Competition Law in EV Battery-Swap Platform Dominance in China

1. Introduction

Electric-vehicle battery swapping is developing as an alternative to conventional plug-in charging. In a battery-swap model, an operator may control several interconnected elements:

battery-swap stations;

vehicle–battery compatibility standards;

battery ownership or leasing;

station networks;

software and mobile applications;

battery-management data;

authentication and access systems;

payment and settlement infrastructure;

fleet and consumer relationships; and

interfaces connecting vehicles, batteries and swapping stations.

This creates a potentially important platform-economy competition problem. A battery-swap operator may become powerful not merely because it owns many stations, but because its ecosystem creates network effects, switching costs, data advantages and technological lock-in.

Chinese competition law is therefore capable of addressing battery-swap platform dominance through the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), the Platform Economy Anti-Monopoly Guidelines, and the 2024 Supreme People's Court judicial interpretation concerning monopoly civil disputes. The 2026 SAMR Internet Platform Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidelines further emphasize risks arising from data, algorithms, technology, capital and platform rules. (National People's Congress)

Important qualification: there does not appear to be a publicly reported Chinese enforcement decision specifically holding an EV battery-swapping platform dominant and abusive. Accordingly, the six cases below are analogical authorities showing how Chinese competition law would likely analyse such a case.

2. Relevant Legal Framework

A. Anti-Monopoly Law

The principal statutory framework is China's Anti-Monopoly Law, particularly the provisions dealing with:

monopoly agreements;

abuse of dominant market position;

concentrations; and

restrictions on competition.

Article 6 prohibits undertakings possessing a dominant market position from abusing that position to eliminate or restrict competition. (National People's Congress)

For an EV battery-swap platform, the central issue would therefore be:

Does the operator possess dominance in a properly defined battery-swapping market, and is it using that dominance to foreclose competing vehicles, batteries, stations, software or service providers?

3. Defining the Relevant Market

Market definition will be particularly important.

A regulator could potentially consider several alternative markets.

Possible Market 1: EV Battery-Swapping Services

The narrowest market could be:

commercial EV battery-swapping services in China.

This would distinguish swapping from conventional charging because the consumer obtains a rapid replacement battery rather than electricity through a charging process.

Possible Market 2: EV Energy-Replenishment Services

A broader market might include:

battery swapping;

DC fast charging;

ultra-fast charging;

other rapid-energy-replenishment technologies.

The question would depend on demand substitutability.

Possible Market 3: Battery-Swap Platform Services

Another possibility is a platform market consisting of:

station operators;

vehicle manufacturers;

battery providers;

fleet operators;

consumers.

The Platform Economy Anti-Monopoly Guidelines expressly recognise that platform markets may involve multiple sides, network effects, switching costs, user stickiness and cross-platform effects. (China Anti-Corruption Agency)

Possible Market 4: Compatible Battery-Swap Ecosystem

A particularly important possibility is a market for:

a specific technologically compatible battery-swapping ecosystem.

For example, if only vehicles using a particular battery architecture can use a particular station network, the relevant competitive constraint may be much narrower than the general charging market.

4. Market Dominance

Chinese platform competition analysis does not rely exclusively on market share.

The authorities may consider:

market share;

transaction volume;

number of active users;

network effects;

financial strength;

technical capabilities;

control over data;

switching costs;

user dependence;

platform interoperability;

barriers to entry;

ability to control prices or transaction conditions;

access to essential infrastructure; and

technological advantages.

The Platform Economy Guidelines expressly identify network effects, lock-in, switching costs, data and platform-entry barriers as relevant considerations. (China Anti-Corruption Agency)

For battery swapping, this means that station count alone would not necessarily establish dominance.

A regulator could instead ask:

How difficult would it be for a competing battery-swap platform to reproduce the incumbent's network, compatible battery pool, software ecosystem and consumer base?

5. Network Effects

Battery swapping can generate powerful direct and indirect network effects.

Direct network effect

More drivers using the platform can make the network more attractive because more stations and better utilisation become economically viable.

Indirect network effect

More vehicles can attract:

station operators;

battery suppliers;

investors;

fleet customers.

Conversely, more stations make the platform more attractive to vehicle users.

This can create a reinforcing cycle:

More Vehicles → More Battery Demand → More Stations → Greater Consumer Convenience → More Vehicles

A dominant undertaking could potentially use this network effect to make entry by a rival extremely difficult.

6. Switching Costs and Lock-In

Battery swapping creates unusual switching costs.

A driver may be dependent upon:

compatible battery dimensions;

battery-management software;

authentication systems;

subscription arrangements;

battery ownership models;

station coverage;

vehicle warranty requirements;

payment systems;

battery health data.

If changing platforms requires changing the vehicle itself, the switching cost may be exceptionally high.

This is legally significant because China's platform guidelines specifically recognise lock-in effects, user stickiness and switching costs in determining dominance. (China Anti-Corruption Agency)

7. Potential Abusive Conduct

A. Exclusive Dealing

Suppose a dominant battery-swap platform requires vehicle manufacturers to agree:

"Vehicles compatible with our battery architecture may not participate in rival battery-swap networks."

This could constitute 限定交易 / exclusive dealing.

The same issue arises if a dominant platform requires station operators to use exclusively its batteries or software.

The Alibaba and Meituan cases are particularly relevant.

8. Case Law 1 — Alibaba Group / Online Retail Platform

Facts

SAMR found Alibaba dominant in China's online retail platform services market.

Alibaba had imposed the well-known "choose one from two" arrangement, requiring merchants to avoid competing platforms or face various commercial disadvantages.

SAMR concluded that Alibaba used market power, platform rules, data and algorithms to enforce exclusivity.

It imposed a fine of RMB 18.228 billion. (SAMR)

Principle

The case demonstrates that Chinese competition law is prepared to treat platform-mediated exclusivity as an abuse of dominance.

Application to battery swapping

Suppose a dominant battery-swap platform tells EV manufacturers:

"If you use our battery-swapping network, you cannot make your vehicles compatible with a competing network."

That could resemble Alibaba's exclusivity problem.

The relevant competitive harm would be:

foreclosure of rival platforms;

reduced interoperability;

higher entry barriers;

reduced consumer choice;

reduced innovation.

9. Case Law 2 — Meituan / Food-Delivery Platform

Facts

SAMR investigated Meituan's conduct in China's online food-delivery platform services market.

Meituan used:

differential rates;

delayed merchant onboarding;

exclusive cooperation arrangements;

exclusive cooperation deposits;

data;

algorithms; and

punitive measures.

SAMR concluded that the conduct constituted abuse of dominance through restricting counterparties to transact exclusively with it. (SAMR)

Battery-Swap Relevance

This is highly relevant to battery swapping.

Imagine a dominant battery-swap platform tells station operators:

"You may operate on our network only if you do not host rival batteries."

Or:

"Vehicle manufacturers using our platform cannot cooperate with competing swap networks."

Such arrangements could substantially increase competitors' costs and reduce their ability to achieve network scale.

10. Case Law 3 — Qihoo 360 v Tencent

Facts

In the landmark Qihoo 360 v Tencent case, Qihoo alleged that Tencent abused its dominant position in the instant-messaging market.

The dispute involved Tencent's demand that users choose between Tencent's services and Qihoo's software.

The Supreme People's Court ultimately rejected the abuse claim because the evidence did not establish Tencent's dominance in the properly defined relevant market. (IPC Court)

Legal Importance

The case is particularly important for battery-swap platforms because it demonstrates:

A large user base does not automatically establish dominance.

The Supreme People's Court emphasised:

relevant market definition;

market share;

competitive constraints;

market entry;

user behaviour;

network characteristics; and

actual competitive effects.

It also recognised that market definition in Internet cases can be complex and that market share may be an imperfect indicator. (IPC Court)

Battery-Swap Application

A battery-swap operator might have a large number of stations but still face meaningful competition from:

fast charging;

other swap networks;

alternative battery technologies;

manufacturer-owned networks.

Therefore, the operator must be shown to possess actual market power, not merely commercial success.

11. Case Law 4 — Qualcomm / China

Facts

China's NDRC found Qualcomm dominant in markets involving CDMA, WCDMA and LTE standard-essential patent licensing and baseband chips.

Qualcomm was found to have engaged in several abusive practices involving licensing and commercial conditions.

The NDRC ordered corrective measures and imposed a RMB 6.088 billion penalty. (NDRC)

Battery-Swap Relevance

The case is important where battery swapping involves proprietary technical standards.

A dominant platform could potentially control:

battery-interface standards;

authentication technology;

battery-management systems;

communications protocols;

patents;

station-control software.

If the platform refuses reasonable access to essential technology without legitimate justification, competition concerns may arise.

The modern judicial framework expressly recognises refusal to make platforms, software systems, technology, data or intellectual property compatible or accessible as potentially relevant to refusal-to-deal analysis. (Gongbao)

12. Case Law 5 — Weihai Water / Public-Utility Exclusive Dealing

Facts

In Weihai Water Group v Weihai property developer, the Supreme People's Court considered an abuse-of-dominance dispute involving a public utility.

The Court recognised that exclusive dealing can occur indirectly, not merely through an explicit contractual prohibition.

A dominant utility could effectively restrict consumer choice by recommending only a particular transaction counterparty or withholding information about alternatives.

The Court treated such conduct as potentially constituting implicit exclusive dealing. (IPC Court)

Battery-Swap Application

This principle could become important where a battery-swap platform does not expressly prohibit alternatives but effectively makes them unavailable.

For example:

the app displays only its own stations;

rival stations are hidden from navigation;

competing batteries cannot be authenticated;

vehicles are technically prevented from using rival stations;

users receive warnings discouraging use of competing networks.

An apparently neutral technical rule could therefore have an exclusionary effect.

13. Case Law 6 — Cable Digital Television Public-Utility Case

The Supreme People's Court has also identified cases concerning dominant public-utility operators involving bundling and refusal to deal.

The Court's typical-case materials identify a case concerning a cable digital television public-utility undertaking involving alleged tying and refusal to deal. (Supreme People's Court)

Battery-Swap Application

A dominant battery-swap operator could potentially engage in unlawful tying by requiring:

Battery-swapping service + compulsory battery lease

or:

Battery access + compulsory software subscription

or:

Battery-swapping + exclusive maintenance services.

The crucial question would be whether the products are separate, whether consumers are forced to accept the tied product, and whether competition in the tied market is foreclosed.

14. Refusal to Deal

Refusal to deal could be one of the most significant battery-swap issues.

Suppose a dominant platform controls the largest network of swapping stations and refuses to allow compatible rival vehicles to use the network.

The legal analysis would ask:

Is the platform dominant?

Is access technically feasible?

Is access economically feasible?

Is the infrastructure reasonably reproducible?

Do competitors depend upon access?

Does refusal eliminate or restrict downstream competition?

Is there a legitimate justification?

The 2024 Supreme People's Court judicial interpretation expressly provides guidance on refusal to trade involving platforms, software, technology, data and interfaces. (Gongbao)

15. Essential-Facility Theory

The essential-facility argument could become especially important in battery swapping.

A battery-swap network might potentially be considered indispensable where:

it covers an exceptionally large geographic area;

rival networks cannot economically reproduce it;

consumers are substantially dependent on it;

interoperability is technically feasible;

access is necessary for downstream competition.

However, dominance alone does not automatically create an obligation to open infrastructure.

The Chinese platform guidelines indicate that essential-facility analysis requires consideration of:

data controlled by the platform;

substitutability of competing platforms;

availability of potential alternatives;

feasibility of developing competing platforms;

dependence of trading parties; and

consequences of opening the platform. (China Anti-Corruption Agency)

16. Interoperability

Interoperability is arguably the central competition issue for battery swapping.

A dominant platform could theoretically prevent competition by making its:

batteries;

connectors;

battery-management systems;

software;

authentication protocols;

payment systems;

station interfaces

incompatible with rival systems.

Chinese judicial guidance now specifically recognises refusal to make a platform, software system or other technology compatible with another system as potentially relevant to abuse of dominance. (Gongbao)

Therefore:

Technical incompatibility is not automatically illegal, but deliberate exclusionary incompatibility by a dominant undertaking may create significant AML risk.

17. Tying and Bundling

Battery swapping produces several possible tying arrangements.

Example 1

Dominant platform sells the vehicle only together with its battery-swap subscription.

Example 2

Station access is conditional upon purchasing the platform's battery-management software.

Example 3

The platform requires battery leasing exclusively from its affiliated finance company.

Example 4

Access to swapping stations is tied to exclusive maintenance.

Under the 2024 judicial interpretation, tying can involve separately saleable products where the counterparty is effectively forced to accept the tied product and the conduct eliminates or restricts competition. (Gongbao)

18. Data Advantage

Battery-swap platforms can accumulate extremely valuable information:

battery health;

charging and swapping frequency;

degradation;

geographic demand;

driving patterns;

station utilisation;

battery inventory;

vehicle performance;

consumer preferences.

This data may create a significant competitive advantage.

A dominant platform could potentially use the data to:

disadvantage rival stations;

discriminate against rival vehicle manufacturers;

predict competitor expansion;

optimise its own station placement;

deny rivals necessary information;

engage in self-preferencing.

The Chinese platform framework expressly treats data control and data-processing capability as relevant to market power. (China Anti-Corruption Agency)

19. Self-Preferencing

Suppose a platform operates both:

a battery-swapping marketplace; and

its own battery and station business.

It could theoretically rank its own stations first, give its batteries better availability, or provide its affiliated vehicles with preferential access.

Possible forms include:

preferential station allocation;

priority battery availability;

better subscription prices;

preferential software functionality;

better app visibility;

faster authentication;

preferential data access.

The competition concern would be leveraging platform control into adjacent markets.

20. Predatory Pricing

A large platform might subsidise battery swapping below cost to rapidly acquire users.

Low pricing is not automatically unlawful.

The key questions would include:

Is the platform dominant?

Is the price below the relevant cost benchmark?

Is the conduct sustained?

Can equally efficient competitors survive?

Is there an exclusionary strategy?

Is recoupment plausible?

Are there legitimate network-building efficiencies?

Chinese judicial guidance recognises that platform multi-sided costs and relationships between different sides of a platform must be considered when assessing below-cost conduct. (Gongbao)

21. Excessive Pricing

The opposite problem could arise once competitors have been excluded.

A dominant platform might impose:

excessive swapping fees;

excessive battery rental fees;

unreasonable membership charges;

discriminatory station-access fees.

However, establishing excessive pricing would require careful economic comparison and consideration of investment, innovation and risk.

22. Algorithmic Discrimination

Battery-swap platforms are highly dependent upon algorithms.

An operator could potentially use algorithms to:

vary swapping prices;

allocate batteries;

prioritize vehicles;

restrict station access;

rank stations;

discriminate between manufacturers;

detect and punish use of competing platforms.

China's 2026 Internet Platform Anti-Monopoly Compliance Guidelines expressly identify data analytics, artificial intelligence, algorithms, interface calls, data usage and traffic allocation as areas requiring antitrust compliance. (SAMR)

23. Cross-Platform Network Effects

A battery-swap platform may become particularly powerful if it connects:

Vehicle Owners ↔ Vehicle Manufacturers ↔ Battery Owners ↔ Battery Suppliers ↔ Swap Stations ↔ Fleet Operators ↔ Financial Services

This is effectively a multi-sided platform ecosystem.

The more participants join one side, the more valuable the other sides become.

That can produce a strong barrier to entry.

24. Foreclosure of Rival Vehicle Manufacturers

Consider a hypothetical dominant swap platform that tells automobile manufacturers:

"Your vehicles can use our network only if you do not make them compatible with competing swap systems."

This could:

prevent interoperability;

raise rivals' costs;

prevent new entrants from reaching consumers;

increase switching costs;

reinforce the incumbent's network effect.

It would therefore present a serious exclusive-dealing concern under Chinese AML principles.

25. Foreclosure of Rival Battery Manufacturers

The same concern exists upstream.

A dominant platform might require:

"Only our battery technology can be used in stations connected to our network."

A safety or technical justification may be legitimate.

But if the requirement goes beyond what is necessary for:

safety;

battery integrity;

cybersecurity;

warranty protection;

technical compatibility,

it may become an exclusionary restriction.

The 2024 judicial interpretation recognises protection of safety, data security, intellectual property and legitimate platform interests as possible justifications, but the justification must be genuine and proportionate. (Gongbao)

26. Competition Concerns in a Closed Battery Ecosystem

A closed ecosystem can generate:

First-stage foreclosure

Rival batteries cannot enter.

Second-stage foreclosure

Rival station operators cannot obtain customers.

Third-stage foreclosure

Rival vehicle manufacturers cannot offer interchangeable vehicles.

Fourth-stage foreclosure

Consumers become locked into the dominant ecosystem.

This can produce a self-reinforcing monopoly.

27. Concentration and Merger Control

Dominance can also arise through mergers.

For example:

Battery-swap platform + major EV manufacturer + battery producer + station network.

A transaction combining these businesses could create substantial vertical and ecosystem effects.

SAMR's recent enforcement priorities show continuing attention to concentrations in platforms and lithium-battery-related sectors, illustrating the broader regulatory significance of these industries. (SAMR)

Potential concerns include:

vertical foreclosure;

access discrimination;

raising rivals' costs;

data combination;

interoperability restrictions;

elimination of nascent competitors.

28. Public-Interest and Innovation Considerations

Battery swapping is strategically important for:

EV adoption;

energy efficiency;

battery utilisation;

urban mobility;

commercial fleets;

renewable-energy integration.

Competition authorities therefore have to balance:

Competition + Innovation + Safety + Standardisation + Investment

A rule requiring interoperability may promote competition but could also undermine legitimate technical standards.

Conversely, excessive standardisation controlled by one undertaking could create artificial entry barriers.

29. Possible Defences

A dominant battery-swap platform could argue:

1. Safety

Only certified batteries can be admitted because defective batteries could create fire or operational risks.

2. Cybersecurity

Open interfaces could create cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

3. Battery integrity

The platform may need control over battery-management systems.

4. Intellectual property

Interoperability could require licensing proprietary technology.

5. Investment protection

The operator may argue that competitors should not free-ride on its infrastructure investment.

6. Efficiency

Exclusive arrangements may reduce transaction costs and improve station utilisation.

7. Consumer protection

Uniform technical standards may ensure predictable swapping performance.

These defences are potentially legitimate, but they should be objective, necessary and proportionate, rather than disguised exclusionary mechanisms.

30. Remedies

If abuse is established, possible remedies could include:

Structural remedies

divestiture;

separation of platform and battery businesses;

separation of station and vehicle operations.

Behavioural remedies

prohibition of exclusivity;

mandatory interoperability;

non-discriminatory access;

transparent technical standards;

API access;

data-access rules;

prohibition of self-preferencing;

restrictions on discriminatory pricing.

Compliance remedies

algorithm audits;

data-governance controls;

competition compliance programmes;

periodic reporting;

internal antitrust review.

China's 2026 platform compliance framework specifically encourages platforms with significant market share or market power to periodically assess whether they possess a dominant position and to manage risks involving restrictive dealing, tying, discrimination and other abuses. (SAMR)

31. Six Case-Law Principles Compared

32. Hypothetical Example

Assume Platform A controls 75% of China's commercial battery-swap stations.

It also controls:

the largest battery inventory;

the dominant swap application;

battery-management software;

vehicle authentication;

battery-health data.

Platform A then requires vehicle manufacturers to agree:

"Vehicles using Platform A's batteries may not access competing swap networks."

It additionally:

refuses API access to rival networks;

gives its own vehicles priority access;

hides competing stations in its app;

requires exclusive battery leasing;

charges rivals substantially higher access fees.

Competition-law analysis

Step 1 — Relevant market:
Battery-swapping services or a narrower compatible battery-swap ecosystem.

Step 2 — Dominance:
75% market share + network effects + data + infrastructure + switching costs may provide strong evidence.

Step 3 — Conduct:
Exclusive dealing, refusal to deal, discrimination, tying and interoperability restrictions.

Step 4 — Effects:
Rivals cannot achieve network scale.

Step 5 — Justification:
Safety and technical compatibility would be examined.

Step 6 — Outcome:
If legitimate justification is inadequate, the conduct could potentially constitute abuse of dominant market position.

33. Special Importance of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation

The 2024 Supreme People's Court interpretation is particularly significant for this sector because it expressly addresses:

refusal to deal;

platform compatibility;

technology;

data;

platform interfaces;

exclusive dealing;

tying;

differential treatment.

For example, refusal to open a platform or interface can be evaluated by considering technical and economic feasibility, substitutability, rebuilding costs, competitor dependence, innovation effects and competitive foreclosure. (Gongbao)

That framework fits battery-swapping unusually well.

34. Overall Legal Test

A Chinese competition authority or court would likely examine the problem through the following sequence:

Relevant Market

↓

Market Share + Network Effects

↓

User Dependence + Switching Costs

↓

Data + Technology + Infrastructure Control

↓

Barriers to Entry

↓

Dominance

↓

Identification of Conduct

↓

Exclusivity / Refusal / Tying / Discrimination / Predatory Pricing / Self-Preferencing

↓

Actual or Potential Exclusionary Effects

↓

Efficiency, Safety, IP and Other Justifications

↓

Proportionality

↓

Remedy

35. Conclusion

Competition law in China can potentially play a major role in regulating EV battery-swap platform dominance, even though there is not yet a prominent publicly reported Chinese enforcement decision specifically declaring an EV battery-swap platform dominant.

The most important competition risks are likely to be exclusive dealing, refusal to deal, interoperability restrictions, tying, discriminatory access, self-preferencing, data exploitation and exclusionary algorithmic conduct.

The Alibaba and Meituan decisions demonstrate the danger of platform-based exclusivity; Qihoo 360 v Tencent demonstrates the importance of carefully establishing the relevant market and actual dominance; Qualcomm illustrates the importance of technology and IP control; and the Supreme People's Court's recent cases and 2024 judicial interpretation provide particularly useful guidance on implicit exclusivity, interoperability, platform access, tying and refusal to deal. (SAMR)

Accordingly, the central competition-law question is not simply "Who owns the most battery-swap stations?" It is:

Whether control over the battery, vehicle, station, software, data and interoperability ecosystem enables one undertaking to exclude competing battery-swap networks and thereby restrict competition in a relevant Chinese market.