Competition Law and Last-Mile Delivery Platform Competition

1. Introduction

Last-mile delivery platforms are digital intermediaries that coordinate the final movement of goods from a restaurant, retailer, warehouse, pharmacy, supermarket, or other merchant to the consumer. Examples include food-delivery marketplaces, quick-commerce applications, grocery-delivery platforms, and broader local-commerce logistics platforms.

Competition law becomes particularly important because these businesses are often multi-sided platforms connecting:

• consumers;
• restaurants and retailers;
• independent couriers/drivers;
• advertisers;
• payment providers;
• logistics partners; and
• sometimes competing merchants or delivery providers.

The central competition question is not simply whether a platform is large. The relevant inquiry is whether its conduct restricts rivals, forecloses merchants or couriers, raises barriers to entry, reduces consumer choice, facilitates coordination, or enables exploitation of market power.

Recent enforcement illustrates the importance of this sector. The European Commission's 2025 Delivery Hero/Glovo decision concerned information exchange, market allocation and no-poach arrangements in online food, grocery and other delivery services.

2. Relevant Markets

A last-mile delivery platform may participate in several overlapping markets.

A. Platform-to-consumer market

Consumers use an application to:

• search for products;
• compare merchants;
• place orders;
• make payments; and
• obtain delivery.

Competition may therefore exist among different delivery platforms.

B. Platform-to-merchant market

Restaurants and retailers purchase access to:

• customer demand;
• ordering infrastructure;
• payment facilities;
• logistics;
• advertising;
• customer data; and
• fulfilment services.

C. Courier/driver market

Couriers may supply delivery services to multiple platforms.

Competition authorities can therefore examine whether a platform's conduct affects courier-side competition, including exclusivity, no-poach arrangements and restrictions on multi-homing.

D. Logistics market

A platform may also compete with:

• merchant-owned delivery;
• third-party logistics companies;
• courier networks;
• postal services;
• supermarket delivery systems; and
• direct ordering systems.

Market definition is consequently highly fact-specific.

The European Commission has noted in food-delivery merger analysis that competition may need to be examined specifically among platforms providing online management of door-to-door food orders, rather than automatically treating every form of restaurant delivery as the same market.

3. Network Effects

Last-mile platforms exhibit powerful network effects.

More consumers attract more restaurants.

More restaurants attract more consumers.

More orders attract more couriers.

More couriers improve delivery times and reliability.

Better delivery performance attracts still more consumers.

This produces a reinforcing cycle:

Consumers → Restaurants → Orders → Couriers → Better delivery → More consumers

The consequence is that an incumbent can develop substantial advantages even without formally excluding competitors.

Competition authorities therefore examine:

• user numbers;
• order volumes;
• restaurant coverage;
• courier density;
• geographic coverage;
• delivery times;
• switching costs;
• multi-homing;
• loyalty programmes; and
• access to data.

4. Multi-Homing and Single-Homing

An important characteristic of last-mile delivery is multi-homing.

A restaurant may simultaneously list itself on:

• Platform A;
• Platform B; and
• Platform C.

Likewise, consumers may maintain several delivery applications.

Multi-homing can constrain platform market power because merchants and consumers can switch between competing services.

However, platforms may attempt to reduce multi-homing through:

• exclusivity agreements;
• loyalty programmes;
• contractual restrictions;
• preferential ranking;
• commission structures;
• technical restrictions;
• differential access to data; or
• tying delivery services to marketplace services.

The competitive significance of these practices depends upon their actual effects and the market's structure.

5. Key Competition Concerns

A. Excessive platform commissions

A dominant platform may charge restaurants substantial commissions.

High commissions are not automatically unlawful.

The competition issue becomes more serious where a dominant platform uses market power to impose conditions that competitors cannot realistically replicate or where the conduct forms part of an exclusionary strategy.

B. Price-parity or MFN clauses

Platforms may require merchants not to offer lower prices through competing platforms.

For example:

Restaurant must not sell a meal for ₹300 on Platform B if the same meal costs ₹280 on Platform A.

Such provisions can reduce price competition between platforms.

Potential consequences include:

• higher consumer prices;
• reduced platform competition;
• reduced incentives for entrants to offer lower commissions; and
• increased platform fees.

6. Exclusivity

A platform may attempt to obtain exclusive relationships with restaurants, retailers or couriers.

Exclusivity becomes particularly important where the platform already possesses substantial market power.

Possible effects include:

• foreclosure of rival platforms;
• increased entry barriers;
• reduced merchant choice;
• reduced consumer choice; and
• reduced opportunities for smaller platforms to achieve sufficient scale.

An exclusivity agreement should therefore be examined in light of:

1. duration;
2. geographic scope;
3. market coverage;
4. platform market share;
5. availability of alternative distribution channels; and
6. ability of competitors to enter.

7. Self-Preferencing

A vertically integrated platform may compete against businesses that depend upon the platform.

For example:

Platform → Marketplace → Delivery → Own Retail Business

The platform might theoretically give its own delivery or retail operation:

• better search placement;
• lower delivery fees;
• faster dispatch;
• better access to customer data;
• preferential algorithmic treatment; or
• better visibility.

This creates a vertical foreclosure concern.

The key issue is whether the platform is using control over an essential customer-access channel to disadvantage independent competitors.

8. Algorithmic Ranking

Algorithms determine:

• restaurant visibility;
• delivery allocation;
• courier allocation;
• promotional placement;
• delivery fees;
• estimated delivery time; and
• consumer recommendations.

Competition concerns can arise where a dominant platform deliberately manipulates ranking to disadvantage competing merchants or competing delivery providers.

Important evidence may include:

• internal algorithm documentation;
• changes in ranking;
• treatment of competing merchants;
• platform incentives;
• consumer conversion data; and
• effects on rival platforms.

9. Data Advantages

Last-mile platforms accumulate enormous quantities of data, including:

• consumer preferences;
• order histories;
• delivery locations;
• merchant performance;
• prices;
• courier availability;
• delivery times;
• cancellation rates; and
• demand patterns.

A vertically integrated platform may use merchant-generated data to compete against those merchants.

This concern was central to the European Commission's Amazon Marketplace investigation, where the Commission examined Amazon's use of non-public seller data in competition with sellers using its marketplace.

The same economic theory can apply to last-mile delivery where a platform simultaneously operates the marketplace and competes with merchants.

10. Courier-Side Competition

Competition law is increasingly concerned with the labour and courier side of platforms.

Potential practices include:

• no-poach agreements;
• restrictions on switching platforms;
• exclusivity;
• restrictions on multi-apping;
• sharing courier compensation information;
• coordination of working conditions; and
• algorithmic coordination of remuneration.

The Delivery Hero/Glovo case is particularly significant because the European Commission found an Article 101 TFEU infringement involving commercially sensitive information exchange, market allocation and no-poach arrangements in the online delivery sector.

11. Information Exchange

Competitors on a digital platform can potentially obtain highly sensitive information about one another.

Relevant information includes:

• current prices;
• future pricing;
• delivery capacity;
• geographic expansion plans;
• costs;
• employee compensation;
• demand forecasts; and
• commercial strategy.

The Delivery Hero/Glovo investigation illustrates the danger particularly clearly. The Commission's proceedings concerned information concerning prices, capacity, costs, commercial strategies and other competitive parameters.

12. Market Allocation

Competitors agreeing not to enter one another's geographic territories can effectively divide the market.

For example:

• Platform A operates in Delhi;
• Platform B operates in Mumbai;
• neither enters the other's territory.

If competitors reach such an arrangement, the geographic segmentation may constitute serious cartel conduct.

The Delivery Hero/Glovo decision specifically concerned arrangements to allocate geographic markets within the EEA.

13. No-Poach Agreements

No-poach arrangements can have a special significance in platform markets because delivery companies compete for:

• drivers;
• engineers;
• dispatch specialists;
• data scientists;
• operational managers; and
• other employees.

An agreement not to recruit another platform's workers can reduce competition for labour.

In the Delivery Hero/Glovo matter, the Commission treated no-poach arrangements as part of the Article 101 infringement.

14. Predatory Pricing and Subsidisation

New delivery platforms frequently subsidise:

• consumers;
• restaurants;
• couriers; and
• promotional campaigns.

Low prices are generally beneficial to consumers and are not inherently anti-competitive.

However, competition law may investigate whether a dominant firm deliberately prices below an appropriate cost benchmark to eliminate rivals and subsequently recoup losses.

Relevant evidence includes:

• incremental costs;
• variable costs;
• duration of losses;
• market coverage;
• internal strategy documents;
• barriers to entry; and
• likelihood of recoupment.

15. Loyalty Programmes

Programmes such as subscription-based free delivery can produce substantial consumer benefits.

But where a dominant platform conditions meaningful benefits on customers using only its services, competition authorities may examine whether the programme produces foreclosure.

Important questions include:

• Can consumers easily use rival platforms?
• Is the subscription economically significant?
• How many consumers are enrolled?
• Are rival platforms able to offer comparable benefits?
• Does the programme cover multiple services?

16. Mergers and Acquisitions

Concentration is particularly significant in last-mile delivery because scale is economically important.

A merger can combine:

• consumer networks;
• restaurant networks;
• courier networks;
• data;
• warehouses;
• delivery infrastructure; and
• advertising businesses.

Competition authorities therefore examine:

Horizontal effects

Two competing delivery platforms combine.

Vertical effects

A marketplace acquires a logistics provider.

Conglomerate effects

A large technology company combines:

• retail;
• advertising;
• payments;
• logistics;
• cloud;
• marketplace; and
• delivery.

17. Case Law / Major Competition Decisions

Case 1 — Amazon/Deliveroo, UK CMA

The UK Competition and Markets Authority examined Amazon's acquisition of a minority shareholding and certain rights in Deliveroo.

The investigation considered competition in restaurant delivery and online convenience grocery delivery, including the potential competitive relationship between Amazon and Deliveroo.

The CMA ultimately cleared Amazon's 16% investment following its Phase 2 investigation.

Principle

The case demonstrates that minority investments can raise competition concerns where the investor and target are actual or potential competitors.

Relevance

For last-mile platforms, authorities should examine:

• minority shareholdings;
• board rights;
• access to information;
• future competitive incentives; and
• potential elimination of independent competition.

Case 2 — Takeaway.com/Just Eat, UK CMA

The CMA investigated Takeaway.com's acquisition of Just Eat.

The authority examined whether the transaction could reduce competition in the UK food-delivery market. It considered, among other matters, whether Takeaway.com could potentially have re-entered the UK independently.

The transaction was ultimately cleared.

Principle

Competition analysis must consider potential competition, not merely existing market shares.

Relevance

A platform with no current operations in a geographic market may nevertheless represent a meaningful competitive constraint if entry is commercially realistic.

Case 3 — Just Eat/La Nevera Roja, Spain

The Spanish CNMC reviewed Just Eat's acquisition of La Nevera Roja.

The transaction was authorised in Phase I with commitments.

Principle

Food-delivery platform mergers can require scrutiny even where the businesses appear to operate principally as digital intermediaries.

Relevance

The case illustrates the importance of:

• platform concentration;
• merchant relationships;
• geographic market structure; and
• commitments designed to preserve competitive conditions.

Case 4 — Delivery Hero/Glovo, European Commission

This is one of the most directly relevant modern cases.

The European Commission's 2025 decision concerned a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA involving:

• exchange of commercially sensitive information;
• market allocation; and
• no-poach arrangements.

The conduct concerned online ordering and delivery of meals, groceries and other products.

Principle

Digital platforms remain subject to ordinary cartel rules even where coordination occurs through sophisticated technology and platform structures.

Relevance

The case is particularly important for:

delivery-platform competition + labour competition + information exchange + geographic market allocation.

Case 5 — Delivery Hero/Woowa Brothers, South Korea

The Korea Fair Trade Commission reviewed Delivery Hero's transaction involving Woowa Brothers, operator of Baedal Minjok, a major Korean online food-delivery platform.

The transaction received conditional regulatory approval, including divestiture of Delivery Hero Korea and behavioural measures pending divestiture.

Principle

Where two significant delivery ecosystems combine, structural remedies may be necessary to preserve competitive conditions.

Relevance

The case demonstrates the importance of:

• platform concentration;
• network effects;
• restaurant bargaining power;
• consumer choice; and
• geographic market structure.

Case 6 — Amazon Marketplace, European Commission

The European Commission investigated Amazon's use of non-public data generated by third-party sellers operating through its marketplace.

The Commission's preliminary concern was that Amazon could use information from sellers competing on its platform to benefit Amazon's own retail business.

Principle

A platform can create competition concerns when it simultaneously:

1. controls the marketplace;
2. collects commercially valuable information from participants; and
3. competes against those participants.

Relevance to Last-Mile Delivery

The same issue can arise where a delivery platform obtains detailed data about restaurants or retailers and then uses that information to:

• launch competing private-label products;
• favour its own merchants;
• target competitors;
• alter delivery pricing; or
• optimise its own vertically integrated operations.

Case 7 — Amazon Marketplace / Amazon Buy Box, UK CMA

The UK CMA investigated Amazon Marketplace and accepted commitments concerning:

• third-party seller data;
• selection of the Buy Box;
• and negotiation of delivery rates for Prime orders. 

Principle

Platform governance can itself become a competition issue when the platform controls commercially significant access conditions.

Relevance

In last-mile delivery, comparable concerns may arise concerning:

• delivery-slot allocation;
• preferred courier assignment;
• ranking;
• merchant visibility;
• delivery rates; and
• access to premium logistics programmes.

Case 8 — Grubhub, FTC and Illinois

Although the proceedings also involved consumer-protection issues rather than being a conventional monopolisation case, the Grubhub matter is relevant to platform governance.

The FTC and Illinois alleged practices involving delivery costs, driver earnings information and restaurant listings. The resulting settlement required changes concerning disclosure of delivery costs, advertising of driver pay and restaurant consent.

Competition significance

Transparent platform rules matter because misleading information concerning:

• merchant participation;
• delivery costs; or
• courier compensation

can distort the competitive process.

The case therefore demonstrates the overlap between competition, platform governance and consumer protection.

18. Essential-Facility-Type Issues

A large delivery platform may become an important gateway to customers.

The legal question is whether refusal to provide access can constitute unlawful exclusion.

Possible examples include:

• refusing API access;
• denying merchant onboarding;
• denying delivery infrastructure;
• refusing interoperability;
• restricting access to logistics data; or
• refusing access to a commercially indispensable platform.

However, mere size does not automatically create an obligation to deal.

Authorities generally examine:

• indispensability;
• absence of realistic alternatives;
• competitive foreclosure;
• objective justification;
• investment incentives; and
• effects on downstream competition.

19. Interoperability

Interoperability can substantially increase competition.

For example, a restaurant could theoretically use:

Platform A for customer acquisition + Platform B for delivery + Platform C for payment

rather than being forced into one vertically integrated ecosystem.

Interoperability can therefore reduce:

• switching costs;
• lock-in;
• network-effect advantages; and
• dependence upon one platform.

Possible remedies include:

• open APIs;
• data portability;
• interoperability standards;
• merchant switching rights; and
• restrictions on technical discrimination.

20. Data Portability

Data portability may allow merchants to move:

• customer information;
• order histories;
• menus;
• transaction data;
• ratings; and
• delivery records

between competing platforms.

From a competition perspective, portability can reduce switching costs and make entry easier.

However, privacy and data-protection requirements must also be respected.

21. Tying and Bundling

A platform could combine:

Marketplace access + delivery + advertising + payments + loyalty membership

and condition access to one service on purchasing another.

For example, a merchant might be required to use the platform's delivery service to obtain:

• preferred ranking;
• premium marketplace status;
• advertising benefits; or
• access to certain customers.

Tying becomes particularly important where the platform has substantial market power in the tying market.

22. Predatory Algorithmic Pricing

Delivery platforms may use algorithms to determine:

• consumer prices;
• courier compensation;
• restaurant commissions;
• delivery fees; and
• promotional discounts.

Algorithms themselves are not unlawful.

The competition problem arises where algorithms are used to:

• implement exclusionary pricing;
• coordinate competitors;
• facilitate information exchange;
• discriminate against rivals; or
• maintain market allocation arrangements.

The Delivery Hero/Glovo decision demonstrates that digital communication and platform technology do not immunise ordinary cartel conduct from Article 101 scrutiny.

23. Cross-Subsidisation

A large platform may operate several services simultaneously:

Ride-hailing + food delivery + grocery delivery + payments + advertising + logistics

It can potentially use profits from one market to subsidise aggressive competition in another.

Competition analysis should therefore examine:

• transfer pricing;
• incremental costs;
• duration of subsidy;
• market foreclosure;
• barriers to entry; and
• whether competitors can match the strategy.

24. Consumer Welfare

Competition analysis should examine more than headline prices.

Relevant dimensions include:

Price

• delivery fees;
• commissions;
• subscription costs.

Quality

• delivery speed;
• reliability;
• food/product condition.

Choice

• number of restaurants;
• retailers;
• platforms;
• delivery options.

Innovation

• route optimisation;
• autonomous delivery;
• lockers;
• drones;
• dark stores;
• real-time tracking.

Privacy

• collection and use of consumer data.

Service reliability

• cancellation;
• refunds;
• customer support.

25. Remedies

Competition authorities can employ several remedies.

Structural remedies

• divestiture;
• separation of business units;
• prohibition of acquisitions.

Behavioural remedies

• non-discrimination;
• access obligations;
• restrictions on exclusivity;
• data-use restrictions;
• transparency requirements;
• interoperability.

Merger remedies

• divestiture of a competing platform;
• geographic divestiture;
• restrictions on information sharing;
• preservation of independent operations.

The Delivery Hero/Woowa transaction illustrates the use of divestiture as part of merger clearance.

26. Competition-Law Analytical Framework

A useful framework is:

Step 1 — Identify the platform

↓

Step 2 — Identify all relevant sides of the platform

Consumers → Merchants → Couriers → Advertisers

↓

Step 3 — Define relevant product and geographic markets

↓

Step 4 — Measure market power

Consider:

• market shares;
• network effects;
• data;
• switching costs;
• multi-homing;
• entry barriers.

↓

Step 5 — Identify conduct

• exclusivity;
• MFNs;
• tying;
• self-preferencing;
• predatory pricing;
• data exploitation;
• refusal to deal;
• algorithmic discrimination;
• information exchange.

↓

Step 6 — Determine competitive effects

• foreclosure;
• higher prices;
• reduced choice;
• lower quality;
• reduced innovation;
• reduced courier competition.

↓

Step 7 — Examine objective justifications and efficiencies

↓

Step 8 — Select proportionate remedy

27. Important Legal Principles Emerging from the Cases

28. Conclusion

Last-mile delivery platforms present a distinctive competition-law environment because digital network effects, physical logistics, data, algorithms and multi-sided platform economics operate simultaneously.

The principal competition concerns are:

1. platform concentration and mergers;
2. exclusivity and loyalty arrangements;
3. price-parity/MFN clauses;
4. self-preferencing;
5. algorithmic discrimination;
6. data exploitation;
7. refusal of access and interoperability problems;
8. predatory or exclusionary pricing;
9. information exchange between competing platforms;
10. market allocation;
11. no-poach arrangements affecting couriers and workers; and
12. vertical integration between marketplace and logistics services.

The Delivery Hero/Glovo decision is particularly important because it shows that competition law can address several dimensions of a modern delivery platform simultaneously—commercial information, geographic competition and labour-market competition.