquire legal validity merely because the parties have lived together as husband and wife.
Voidable Marriages – Section 12
A voidable marriage is different from a void marriage. It remains legally valid unless and until a competent court annuls it by passing a decree of nullity.
Section 12 provides certain grounds on which a marriage may be annulled. These include circumstances relating to non-consummation due to impotence, certain violations of the conditions relating to mental capacity, consent obtained through force or fraud, and the respondent being pregnant by another person at the time of marriage, subject to the statutory requirements.
The distinction between these two types of marriages becomes particularly important when determining the legitimacy of children under Section 16.
2. Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Protecting the Child
Section 16 was introduced to prevent children from suffering the consequences of the legal invalidity of their parents' marriage. The provision was substantially amended by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976, strengthening the protection available to such children.
It creates a statutory legal fiction by treating children covered by the provision as legitimate, even though their parents' marriage is void or has been annulled.
The provision can be understood through its three subsections.
A. Section 16(1): Children of Void Marriages
Section 16(1) provides that a child born from a marriage that is null and void under Section 11 shall be considered legitimate if the child would have been legitimate had the marriage been valid.
An important feature of this provision is that the protection applies whether or not a decree of nullity has been granted by the court. Therefore, the absence of a formal decree does not, by itself, deprive the child of the protection provided under this subsection.
B. Section 16(2): Children of Voidable Marriages
Section 16(2) deals with children born from voidable marriages.
Where a court grants a decree of nullity in respect of a voidable marriage under Section 12, a child who was begotten or conceived before the decree was made is deemed to be the legitimate child of the parties, provided the child would have been legitimate if the marriage had been dissolved by divorce instead of being annulled.
This provision ensures that the annulment of a marriage does not automatically deprive an already conceived child of legal legitimacy.
C. Section 16(3): The Limitation on Property Rights
Although Section 16(1) and Section 16(2) recognise the legitimacy of children, Section 16(3) places an important restriction on their property rights.
It provides that a child covered by Section 16 cannot claim rights in or to the property of any person other than their parents in circumstances where the child would otherwise have been unable to acquire those rights because of their illegitimacy.
In simple terms, the child can claim rights in the property of their parents, but cannot use Section 16 to claim property belonging to other relatives or members of the family merely because of the statutory recognition of legitimacy.
This restriction created a major legal question: Does the expression “property of the parents” include only self-acquired property, or does it also include the parent's share in ancestral joint family property?
The Supreme Court eventually settled this question in Revana Siddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023).
3. The Judicial Conflict: From Restrictive Interpretation to a Broader Approach
For several years, the courts adopted a restrictive interpretation of Section 16(3). The main disagreement concerned whether children covered by Section 16 could inherit a share in their parent's interest in ancestral coparcenary property.
A. The Restrictive Approach
In Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi (2003) 1 SCC 730, the Supreme Court adopted a narrow interpretation of Section 16.
The Court held that the statutory recognition of legitimacy did not automatically make children of void or voidable marriages coparceners by birth. Their rights could not be extended to ancestral coparcenary property in the manner claimed.
A similar restrictive approach was followed in:
- Neelamma v. Sarojamma (2006) 9 SCC 612.
- Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan (2010) 11 SCC 483.
These decisions treated the rights of children under Section 16 as limited and did not recognise their entitlement to a share in ancestral coparcenary property.
The central reasoning was that statutory legitimacy and coparcenary status are two different legal concepts. Recognizing a child as legitimate does not automatically make that child a coparcener by birth.
However, this interpretation raised an important concern. If the law recognises the child as legitimate, why should the child be denied an inheritance in the parent's share of ancestral property?
B. The Shift in Revanasiddappa (2011)
The issue received fresh consideration in Revana Siddappa & Anr. v. Mallikarjun & Ors. (2011) 11 SCC 1.
A Division Bench of the Supreme Court questioned the earlier restrictive interpretation and referred the matter to a larger Bench for authoritative consideration.
The Bench emphasized that the expression “property of the parents” in Section 16(3) was not expressly limited to self-acquired property. It raised the question of whether the parent's undivided interest in joint family property could also be treated as the parent's property for the purpose of inheritance.
The Court also recognized an important principle: a child should not be made to suffer because of circumstances over which the child has no control.
The matter was therefore placed before a three-judge Bench, which delivered its landmark judgment in 2023.
4. The Landmark Judgment: Revana Siddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023)
On 1 September 2023, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Manoj Misra, delivered its judgment in Revana Siddappa & Ors. v. Mallikarjun & Ors. (2023) 10 SCC 1.
The judgment clarified the relationship between Section 16(3) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
The Court recognized that children covered by Section 16 are entitled to inherit their parents' share in Mitakshara joint family property. At the same time, it clarified that such children do not become coparceners by birth.
The judgment established three important principles.
A. No Coparcenary Rights by Birth
The Supreme Court clarified that children born from void or voidable marriages do not become coparceners by birth merely because Section 16 recognises them as legitimate.
Under Mitakshara Hindu law, coparcenary rights arise by birth. Since Section 16 does not confer this status, such children cannot claim an independent birthright in the joint family property.
They also cannot demand partition of the joint family property during the lifetime of their parent on the basis of Section 16.
B. Right to Inherit the Parent's Share
The Court made an important distinction between the property of the entire joint family and the individual interest of a parent in that property.
A coparcener has an undivided interest in joint family property. That interest is a valuable property right belonging to the coparcener.
Therefore, the expression “property of the parents” under Section 16(3) is not restricted to self-acquired property. It also includes the parent's share in Mitakshara coparcenary property.
Consequently, children covered by Section 16 are entitled to inherit the share that would have belonged to their deceased parent, subject to the applicable rules of succession.
However, they cannot claim the independent shares of other coparceners or property belonging to other relatives.
C. The Role of Notional Partition
To determine the deceased parent's share in joint family property, the law uses the concept of notional partition under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
A notional partition is a legal assumption. It does not mean that an actual physical division of the property took place. Instead, the law assumes that a partition occurred immediately before the coparcener's death to calculate the share that would have been allotted to that person.
After determining the deceased parent's share, that share devolves by succession upon the eligible legal heirs.
This mechanism allows children covered by Section 16 to inherit their parent's interest without treating them as coparceners by birth.
5. Understanding the Calculation: A Practical Example
The principle laid down in Revana Siddappa becomes easier to understand through a simple example.
Consider a Hindu joint family governed by Mitakshara law with ancestral property worth ₹1,20,00,000 (₹1.2 crore).
The family consists of:
Father (F) – the deceased coparcener.
Son (S) – born from a valid marriage.
Daughter (D) – born from a valid marriage and a coparcener under the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act.
Child (C) – born from a void marriage and recognized as legitimate under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Widow (W) – the wife of the deceased father.
For this illustration, assume that there are no other relevant heirs or circumstances affecting the calculation.
Step 1: Identify the Coparceners
Before the father's death, the coparcenary consists of:
- Father (F)
- Son (S)
- Daughter (D)
The child covered by Section 16 is not a coparcener by birth and therefore does not receive an independent coparcenary share at this stage.
Step 2: Calculate the Share Through Notional Partition
The total ancestral property is worth ₹1,20,00,000.
For the purpose of this illustration, the property is notionally divided equally among the three coparceners.
₹1,20,00,000 ÷ 3 = ₹40,00,000
Therefore:
Father's share: ₹40,00,000
Son's share: ₹40,00,000
Daughter's share: ₹40,00,000
The father's share of ₹40,00,000 is then treated as his estate for succession.
Step 3: Distribute the Father's Share
Assuming the father dies intestate and the widow, son, daughter and child covered by Section 16 are the only relevant Class I heirs, his ₹40,00,000 share is divided equally among them under the applicable succession provisions.
₹40,00,000 ÷ 4 = ₹10,00,000
Each eligible heir receives ₹10,00,000 from the father's estate.
Final Distribution
| Family Member | Share from Notional Partition | Share Inherited from Father | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Son | ₹40,00,000 | ₹10,00,000 | ₹50,00,000 |
| Daughter | ₹40,00,000 | ₹10,00,000 | ₹50,00,000 |
| Widow | — | ₹10,00,000 | ₹10,00,000 |
| Child under Section 16 | — | ₹10,00,000 | ₹10,00,000 |
| Total | ₹80,00,000 | ₹40,00,000 | ₹1,20,00,000 |
The example demonstrates the distinction established in Revana Siddappa. The child covered by Section 16 does not receive a separate coparcenary share by birth, but is entitled to an equal share in the deceased parent's estate along with the other eligible heirs.
The calculation is illustrative. Actual succession depends on the family composition, the applicable statutory provisions and the facts of each case.
6. Practical and Evidentiary Challenges
Although the 2023 judgment clarified the inheritance rights of children covered by Section 16, certain practical difficulties remain.
A. No Right to Demand Partition During the Parent's Lifetime
One of the most important limitations is that a child covered by Section 16 does not become a coparcener by birth.
As a result, the child cannot demand partition of the joint family property during the parent's lifetime merely on the basis of Section 16.
The entitlement recognized in Revana Siddappa concerns the share that would have belonged to the parent and that becomes available for succession upon the parent's death.
This distinction can create uncertainty for children who depend on the parent's property for their long-term financial security.
B. Proving the Existence of a Marriage
Section 16 does not automatically apply to every relationship between two persons.
The provision concerns children of marriages that fall within the statutory framework of Sections 11 and 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, the existence of a marriage in fact and the circumstances that make it void or voidable may become important questions before a court.
A mere relationship or cohabitation cannot automatically be treated as a void or voidable marriage for the purpose of claiming the benefit of Section 16.
The Supreme Court's decision in Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar (2000) 2 SCC 431 is relevant to understanding the legal treatment of children born from relationships involving a subsisting marriage and the distinction between marital status and a child's rights.
C. Establishing Parentage
Inheritance disputes may also involve disagreements about the identity of the child's parents.
In such cases, courts may have to consider documentary evidence, the statutory presumption relating to legitimacy and, where legally justified, scientific evidence such as DNA testing.
In Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik (2014) 2 SCC 576, the Supreme Court considered the relationship between the statutory presumption of legitimacy and DNA evidence.
However, DNA testing is not something that should be ordered mechanically in every dispute. Courts must consider the facts, the legal requirements and the interests of the persons involved, including the child's dignity and privacy.
D. Lifetime Transfers of Property
Another issue deserves attention: what happens when a parent transfers or disposes of property during their lifetime?
Since a child covered by Section 16 does not become a coparcener by birth and cannot demand partition on that basis, questions may arise when the parent sells, gifts or otherwise transfers their interest in joint family property.
The extent to which such transactions can be challenged depends on the nature of the property, the authority of the person making the transfer and the applicable legal principles.
The 2023 judgment clarified the child's right to inherit the parent's share, but it should not be understood as automatically invalidating every lifetime transfer made by the parent.
This remains an important area where clear legal guidance and careful examination of individual transactions are necessary.
7. Constitutional Perspective: Equality and the Dignity of the Child
The protection provided under Section 16 is not merely a technical rule of inheritance. It also reflects a broader principle of fairness: children should not be punished for circumstances beyond their control.
A. Article 14 – Right to Equality
Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws.
A child has no control over the circumstances in which they are born or the legal validity of their parents' marriage. Denying a child the opportunity to inherit the parent's property solely because of the parents' marital status raises serious questions of equality and fairness.
The interpretation adopted in Revana Siddappa helps prevent the statutory recognition of legitimacy from becoming meaningless in matters of inheritance.
B. Article 21 – Right to Life and Dignity
Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty. The right to life has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to include the right to live with human dignity.
Children should not be subjected to social exclusion or unnecessary economic hardship because of their parents' relationship.
Recognizing their entitlement to inherit the parent's share in property gives practical meaning to the protection granted by Section 16.
C. Article 39(f) – Protection of Children
Article 39(f), a Directive Principle of State Policy, directs the State to ensure that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.
It also emphasizes the protection of children against exploitation and moral and material abandonment.
Although Directive Principles are not independently enforceable in the same manner as Fundamental Rights, they provide important guidance in interpreting laws intended to protect children.
Together, these constitutional principles support a legal approach that recognises the dignity and interests of children, irrespective of the circumstances of their birth.
8. The Way Forward: What More Needs to Be Done?
The decision in Revana Siddappa is a significant step towards protecting the inheritance rights of children born from void and voidable marriages. However, judicial clarification alone may not resolve every practical difficulty.
A few measures deserve consideration.
1. Clearer Statutory Guidance
Parliament may consider providing clearer statutory guidance on the calculation of shares under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act when Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act is involved. This could help reduce confusion and inconsistent calculations in inheritance and partition proceedings.
2. Greater Awareness Among Courts and the Public
Many people remain unaware that Section 16 recognises the legitimacy of children born from certain void and voidable marriages. Greater awareness among legal practitioners, judicial officers and the public can help ensure that the protection is properly understood and applied.
3. Attention to Children's Financial Security
The law should continue to examine situations in which children may face practical difficulties in securing their rights, particularly where property is transferred during a parent's lifetime or inheritance is disputed among family members.
Any reform in this area should balance the child's interests with the established rights of other coparceners and the legal rules governing property transfers.
4. Consistent Application of the Law
The principles laid down by the Supreme Court should be applied consistently by courts dealing with inheritance and partition disputes. Clear reasoning and accurate calculation of shares are essential to prevent unnecessary litigation and delay.
Conclusion
The law may declare a marriage void or annul it, but that does not mean the child born from that marriage should be left without legal protection.
Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 represents an important legislative effort to separate a child's legal status from the validity of the parents' marriage. However, the real significance of the provision becomes clear when it is examined alongside the child's right to inheritance.
The Supreme Court's decision in Revana Siddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023) brought much-needed clarity to this issue. It recognized that children covered by Section 16 are not coparceners by birth, but they are entitled to inherit the share of their deceased parent in Mitakshara joint family property. In doing so, the Court balanced the traditional structure of coparcenary law with the protective purpose of Section 16.
Nevertheless, the absence of a right to demand partition during the parent's lifetime and the practical difficulties surrounding property transfers and inheritance disputes show that further clarity may still be needed.
Ultimately, a child's rights should not be reduced because of the legal circumstances of their parents' relationship. The purpose of Section 16 is not to validate an invalid marriage, but to ensure that the child does not carry the burden of that invalidity.
The child is not at fault, and the law must never lose sight of that principle.
References and Table of Cases
Statutes
- The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Sections 5, 7, 11, 12 and 16.
- The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 6, 8 and 10.
- The Constitution of India – Articles 14, 21 and 39(f).
Cases
- Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi, (2003) 1 SCC 730.
- Neelamma v. Sarojamma, (2006) 9 SCC 612.
- Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483.
- Revanasiddappa & Anr. v. Mallikarjun & Ors., (2011) 11 SCC 1.
- Revanasiddappa & Ors. v. Mallikarjun & Ors., (2023) 10 SCC 1.
- Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar, (2000) 2 SCC 431.
- Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik, (2014) 2 SCC 576.
- Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1.
AUTHOR
Divya.H
A student at ABBS School of Law, Bengaluru, with an interest in legal research and writing.

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