Legal Personality For Autonomous Research Systems Generating Patentable Inventions.
🧠Core Legal Issue: Legal Personality and Inventorship
Legal personality is the capacity to hold rights and obligations under law—only entities (natural persons or juridical/legal persons like corporations) with legal personality can be inventors, own patents, be sued, or assign rights. Current patent laws worldwide continue to see inventorship and ownership as rights tied to legal persons because AI lacks legal personality.
📌 1. Thaler v. Vidal (U.S. Federal Circuit, 2022) — AI Cannot Be an Inventor
Facts
Dr. Stephen Thaler filed patent applications in the U.S. naming an autonomous AI system called DABUS as the sole inventor. The applications were rejected by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) because only human inventors are recognized under U.S. patent law.
Legal Question
Can an AI system be a legal inventor under the U.S. Patent Act?
Holding
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that:
The statutory definition of “inventor” refers to individuals (i.e., humans), and
Since AI systems like DABUS lack legal personality, they cannot be inventors under U.S. law.
Reasoning
Patent statutes (35 U.S.C. §100(f)) consistently define inventors as natural persons.
AI cannot legally sign an inventor’s oath, bear responsibility, or hold proprietary rights.
Without legal personality, AI systems cannot transfer rights to humans.
Significance
This case is foundational in U.S. law: AI inventions need human attribution regardless of how autonomous the AI system may be. Patent rights do not extend to machines.
📌 2. Thaler v. Comptroller‑General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks (UK Supreme Court) — AI is Not a Person
Facts
Thaler pursued two patent applications in the U.K. naming DABUS as the inventor. The UK Intellectual Property Office refused them because patents require a named inventor who is a person under the Patents Act 1977.
Issue
Can a non‑human AI be treated as an “inventor” within the meaning of UK patent law?
Decision
The UK Supreme Court held that:
The statute requires a person (natural person) to be named as inventor, and
Ownership rights of inventions arising from DABUS cannot be conferred simply by owning the machine.
Reasoning
By interpreting statutory language directly, the court determined the legislative scheme assumed human inventors.
An AI machine, lacking legal personality, cannot be a patent applicant or inventor,
Ownership cannot arise just because a person owns the AI machine that generated the invention.
Significance
Reinforces the person‑centric foundation of patent law in the UK.
Ownership through machine control alone cannot substitute inventorship.
📌 **3. EPO Board of Appeal J 0008/20 — AI Cannot Be an Inventor (EPO)
Facts
Two European patent applications filed with the European Patent Office (EPO) designated DABUS, an AI system, as the inventor. The EPO refused the applications.
Key Points
Inventors under the European Patent Convention must be natural persons with legal capacity.
Since AI has no legal personality, it cannot be listed as an inventor.
As machines cannot be employees or owners in the legal sense, rights cannot transfer from machine to human.
Outcome
Applications were refused because DABUS did not meet the requirement for a legally recognized inventor.
Significance
This confirms the European legal standard: AI cannot satisfy formal inventor designation requirements in patent procedures.
📌 4. DABUS in South Africa — Formal Patent Grant (An Outlier)
Facts
The South African Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) granted a patent listing the AI system DABUS as the inventor.
Context
South Africa’s patent system does not require a substantive examination.
It only checks formal requirements such as who is designated as an inventor.
Outcome
A patent was formally granted with DABUS as inventor, although this decision is seen as a formal technicality rather than a doctrinal change recognizing AI legal personality.
Significance
This reveals how jurisdictional differences can create unique outcomes.
However, it does not indicate a broader trend toward legal personhood for AI.
📌 5. Australian Court’s DABUS Decision and Reversal
Initial Decision
In July 2021, the Federal Court of Australia held that an AI system could technically be named as an inventor because the Australian Patents Act did not explicitly rule it out.
Reversal
Subsequently, the Full Federal Court clarified that:
Inventorship under Australian law requires a natural person.
AI cannot be recognized as an inventor.
Thus, AI systems must not be treated as legal persons capable of holding patent rights.
Significance
This shows how courts initially explored flexibility but ultimately upheld the human‑centric legal framework.
🧾 6. Swiss and Other Recent Developments
A recent ruling by the Swiss Federal Administrative Court held that AI systems cannot be listed as inventors under Swiss law. However, a subsidiary position allowed human applicants to pursue applications based on AI output if humans file and take responsibility.
⚖️ Underlying Legal Principles Across Jurisdictions
Human Inventorship
Almost all major patent laws require inventors to be humans because:
Inventorship implies accountability and responsibility, which AI cannot assume.
Legal personality is necessary to hold legal rights and obligations, which current AI lacks.
Patent statutes use language (e.g., inventor must execute human acts such as signing oaths).
🧠Why AI Does Not Have Legal Personality (and Therefore Cannot Be Inventors)
Patent laws universally link inventorship and ownership to entities that:
Can enter contracts
Sue and be sued
Own property
Bear legal duties
Since AI systems lack these capacities, they cannot qualify as inventors or owners in legal terms.
🧩 Emerging Debate
Some scholars argue that patent law might need reform to address AI autonomy—e.g., awarding rights to the human orchestrators or owners of AI rather than to the AI itself. They also suggest frameworks like “functional equivalence” that treat human direction and AI contribution together rather than requiring strict human inventorship.
đź“Ś Other Relevant Case Law (Foundational Patent Context)
Although not specifically about AI, these traditional cases show how courts treat patent eligibility and principles that underpin inventorship:
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) — living organism is patentable subject matter.
Diamond v. Diehr (1981) — software‑controlled machines can be patentable.
Enfish v. Microsoft (2016) — software inventions can be patentable if claims are properly directed.
(These cases inform patent eligibility rules, which continue to apply to innovations involving AI.)
đź“Ś Conclusion: Current Legal Position (as of 2026)
| Jurisdiction | AI As Inventor | Patentable If Human Involved? |
|---|---|---|
| United States | ❌ No (must be human) | ✔️ Yes, if a human inventor is named |
| United Kingdom | ❌ No | ✔️ Yes |
| European Patent Office | ❌ No | ✔️ Yes |
| Australia | ❌ No (after appeals) | ✔️ Yes |
| South Africa | Partially Yes (formal grant) | ✔️ Yes |
| Switzerland | ❌ No | ✔️ Yes |
Essentially, AI currently cannot be granted inventorship rights on its own because it lacks legal personality and the capacity to hold rights and obligations, although human involvement can legitimise patents based on AI‑generated inventions.
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