Competition Law and Internet Governance and Competition Policy

1. Introduction

Internet governance refers to the rules, institutions, technical standards, policies, and decision-making processes that shape how the Internet operates. It covers matters such as domain names, Internet Protocol addressing, technical standards, access networks, platforms, app stores, search engines, data governance, cybersecurity, interoperability, and the management of critical Internet infrastructure.

Competition policy, by contrast, seeks to preserve competitive markets by addressing cartels, exclusionary conduct, abuse of dominance, anti-competitive agreements, mergers, market foreclosure, and barriers to entry.

The two fields increasingly overlap because Internet governance decisions can determine who can access essential infrastructure, who can interoperate with whom, which technical standards become dominant, how data is accessed, and whether new competitors can enter digital markets.

The central competition-law question is therefore:

Can governance arrangements that are technically or administratively necessary nevertheless create or reinforce market power, foreclosure, discrimination, or exclusion?

This issue arises at both the infrastructure level and the platform/ecosystem level.

2. Meaning of Internet Governance

Internet governance is broader than government regulation of the Internet. It involves multiple actors, including:

• Governments and regulators;
• Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN);
• Regional Internet Registries;
• Internet service providers;
• domain-name registries and registrars;
• standards organisations;
• Internet exchange points;
• cloud and content-delivery providers;
• digital platforms;
• cybersecurity organisations;
• technical communities;
• consumers and businesses.

ICANN, for example, was created to undertake functions relating to IP-address allocation, protocol parameters, DNS management and root-server-system management. Its historical arrangements also contemplated introducing competition into domain-name registration services.

Consequently, Internet governance can have direct competitive consequences even when the governance institution itself is not a conventional commercial enterprise.

3. Relationship Between Internet Governance and Competition Law

The relationship can be understood through six principal mechanisms.

A. Control over essential infrastructure

Some Internet resources may function as gateways or bottlenecks.

Examples include:

• DNS infrastructure;
• domain registries;
• Internet exchange points;
• submarine cable landing facilities;
• backbone networks;
• cloud infrastructure;
• app stores;
• operating systems;
• search engines.

Where access to such infrastructure is indispensable, competition law may examine whether the infrastructure operator is:

• refusing access;
• discriminating between competitors;
• imposing unreasonable conditions;
• charging excessive access fees;
• favouring affiliated businesses.

B. Standard-setting

Technical standards create interoperability.

However, a standard can also create competitive advantages for firms controlling or influencing the standard-setting process.

Potential issues include:

1. exclusion of rival technologies;
2. discriminatory participation;
3. manipulation of technical specifications;
4. excessive licensing fees;
5. refusal to license essential intellectual property;
6. strategic standard-setting;
7. discriminatory certification.

Competition policy therefore seeks to distinguish legitimate technical standardisation from standard-setting designed or used for exclusionary purposes.

C. Domain-name governance

Domain names are a fundamental Internet resource.

Competition questions can arise concerning:

• allocation of new generic top-level domains;
• registry access;
• registrar accreditation;
• domain-registration pricing;
• registry/registrar separation;
• preferential treatment;
• discriminatory access;
• vertical integration;
• control over scarce domain resources.

The ICANN system itself historically contemplated developing competition in domain-registration services.

4. Internet Governance as a Competition Policy Issue

Internet governance increasingly involves a shift from a purely technical model toward a broader regulatory model.

Competition authorities must consider whether governance rules:

1. Preserve interoperability

Interoperability allows competing products and services to function together.

2. Reduce switching costs

Users should not be artificially prevented from moving from one platform or provider to another.

3. Prevent gatekeeper foreclosure

A firm controlling an important gateway can potentially disadvantage competitors.

4. Promote open access

Where infrastructure is difficult to duplicate, access rules become particularly important.

5. Maintain competitive neutrality

Governance institutions should avoid rules that unnecessarily favour one commercial participant.

6. Protect innovation

Competition policy must consider whether governance arrangements prevent emerging technologies from challenging established technologies.

5. Relevant Competition-Law Concepts

A. Relevant Market

Internet markets frequently require careful market definition.

A single Internet company may operate across several connected markets:

• operating systems;
• app stores;
• online search;
• search advertising;
• digital advertising;
• cloud computing;
• payment services;
• online marketplaces.

The CCI's Google decisions demonstrate this approach. In the Google Android proceedings, the Commission identified markets including the licensable operating systems market for smart mobile devices and the app-store market for Android mobile operating systems.

B. Network Effects

Internet markets are particularly affected by network effects.

The value of a platform can increase as more:

• users join;
• developers participate;
• advertisers purchase services;
• sellers join;
• data is generated.

This can create a feedback loop:

More users → more data → better service → more users → stronger market position

Competition concerns arise if the incumbent subsequently uses this position to prevent competitors from reaching sufficient scale.

C. Multi-Sided Markets

Many Internet businesses operate simultaneously on multiple sides of a market.

For example:

Search engine

Users → Search platform ← Advertisers

App store

Users → App store ← Developers

Marketplace

Consumers → Marketplace ← Sellers

Conduct affecting one side can have competitive effects on another.

6. Abuse of Dominance in Internet Governance

A dominant Internet infrastructure or platform operator may potentially engage in:

Self-preferencing

Giving its own services preferential treatment.

Discriminatory access

Providing competitors with inferior access to infrastructure or data.

Tying

Requiring users or businesses to take another service.

Exclusive dealing

Preventing business partners from dealing with competitors.

Predatory pricing

Using below-cost pricing to eliminate competitors.

Margin squeeze

Charging high upstream prices while competing downstream at prices that make efficient competition difficult.

Refusal to deal

Withholding access to infrastructure that competitors reasonably require.

Data foreclosure

Restricting competitors' access to competitively important data.

7. Case Laws

1. Matrimony.com Ltd. v. Google LLC & Others — CCI, 2018

This is an important Indian Internet-competition case.

The complaint concerned Google's search and advertising activities and allegations including preferential treatment of Google's own vertical services.

The CCI examined markets including:

• online general web search services; and
• online search advertising services.

The case is significant because it demonstrates how competition law can scrutinise search-engine architecture, ranking, vertical integration and self-preferencing.

Principle

A search engine may simultaneously operate as:

infrastructure + platform + intermediary + competitor

This creates potential conflicts between its role as a gateway and its commercial interests.

2. Google Android — CCI, Case No. 39 of 2018

The CCI examined Google's Android ecosystem and its contractual arrangements with mobile-device manufacturers.

The case concerned arrangements including:

• Mobile Application Distribution Agreements;
• Anti-Fragmentation Agreements;
• Android Compatibility arrangements;
• revenue-sharing arrangements.

The CCI concluded that the arrangements could reinforce Google's position in search and related markets and imposed behavioural measures.

Competition significance

The case illustrates how technical architecture and contractual governance can jointly produce competitive foreclosure.

The important relationship is:

Operating system → default placement → user access → search queries → data → advertising → market power

3. Google Play — CCI, 2022

The Google Play proceedings concerned Google's conduct in relation to app stores and payment systems.

The CCI treated the Android app-store environment as a distinct competitive setting and examined Google's position in the market.

The case illustrates the importance of:

• app-store access;
• payment rules;
• developer conditions;
• platform fees;
• alternative payment systems;
• platform governance.

The later CCI proceedings concerning WinZO also relied on the earlier findings concerning Google's dominance in the Android operating-system and app-store markets.

4. Google Shopping — European Commission, 2017

The European Commission found Google to have abused its dominant position by giving its own comparison-shopping service favourable treatment in search results.

Competition significance

The case is particularly important for Internet governance because search-result ranking effectively determines access to users.

A search engine is not merely a neutral technical infrastructure when it controls the ordering and visibility of competing commercial services.

The broader principle is:

Control over digital visibility can constitute an important source of market power.

This issue remains relevant under newer digital-market regulation. In July 2026, the European Commission announced a DMA decision concerning Google's treatment of its own services in Google Search.

5. United States v. Google — Search and Advertising Litigation

The United States antitrust proceedings concerning Google have focused on contractual and structural practices associated with maintaining Google's position in search and digital advertising.

The case illustrates a major Internet-governance problem:

Distribution agreements can determine which search engine users encounter by default.

Competition analysis therefore extends beyond the search engine itself to:

• browsers;
• mobile operating systems;
• device manufacturers;
• default settings;
• distribution agreements;
• advertising infrastructure.

This demonstrates the importance of examining the entire digital distribution architecture, rather than analysing an individual product in isolation.

6. name.space, Inc. v. ICANN

This is particularly relevant because it directly connects Internet governance and antitrust law.

name.space challenged aspects of ICANN's New gTLD programme and alleged violations of U.S. antitrust law.

The U.S. Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims in 2015. The allegations concerned ICANN's creation and administration of the New gTLD programme, including the application fee and rules governing new domain extensions.

Competition significance

The case demonstrates that Internet-governance decisions concerning:

• domain-name allocation;
• eligibility;
• application requirements;
• fees;
• technical rules;

can become subjects of competition-law litigation.

It also illustrates the difficulty of applying conventional antitrust concepts to non-traditional Internet governance institutions.

8. Comparative Significance of the Cases

9. Internet Exchange Points and Competition

Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) provide infrastructure through which networks exchange Internet traffic.

Their competitive importance arises because an IXP can potentially affect:

• interconnection costs;
• latency;
• traffic routing;
• network quality;
• access to other networks;
• entry by smaller ISPs.

A dominant IXP or network operator could potentially engage in:

• discriminatory access;
• excessive access charges;
• preferential routing;
• exclusionary membership requirements;
• refusal to interconnect;
• discriminatory technical standards.

Therefore, competition policy may treat certain interconnection facilities as potentially important infrastructure.

10. Competition and Internet Backbone Infrastructure

Internet backbone infrastructure may involve significant:

• sunk costs;
• economies of scale;
• network effects;
• geographical constraints;
• switching costs.

This creates possible natural-monopoly characteristics.

Competition authorities therefore need to examine whether:

Infrastructure ownership + vertical integration + discriminatory access = foreclosure risk

For example:

Backbone operator

↓

Controls network access

↓

Competes with downstream service providers

↓

Restricts or disadvantages rival providers

↓

Potential exclusionary effect

This is closely related to the essential-facilities/access doctrine, although competition authorities must apply the doctrine cautiously because forced access can reduce investment incentives.

11. Data Governance and Competition Policy

Data is increasingly an important competitive input.

Internet governance therefore intersects with competition policy through:

• data portability;
• interoperability;
• access to public data;
• access to platform data;
• data-sharing arrangements;
• privacy restrictions;
• data concentration.

A dominant platform can potentially strengthen its position through control over a large data ecosystem.

However, competition law should not automatically treat all data as an essential facility.

The relevant questions include:

1. Is the data competitively significant?
2. Is it difficult to replicate?
3. Can competitors obtain comparable data elsewhere?
4. Would access materially improve competitive entry?
5. Does compulsory sharing undermine privacy?
6. Would mandatory access reduce incentives to collect or innovate?

12. Privacy and Competition

Privacy and competition are increasingly interconnected.

A dominant platform may impose privacy-related terms that:

• restrict interoperability;
• prevent competitors from accessing data;
• increase switching costs;
• reinforce ecosystem dependency.

Conversely, privacy requirements may legitimately restrict data sharing.

Therefore:

Privacy protection ≠ anti-competitive conduct

and

Data access ≠ automatic competition remedy

Competition authorities must balance:

• competition;
• consumer protection;
• privacy;
• cybersecurity;
• innovation.

13. Internet Governance and Digital Gatekeepers

Modern Internet governance increasingly focuses on gatekeeper platforms.

A gatekeeper may control:

• access to consumers;
• app distribution;
• search visibility;
• advertising infrastructure;
• payment systems;
• operating systems;
• cloud infrastructure;
• data.

The resulting structure can be represented as:

Infrastructure

↓

Gateway

↓

Platform

↓

Business users

↓

Consumers

If the gateway operator simultaneously competes with businesses dependent upon it, the possibility of vertical foreclosure becomes significant.

14. Interoperability as Competition Policy

Interoperability is one of the most important competition-policy tools in Internet governance.

It allows competing services to communicate or function together.

Examples include:

• messaging interoperability;
• payment interoperability;
• API access;
• operating-system compatibility;
• data portability;
• cloud interoperability.

Interoperability can reduce:

• switching costs;
• lock-in;
• network-effect advantages;
• entry barriers.

However, mandatory interoperability may also create:

• cybersecurity risks;
• privacy risks;
• technical complexity;
• free-riding;
• reduced innovation incentives.

Thus, interoperability remedies should be designed proportionately.

15. Standard-Setting and Competition

Standard-setting organisations can produce substantial economic benefits.

Standards may:

• reduce transaction costs;
• improve interoperability;
• encourage innovation;
• facilitate international trade;
• reduce duplication.

But anti-competitive standardisation can occur where competitors coordinate to:

• exclude alternative technologies;
• disadvantage a rival;
• manipulate technical specifications;
• impose discriminatory licensing terms.

A competition-law assessment therefore asks whether the standard-setting process was:

Open + transparent + technically justified + non-discriminatory

or instead:

Closed + discriminatory + strategically exclusionary

16. Competition-Neutral Internet Governance

A sound Internet-governance framework should generally pursue:

1. Open access

Comparable users should receive comparable access where circumstances are equivalent.

2. Transparency

Technical and commercial rules should be reasonably transparent.

3. Non-discrimination

Governance systems should avoid unjustified discrimination.

4. Interoperability

Competing technologies should be capable of interacting where technically feasible.

5. Contestability

New entrants should have meaningful opportunities to compete.

6. Consumer choice

Users should not be artificially locked into one ecosystem.

7. Innovation

Governance rules should avoid unnecessary restrictions on technological development.

17. Merger Control and Internet Governance

Internet governance also has implications for mergers.

A merger involving:

• an ISP;
• cloud provider;
• domain registry;
• cybersecurity provider;
• CDN;
• payment network;
• app store;
• digital advertising platform;

may affect competitive access to Internet infrastructure.

Traditional market-share analysis may be insufficient because a transaction can create:

• data advantages;
• ecosystem effects;
• interoperability advantages;
• vertical foreclosure;
• increased switching costs;
• control over an important gateway.

Consequently, modern digital merger analysis increasingly considers ecosystem effects, not merely conventional horizontal overlaps.

18. Role of Competition Authorities

Competition authorities should monitor Internet governance through several tools.

A. Ex-post enforcement

Investigating:

• abuse of dominance;
• exclusionary agreements;
• discriminatory access;
• tying;
• self-preferencing.

B. Merger control

Examining acquisitions that may consolidate control over Internet infrastructure.

C. Market studies

Studying emerging digital markets before serious foreclosure occurs.

D. Regulatory cooperation

Competition authorities may need to cooperate with:

• telecommunications regulators;
• data-protection authorities;
• cybersecurity authorities;
• Internet-governance organisations.

E. Behavioural remedies

Examples:

• non-discrimination obligations;
• access requirements;
• interoperability;
• transparency;
• prohibition of self-preferencing.

F. Structural remedies

In exceptional circumstances:

• separation;
• divestiture;
• restrictions on vertical integration.

19. Challenges in Applying Competition Law

1. Rapid technological change

Competition law may move more slowly than technology.

2. Network effects

A market may tip rapidly toward one platform.

3. Zero-price services

Traditional price-based analysis becomes difficult when users pay with attention or data rather than money.

4. Multi-sided markets

Conduct affecting one group can benefit or harm another.

5. Ecosystems

Competition may occur between entire ecosystems rather than individual products.

6. Global jurisdiction

Internet services frequently operate across numerous countries.

7. Technical complexity

Competition authorities require significant technical expertise.

8. Regulatory overlap

Competition law may intersect with:

• telecom law;
• privacy law;
• cybersecurity law;
• consumer protection;
• intellectual property;
• Internet governance rules.

20. Indian Legal Framework

In India, the principal statute is the Competition Act, 2002.

Important provisions include:

Section 3

Prohibits anti-competitive agreements.

Section 4

Deals with abuse of dominant position.

Sections 5 and 6

Concern combinations and merger control.

Section 19

Provides the framework for inquiry into alleged contraventions.

Section 27

Provides remedial powers following findings of contravention.

For digital markets, Section 4 has been particularly important because Internet platforms can acquire substantial market power through:

• network effects;
• data advantages;
• ecosystem integration;
• defaults;
• technical restrictions;
• platform governance.

The CCI's Digital Competition Committee report identified several important digital cases, including WhatsApp, Google Android, Apple, Digital News Publishers, Zomato, BookMyShow, Google Play, and MakeMyTrip-related proceedings.

21. Internet Governance and the Digital Competition Framework

The Internet is moving from a model based predominantly on:

Open technical coordination

toward a more complex model involving:

Technical governance + platform governance + regulatory governance + competition policy

This creates a layered regulatory structure:

Layer 1 — Physical infrastructure
Cables, IXPs, networks

↓

Layer 2 — Internet protocols
IP, DNS, routing, standards

↓

Layer 3 — Platforms
Operating systems, app stores, search engines

↓

Layer 4 — Digital services
Advertising, marketplaces, cloud, payments

↓

Layer 5 — Consumers and businesses

Competition concerns can arise at every layer.

22. Emerging Competition Issues

Future competition-policy questions will increasingly involve:

• AI infrastructure governance;
• cloud interoperability;
• AI model access;
• foundation-model ecosystems;
• algorithmic traffic management;
• digital identity infrastructure;
• Internet-of-Things standards;
• satellite Internet;
• Internet exchange infrastructure;
• DNS competition;
• cybersecurity certification;
• cross-platform interoperability;
• digital advertising infrastructure;
• data-sharing mandates;
• content-distribution networks;
• edge computing;
• Web3 infrastructure.

The central concern will be whether control over digital infrastructure becomes a mechanism for controlling downstream competition.

23. Important Legal Principles

The combined lessons from Internet-governance and competition cases can be summarised as follows:

Principle 1

Technical infrastructure can have economic significance.

Principle 2

Control over a digital gateway can create substantial market power.

Principle 3

Interoperability can be an important competitive condition.

Principle 4

Self-preferencing can become problematic where a dominant intermediary competes with businesses dependent upon it.

Principle 5

Default arrangements can materially influence competitive outcomes.

Principle 6

Standard-setting must not unnecessarily become a vehicle for exclusion.

Principle 7

Access remedies must balance competition with innovation and investment incentives.

Principle 8

Internet governance increasingly requires coordination between competition and sector regulators.

24. Conclusion

Internet governance and competition policy are increasingly inseparable. Internet governance determines the architecture through which businesses reach users, exchange data, interoperate, establish technical compatibility and access critical digital infrastructure. Competition law determines whether that architecture is being used in a manner that preserves or restricts competitive opportunities.

The most important competition concerns arise where a firm or institution controls a gateway and simultaneously participates in downstream commercial activity. Search engines, operating systems, app stores, domain infrastructure, network interconnection, cloud services and digital advertising illustrate this problem.

The cases involving Matrimony.com/Google, Google Android, Google Play, Google Shopping, U.S. Google litigation and name.space/ICANN demonstrate different dimensions of the same broader problem: control over Internet architecture can translate into economic power.

Accordingly, modern competition policy must consider not only prices and market shares but also interoperability, defaults, data, network effects, technical standards, access conditions, switching costs, ecosystem control and digital gateways. The objective is not to regulate technical governance merely because it affects competition, but to identify when governance arrangements become mechanisms for unjustified exclusion, discrimination or foreclosure.