Competition Law and Governance of Ecosystem Awareness Infrastructures

1. Introduction

“Ecosystem awareness infrastructures” is not a formally defined category in competition statutes. It can be used as a useful analytical concept for digital markets describing the data, ranking, recommendation, monitoring, identity, analytics, interoperability, notification and decision-support systems through which a digital ecosystem becomes aware of users, competitors, transactions, suppliers and market conditions.

Examples include:

• search and recommendation systems;
• app-store ranking and discovery systems;
• advertising and auction infrastructure;
• consumer-behaviour analytics;
• identity and authentication systems;
• business dashboards and seller analytics;
• interoperability and API infrastructure;
• data portability systems;
• AI-based recommendation and classification systems;
• ecosystem-wide monitoring and risk-detection systems.

Competition law becomes relevant where control over these infrastructures allows an undertaking to collect superior information, deny access to rivals, favour its own services, impose discriminatory conditions, tie complementary products, exploit network effects, or raise competitors' costs.

The central competition-law question is therefore:

Does an ecosystem's informational advantage arise from competition on the merits, or is awareness infrastructure being used as a mechanism for excluding or weakening competitors?

2. Meaning of Ecosystem Awareness Infrastructure

An ecosystem awareness infrastructure can be understood through five layers.

A. Data layer

The ecosystem collects:

• search queries;
• purchasing information;
• location data;
• transaction data;
• clickstream data;
• app usage;
• advertising responses;
• seller performance;
• consumer preferences.

The larger the ecosystem, the greater the potential informational advantage.

B. Intelligence layer

Raw information is transformed into:

• rankings;
• recommendations;
• predictions;
• consumer profiles;
• demand forecasts;
• fraud scores;
• seller scores;
• advertising targeting;
• algorithmic classifications.

C. Visibility layer

The infrastructure determines what users see.

Examples include:

• search ranking;
• app-store ranking;
• product placement;
• recommendation feeds;
• default settings;
• advertisements;
• preferred suppliers.

D. Access layer

The ecosystem determines which businesses receive access to:

• APIs;
• data;
• interoperability;
• users;
• payment systems;
• app stores;
• advertising exchanges;
• authentication systems.

E. Governance layer

The operator establishes the rules governing:

• ranking;
• data access;
• interoperability;
• platform participation;
• pricing;
• recommendation;
• content or product visibility;
• technical standards.

Thus, an ecosystem-awareness infrastructure can become a competitive bottleneck even where the underlying information itself is not scarce.

3. Competition-Law Framework

A. Abuse of Dominance

The principal concern is whether a dominant undertaking uses control over awareness infrastructure to exclude competitors.

Under Section 4 of the Indian Competition Act, 2002, relevant conduct may include:

• unfair or discriminatory conditions;
• denial of market access;
• leveraging dominance;
• tying and bundling;
• preferential treatment;
• restricting technical development;
• exclusionary agreements.

The comparable legal frameworks include:

• Article 102 TFEU in the European Union;
• Chapter II Competition Act 1998 in the UK;
• Section 2 Sherman Act in the United States.

4. Data as a Competitive Input

Awareness infrastructures can create a data feedback loop:

More users → more data → better algorithms → better service → more users → more data

This can create a self-reinforcing ecosystem.

The competition concern arises when competitors cannot reproduce the same informational advantage because the dominant undertaking:

1. controls the primary data source;
2. restricts access to data;
3. combines data across markets;
4. uses data obtained from dependent businesses;
5. uses its informational advantage to favour its own products.

The DOJ's Google search litigation illustrates the importance of access to search data and user-interaction information in remedies addressing entrenched digital market power.

5. Self-Preferencing

Self-preferencing occurs when an ecosystem operator gives its own service preferential treatment within an infrastructure that competitors depend upon.

Examples:

• ranking its own shopping service above competitors;
• giving its own applications greater visibility;
• prioritising its own advertising products;
• using proprietary data to improve its competing downstream service;
• giving its own business better access to platform information.

The Google Shopping litigation is a leading authority.

6. Six Major Case Laws

Case 1: Google Search (Shopping) — European Union

Google and Alphabet v European Commission, T-612/17

The European Commission found that Google systematically gave prominent placement to its own comparison-shopping service while demoting competing comparison-shopping services.

The General Court upheld the Commission's essential findings in 2021.

Competition principle

The case demonstrates that a dominant digital intermediary may face competition-law scrutiny where it controls an important visibility and discovery infrastructure and uses that infrastructure to favour its own downstream service.

Relevance to ecosystem awareness infrastructure

Search is not merely an information service. It determines:

• what consumers become aware of;
• which competitors receive visibility;
• how users discover products;
• which businesses obtain traffic.

Therefore, ranking infrastructure itself can possess competitive significance.

Case 2: Google Android — European Union

Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Android)

The European Commission's Android case concerned Google's conduct involving Android, Google Play and Google Search.

The underlying concern was that contractual arrangements surrounding Google's mobile ecosystem could reinforce Google's position across interconnected digital markets.

Competition principle

A dominant undertaking cannot necessarily use control over one ecosystem layer—such as an operating system—to strengthen dominance in adjacent markets.

Ecosystem relevance

Android illustrates the ecosystem leverage problem:

Operating system → app store → search → browser → advertising → user data

Control at one level can influence competitive conditions at other levels.

Case 3: Google Android — India

Google LLC & Anr. v Competition Commission of India & Ors.

The CCI's 2022 Android decision is particularly relevant to ecosystem-awareness infrastructure.

The CCI imposed a penalty of ₹1,337.76 crore and found abuse involving Google's Android mobile-device ecosystem. The Commission examined Android and several proprietary applications including Play Store, Search, Chrome and YouTube.

The CCI identified multiple relevant markets and examined Google's conduct across interconnected Android markets.

Competition principle

The case demonstrates that competition authorities can examine an ecosystem as a collection of interconnected markets rather than as an isolated product.

Relevance

The informational advantage generated through:

• Android usage;
• Google Search;
• Play Store;
• YouTube;
• Chrome;
• advertising;

can potentially reinforce Google's position throughout the ecosystem.

The case was subsequently considered by NCLAT, which upheld substantial portions of the CCI's behavioural directions and penalty framework.

Case 4: Facebook/Meta Data — Germany

Bundeskartellamt v Facebook/Meta

The German competition authority's Facebook proceedings examined the relationship between Facebook's dominant position and the extensive collection and combination of user data from Facebook and other sources.

The case is important because data governance itself became a competition issue.

Competition principle

Where a dominant platform controls an important user-facing ecosystem, the ability to combine information from different services may strengthen market power.

Ecosystem relevance

Awareness infrastructure becomes particularly powerful where:

Service A data + Service B data + third-party data → unified behavioural profile

That profile can improve:

• targeting;
• recommendations;
• advertising;
• fraud detection;
• product development.

Competitors lacking equivalent data access may face an informational disadvantage.

Case 5: United States v Google — Search

United States et al. v Google LLC

The U.S. search-monopoly litigation concerned Google's agreements and practices surrounding distribution and default placement of its search service.

In 2024, the U.S. District Court found Google liable for unlawful monopolization. In 2025, the court imposed remedies that included restrictions on certain exclusive distribution agreements and requirements concerning access to specified search-index and user-interaction data.

Competition principle

A dominant platform can potentially entrench its position when it controls the principal access and discovery pathways through which users encounter competing services.

Ecosystem-awareness relevance

The case illustrates a crucial distinction:

Control over information infrastructure can become control over market access.

Search defaults, distribution agreements, data and user interaction can collectively create substantial ecosystem advantages.

Case 6: United States v Google — Digital Advertising Technology

United States v Google LLC, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

The U.S. Department of Justice challenged Google's conduct involving the digital advertising technology stack.

The litigation concerned interconnected products used by publishers and advertisers, including publisher ad servers, ad exchanges and related advertising technologies. In 2025, the court found Google liable for monopolization in important open-web digital advertising markets.

In September 2026, further remedies required interoperability and data-sharing measures and addressed self-preferencing in Google's ad-tech products.

Competition principle

The case demonstrates how control of interconnected technological infrastructure can produce competitive advantages across multiple layers of an ecosystem.

Awareness-infrastructure relevance

Advertising infrastructure constantly processes information concerning:

• publishers;
• advertisers;
• consumers;
• bids;
• inventory;
• prices;
• performance;
• demand.

Control over this informational infrastructure can therefore affect competitive conditions throughout the ecosystem.

7. Additional Important Authority: Bronner

Oscar Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint, C-7/97

The European Court of Justice established an important framework for determining when refusal of access to an infrastructure can constitute abusive conduct.

The essential-facility analysis requires particularly stringent conditions.

Importance

Not every valuable infrastructure must be opened to competitors.

This is crucial for ecosystem-awareness systems.

A platform does not automatically violate competition law merely because competitors would benefit from access to its data or infrastructure.

The analysis must consider matters such as:

• indispensability;
• duplication possibilities;
• exclusionary effect;
• objective justification;
• competitive harm.

8. Essential Facilities and Awareness Infrastructure

A digital awareness infrastructure may become strategically important where competitors cannot realistically reproduce it.

Examples:

Search index

A competitor may struggle to reproduce the scale and quality of a mature search index.

App-store data

App stores possess information about:

• downloads;
• rankings;
• reviews;
• purchases;
• developer behaviour.

Advertising exchanges

They possess real-time information regarding:

• bids;
• inventory;
• advertisers;
• publishers;
• consumer interactions.

Identity infrastructure

A dominant authentication system may control access to users across multiple services.

Therefore, digital infrastructure can function as an informational essential facility, although the strict legal requirements for mandatory access remain important.

9. Interoperability

Interoperability is increasingly important to ecosystem governance.

A dominant platform may restrict interoperability with:

• rival applications;
• competing payment systems;
• alternative app stores;
• browsers;
• APIs;
• identity services;
• data-portability tools.

The competition concern increases when interoperability restrictions:

1. prevent competitors from reaching users;
2. increase switching costs;
3. protect the incumbent's network effects;
4. prevent innovation;
5. reinforce ecosystem dependency.

The UK's current digital-markets work illustrates this trend: the CMA's investigations into Google's and Apple's mobile platforms include issues concerning app distribution, steering, app ranking, data use and interoperability.

10. Ranking as Competition Infrastructure

Ranking is particularly important because visibility has economic value.

A platform may control:

• search rankings;
• product rankings;
• app rankings;
• recommendation rankings;
• seller rankings;
• advertising placement.

A ranking algorithm can therefore act as an invisible allocation mechanism.

Competition risks

Potential problems include:

• self-preferencing;
• discriminatory ranking;
• retaliation against competitors;
• manipulation of seller visibility;
• preferential treatment for affiliated businesses;
• opaque ranking criteria.

Google Shopping provides the classic example of competition scrutiny directed toward this phenomenon.

11. Algorithmic Awareness and Competition

Modern ecosystems increasingly employ AI and machine learning to determine:

• what consumers want;
• which products should be displayed;
• which advertisements should be shown;
• which transactions appear suspicious;
• which sellers are trustworthy;
• which users should receive particular offers.

This creates a new competition issue:

Who controls the algorithm that determines what the market can see?

If a dominant platform controls both:

1. the data used to train the algorithm, and
2. the market in which the algorithm operates,

it may possess a substantial structural advantage.

12. Data Advantage and Network Effects

The relationship can be expressed as:

Users

↓

Transactions

↓

Data generation

↓

Algorithmic improvement

↓

Better recommendations / rankings

↓

More users

↓

More data

This is a data-network feedback loop.

Competition law must distinguish between:

Legitimate data advantage

A firm becomes successful because consumers voluntarily choose its service and its data improves the service.

Potentially exclusionary data advantage

The firm uses dominance to:

• prevent competitors accessing necessary information;
• impose discriminatory data-access conditions;
• combine data in ways that foreclose rivals;
• exploit data obtained from dependent businesses;
• use privileged information to compete against those businesses.

13. Self-Preferencing Through Data

A particularly important model is:

Platform

→ receives data from third-party sellers

→ analyses seller performance

→ identifies successful products

→ develops or promotes its own competing products

→ uses platform visibility to promote them.

This creates a potential conflict between the platform's roles as:

infrastructure provider + information intermediary + competitor.

Competition authorities therefore increasingly examine whether information obtained through platform operation is being converted into a competitive advantage in downstream markets.

14. Data Portability

Data portability can reduce ecosystem lock-in.

If users or businesses can transfer their relevant data to competitors, switching costs may fall.

Competition benefits can include:

• easier switching;
• increased multi-homing;
• greater entry opportunities;
• stronger innovation;
• reduced informational barriers.

However, portability must be designed consistently with:

• privacy;
• cybersecurity;
• confidentiality;
• intellectual property;
• legitimate commercial interests.

Thus, competition law does not necessarily require unlimited disclosure.

15. Interoperability as a Remedy

Where exclusion is caused by technical isolation, competition authorities may consider:

A. API access

Competitors receive technical access under specified conditions.

B. Data portability

Users or businesses can transfer information.

C. Functional interoperability

Rival services can interact with the dominant platform.

D. Non-discrimination

The platform cannot give its own services preferential technical treatment.

E. Transparency

Ranking or access conditions may need greater transparency.

The recent U.S. Google ad-tech remedies demonstrate how interoperability and data-sharing can be incorporated into remedies for digital monopolization.

16. Governance Problems

Ecosystem-awareness infrastructure produces several distinctive governance problems.

17. Merger Control

Competition authorities should examine mergers involving awareness infrastructure particularly carefully where the transaction combines:

• large user datasets;
• analytics systems;
• advertising infrastructure;
• identity systems;
• recommendation engines;
• AI models;
• search systems;
• app stores;
• cloud infrastructure.

Traditional turnover thresholds may not always capture the strategic value of data-rich acquisitions.

Relevant theories of harm can include:

Horizontal effects

Two competing information platforms combine.

Vertical effects

An infrastructure provider acquires a downstream user-facing service.

Conglomerate effects

A company combines complementary ecosystem components.

Data-related effects

The merger combines datasets that previously competed or were independently controlled.

18. Competition Law and Consumer Welfare

Ecosystem awareness can produce significant pro-competitive benefits.

For example:

• better recommendations;
• fraud prevention;
• lower search costs;
• personalised services;
• improved security;
• reduced transaction costs;
• more accurate advertising;
• improved logistics.

Therefore, competition law should not treat every large dataset or algorithmic advantage as anticompetitive.

The relevant question is whether the conduct distorts the competitive process rather than merely whether the undertaking possesses sophisticated technology.

19. Relationship With Consumer Protection and Data Protection

Ecosystem awareness sits at the intersection of three regulatory areas.

Competition law

Asks:

Is market power being used to restrict competition?

Data protection law

Asks:

Is personal information being collected and processed lawfully?

Consumer protection law

Asks:

Are consumers being deceived, manipulated or unfairly treated?

A single practice can therefore raise three different legal questions.

For example:

Personalised ranking

→ competition issue: self-preferencing?

→ privacy issue: lawful profiling?

→ consumer issue: deceptive or manipulative presentation?

These legal regimes should be coordinated without treating them as interchangeable.

20. Current Regulatory Direction

Digital competition regulation increasingly focuses on ecosystem governance rather than isolated conduct.

The EU's Digital Markets Act provides a particularly important example. In July 2026, the European Commission announced findings that Google had breached DMA obligations concerning self-preferencing in Search and steering restrictions in Google Play, imposing fines of €460 million and €430 million respectively.

The UK similarly has active digital-markets investigations into Google's search services, Google's mobile platform, Apple's mobile platform and Microsoft's business-software ecosystem.

This demonstrates the movement toward regulating structural ecosystem behaviour, rather than waiting exclusively for traditional single-market abuses.

21. Proposed Governance Framework

A competition-compliant ecosystem-awareness infrastructure should ideally follow these principles.

1. Data neutrality

Do not use privileged ecosystem data to unfairly disadvantage rivals.

2. Non-discriminatory access

Comparable businesses should receive comparable technical access.

3. Transparent ranking

Ranking criteria should not be manipulated to favour affiliated businesses without legitimate justification.

4. Interoperability

Where legally required and technically feasible, interoperability should be supported.

5. Data portability

Users and businesses should be able to move relevant information where appropriate.

6. Separation of roles

Where an undertaking is simultaneously:

• infrastructure operator,
• data intermediary, and
• competitor,

competition risks should receive enhanced scrutiny.

7. Auditability

Important algorithms and access decisions should be capable of regulatory examination.

8. Non-retaliation

Platforms should not punish businesses for using competing services.

9. Objective justification

Restrictions should be supported by legitimate grounds such as:

• cybersecurity;
• privacy;
• technical integrity;
• fraud prevention;
• intellectual property.

10. Proportionate remedies

Competition authorities should consider:

• behavioural remedies;
• access obligations;
• interoperability;
• data portability;
• non-discrimination;
• structural remedies where necessary.

22. Key Legal Principles From the Case Law

The six principal cases collectively demonstrate several important principles:

Principle 1 — Information infrastructure can have competitive significance

Google Shopping demonstrates that control over discovery and ranking can affect competition.

Principle 2 — Ecosystems must sometimes be analysed across multiple connected markets

The Indian Android proceedings examined Google's conduct across several interconnected Android-related markets.

Principle 3 — Data can become a source of market power

The Facebook/Meta proceedings demonstrate the competition-law relevance of combining and controlling extensive datasets.

Principle 4 — Defaults and distribution can reinforce market power

The U.S. Google Search litigation illustrates the significance of default placement and distribution arrangements.

Principle 5 — Infrastructure control can create foreclosure risks

Google's ad-tech litigation demonstrates how control over multiple interconnected layers can affect publishers, advertisers and competing technologies.

Principle 6 — Remedies may need to address ecosystem architecture

Modern remedies increasingly include:

• interoperability;
• data access;
• non-discrimination;
• restrictions on exclusive arrangements;
• technical access.

The 2026 Google ad-tech remedies are an especially clear contemporary example.

23. Short Hypothetical

Suppose Platform X operates:

• a search engine;
• an app store;
• a payment system;
• an advertising exchange;
• a recommendation engine.

Thousands of independent businesses use X.

X receives information concerning:

• customer searches;
• transactions;
• conversion rates;
• product popularity;
• advertising performance.

X then launches its own competing products.

If X uses its privileged ecosystem information to:

1. identify successful competitors;
2. reproduce their products;
3. downgrade those competitors;
4. restrict their API access;
5. promote X's products;
6. prevent users from switching,

the conduct could raise concerns involving:

• abuse of dominance;
• self-preferencing;
• discriminatory access;
• leveraging;
• tying;
• exclusionary conduct;
• data-based foreclosure.

The legality would ultimately depend on market definition, dominance, the precise conduct, competitive effects, objective justifications and applicable jurisdictional rules.

24. Conclusion

Ecosystem awareness infrastructures represent an important emerging dimension of competition law. They convert raw information into market visibility, prediction, ranking, targeting and strategic control.

The most important competition risks arise when a dominant ecosystem controls both:

the infrastructure through which market information is generated or processed, and the competitive markets in which that information is subsequently used.

The Google Shopping, Google Android, Facebook/Meta, U.S. Google Search and Google AdTech proceedings demonstrate different manifestations of this problem, while Bronner supplies an important caution that valuable infrastructure does not automatically create an obligation to provide access.

The central regulatory challenge is therefore to preserve the efficiency and innovation benefits of integrated digital ecosystems while preventing informational advantages, ranking systems, interoperability restrictions and data feedback loops from becoming mechanisms of durable exclusion.

Key Case-Law List

1. Google and Alphabet v European Commission (Google Shopping), T-612/17 — EU
2. Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Android) — EU
3. Google LLC & Anr. v Competition Commission of India & Ors. — India
4. Bundeskartellamt v Facebook/Meta — Germany
5. United States et al. v Google LLC — U.S. Search
6. United States v Google LLC — U.S. Digital Advertising Technology
7. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint, C-7/97 — EU
8. United Brands Company v Commission, 27/76 — EU

These authorities collectively provide a strong doctrinal foundation for analysing data control, digital visibility, interoperability, self-preferencing, essential facilities, ecosystem leverage and informational foreclosure.