Competition Law and Lunar Resource Market Competition

Jurisdictional approach: Indian competition law with international space-law context

Lunar-resource competition is a future-facing competition-law problem. Commercial extraction of lunar resources—such as water ice, oxygen, regolith, and potentially metals and other minerals—could create markets involving extraction, processing, transportation, storage, communications, landing infrastructure and in-space manufacturing.

There is currently no established body of reported Indian or international antitrust case law specifically deciding a lunar-resource competition dispute. Therefore, the case laws below are analogical competition authorities, especially from mining, essential facilities, monopoly, refusal-to-deal and digital/platform markets. They should not be presented as precedents that already govern lunar mining.

The international legal foundation is equally important. The Outer Space Treaty provides that exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon, are for the benefit and interests of all countries; outer space is free for exploration and use by States, and the Moon and other celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by sovereignty or occupation. It also makes States internationally responsible for national space activities, including those conducted by non-governmental entities. (UNOOSA)

1. Meaning of Lunar Resource Market Competition

Lunar resource market competition refers to competition among enterprises, governments, contractors and commercial space operators involved in discovering, extracting, processing, transporting, storing, selling or using resources obtained from the Moon.

Potential resources include:

water ice;

oxygen;

hydrogen;

lunar regolith;

silicon;

aluminium;

iron;

titanium;

other minerals;

materials useful for construction;

resources used for propellant production.

The commercial importance of lunar resources may arise not because they are necessarily transported back to Earth, but because they can support in-space economic activity.

2. Why Lunar Resources Could Create Competition Markets

A lunar economy could eventually contain several connected markets:

Exploration

↓

Landing

↓

Resource identification

↓

Extraction

↓

Processing

↓

Storage

↓

Transportation

↓

Sale/use in space

↓

Manufacturing

Competition could arise at each stage.

3. Lunar Resource Markets Are Different from Earth Markets

Traditional markets operate within recognised national territories.

The Moon creates a special legal environment.

The Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation of the Moon by sovereignty, occupation or other means. At the same time, it establishes freedom of exploration and use and requires States to authorise and continuously supervise non-governmental activities. (UNOOSA)

Therefore, a future lunar resource market cannot simply be treated as ordinary terrestrial mining.

4. The Basic Competition-Law Question

The fundamental question would be:

Can one enterprise or group obtain such control over lunar infrastructure or resources that effective competition is prevented or substantially weakened?

Potential sources of power include:

control of landing sites;

control of extraction technology;

exclusive infrastructure;

proprietary technology;

communications networks;

transportation systems;

resource-processing facilities;

data;

first-mover advantages;

government licences;

network effects.

5. Relevant Market

The first competition-law question would be defining the relevant market.

Possible markets might include:

lunar water extraction;

lunar oxygen production;

lunar regolith processing;

lunar-resource transportation;

lunar-resource storage;

lunar communications;

lunar landing services;

lunar-resource data;

lunar construction materials;

in-space propellant.

A single broad "lunar resources market" might therefore be inappropriate.

6. Product-Market Definition

Different lunar resources may have different uses.

For example:

Water

may be used for:

life support;

radiation shielding;

hydrogen/oxygen propellant production.

Whereas:

Regolith

may be used for:

construction;

shielding;

manufacturing.

Consequently, competition authorities may have to determine whether different resources are:

substitutes;

complements;

separate products.

7. Geographic Market

Traditional competition law often relies upon territorial geography.

The lunar environment complicates this.

A future geographic market might be:

a particular lunar region;

a particular crater;

a polar zone;

a specific extraction site;

the Moon as a whole;

Earth-Moon transportation corridors.

The answer would depend upon the substitutability of resources and infrastructure.

8. Lunar Poles and Strategic Concentration

Lunar polar regions may be especially important because of their potential water-ice resources.

If commercially valuable resources are concentrated in particular areas, access to those locations could become a major source of market power.

This could create:

Resource concentration → access advantage → infrastructure advantage → market power.

9. Scarcity as a Source of Market Power

Scarcity is an important competition-law concept.

If a particular lunar resource is:

geographically concentrated;

difficult to extract;

expensive to transport;

technically difficult to process;

the enterprise controlling it may possess significant economic power.

However, scarcity alone does not establish an antitrust violation.

10. First-Mover Advantage

The first commercial operator could potentially establish:

infrastructure;

customer relationships;

technical expertise;

resource databases;

supply contracts;

transportation networks.

This could create substantial first-mover advantages.

Competition law would need to distinguish:

legitimate first-mover success

from

strategies designed to exclude future competitors.

11. Network Effects in Lunar Markets

Lunar markets could develop network effects.

For example:

More extraction infrastructure

↓

More spacecraft

↓

More customers

↓

More demand for infrastructure

↓

More investment

↓

More infrastructure.

An early platform could consequently become increasingly difficult to challenge.

12. Infrastructure as a Competitive Bottleneck

Potential lunar infrastructure could include:

landing pads;

launch/landing systems;

communications;

navigation;

power systems;

storage;

transport vehicles;

processing facilities.

If one enterprise controls an infrastructure facility essential for rivals, questions concerning essential facilities and refusal to deal could arise.

13. Essential-Facility Theory

An essential facility is generally an input or infrastructure facility that competitors cannot reasonably duplicate or access elsewhere.

Potential lunar examples might theoretically include:

a unique landing facility;

a communications relay;

a critical power installation;

a transportation corridor;

a specialised processing facility.

Whether something actually qualifies would depend heavily on future facts and applicable law.

14. Refusal to Deal

Suppose a dominant lunar infrastructure operator refuses competitors access to a critical facility.

Possible competition questions could include:

Is the operator dominant?

Is the facility genuinely indispensable?

Are alternatives available?

Is access technically feasible?

Is there a legitimate business justification?

Does refusal substantially harm competition?

These questions resemble terrestrial essential-facility disputes.

15. Exclusive Lunar Infrastructure

An enterprise might enter agreements granting it exclusive control over:

landing facilities;

transportation;

communications;

resource processing.

Exclusive arrangements could create foreclosure concerns if they prevent competitors from entering.

Again, exclusivity is not automatically unlawful.

Its competitive effect would matter.

16. Government Licensing and Competition

Lunar activities will likely require extensive governmental authorisation.

The Outer Space Treaty requires States to authorise and continuously supervise non-governmental space activities. (UNOOSA)

Therefore, competition could be affected by:

licensing requirements;

safety standards;

environmental restrictions;

spectrum allocation;

launch regulation;

resource-operation permissions.

This creates a close relationship between regulation and competition law.

17. State-Created Monopoly

A government could potentially grant exclusive rights to operate particular infrastructure or perform particular activities.

Competition law would then face an important question:

Is the monopoly a necessary regulatory arrangement, or does it unnecessarily restrict competition?

The answer would depend upon the statutory framework and international obligations.

18. Indian Competition Act and Lunar Markets

The Competition Act, 2002 prohibits anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and combinations that cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India. (cci.gov.in)

Therefore, application to a lunar-resource transaction would require careful analysis of:

jurisdiction;

Indian enterprises;

effects in Indian markets;

applicable international law;

national space legislation.

The Competition Act cannot simply be assumed to regulate every activity occurring on the Moon.

19. Section 3 and Lunar Resource Agreements

Section 3 could become relevant to agreements between competing lunar operators.

Potential agreements could concern:

prices;

resource quantities;

customers;

extraction areas;

transportation;

technology;

market allocation.

A cartel among competing lunar-resource producers could theoretically raise the same basic competition concerns as a terrestrial cartel.

20. Lunar Resource Cartels

Imagine three major companies control most lunar water production.

They agree:

"We will maintain the same price and divide customers."

This could create:

Price coordination + market allocation + reduced competition.

The technological location of the market would not change the economic nature of the coordination.

21. Section 4 and Lunar Dominance

Section 4 prohibits abuse of dominant position.

Potential forms of abuse in a future lunar economy could include:

unfair pricing;

discriminatory access;

refusal to deal;

denial of market access;

tying;

leveraging;

exclusionary conditions.

The challenge would first be establishing dominance in the relevant lunar market.

22. Resource Monopoly

Suppose one company controls 90% of commercially accessible lunar water.

That fact would be important but would not automatically establish unlawful conduct.

The analysis would also consider:

potential competitors;

alternative water sources;

entry barriers;

transportation costs;

technology;

countervailing buyer power;

government access rules.

23. Case Law 1 — Beach Mineral Producers Association v. IREL

CCI Case No. 26/2022

This is particularly useful by analogy because it concerns strategic mineral extraction.

The CCI examined allegations involving IREL and the market for mining and supply of beach-sand ilmenite.

The Commission initially treated the relevant market as mining and supply of beach-sand ilmenite in India and considered IREL's market position. (cci.gov.in)

The matter subsequently resulted in the CCI's January 2025 order. (cci.gov.in)

Lunar significance

This case demonstrates how competition law can analyse:

strategic minerals;

regulatory restrictions;

government-linked supply;

resource concentration;

access conditions.

These are highly relevant analogies for future lunar-resource markets.

24. Case Law 2 — Kalpit Sultania v. IREL

CCI Case No. 22/2021

The CCI issued its order on 8 October 2024. (cci.gov.in)

Significance

This proceeding involved allegations concerning IREL's activities in the beach-sand mineral sector.

It is relevant because resource markets can have unusual regulatory and supply structures.

Lunar lesson

Competition authorities dealing with lunar resources may similarly have to distinguish:

monopoly created by law;

monopoly created by scarcity;

technological superiority;

actual abusive conduct.

25. Case Law 3 — Coal India Ltd. v. CCI

The Coal India litigation is particularly relevant to natural-resource monopolies.

The Supreme Court considered the application of competition law to Coal India, a statutory monopoly, and the relationship between its statutory obligations and competition-law responsibilities. The judgment specifically addressed the position of Coal India as a monopoly created by statute. (Science Portal)

Lunar significance

This provides an important analogy where a future lunar-resource operator receives substantial governmental or statutory privileges.

Principle

A statutory or government-created position does not automatically answer every competition-law question; the relationship between statutory functions and competition obligations must be examined carefully.

26. Case Law 4 — United States v. Aluminum Co. of America

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)

Importance

The famous Alcoa case examined monopoly in the aluminium industry.

The case is particularly relevant to lunar resources because aluminium and other metals could potentially become economically important in space construction.

Principle

The case demonstrates how durable control over production capacity and market entry can create serious monopoly concerns.

Lunar application

If one operator controlled most commercially accessible lunar aluminium production, competition authorities might examine:

production capacity;

barriers to entry;

potential competitors;

resource availability;

technological alternatives.

27. Case Law 5 — United States v. Aluminum Co. of America / Alcoa Merger Principles

A related Supreme Court decision concerning Alcoa's later merger litigation is United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).

The Court examined the competitive significance of a relatively small acquisition in a concentrated aluminium market and recognised that a seemingly small increase in concentration can matter in an already concentrated industry. (Legal Information Institute)

Lunar significance

This is highly relevant to future lunar-resource mergers.

Suppose:

Company A = 45%

Company B = 8%

An acquisition of B could matter substantially if:

entry is extremely difficult;

resource sites are scarce;

the target is an important potential competitor.

28. Case Law 6 — Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.

472 U.S. 585 (1985)

Importance

The case concerned refusal to continue a previously profitable cooperative arrangement between competing ski operators.

The Supreme Court treated the refusal as potentially unlawful under the particular facts, including evidence that the defendant had previously cooperated and had declined opportunities that could have produced short-term benefits. (Justia Law)

Lunar significance

The analogy is useful for future lunar infrastructure.

Suppose two companies jointly operate:

Lunar transportation network

and one dominant operator suddenly refuses access to a smaller rival despite previously profitable cooperation.

A future competition authority might ask similar questions concerning:

prior cooperation;

legitimate business justification;

competitive effects;

exclusionary purpose/effect.

29. Case Law 7 — Verizon Communications v. Trinko

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)

Importance

Trinko cautioned against broadly imposing duties to share infrastructure and recognised the difficulties of determining when compulsory sharing is appropriate.

Lunar significance

This is particularly important for future lunar infrastructure.

If a company builds an expensive lunar communications or landing facility, competition law must balance:

Access for competitors

against

incentives to invest in infrastructure.

This balance could become one of the most important issues in lunar-resource competition.

30. Case Law 8 — CCI v. SAIL

Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744

Importance

This Supreme Court case is foundational to India's modern competition-law framework.

Lunar significance

Future lunar-resource disputes involving Indian enterprises would still require:

statutory jurisdiction;

proper CCI procedure;

relevant-market analysis;

evidence;

procedural safeguards.

The technological novelty of the lunar economy would not eliminate these legal requirements.

31. Case Law 9 — CCI v. Bharti Airtel Ltd.

Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 521

Importance

The telecommunications dispute demonstrates the relationship between competition law and specialised sectoral regulation.

Lunar significance

Lunar-resource activities are likely to be heavily regulated through:

space licensing;

communications;

launch safety;

environmental rules;

resource-operation authorisations.

The Bharti Airtel principle provides an important analogy for coordination between competition authorities and sector regulators.

32. Essential-Facility Problem in Lunar Mining

Imagine Company A constructs the only economically viable lunar landing facility near a major water-ice deposit.

Company B wants access.

Possible questions:

Is the facility indispensable?

Can Company B build another facility?

What would duplication cost?

Is the restriction temporary or permanent?

Is there a legitimate safety justification?

Is the owner dominant?

Does denial substantially reduce competition?

These questions resemble terrestrial essential-facility analysis but would be complicated by the extraordinary costs and physical conditions of the Moon.

33. Infrastructure Investment and Competition

Lunar infrastructure may require enormous capital expenditure.

Competition law must therefore avoid a rule saying:

"Every infrastructure owner must provide access to every competitor."

Such a rule could discourage investment.

The better economic question is:

When does refusal to provide access become sufficiently exclusionary to justify intervention?

Trinko provides an important cautionary framework for this problem.

34. Exclusive Resource Zones

Suppose a future regulatory system permits an operator to conduct extraction activities in a particular zone.

Competition concerns could arise if the exclusive zone:

is unnecessarily broad;

lasts excessively long;

prevents meaningful rival entry;

covers scarce resources;

is repeatedly renewed;

effectively creates permanent control.

At the same time, limited operational zones may be necessary for safety and coordination.

35. Resource Hoarding

An operator might theoretically acquire control over multiple prospective extraction areas without immediately exploiting them.

This could create:

Resource-site accumulation → exclusion of potential entrants.

Competition authorities would need to determine whether such conduct constitutes legitimate investment or strategic foreclosure.

36. Predatory Pricing in Lunar Markets

A large company might initially sell lunar water or transportation services below cost.

If it can sustain losses because of other revenue streams, competitors may be unable to survive.

Later, after rivals exit:

Prices increase

and

market power becomes stronger.

This resembles terrestrial predatory-pricing theory, although the economics of a lunar market would be highly unusual.

37. Cross-Subsidisation

A diversified space company could earn money from:

satellite communications;

Earth-based launches;

defence contracts;

terrestrial services;

and use those revenues to subsidise lunar-resource operations.

This would not automatically be unlawful.

But if subsidisation were used to eliminate competitors in a relevant market, competition analysis could become important.

38. Vertical Integration

A lunar company might control:

Extraction

Processing

Transportation

Storage

Sale

Vertical integration can generate efficiencies.

But it can also create foreclosure concerns if the integrated company denies rivals access to essential inputs or infrastructure.

39. Conglomerate Power

A large aerospace group might operate across:

launch services;

satellites;

communications;

lunar transportation;

lunar mining;

robotics;

AI;

insurance.

Its strength in one market could potentially support expansion into another.

This is a classic conglomerate/ecosystem competition problem.

40. Data as a Lunar Competitive Asset

Lunar-resource competition will not be based solely on physical resources.

Data may become equally important.

Examples:

geological maps;

mineral surveys;

ice-location data;

terrain maps;

extraction data;

navigation information;

environmental information.

A company possessing unique lunar-resource data could obtain a significant competitive advantage.

41. Data Monopolisation

Suppose one operator conducts extensive lunar exploration and possesses the best dataset concerning water deposits.

It then refuses to license or share the data.

Competition analysis could consider:

whether the data is indispensable;

whether rivals can independently obtain it;

whether sharing is technically possible;

whether compulsory access would reduce innovation incentives.

42. Intellectual Property

Lunar-resource technology could involve patents covering:

drilling;

extraction;

purification;

robotics;

processing;

propulsion;

autonomous navigation.

Intellectual property rights are not automatically anti-competitive.

However, competition law may become relevant where IP rights are used to create unlawful exclusion or restrictive licensing arrangements.

43. Standard-Essential Lunar Technologies

Future lunar operations may require common standards for:

docking;

communications;

navigation;

charging;

fuel transfer;

data exchange.

If one company controls a standard essential to lunar commerce, discriminatory licensing could potentially affect competition.

44. Network Effects and Lunar Transportation

Consider:

More spacecraft use Network A

↓

More infrastructure investment

↓

Lower average cost

↓

More customers use Network A

This could eventually create a dominant lunar logistics network.

The competition issue would be whether rivals can realistically enter and interoperate.

45. Interoperability

Interoperability may become particularly important in a lunar economy.

For example:

spacecraft from different companies may need to dock;

fuel systems may need compatible standards;

communication systems may need interoperability.

If interoperability is restricted without legitimate justification, competitive access may be affected.

46. International Competition

Lunar resources create a major international dimension.

Potential participants include:

national space agencies;

private companies;

multinational corporations;

international partnerships;

state-owned enterprises.

Competition law operates nationally, while lunar activities occur within an international legal framework.

This creates a jurisdictional challenge.

47. Outer Space Treaty and Competition

The Outer Space Treaty establishes:

freedom of exploration and use;

non-appropriation;

peaceful use;

international responsibility;

continuing supervision of non-governmental activities;

international consultation concerning potentially harmful interference. (UNOOSA)

Therefore, future competition governance must operate consistently with these principles.

48. Moon Agreement

The 1979 Moon Agreement contains more detailed provisions concerning the Moon and its resources.

Its Article 11 framework treats the Moon and its natural resources as the common heritage of mankind and contemplates an international regime when exploitation becomes feasible.

However, the Moon Agreement has a relatively limited number of States Parties. A 2024 International Institute of Space Law submission to the UN Working Group noted that the Agreement had only 17 States Parties at that time. (UNOOSA)

Therefore, its precise future role in commercial lunar-resource governance remains an important legal issue.

49. Artemis Accords and Resource Utilisation

The Artemis Accords represent another approach to principles for civil exploration and resource utilisation.

They are not equivalent to a competition statute.

However, their treatment of resource extraction and operational coordination illustrates the broader regulatory environment in which future lunar businesses may operate.

The key competition question remains:

How can commercial resource utilisation occur without allowing private or state-backed actors to convert temporary operational advantages into unjustified exclusionary market power?

50. Lunar Resource Market and Merger Control

Future acquisitions could involve:

Company A — lunar extraction

acquiring

Company B — lunar transportation

or:

Company A — water extraction

acquiring

Company B — ice-location data.

Competition authorities may need to consider:

vertical effects;

potential competition;

data concentration;

infrastructure foreclosure;

innovation;

ecosystem effects.

51. Killer Acquisitions in Space

A large space company might acquire a small start-up developing:

advanced lunar drilling;

autonomous mining robots;

efficient water extraction;

new lunar transportation technology.

Even if the start-up has little present revenue, its technology could represent future competitive potential.

This creates a possible killer-acquisition concern.

52. Competition Between State-Owned and Private Enterprises

Future lunar markets could contain:

private enterprises;

government-owned enterprises;

government-supported enterprises.

This could create competitive-neutrality issues.

A state-backed company might receive:

preferential financing;

infrastructure;

government contracts;

regulatory advantages.

Competition policy may therefore need to distinguish legitimate public support from measures that unnecessarily distort competitive conditions.

53. Consumer Welfare in Lunar Markets

Initially, lunar-resource markets may not directly involve ordinary consumers.

Instead, customers could include:

space agencies;

satellite operators;

spacecraft operators;

manufacturing companies;

research organisations.

Consumer welfare could therefore be assessed indirectly through:

lower space-service costs;

innovation;

broader access;

increased infrastructure;

technological development.

54. Environmental Competition Concerns

Lunar extraction could raise environmental and scientific issues.

The Outer Space Treaty requires States to conduct lunar activities with due regard to the interests of other States and to avoid harmful contamination and potentially harmful interference. (UNOOSA)

Competition law should therefore operate alongside:

environmental rules;

planetary-protection rules;

safety rules;

space-traffic regulation.

55. Long-Term Governance Model

A future lunar competition framework could follow:

Step 1 — Identify the market

Water, oxygen, transport, data, communications, etc.

Step 2 — Identify infrastructure

Landing, power, communications, processing and storage.

Step 3 — Measure market power

Market share + resource access + infrastructure + technology.

Step 4 — Examine barriers

Capital, regulation, technology, geography and resource scarcity.

Step 5 — Examine conduct

Exclusivity, refusal to deal, tying, discrimination and acquisitions.

Step 6 — Examine innovation

Potential entrants and technological alternatives.

Step 7 — Consider international law

Outer Space Treaty, applicable national laws and other space-law instruments.

Step 8 — Design remedies

Access, interoperability, behavioural commitments or other proportionate remedies.

56. Potential Competition Remedies

Possible future remedies could include:

non-discriminatory access;

interoperability;

access to essential infrastructure;

transparency;

licensing safeguards;

limits on exclusionary agreements;

divestiture in exceptional merger situations;

data-access remedies where justified;

monitoring obligations.

But remedies must preserve incentives to undertake extraordinarily expensive lunar investment.

57. Major Competition Risks

58. Important Distinction

It is essential not to confuse resource ownership, operational control and monopoly power.

For example:

Extracting lunar water does not necessarily mean owning the Moon.

Likewise:

Building a lunar facility does not necessarily create unlawful monopoly power.

And:

Being the first commercial operator does not automatically constitute an antitrust violation.

The legal assessment depends upon the applicable space-law regime and competition-law requirements.

59. Six Core Case-Law Lessons

60. Key Legal Principles

Lunar-resource competition is largely an emerging/future field.

There is presently no established body of direct lunar-resource antitrust case law comparable to mature terrestrial markets.

Mining and infrastructure competition cases provide useful analogies.

Resource scarcity can contribute to market power.

Scarcity alone does not establish unlawful dominance.

Infrastructure may become a competitive bottleneck.

Essential-facility principles could become relevant.

Refusal to deal requires careful analysis.

Exclusive extraction rights could create entry barriers.

Government licensing can significantly influence competition.

State-created monopoly and private monopoly require separate analysis.

Network effects may develop around lunar logistics.

Data concerning resource deposits may become strategically valuable.

Intellectual property can create technological advantages.

Vertical integration can produce both efficiencies and foreclosure risks.

Mergers may eliminate future lunar competitors.

Interoperability could be critical to competitive access.

Competition law must operate consistently with international space law.

The Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies while allowing exploration and use subject to its principles. (UNOOSA)

Long-term lunar competition governance will require coordination between competition law, space regulation and international law.

61. Quick Revision Formula

Remember:

Lunar Competition =

Resource Scarcity

Infrastructure

Technology

Licensing

Data

Network Effects

Transportation

Interoperability

International Space Law

Antitrust Enforcement

Conclusion

Lunar resource market competition represents a new frontier for competition law. Unlike ordinary mining markets, lunar markets will operate within a unique international legal environment in which national appropriation of the Moon is prohibited, while exploration and use remain open subject to international obligations. (UNOOSA)

The most important future competition issues are likely to involve scarce resource locations, landing and transportation infrastructure, communications, data, proprietary extraction technology, intellectual property, exclusive arrangements, network effects, vertical integration and mergers involving potential competitors.

The Indian Beach Mineral Producers Association v. IREL proceedings are particularly useful as an analogy because they show how competition law can analyse a strategically important mineral market where regulation and resource concentration create unusual competitive conditions. The CCI's 2024–25 annual report also records its treatment of IREL's beach-sand mineral cases, noting that dominance was established in the relevant mineral markets in those proceedings but abuse was not ultimately established in the specified cases. (cci.gov.in)

Exam definition:

Lunar resource market competition means the application of competition principles to present or future markets involving the exploration, extraction, processing, transportation and utilisation of lunar resources, with particular attention to resource scarcity, infrastructure control, technological barriers, exclusive arrangements, network effects, mergers and the interaction between antitrust law and international space law.