Competition Law in Examination Software Exclusivity in China

Introduction

“Examination software exclusivity” refers to a situation in which an examination authority, educational institution, examination organiser, testing platform, or dominant software provider requires examinations to be conducted exclusively through one particular examination software or platform, thereby preventing competing software suppliers from participating.

In China, such conduct may raise issues under the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (AML), particularly:

1. Abuse of dominant market position through exclusive dealing or restricted transactions;
2. Tying and unreasonable trading conditions;
3. Administrative monopoly, where a government or educational authority uses administrative power to designate a particular software supplier;
4. Monopoly agreements, where competing or vertically related undertakings coordinate exclusivity;
5. Unfair competition, where the conduct does not satisfy the elements of an AML violation but improperly excludes rivals;
6. Digital/platform competition, where examination software creates switching costs, data advantages and technological lock-in.

The issue is especially important because examination software can become a gateway market: once schools, students, examination authorities and teachers become accustomed to one platform, competitors may find it difficult to obtain access to future examinations.

I. Relevant Legal Framework

1. Anti-Monopoly Law

China's AML prohibits undertakings with a dominant market position from engaging in certain forms of exclusionary conduct.

The classic prohibition covers, without justifiable reasons, requiring trading counterparties to transact exclusively with the dominant undertaking or with an undertaking designated by it. The earlier statutory formulation expressly addressed exclusive dealing and designated suppliers.

The amended AML, effective from 2022, strengthens China's treatment of abuse of dominance and monopoly agreements.

For examination software, the relevant conduct may therefore involve:

• exclusive use of one examination platform;
• prohibition on competing examination software;
• contractual restrictions on schools;
• exclusive technical certification;
• exclusive access to examination databases;
• compulsory use of a designated examination application;
• interoperability restrictions;
• refusal to permit competing software to connect with examination infrastructure.

II. What Constitutes Examination Software Exclusivity?

A typical arrangement could operate as follows:

Education authority / examination organiser

↓

selects one software provider

↓

requires schools to use that software exclusively

↓

students and teachers become dependent on the platform

↓

competing software cannot participate

↓

data, users and institutional relationships migrate toward the incumbent

↓

competitors face increased entry barriers.

The exclusivity may be express or indirect.

Express exclusivity

For example:

“All examination centres must use Software X and may not use competing examination software.”

Indirect exclusivity

The authority may instead state:

• only Software X is technically certified;
• only Software X can access examination data;
• examinations will only be compatible with Software X;
• schools using another system will not receive examination services;
• examination results can only be uploaded through Software X.

The Chinese courts have recognised that restricted transactions need not always be expressed in an obvious contractual prohibition; they can also arise through indirect or practical restrictions. The Supreme People's Court's Weihai Water case is particularly important on this point.

III. Relevant Market

The first major question is:

What is the relevant market?

The market should not automatically be defined as the entire “software market”.

Depending upon the facts, possible relevant product markets include:

A. Examination software market

Software used to:

• create examinations;
• administer examinations;
• conduct computer-based examinations;
• mark examinations;
• manage examination centres;
• generate examination results.

B. Online examination platform market

Where the relevant product is a cloud-based examination platform.

C. Examination management software market

Where the software principally performs:

• candidate registration;
• identity verification;
• scheduling;
• examination administration;
• result management.

D. Specialised examination software

For example:

• professional licensing examinations;
• vocational examinations;
• university entrance examinations;
• government examinations;
• computer-based certification examinations.

The narrower the market, the easier it may be to demonstrate substantial market power.

IV. Market Power and Dominance

Exclusivity alone does not automatically constitute abuse of dominance.

The authority or court must ordinarily examine whether the undertaking exercising the exclusionary conduct possesses substantial market power.

Relevant factors include:

• market share;
• ability to control prices or other trading conditions;
• financial and technological strength;
• network effects;
• switching costs;
• barriers to entry;
• access to examination data;
• dependence of schools and examination authorities;
• interoperability;
• availability of alternative platforms;
• user loyalty;
• control over technical standards.

The Supreme People's Court's approach to digital markets demonstrates that market definition and dominance must be analysed carefully rather than inferred merely from a company's popularity. This is particularly evident in the Qihoo 360 v Tencent litigation.

V. Why Examination Software Can Produce Strong Network Effects

Examination software has unusual competitive characteristics.

A platform may simultaneously serve:

Examination authority → School → Teacher → Student → Examiner → Data system

The more institutions use the platform, the more valuable it becomes.

This can produce:

1. Network effects

More schools → more students → more examination data → better platform → more schools.

2. Switching costs

Schools may have to retrain:

• teachers;
• examination administrators;
• IT staff;
• students.

3. Data advantages

The incumbent may accumulate:

• examination histories;
• question banks;
• candidate information;
• performance analytics;
• assessment data.

4. Compatibility advantages

If the examination authority designs the technical infrastructure around one platform, competing software may be technically excluded.

5. Reputation effects

Being selected for a government or major educational examination can itself establish credibility.

VI. Exclusive Dealing / Restricted Transaction

This is probably the most direct AML theory.

Suppose a dominant examination software provider tells schools:

“If you use our examination system, you cannot simultaneously use another examination platform.”

That may constitute exclusive dealing.

The authority should examine:

1. whether the undertaking is dominant;
2. whether the counterparty is required to deal exclusively;
3. duration of exclusivity;
4. market coverage;
5. foreclosure of competitors;
6. switching costs;
7. availability of alternatives;
8. legitimate business justification;
9. effects on innovation and consumers.

China's platform-economy guidance expressly identifies arrangements requiring platform merchants to choose between competing platforms as a possible form of restricted transaction.

VII. Tying

Examination software exclusivity may also constitute tying.

For example:

A school purchases examination-management software, but the supplier requires it also to purchase the supplier's identity-verification, marking and analytics software.

Potentially problematic combinations include:

• examination platform + identity verification;
• examination software + question bank;
• examination software + cloud hosting;
• examination software + marking system;
• examination software + student analytics.

The central question is whether the supplier is using market power in one product to force customers to acquire another product.

The Supreme People's Court has considered tying in Wu Xiaoqin v Shaanxi Broadcasting & TV Network, where it analysed whether a dominant utility operator unlawfully tied an additional service to its basic service.

VIII. Administrative Monopoly: Particularly Important in Examination Software

This is arguably the most important Chinese-law issue.

Suppose a provincial education department says:

“All institutions participating in the examination must exclusively use Software X.”

Here, the problem may not simply be the software company's dominance.

The problem may be government intervention in favour of a particular supplier.

China's AML prohibits administrative authorities from abusing administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition, including by designating or effectively requiring entities or individuals to purchase or use goods supplied by a designated operator.

IX. Leading Case: Guangdong Education Department / Guanglianda Software

This is the most directly relevant Chinese case for examination software exclusivity.

Facts

The Guangdong Education Department organised a provincial selection competition involving an engineering-cost skills competition.

The competition rules expressly required participants to use Guanglianda's software exclusively.

A competing software company challenged the arrangement.

The argument was that the education authority had selected one software provider without an adequate open and fair competitive-selection process.

The courts found that the education authority's designation could affect:

• competing software suppliers;
• participating schools;
• software usage habits;
• market shares;
• future commercial opportunities.

The Guangdong courts concluded that the administrative designation constituted an abuse of administrative power that restricted competition. The appellate court upheld the conclusion.

Significance

This case is extraordinarily important for the hypothetical:

“Government-mandated examination software exclusivity.”

The court considered that exclusive designation could cause participating schools and students to develop dependence on the selected software, increasing the supplier's market position while reducing opportunities for competitors.

Principle

An education authority cannot simply say:

“We chose this software for convenience.”

It must be able to demonstrate that the selection is legally justified and appropriately competitive.

X. Case Law 2: Qihoo 360 v Tencent

Facts

Qihoo alleged that Tencent abused its dominant position in the instant-messaging software and services market.

Tencent required users effectively to choose between QQ and 360 products and also engaged in software bundling.

The dispute reached the Supreme People's Court.

The Court rejected Qihoo's claim because the relevant market and dominance had not been sufficiently established.

Principle

Exclusivity or technological restriction is not automatically illegal.

A claimant must establish:

1. relevant market;
2. dominance;
3. abusive conduct;
4. absence of adequate justification;
5. exclusionary or restrictive competitive effects.

Relevance to examination software

An examination platform cannot be condemned merely because it is technologically integrated.

The claimant must demonstrate that:

integration + market power + exclusionary effect

go beyond legitimate technological design.

XI. Case Law 3: Meituan “Choose One” Case

In 2021, China's market regulator found that Meituan had abused its dominant position in the online food-delivery platform market through “二选一” arrangements.

The conduct involved:

• exclusive cooperation;
• differential treatment;
• delayed onboarding;
• exclusive-dealing deposits;
• algorithms;
• data and technical measures;
• penalties designed to enforce exclusivity.

SAMR concluded that the arrangements restricted competition and imposed exclusive dealing on merchants. Meituan was fined RMB 3.442 billion and required to return exclusive-cooperation deposits of RMB 1.289 billion.

Relevance

This is highly relevant to examination platforms.

Imagine an examination software company telling schools:

“Use our platform exclusively or you will lose preferential access, technical support or examination services.”

The use of technical and algorithmic mechanisms to enforce exclusivity can strengthen the competition-law concern.

XII. Case Law 4: Alibaba “Choose One” Case

Alibaba's “choose one” enforcement action is another important Chinese precedent concerning exclusivity.

The underlying theory was that a dominant platform required merchants to maintain exclusive arrangements and restricted their ability to operate simultaneously through competing platforms.

Relevance

For examination software, an equivalent arrangement could be:

“A school using Platform A for official examinations cannot use Platform B for other examinations.”

The legal question would be whether the restriction materially forecloses competing examination platforms.

The key lesson is that exclusivity should be analysed according to its economic effects, not merely its contractual wording.

XIII. Case Law 5: China Super League Image Rights Case

The Supreme People's Court considered exclusive commercial exploitation of Chinese Super League image resources in the China Super League image-rights dispute.

The Court recognised that exclusive rights do not automatically constitute abusive monopolisation.

The exclusive rights had been awarded through a public competitive bidding process, and the exclusivity was found to have legitimate justification and insufficient anti-competitive effect.

Importance

This provides the necessary counter-principle:

Not every exclusive arrangement is unlawful.

If an examination authority conducts a genuine competitive procurement process and selects one software provider for a limited examination cycle for legitimate technical reasons, exclusivity may be defensible.

XIV. Case Law 6: Weihai Water Group Case

In Weihai Water Group, the Supreme People's Court recognised that restricted transactions can occur indirectly.

The Court held that a dominant public-utility operator may engage in restricted dealing even where the restriction is not expressed as a straightforward prohibition.

For example, merely recommending a particular supplier, combined with circumstances making customers practically unable to select competitors, can contribute to a finding of restricted dealing.

Relevance

This is highly useful for examination software.

Suppose an education authority does not expressly state:

“Competitors are prohibited.”

Instead it:

• provides technical information only to Software A;
• certifies only Software A;
• integrates only Software A;
• provides examination data only to Software A;
• refuses interoperability with Software B.

The practical result may nevertheless be:

Software A becomes the only commercially viable option.

That can raise the same competition concerns.

XV. Case Law 7: Tan v Agricultural Products Company — 2026

The Supreme People's Court's latest 2026 antitrust cases provide a particularly useful modern statement on exclusive dealing.

A market operator required a trader to operate exclusively in its market. When the trader operated in a competing market, the operator imposed a substantially higher transaction-service fee and effectively forced the trader to choose between the two markets.

The Supreme People's Court held that this constituted restricted dealing through the combination of:

• contractual exclusivity;
• discriminatory charges;
• economic pressure;
• “choose one” requirements.

The Court treated the discriminatory charge as part of the mechanism enforcing the exclusive arrangement rather than analysing it in isolation.

Relevance

An examination software provider could theoretically use similar mechanisms:

• higher licensing fees for schools using competitors;
• withdrawal of technical support;
• loss of preferential access;
• exclusion from examination databases;
• additional certification charges.

The legal analysis would examine whether these measures effectively force exclusive use.

XVI. Case Law 8: Wu Xiaoqin v Shaanxi Broadcasting & TV Network

This case concerned tying by a dominant utility operator.

The Supreme People's Court considered whether a basic service was being combined with another service in circumstances where customers did not have genuine freedom of choice.

The Court's reasoning illustrates the Chinese approach to examining whether separate services have effectively been bundled together by a dominant undertaking.

Examination-software application

Suppose an examination platform has substantial market power and requires:

examination software + proprietary cloud storage + proprietary identity verification + proprietary marking software.

The bundled arrangement may require examination under the AML's rules on tying and unreasonable conditions.

XVII. Administrative Exclusivity vs Commercial Exclusivity

This distinction is crucial.

XVIII. Legitimate Justifications

Exclusivity is not automatically unlawful.

A supplier or government authority may argue that exclusivity is necessary because of:

1. Examination security

A single system may reduce:

• hacking;
• cheating;
• identity fraud;
• data leakage.

2. Technical compatibility

A common software platform may facilitate:

• standardised examination formats;
• common APIs;
• uniform marking;
• secure data transmission.

3. Reliability

Large-scale examinations may require:

• predictable infrastructure;
• disaster recovery;
• uniform testing;
• stable technical support.

4. Cybersecurity

A common platform may make security auditing easier.

5. Procurement efficiency

An authority may legitimately procure one integrated system.

However, these justifications should be proportionate and evidence-based.

The authority should demonstrate why:

exclusive use is necessary

rather than merely:

one supplier is convenient.

XIX. When Exclusivity Becomes More Problematic

Risk increases where:

1. the supplier has very high market share;
2. the contract lasts for many years;
3. schools cannot switch easily;
4. examination data are locked into the platform;
5. APIs are unavailable;
6. competitors cannot obtain certification;
7. the government authority directly mandates the supplier;
8. technical standards are designed around one provider;
9. competing software is denied access to examination infrastructure;
10. exclusivity covers a substantial portion of national or provincial examinations.

XX. Data Lock-In and Examination Software

Modern examination platforms can create a particularly powerful form of foreclosure through data lock-in.

Suppose Platform A controls:

• student examination history;
• question banks;
• performance analytics;
• grading records;
• identity information;
• examination schedules.

If the school wants to migrate to Platform B but cannot export the data in a usable format, switching becomes expensive.

This creates:

Data → switching cost → reduced mobility → stronger incumbent position.

Therefore, interoperability and data portability can become important competition considerations.

XXI. Algorithmic and Platform Exclusivity

Modern examination software may use algorithms for:

• candidate allocation;
• automated marking;
• cheating detection;
• facial recognition;
• question selection;
• risk scoring;
• adaptive testing.

If the dominant platform uses technical architecture to make competing software incompatible, the conduct could be analysed as an exclusionary strategy.

China's platform-economy guidance recognises that data, algorithms, platform rules and technical mechanisms can be relevant to analysing restrictive conduct.

XXII. Public Procurement Dimension

Where an education department purchases examination software, competition law should also be considered at the procurement stage.

A legally safer procedure would ordinarily involve:

1. transparent specifications;
2. objective technical requirements;
3. open competition;
4. non-discriminatory qualification criteria;
5. transparent evaluation;
6. proportionate cybersecurity requirements;
7. interoperability requirements;
8. avoidance of unnecessary supplier-specific specifications.

The Guangdong Education Department–Guanglianda case demonstrates the danger of specifying one supplier's software without sufficiently demonstrating a lawful and competitive justification.

XXIII. Examination Software Exclusivity and Education Authorities

A particularly sensitive scenario is:

Government authority → schools → students

The authority may possess regulatory or administrative power that private software suppliers do not possess.

Consequently, a competitor challenging exclusivity can argue:

• the authority selected a particular undertaking;
• competitors were denied equal access;
• schools were forced into dependency;
• students were exposed to one platform;
• the selected undertaking gained reputational advantages;
• future market entry was impaired.

This is why the administrative-monopoly provisions of the AML can sometimes be more important than the ordinary abuse-of-dominance provisions.

XXIV. Competition Effects

The principal anti-competitive effects may include:

A. Foreclosure

Competing examination software providers lose access to schools.

B. Raising rivals' costs

Competitors must spend more to achieve certification and compatibility.

C. Entry barriers

New software providers cannot build sufficient user bases.

D. Network effects

The incumbent becomes increasingly attractive because everyone already uses it.

E. Innovation suppression

Competitors have less incentive to develop:

• better examination systems;
• AI assessment;
• security technology;
• accessibility tools.

F. Consumer harm

Schools and students may face:

• higher prices;
• lower quality;
• reduced choice;
• poorer interoperability.

XXV. A Competition-Law Test for Examination Software Exclusivity

A useful examination-answer framework is:

Step 1 — Identify the actor

Is it:

• private software company?
• examination authority?
• education department?
• public university?
• platform operator?

Step 2 — Define the market

Is it:

• general education software?
• examination software?
• online examination platforms?
• specialised professional examination software?

Step 3 — Determine market power

Examine:

• market share;
• entry barriers;
• network effects;
• data;
• switching costs.

Step 4 — Identify exclusivity

Is there:

• express exclusivity?
• contractual restriction?
• technical restriction?
• algorithmic restriction?
• indirect exclusivity?

Step 5 — Establish foreclosure

Ask:

Are competing examination software suppliers materially prevented from accessing customers?

Step 6 — Examine justification

Consider:

• cybersecurity;
• examination integrity;
• technical interoperability;
• reliability;
• procurement efficiency.

Step 7 — Examine proportionality

Could the legitimate objective be achieved through a less restrictive method?

Step 8 — Assess competitive effects

Consider:

• competitors;
• schools;
• students;
• innovation;
• prices;
• quality;
• choice.

XXVI. Hypothetical Example

Assume ExamTech China controls 70% of provincial computer-based examination software.

It signs contracts with 500 schools stating:

“Schools using ExamTech may not use competing examination software.”

ExamTech also:

• prevents export of examination data;
• gives discounts only to exclusive customers;
• refuses API access to competitors;
• requires examination authorities to certify only its platform.

Legal analysis

Relevant market: provincial examination software.

Dominance: potentially established because of 70% share plus strong network effects and switching costs.

Conduct: exclusive dealing and potentially technical foreclosure.

Effects: competitors lose access to schools and examination data.

Justification: cybersecurity and standardisation may be legitimate.

Proportionality: if equivalent security can be achieved through common standards and certification, complete exclusivity may be difficult to justify.

Conclusion: significant AML risk.

XXVII. Remedies

If unlawful exclusivity is established, possible remedies can include:

Behavioural remedies

• terminate exclusivity;
• permit multi-homing;
• allow competitors to connect;
• provide interoperability;
• prohibit discriminatory pricing;
• provide data portability.

Structural remedies

In exceptional circumstances, structural remedies could be considered where behavioural remedies cannot effectively restore competition.

Administrative remedies

Where an administrative authority is responsible, the relevant administrative decision may be challenged or required to be corrected.

The Guangdong education-software litigation demonstrates that courts can declare an administrative designation unlawful where it improperly restricts competition.

XXVIII. Six+ Key Cases at a Glance

The Supreme People's Court's 2026 antitrust cases expressly include restricted-transaction analysis and reinforce the importance of examining economic pressure used to enforce exclusivity.

XXIX. Conclusion

Competition law in China's examination-software sector is particularly significant because software exclusivity can create long-term technological and institutional lock-in.

The central distinction is:

Legitimate standardisation ≠ unlawful exclusion.

An examination authority may legitimately require technical security, reliability and interoperability. Similarly, a software provider may legitimately obtain an exclusive contract through a genuine competitive procurement process.

However, serious competition concerns arise where:

market power + exclusivity + foreclosure + lack of objective justification

combine to prevent competing examination-software suppliers from accessing schools, students or examination authorities.

The Guangdong Education Department–Guanglianda case is the strongest directly analogous authority because it demonstrates that the designation of one company's software in an educational competition can affect competitors' market opportunities and create dependence among participating institutions.

For an examination answer, the most important propositions are therefore:

1. Exclusive examination software is not per se unlawful.
2. Dominance must generally be established for an abuse-of-dominance claim.
3. Exclusive dealing can constitute restricted transaction under the AML.
4. Tying and unreasonable technical conditions may create additional liability.
5. Administrative designation of one software supplier creates a distinct administrative-monopoly problem.
6. Technical, algorithmic and data-based restrictions can constitute indirect exclusivity.
7. Legitimate cybersecurity and standardisation objectives may justify some restrictions, but proportionality matters.
8. The strongest Chinese precedent is the Guangdong Education Department–Guanglianda software case.
9. The Meituan, Alibaba, Tencent and Weihai Water cases provide broader principles for analysing exclusivity and digital lock-in.
10. The 2026 Supreme People's Court jurisprudence confirms that Chinese antitrust law is increasingly attentive to indirect and economically coercive forms of exclusive dealing.