Competition Law and Governance of Advanced Ecosystem Infrastructures

1. Introduction

Advanced ecosystem infrastructures are the technological, commercial, and data-based systems on which multiple businesses depend to reach customers, develop products, exchange data, make payments, distribute services, or interoperate with other platforms.

Examples include:

• mobile operating systems and app stores;
• cloud-computing infrastructure;
• digital payment and identity systems;
• AI-compute and model ecosystems;
• data-sharing and API infrastructures;
• digital advertising exchanges;
• EV-charging and battery ecosystems;
• telecommunications networks;
• smart-grid infrastructure;
• logistics and marketplace platforms;
• interoperability layers connecting different digital services.

Competition law becomes particularly important where one undertaking controls an infrastructure that is necessary, highly valuable, difficult to replicate, or capable of determining competitive conditions in adjacent markets.

The central competition-law question is therefore:

When does control over an advanced ecosystem infrastructure become a source of legitimate competitive advantage, and when does it become a mechanism for excluding or disadvantaging competitors?

Modern enforcement increasingly examines not merely the infrastructure itself, but the governance rules, access conditions, interoperability, data flows, technical standards, algorithms, APIs and ecosystem relationships surrounding it.

2. Meaning of Advanced Ecosystem Infrastructure

An advanced ecosystem infrastructure may be understood through five interconnected layers:

A. Physical infrastructure

Examples:

• telecommunications networks;
• data centres;
• cloud servers;
• EV charging networks;
• electricity grids;
• fibre networks.

B. Digital infrastructure

Examples:

• operating systems;
• app stores;
• cloud platforms;
• APIs;
• payment rails;
• digital identity systems.

C. Data infrastructure

Examples:

• search indexes;
• datasets;
• transaction databases;
• consumer profiles;
• interoperability databases;
• authentication information.

D. Algorithmic infrastructure

Examples:

• recommendation systems;
• ranking algorithms;
• AI models;
• automated pricing systems;
• fraud-detection systems;
• matching algorithms.

E. Governance infrastructure

This is particularly important for competition law.

It includes:

• access rules;
• technical standards;
• API conditions;
• interoperability requirements;
• ranking rules;
• platform terms;
• certification requirements;
• data-access rules;
• dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Thus, an ecosystem infrastructure can become a private regulatory system governing the commercial behaviour of numerous firms.

3. Competition-Law Framework

A. Relevant market

The first question is whether the infrastructure constitutes:

1. a separate relevant market;
2. an input market;
3. an upstream infrastructure market;
4. a platform connecting multiple sides;
5. part of a wider ecosystem.

Traditional market definition may be difficult because infrastructure can simultaneously serve several markets.

For example, an operating system may connect:

OS → App developers → Consumers → Advertising → Payments → Data services.

Consequently, competition authorities increasingly examine ecosystem effects rather than treating every service as an isolated market.

4. Dominance and Market Power

Control over infrastructure can produce market power through:

• network effects;
• economies of scale;
• economies of scope;
• switching costs;
• data advantages;
• interoperability advantages;
• technical standards;
• ecosystem lock-in;
• high investment requirements;
• control over downstream distribution.

A firm need not have an absolute monopoly.

A sufficiently powerful infrastructure may permit the operator to influence competitive conditions in neighbouring markets.

5. Essential-Facility Considerations

The essential facilities doctrine becomes relevant where competitors require access to infrastructure controlled by a dominant undertaking.

Traditional considerations include:

1. control by a dominant undertaking;
2. practical or economic indispensability;
3. absence of reasonable alternatives;
4. inability to duplicate the infrastructure;
5. potential elimination or substantial restriction of competition;
6. feasibility of providing access.

However, competition law generally avoids converting every commercially useful infrastructure into an essential facility.

The distinction between “valuable” and “indispensable” infrastructure is therefore crucial.

6. Interoperability as a Competition Issue

Interoperability permits competing systems to communicate or function with an infrastructure.

Examples:

• third-party AI assistants interacting with Android;
• competing payment services operating through a digital platform;
• third-party EV applications interacting with charging networks;
• competing applications accessing operating-system functionality.

The importance of interoperability has increased considerably in digital ecosystems.

In Alphabet/Android Auto (Enel X), the Court of Justice of the European Union held in 2025 that refusal by a dominant undertaking to make a digital platform interoperable with a third-party application can constitute an abuse even where the platform is not indispensable to the downstream product, particularly where interoperability makes the downstream application more attractive to consumers.

This is particularly significant for advanced ecosystem infrastructures because competitive harm can arise from denying functionality, rather than denying the entire infrastructure.

7. Self-Preferencing

An infrastructure operator may simultaneously be:

• infrastructure provider;
• platform operator;
• competitor to infrastructure users.

This creates a structural conflict.

For example:

Platform → gives access to competitors → platform also owns competing downstream service.

Potential problems include:

• preferential API access;
• preferential data access;
• preferential ranking;
• preferential interoperability;
• preferential technical functionality;
• preferential pricing;
• preferential visibility.

The competitive concern is particularly strong where the infrastructure operator can determine the conditions under which rivals reach consumers.

8. Data as Infrastructure

Data may constitute an important competitive input where it is:

• unique;
• continuously generated;
• difficult to reproduce;
• necessary for algorithmic performance;
• linked to network effects;
• combined with other datasets.

However, not every large dataset constitutes an essential facility.

The OECD has specifically observed that treating data as an essential facility too readily may create innovation and investment concerns; it identifies indispensability as a central issue while noting the increasing importance of interoperability and discriminatory-access concerns.

9. AI Infrastructure

AI creates a new infrastructure layer involving:

• GPUs;
• cloud computing;
• foundation models;
• training datasets;
• inference infrastructure;
• AI APIs;
• model marketplaces;
• developer tools.

Competition concerns may arise where an undertaking controls several layers simultaneously:

Cloud → Compute → Data → Foundation Model → API → Applications.

This can facilitate:

• tying;
• bundling;
• exclusive arrangements;
• discriminatory access;
• foreclosure;
• self-preferencing;
• raising rivals' costs;
• acquisition of emerging competitors.

Research examining EU, US and Chinese approaches identifies data and computational resources as increasingly important competitive inputs in AI ecosystems.

10. Network Effects and Ecosystem Lock-In

Advanced infrastructures often exhibit direct or indirect network effects.

For example:

More users
↓
More developers
↓
More applications
↓
More consumers
↓
More data
↓
Better services
↓
More users.

This creates a feedback loop.

Once established, the infrastructure may become difficult for rivals to challenge even where competing technology is technically available.

Competition authorities therefore examine:

• switching costs;
• multi-homing;
• portability;
• interoperability;
• exclusivity;
• default settings;
• technical restrictions.

11. Six Major Case Laws

Case 1: United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001)

Facts

Microsoft possessed a dominant position in PC operating systems and had developed an ecosystem involving Windows, Internet Explorer and software developers.

The authorities examined Microsoft's conduct toward browser competitors, particularly Netscape.

Competition issue

Microsoft used control over the operating-system infrastructure to disadvantage an adjacent competitor.

Principle

The case demonstrates that dominance over an infrastructure layer can have significant consequences for competition in neighbouring markets.

Relevance

For modern ecosystems, the case provides a foundation for examining:

• platform leverage;
• exclusionary agreements;
• technical integration;
• default arrangements;
• foreclosure of adjacent markets.

Case 2: Bronner v. Mediaprint

European Court of Justice, Case C-7/97

Principle

The Court developed a stringent framework for refusal-to-deal claims involving infrastructure.

Access generally cannot be compelled merely because the infrastructure would make competition easier.

The infrastructure must satisfy demanding conditions concerning indispensability and elimination of competition.

Importance

Bronner remains important because it protects infrastructure investment incentives.

If every successful infrastructure automatically generated an obligation to provide access to competitors, firms could have reduced incentives to invest.

Case 3: IMS Health GmbH & Co. KG v NDC Health

CJEU, Case C-418/01

Facts

IMS Health controlled a pharmaceutical sales-data structure involving regional segmentation of data.

A competitor sought access to the system.

Competition issue

The case concerned refusal to license an intellectual-property-protected infrastructure that competitors considered necessary to compete.

Principle

The Court developed important conditions for compulsory licensing, including:

• indispensability;
• elimination of competition;
• prevention of a new product for which consumer demand exists;
• absence of objective justification.

Relevance

It illustrates the interaction between:

IP rights + data infrastructure + market access + competition law.

Case 4: Microsoft v Commission

General Court of the European Union, T-201/04

Facts

Microsoft controlled the Windows operating-system environment and withheld interoperability information from competing work-group server operating systems.

Competition concern

The refusal restricted competitors' ability to achieve interoperability with Windows.

Principle

The European Commission and EU courts treated interoperability information as competitively significant where Microsoft's control of the operating-system infrastructure could restrict downstream competition.

Modern relevance

The case is highly relevant to:

• APIs;
• interoperability protocols;
• cloud ecosystems;
• operating systems;
• AI platforms;
• digital standards.

It demonstrates that technical compatibility can itself become a competition-law issue.

Case 5: Google Android — CCI

Umar Javeed & Others v Google LLC & Another, Case No. 39/2018

The CCI found competition concerns concerning Google's Android ecosystem and imposed a monetary penalty in 2022.

Ecosystem structure

The relevant ecosystem involved:

• Android OS;
• Google Play Store;
• Google Search;
• Google Chrome;
• device manufacturers;
• application developers;
• consumers.

Competition concerns

The CCI examined contractual and ecosystem arrangements affecting OEMs and competing services.

Importance

The case demonstrates that competition analysis may extend across an entire ecosystem rather than examining an individual product in isolation.

Case 6: Google Android TV — CCI

Kshitiz Arya & Purushottam Anand v Google LLC & Others, Case No. 19/2020

The case concerned Android TV, including allegations concerning bundling of Play Store with Android TV OS and anti-fragmentation arrangements affecting OEMs and rival Android forks.

In April 2025, the CCI approved Google's settlement proposal in the matter.

Competition significance

The case illustrates the importance of:

• operating-system ecosystems;
• OEM restrictions;
• app-store access;
• competing operating-system forks;
• ecosystem fragmentation.

It demonstrates how contractual governance of infrastructure can affect technological competition.

Case 7: Google Shopping

Google Search (Shopping), European Commission

Issue

Google was found to have used its dominant position in general search to favour its own comparison-shopping service.

Ecosystem significance

The case illustrates self-preferencing.

The infrastructure operator controls:

Search infrastructure → ranking → consumer attention → downstream traffic.

The competition concern therefore arises from the ability to use control over one ecosystem layer to favour another service.

Case 8: Alphabet v Enel X Italy

Case C-233/23, Alphabet and Others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato

This is especially relevant to advanced ecosystem infrastructure.

Android Auto was an infrastructure layer connecting smartphone applications with vehicle infotainment systems.

Enel X sought interoperability for its EV-charging application.

The CJEU held that refusal to provide interoperability could constitute abuse even where the platform was not indispensable to the downstream application's operation, because access could make the application more attractive to consumers.

Importance

The case represents an important evolution from traditional essential-facility analysis toward digital interoperability analysis.

12. Recent EU Development: Android and AI

The EU's Digital Markets Act has moved beyond traditional ex-post abuse analysis.

In July 2026, the European Commission adopted binding specification measures concerning Google's Android interoperability obligations for competing AI services and access to certain Google Search data.

The Commission's measures concern the ability of competing AI services to interact with Android functionality on terms comparable to Google's own AI services.

This illustrates a significant regulatory development:

Competition governance is moving from merely punishing exclusionary conduct toward designing interoperability conditions in advance.

13. Ex-Ante Governance of Ecosystem Infrastructure

Traditional competition law is predominantly ex post:

Conduct → investigation → finding → remedy.

Advanced ecosystem regulation increasingly introduces ex-ante obligations:

Design rules → access obligations → interoperability → monitoring → compliance.

The EU Digital Markets Act is an important example.

Its Android interoperability framework requires Google to provide third-party developers with effective interoperability with certain Android hardware and software features.

14. Governance Mechanisms

Competition authorities can use several mechanisms.

1. Non-discrimination

Infrastructure operators should avoid discriminatory treatment between:

• their own services;
• affiliated firms;
• independent competitors.

2. Interoperability

Competitors may receive technically effective access to necessary functionality.

3. Data portability

Users and businesses may be enabled to transfer relevant data between services.

4. API access

Critical APIs may need transparent and non-discriminatory access conditions.

5. Firewalls

Separate infrastructure governance from downstream competitive operations.

6. Transparency

Operators may be required to explain:

• ranking systems;
• access criteria;
• technical standards;
• eligibility conditions.

7. Structural remedies

In exceptional cases:

• divestiture;
• separation;
• prohibition of cross-use of data;
• functional separation.

15. Competition Risks in Advanced Ecosystems

16. Interoperability vs Security

An infrastructure operator may legitimately argue that unrestricted interoperability creates:

• cybersecurity risks;
• privacy risks;
• fraud;
• system instability;
• safety concerns.

Competition law therefore should not automatically require unlimited access.

In Alphabet/Android Auto, the CJEU recognised that lack of a suitable technical template could potentially constitute an objective justification where interoperability would compromise platform integrity or security or could not technically be achieved.

Therefore, the correct legal test is not:

“Access must always be granted.”

It is closer to:

“Access restrictions must be objectively justified, proportionate, and not used as a disguised means of excluding competitors.”

17. Ecosystem Governance and Merger Control

Advanced infrastructure creates significant merger-control issues.

A merger involving:

Infrastructure provider + downstream competitor

may produce:

• vertical foreclosure;
• data concentration;
• interoperability discrimination;
• elimination of potential competition;
• increased switching costs;
• control over complementary technologies.

Competition authorities therefore increasingly examine acquisitions not merely through current market shares but through:

• ecosystem position;
• future competition;
• innovation;
• data;
• network effects;
• potential entrants.

18. Killer Acquisitions and Ecosystem Expansion

A dominant infrastructure firm may acquire an emerging company that could otherwise develop into a competitive ecosystem.

The competitive theory may involve:

Infrastructure dominance

• acquisition of emerging technology
• integration into existing ecosystem
  = reduced future competitive pressure.

This makes merger control particularly important in:

• AI;
• cloud;
• fintech;
• cybersecurity;
• digital identity;
• robotics;
• autonomous vehicles.

19. Competition Law and Technical Standards

Standards can produce both benefits and risks.

Benefits

• interoperability;
• lower transaction costs;
• consumer compatibility;
• innovation;
• economies of scale.

Risks

• exclusion of rival technologies;
• discriminatory standard-setting;
• manipulation of technical specifications;
• refusal to license essential standards;
• strategic standardisation.

Competition authorities must therefore distinguish genuine technical standardisation from strategic standard-setting designed to exclude rivals.

20. Ecosystem Governance in India

Under India's Competition Act, 2002, advanced ecosystem infrastructure can engage particularly with:

• Section 3 — anti-competitive agreements;
• Section 4 — abuse of dominant position;
• Section 5 — combinations;
• Section 6 — regulation of combinations;
• CCI's powers concerning investigation and remedies.

The Google Android decisions demonstrate how the CCI has applied Section 4 to complex digital ecosystems.

India's enforcement landscape increasingly concerns:

• app ecosystems;
• digital advertising;
• data;
• payment systems;
• operating systems;
• interoperability;
• platform neutrality.

21. New Competition-Law Concept: Infrastructure Neutrality

A useful emerging principle is infrastructure neutrality.

It means that an infrastructure operator should not use control over a critical ecosystem layer to systematically discriminate against firms competing with its own downstream services.

For example:

Infrastructure provider
↓
Competitor A receives normal access
↓
Infrastructure owner's service receives superior access
↓
Competitor A becomes less competitive.

This can be investigated as:

• discriminatory access;
• self-preferencing;
• leveraging;
• refusal to deal;
• tying;
• exclusionary conduct.

22. Dynamic Competition

Advanced ecosystems require dynamic competition analysis.

Traditional analysis asks:

Who has market power today?

Ecosystem analysis additionally asks:

Who controls the infrastructure that determines who can compete tomorrow?

Relevant factors include:

• innovation;
• entry barriers;
• investment incentives;
• technological displacement;
• potential competition;
• switching;
• interoperability;
• data accumulation.

This is especially important in AI and other rapidly evolving markets.

23. Balancing Competition and Innovation

Competition law must balance two objectives.

Excessive intervention

Could:

• reduce investment;
• discourage infrastructure development;
• weaken cybersecurity;
• undermine intellectual-property rights;
• create free-riding.

Insufficient intervention

Could:

• entrench monopolies;
• eliminate rivals;
• increase entry barriers;
• reduce innovation;
• permit ecosystem lock-in.

Therefore, proportionality is central.

24. Regulatory Model

A sophisticated governance model can be represented as:

Infrastructure Control
↓
Market Power Assessment
↓
Relevant Market / Ecosystem Definition
↓
Access & Interoperability Analysis
↓
Discrimination / Self-Preferencing Analysis
↓
Foreclosure Effects
↓
Objective Justification
↓
Proportionality
↓
Behavioural / Structural Remedy

25. Key Doctrinal Principles

The principal competition-law principles emerging from advanced ecosystem infrastructure cases are:

1. Control of infrastructure can create leverage.

2. Interoperability may itself constitute a competitive input.

3. Not every commercially important infrastructure is an essential facility.

4. Self-preferencing becomes important where infrastructure and downstream competition are vertically integrated.

5. Data can constitute a powerful competitive advantage without automatically becoming an essential facility.

6. Technical restrictions can have the same economic effect as contractual exclusion.

7. Ecosystem effects may extend beyond a single relevant market.

8. Security and privacy can constitute legitimate objectives, but must be assessed objectively and proportionately.

9. Merger control must consider ecosystem and innovation effects.

10. Ex-ante digital regulation increasingly complements traditional competition law.

26. Conclusion

Advanced ecosystem infrastructures are becoming a central object of modern competition-law governance. Their importance arises from the fact that control over an infrastructure layer can determine who obtains access to consumers, data, computing power, interoperability, applications and complementary markets.

The traditional essential-facilities doctrine, particularly Bronner, remains important for protecting investment incentives. However, cases such as Microsoft, IMS Health, Google Android, and especially Alphabet/Android Auto demonstrate the increasing importance of interoperability, ecosystem leverage and access conditions.

The contemporary regulatory approach is therefore moving toward a combination of:

Competition law + interoperability + non-discrimination + data governance + merger control + ex-ante platform regulation.

The central principle is not that infrastructure operators must provide unlimited access to everyone. Rather, competition law seeks to prevent control over an advanced infrastructure from being transformed into unjustified exclusionary power in adjacent markets, while preserving incentives to innovate and invest.

Core cases for examination:

1. United States v. Microsoft Corp.
2. Bronner v. Mediaprint
3. IMS Health v. NDC Health
4. Microsoft Corp. v. Commission
5. Umar Javeed & Ors. v. Google LLC — CCI
6. Kshitiz Arya & Purushottam Anand v. Google LLC — CCI
7. Google Search (Shopping) — European Commission
8. Alphabet and Others v. AGCM / Enel X — Case C-233/23

These cases collectively show the evolution from physical essential facilities toward digital, interoperable and ecosystem-based infrastructure governance.