Competition Law and Ride-Hailing Platform Competition Issues

1. Introduction

Ride-hailing platforms connect passengers with drivers through digital applications. They may perform several functions simultaneously:

matching passengers and drivers;

setting or influencing fares;

allocating rides;

processing payments;

rating drivers and passengers;

determining incentives;

collecting and analysing data;

providing navigation and other digital services;

managing driver access to the platform.

Examples of competition issues include:

market definition;

platform dominance;

network effects;

driver exclusivity;

passenger exclusivity;

predatory pricing;

surge pricing;

algorithmic pricing;

driver incentives;

self-preferencing;

access to platform data;

interoperability;

multi-homing;

mergers and acquisitions;

algorithmic coordination;

refusal of access;

discriminatory platform access.

European Union law is particularly important because the Court of Justice has already considered the legal nature of Uber's services and several EU cases concerning digital platforms provide principles directly relevant to ride-hailing competition.

2. Nature of the Ride-Hailing Market

A ride-hailing platform is normally a multi-sided market.

There are at least two principal groups:

Passengers ↔ Ride-hailing platform ↔ Drivers

The platform must attract both sides.

More drivers can mean:

shorter waiting times;

greater geographical coverage;

better passenger choice.

More passengers can mean:

greater earning opportunities for drivers;

greater utilisation of vehicles;

stronger incentives for drivers to join.

This creates indirect network effects.

Consequently:

More drivers → better service → more passengers → more rides → more drivers.

These network effects can make entry difficult for smaller platforms.

3. Relevant Product Market

The first competition-law question is:

What is the relevant market?

Possible definitions include:

A. Taxi services

Traditional taxis and app-based ride-hailing may compete directly.

B. Ride-hailing services

The market could be defined around app-based pre-booked rides.

C. Urban passenger transport

The relevant market might include:

taxis;

ride-hailing;

private-hire vehicles;

potentially public transport for some journeys.

D. Platform intermediation

A separate market could potentially be considered for digital intermediation between drivers and passengers.

The correct definition depends upon:

substitutability;

price;

consumer behaviour;

geographical coverage;

regulatory restrictions;

waiting time;

availability;

service quality.

4. The Importance of the Uber Cases

The Court of Justice has made an important distinction between different Uber business models.

Elite Taxi — Case C-434/15

In Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain, the Court held that Uber's UberPop service was not merely an information-society service. Its intermediation service formed an integral part of an overall service whose principal component was transport. The Member State could therefore regulate the service as transport. (Infocuria)

This case is not itself an Article 101/102 competition judgment, but it is extremely important for defining the economic nature of the platform.

Competition relevance

The more control a platform exercises over:

fares;

drivers;

matching;

service conditions;

customer relationships,

the more difficult it may be to characterise the platform simply as a passive technology intermediary.

5. Uber France — Case C-320/16

In Uber France, the Court again considered UberPop, where Uber fixed fares, collected the customer's payment and paid part of the fare to the driver.

The Court treated the service as falling within the field of transport rather than merely an information-society service for the purposes of the relevant EU framework. (Infocuria)

Competition relevance

The case demonstrates that the actual economic organisation of the platform matters more than the label “digital platform.”

This becomes important when analysing:

control over drivers;

pricing;

vertical relationships;

market definition;

platform responsibility.

6. Platform Competition and Article 101 TFEU

Article 101 TFEU concerns agreements and concerted practices between undertakings that restrict competition.

Ride-hailing platforms can potentially encounter Article 101 problems when they coordinate with:

competing platforms;

taxi companies;

driver associations;

fleet operators;

payment providers;

other intermediaries.

Potential conduct includes:

price coordination;

market allocation;

customer allocation;

driver allocation;

coordinated commission rates;

agreements restricting multi-homing.

7. Article 102 TFEU and Dominant Ride-Hailing Platforms

Article 102 applies where an undertaking holds a dominant position and abuses that position.

The European Commission's current Article 102 framework covers exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings. The Commission adopted its first formal Guidelines on exclusionary abuses on 3 September 2026. (Competition Policy)

A large ride-hailing platform therefore does not infringe Article 102 merely because it has a large market share.

There must be:

a relevant market;

dominance;

abusive conduct;

potential or actual competitive harm satisfying the applicable legal test.

8. Network Effects

Network effects are central to ride-hailing competition.

Suppose Platform A has:

100,000 drivers;

5 million passengers.

A new Platform B may have difficulty attracting drivers because there are fewer passengers.

At the same time, passengers may avoid B because fewer drivers are available.

This creates a chicken-and-egg problem:

Few drivers → fewer passengers → fewer drivers.

A successful incumbent can therefore acquire significant competitive advantages from scale.

9. Multi-Homing

Multi-homing means drivers or passengers use several platforms.

For example, a driver may simultaneously use:

Platform A;

Platform B;

Platform C.

Multi-homing can make markets more competitive because customers and drivers can switch more easily.

Competition concerns become greater if a platform attempts to prevent or discourage multi-homing.

10. Driver Exclusivity

A platform could potentially provide:

“Drivers who work exclusively for us receive higher incentives.”

This is not automatically unlawful.

However, if the platform is dominant, an exclusivity arrangement may require Article 102 analysis.

Important factors include:

duration;

percentage of drivers covered;

market coverage;

switching possibilities;

alternative platforms;

incentive size;

foreclosure capability.

The Court's Unilever Italia judgment confirms that exclusivity arrangements involving a dominant undertaking must be assessed for their actual capability to exclude competitors, including relevant evidence supplied by the undertaking. (curia)

11. Case 1 — Unilever Italia, C-680/20

Facts

Unilever was found by the Italian competition authority to have abused a dominant position in the market for individually packaged ice cream through exclusivity clauses imposed through distributors.

The Court considered:

attribution of distributor conduct;

economic unity;

exclusivity;

exclusionary capability.

Principle

A competition authority must assess whether exclusivity conduct is capable of excluding competitors and must consider relevant evidence concerning its actual competitive capability. (curia)

Ride-hailing relevance

A dominant ride-hailing platform offering drivers substantial incentives for exclusive participation could face similar analysis.

12. Driver Incentives

Ride-hailing platforms commonly use:

sign-up bonuses;

guaranteed earnings;

minimum-income guarantees;

peak-time bonuses;

referral payments;

loyalty incentives.

These can be legitimate ways to attract drivers.

The competition question is whether incentives are structured so as to foreclose rival platforms.

For example:

“Complete 100 rides and receive a bonus.”

is not inherently problematic.

But:

“Drive exclusively for us for 12 months and receive a substantial payment unavailable to multi-homing drivers.”

may deserve much closer scrutiny if offered by a dominant platform.

13. Passenger Exclusivity

A platform could also offer passengers:

subscription discounts;

membership benefits;

free rides;

loyalty points;

cashback.

An aggressive loyalty program could make switching less attractive.

Competition analysis would consider:

reward size;

duration;

exclusivity;

customer coverage;

switching costs;

market power.

14. Predatory Pricing

Ride-hailing companies may initially offer rides at very low prices.

A platform might subsidise:

passenger fares;

driver commissions;

promotional discounts.

This can be legitimate because platforms often need to attract users and create network effects.

However, a dominant undertaking could face scrutiny if pricing below appropriate cost forms part of an exclusionary strategy.

The relevant question is not:

“Is the ride cheap?”

but:

“Is the pricing strategy capable of unlawfully excluding competitors, taking account of the applicable cost and effects analysis?”

15. Cross-Subsidisation

A large technology company might operate:

ride-hailing;

food delivery;

digital payments;

advertising;

mapping;

financial services.

It may use profits from another business to subsidise ride-hailing.

Cross-subsidisation is not automatically unlawful.

But if a dominant undertaking uses market power from one market to exclude competitors in another, competition authorities may investigate the conduct.

16. Surge Pricing

Ride-hailing platforms frequently adjust prices according to:

demand;

driver availability;

location;

time;

traffic.

Dynamic pricing is not inherently anti-competitive.

However, algorithmic pricing can create competition concerns if competing undertakings use systems that facilitate coordination.

The important distinction is:

Independent algorithmic pricing

Each company independently adjusts its prices.

Coordinated algorithmic pricing

Competitors use a system or arrangement that effectively coordinates pricing.

The latter can raise Article 101 issues.

17. Algorithmic Coordination

Suppose competing ride-hailing platforms use a common algorithm that recommends identical fares.

If the algorithm merely reacts independently to market conditions, this does not automatically establish a cartel.

But if competitors:

share competitively sensitive information;

agree to use a common pricing mechanism;

intentionally coordinate outputs;

communicate through an algorithmic intermediary,

Article 101 risks increase.

18. Case 2 — Eturas, C-74/14

Facts

Eturas operated a common online booking system used by travel agencies.

The system administrator sent a message limiting the discounts that participating agencies could offer online, and the system technically implemented the restriction.

The Court considered whether the agencies' conduct could constitute a concerted practice under Article 101. (Infocuria)

Principle

A digital system can be a mechanism through which competitors coordinate their commercial behaviour.

Ride-hailing relevance

This is highly relevant to:

common algorithms;

platform-mediated pricing;

automated restrictions;

shared software;

digital communications.

A platform cannot assume that an automated system removes competition-law responsibility.

19. Platform Commission Rates

Ride-hailing platforms normally charge drivers a commission.

Possible competition questions include:

Is the commission excessive?

Is it discriminatory?

Are drivers prevented from using alternative platforms?

Does the platform impose exclusivity?

Are competing platforms disadvantaged?

A high commission alone does not establish an infringement.

The legal assessment depends upon market power and the relevant theory of harm.

20. Self-Preferencing

A ride-hailing platform may operate other services such as:

food delivery;

vehicle rental;

payment services;

mapping;

fleet management.

Suppose it gives its own affiliated service preferential access to:

drivers;

passenger data;

search results;

app visibility;

promotional placement.

This can raise self-preferencing concerns.

21. Case 3 — Google Shopping, C-48/22 P

Although Google Shopping does not concern transportation, it is a major European precedent concerning digital-platform self-preferencing.

The Court of Justice upheld the finding that Google abused a dominant position by favouring its own comparison-shopping service in general search results. (Infocuria)

Principle

A dominant platform may breach Article 102 when it uses its position in one market to advantage its own service in a related market in a manner capable of foreclosing competition.

Ride-hailing relevance

The principle could become relevant where a dominant mobility platform:

ranks its affiliated services above rivals;

preferentially displays its own fleet;

gives affiliated services better access to users;

disadvantages competing mobility applications.

The factual and economic analysis would, however, depend on the particular platform.

22. Refusal of Interoperability

A ride-hailing ecosystem may depend upon interoperability with:

navigation apps;

payment platforms;

vehicle systems;

mobility applications;

public transport applications.

A dominant platform could potentially refuse interoperability with a competing service.

23. Case 4 — Alphabet and Others, C-233/23

In Alphabet and Others v AGCM, the Court of Justice considered whether a dominant digital platform's refusal to make its platform interoperable with a third-party application could constitute abuse under Article 102.

The Court held that refusal of interoperability can constitute abuse even where the platform is not strictly indispensable, where the platform was developed to allow third-party use and the refusal makes the third-party application less attractive to consumers. The Court also recognised possible objective justifications, including security or integrity concerns. (curia)

Ride-hailing relevance

This could be relevant to:

mobility applications;

integrated transport apps;

navigation;

payment;

ride-hailing interoperability.

24. Access to Platform Data

Ride-hailing platforms possess substantial information concerning:

passenger demand;

driver availability;

journey patterns;

pricing;

cancellation rates;

geographical demand;

peak periods.

Data can therefore become an important competitive asset.

A dominant platform could potentially use data gathered from one market to strengthen another business.

25. Data Advantage and Competitive Foreclosure

A platform with superior data may be able to:

predict demand;

optimise pricing;

recruit drivers;

target promotions;

improve matching.

These can be legitimate efficiencies.

The competition issue arises if data advantages are combined with exclusionary conduct.

26. Platform Self-Preferencing and Driver Allocation

Suppose a platform operates:

its own ride-hailing service;

an independent-driver marketplace.

If the platform systematically directs the most profitable passengers to its affiliated fleet while disadvantaging independent drivers, an Article 102 analysis could potentially arise where dominance and exclusionary capability are established.

This would be analogous in principle to platform self-preferencing cases, although the actual legal analysis would depend on the specific facts.

27. Case 5 — Booking.com, C-264/23

Facts

Booking.com used price-parity clauses requiring hotels not to offer lower prices through certain alternative channels.

The Court of Justice held that such parity clauses could not, in principle, be regarded as ancillary restraints necessary for the platform's operation. The Court also noted their potential to reduce competition between platforms and risk excluding smaller platforms and new entrants. (curia)

Ride-hailing relevance

The analogous issue would be a ride-hailing platform requiring drivers to:

offer the same or better terms exclusively through the dominant platform.

Examples might include restrictions on:

driver pricing;

driver promotions;

direct bookings;

competing apps.

The precise legality would depend upon the agreement, market power and effects.

28. Price-Parity Clauses in Ride-Hailing

A ride-hailing platform could theoretically tell drivers:

“You may not offer passengers lower prices through another platform.”

This could make it difficult for smaller competitors to attract customers through lower prices.

The Booking.com case demonstrates why platform-imposed parity arrangements deserve careful Article 101 analysis. (curia)

29. Case 6 — Star Taxi App, C-62/19

Facts

Star Taxi operated an application connecting taxi users with taxi drivers.

Importantly:

it did not forward bookings directly to drivers;

it did not determine the fare;

customers chose from available drivers;

the fare was paid directly to the driver.

The Court treated the service as an information-society service where it was not integral to an overall transport service. (curia)

Competition relevance

The case demonstrates that not all digital mobility intermediaries are economically identical.

The degree of platform control matters.

This distinction can influence:

market definition;

regulatory treatment;

competitive relationships;

assessment of vertical integration.

30. Case 7 — Uber Systems Spain / Elite Taxi, C-434/15

This case deserves separate treatment from Uber France.

Principle

The Court concluded that UberPop's intermediation service formed an integral part of an overall service whose principal component was transport. (Infocuria)

Competition significance

The case provides an important analytical contrast:

Competition authorities therefore need to examine the actual functions performed by the platform.

31. Case 8 — Unilever Italia, C-680/20

This case is particularly useful for ride-hailing because drivers can function economically as the platform's distribution/service network.

The Court considered when conduct by formally independent distributors can be attributed to a dominant undertaking and emphasised the need to assess exclusionary capability. (curia)

Ride-hailing application

A platform cannot necessarily avoid competition-law scrutiny merely by arguing:

“The drivers are independent businesses, so their conduct is outside our responsibility.”

The actual economic relationship and control structure matter.

32. Case 9 — Google Shopping, C-48/22 P

The Court's 2024 judgment upheld the finding of abuse concerning Google's favouring of its own comparison-shopping service. (Infocuria)

Ride-hailing application

A dominant mobility platform might face analogous scrutiny if it:

owns competing transport services;

controls the platform interface;

ranks its own services preferentially;

deprives rival services of equivalent visibility.

This is an analogy, not a holding specifically about ride-hailing.

33. Case Comparison

34. Predatory Promotions

Ride-hailing platforms often provide:

first-ride discounts;

free rides;

referral credits;

passenger coupons;

driver bonuses.

These may be important for entering a market.

A new entrant can legitimately use aggressive introductory pricing.

However, if a dominant platform systematically prices below relevant cost with the purpose or capability of excluding competitors, predatory-pricing analysis may become relevant.

35. Driver Bonus Wars

Imagine:

Platform A

Pays drivers €500 for joining.

Platform B

Pays €700.

Platform A

Responds with €2,000 exclusivity bonuses.

A competition authority would need to examine:

whether A is dominant;

duration;

cost;

exclusivity;

market coverage;

driver switching;

foreclosure capability.

Competition law does not generally prohibit businesses from competing aggressively for suppliers.

36. Passenger Loyalty Programs

Ride-hailing platforms may use:

monthly subscriptions;

free rides;

discounted rides;

priority booking;

reward points.

If customers can freely use several platforms, such programs may enhance competition.

However, contractual restrictions that prevent switching may raise competition concerns.

37. Most-Favoured-Customer Clauses

A platform may attempt to require:

“Drivers must not charge passengers less through competing platforms.”

This is a form of price-parity condition.

The Booking.com judgment provides an important analogy because the Court rejected the idea that platform price-parity clauses are automatically necessary merely because the platform itself creates consumer and supplier benefits. (curia)

38. Excessive Commission

A dominant ride-hailing platform could potentially face claims that driver commissions are excessive.

However, proving excessive pricing under Article 102 requires a demanding economic and legal analysis.

Questions could include:

platform costs;

investment;

innovation;

risk;

comparable markets;

profitability;

value created for drivers;

passenger benefits.

A high commission alone does not establish abuse.

39. Algorithmic Discrimination

Platforms use algorithms to determine:

ride allocation;

passenger matching;

incentives;

driver rankings;

estimated fares.

A competition issue may arise if the algorithm systematically disadvantages certain rival suppliers or facilitates coordination.

However:

Algorithmic decision-making is not itself an infringement of competition law.

The competitive effect and underlying conduct must be established.

40. Market Definition in Multi-Sided Platforms

Competition authorities may need to examine several sides simultaneously.

For example:

Passenger side

Competition between ride-hailing platforms for users.

Driver side

Competition between platforms for drivers.

Advertising/data side

Potential use of passenger or driver data.

The sides are interconnected through network effects.

Therefore, a platform may have weak market share on one side but considerable market power because of its overall ecosystem.

41. Switching Costs

Switching costs can arise from:

driver ratings;

passenger ratings;

accumulated rewards;

subscription benefits;

driver earnings history;

customer reviews;

stored payment information;

account reputation.

If drivers lose their accumulated reputation when moving platforms, switching can become more difficult.

42. Ratings as a Competitive Asset

Ratings may have significant economic value.

A driver with:

4.95/5 rating and 5,000 completed trips

may not want to start from zero on a competing platform.

Similarly, passengers may have:

loyalty status;

trip history;

payment history;

reward balances.

This can strengthen platform lock-in.

43. Data Portability and Competition

Competition can be strengthened where users can transfer:

ratings;

reviews;

account information;

transaction histories;

loyalty benefits.

But data portability involves several areas of law, including privacy and data-protection law, not competition law alone.

44. Mergers Between Ride-Hailing Platforms

A merger between two major platforms could create serious competition questions.

Authorities may consider:

Horizontal effects

Two competing ride-hailing platforms combine.

Network effects

The combined platform has a larger driver and passenger network.

Pricing

Reduced competition may affect passenger prices or driver commissions.

Innovation

Competition between platforms may encourage better algorithms and services.

Entry

Could new platforms realistically enter?

45. Acquisition of Emerging Competitors

A large platform might acquire:

a smaller ride-hailing competitor;

an autonomous taxi company;

a mobility app;

a driver-management platform;

a route-optimisation company.

Even a small company can have strategic importance if it is an emerging competitive constraint.

46. Vertical Integration

Ride-hailing companies may integrate into:

vehicle leasing;

vehicle manufacturing;

charging infrastructure;

autonomous vehicles;

insurance;

payment services;

food delivery;

logistics.

Vertical integration may create efficiencies but can also produce foreclosure risks.

For example:

Platform → vehicle leasing → drivers

could potentially allow a platform to make competing platforms less attractive to drivers who lease vehicles from the platform.

47. Autonomous Ride-Hailing

Future autonomous-vehicle platforms could create additional competition issues.

A company could control:

autonomous vehicle technology;

software;

mapping;

charging;

fleet operations;

ride-hailing platform.

This could produce substantial vertical integration.

Competition authorities may therefore examine whether control of one layer is used to exclude rivals from another.

48. Access to Essential Digital Infrastructure

A dominant platform may control an important digital interface.

For example:

mapping;

payment infrastructure;

mobile operating systems;

app distribution;

vehicle software.

The Alphabet C-233/23 judgment is relevant because the Court recognised that refusal to provide interoperability can, in particular circumstances, amount to abuse even where the platform is not indispensable in the strict traditional sense. (curia)

49. Competition Between Platforms and Traditional Taxis

Ride-hailing competition is complicated by regulatory differences.

Traditional taxis may face:

licences;

fare regulation;

vehicle requirements;

operating restrictions.

Ride-hailing platforms may face different rules.

The Elite Taxi and Uber France cases demonstrate that Member States may regulate certain Uber services as transport rather than treating them purely as digital services. (Infocuria)

Competition law therefore interacts closely with transport regulation.

50. Public Policy and Competition

Governments may pursue legitimate objectives such as:

passenger safety;

driver safety;

insurance;

accessibility;

traffic management;

environmental objectives;

labour protections.

Competition law does not automatically invalidate such regulation.

The relevant question may instead be whether the regulatory framework itself unnecessarily restricts competition or whether different treatment is objectively justified.

51. Evidence in Ride-Hailing Competition Cases

Authorities may examine:

Platform data

number of rides;

driver numbers;

passenger numbers;

cancellations;

prices;

commissions.

Internal documents

strategy documents;

pricing plans;

driver-retention strategies;

competitor assessments.

Algorithmic evidence

pricing algorithms;

matching algorithms;

incentive algorithms.

Contractual evidence

driver agreements;

exclusivity clauses;

parity provisions;

customer terms.

Economic evidence

market shares;

switching rates;

network effects;

entry barriers;

profitability.

52. Defences

A ride-hailing platform may argue that its conduct is justified by:

safety;

fraud prevention;

reliability;

investment recovery;

service quality;

reducing free-riding;

preventing fake accounts;

ensuring sufficient driver availability.

The competition authority must distinguish legitimate business reasons from exclusionary effects.

The Court's recent Article 102 case law stresses the importance of concrete evidence concerning whether conduct is actually capable of restricting competition and the relevance of objective justifications. (Infocuria)

53. Competition-Compliant Ride-Hailing Strategy

A platform seeking to minimise competition-law risk should consider:

Driver contracts

Avoid unnecessary exclusivity.

Pricing

Document legitimate economic reasons for pricing strategies.

Algorithms

Maintain independent pricing and avoid coordination with competitors.

Data

Prevent inappropriate use of competitor-sensitive information.

Ranking

Use transparent and objectively defensible criteria.

Interoperability

Assess whether restrictions on third-party access have legitimate technical justifications.

Mergers

Assess acquisitions of emerging competitors early.

54. Key Case-Law Principles

The cases can be remembered as follows:

Elite Taxi

What is the platform actually doing?

Uber France

Control over the transport service matters.

Star Taxi

Not every digital taxi intermediary is economically identical.

Eturas

Digital systems can facilitate concerted practices.

Unilever

Exclusivity requires effects/capability analysis.

Google Shopping

Dominant platforms can face self-preferencing concerns.

Booking.com

Platform parity clauses are not automatically ancillary or necessary.

Alphabet

Interoperability refusals can raise Article 102 concerns.

55. Examination-Oriented Legal Framework

For a problem question, use this sequence:

Step 1 — Identify the market

Ask:

Taxi market, ride-hailing market, urban transport market or digital intermediation market?

Step 2 — Identify both sides

Consider:

passengers;

drivers.

Step 3 — Assess market power

Consider:

market share;

network effects;

multi-homing;

switching costs;

entry barriers.

Step 4 — Identify the conduct

Is it:

exclusivity?

predatory pricing?

loyalty discounts?

parity?

self-preferencing?

refusal of access?

algorithmic coordination?

Step 5 — Apply Article 101 or 102

Article 101 → agreement/concerted practice.

Article 102 → dominance and abuse.

Step 6 — Assess effects

Examine:

foreclosure;

consumer harm;

driver harm;

innovation;

entry;

prices;

quality.

Step 7 — Consider justification

Ask whether the conduct has:

legitimate objective;

proportionality;

efficiency justification.

Step 8 — Consider remedies

Possible remedies include:

ending exclusivity;

changing algorithms;

interoperability;

data safeguards;

contract modification;

fines;

merger remedies.

56. Conclusion

Ride-hailing platforms create a distinctive competition-law environment because they combine digital intermediation, network effects, algorithmic pricing, driver incentives, passenger demand, data and physical transportation.

The most important competition risks are:

driver exclusivity;

passenger lock-in;

predatory pricing;

loyalty incentives;

algorithmic coordination;

price-parity clauses;

self-preferencing;

data advantages;

refusal of interoperability;

vertical foreclosure;

anti-competitive mergers;

exclusion of smaller platforms.

The key European cases provide complementary principles:

The central competition-law formula is:

Ride-hailing platform + network effects + market power + restrictive conduct + foreclosure capability/effects + absence of sufficient justification = potential competition-law problem.

The most important point is that being a successful digital platform is not itself unlawful. Competition law permits competition through lower prices, better matching, greater reliability, innovation and efficient technology; the legal concern arises when market power is used through exclusionary conduct that undermines effective competition. The EU Commission's 2026 Article 102 Guidelines expressly frame the modern framework around exclusionary conduct and competition on the merits. (Competition Policy)