1. Introduction

Scooter-sharing market allocation refers to agreements or coordinated practices through which competing electric scooter or conventional scooter-sharing operators divide markets, territories, customers, parking locations, operating zones, or commercial opportunities among themselves.

In Morocco, this issue is particularly relevant to the development of urban mobility, app-based transport services, electric mobility, tourism, and shared micro-mobility systems.

For example, suppose three scooter-sharing companies operate in Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakech. They agree that:

Company A will exclusively operate in Casablanca.

Company B will operate in Rabat.

Company C will operate in Marrakech.

None will enter another company's territory.

They will not compete for customers or commercial partnerships in allocated cities.

Such an arrangement may constitute unlawful market sharing even if the companies claim that it reduces operational costs or improves service efficiency.

The central competition-law principle is that independent competitors must determine their commercial strategies independently. Agreements allocating markets, customers, or territories can eliminate competition and harm consumers.

Morocco's principal legal framework is Law No. 104-12 on Freedom of Prices and Competition, as amended, together with Law No. 20-13 concerning the Competition Council.

2. Legal Framework in Morocco

A. Law No. 104-12 on Freedom of Prices and Competition

Law No. 104-12 is the principal legislation governing anti-competitive agreements and abuses of market power in Morocco.

Its Article 6 prohibits agreements and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition in a market.

Scooter-sharing market allocation can fall within this prohibition.

Examples include:

Territorial allocation between scooter-sharing operators.

Agreements not to enter competing cities.

Allocation of transport hubs, tourist districts, and university areas.

Agreements dividing customers according to geographical location.

Coordination over operating hours and service availability.

Agreements restricting competition for municipal contracts.

The distinction between an unlawful allocation agreement and legitimate commercial cooperation depends on its substance, economic effects, and legal context.

B. Abuse of Dominant Position – Article 7

Article 7 addresses abusive conduct by an undertaking holding a dominant position in a relevant market.

Potential abuses in scooter-sharing markets include:

Exclusionary access restrictions.

Predatory pricing intended to eliminate competitors.

Discriminatory access to essential parking infrastructure.

Exclusivity arrangements that foreclose rival operators.

Refusal to provide access to indispensable infrastructure without objective justification.

Dominance itself is not illegal. The abuse of that dominance is the relevant concern.

C. Merger Control

A merger or acquisition involving scooter-sharing operators may require examination under Morocco's merger-control provisions.

For example, if one operator acquires its principal competitor, the transaction could substantially reduce competition in urban mobility services.

The analysis may consider:

Market concentration.

Barriers to entry.

Network effects.

Access to charging and parking infrastructure.

Availability of alternative transport services.

The effect on prices, quality, and innovation.

D. Role of the Competition Council

The Moroccan Competition Council is responsible for enforcing competition law within its statutory mandate.

Its functions include examining anti-competitive practices, reviewing relevant concentrations, issuing opinions, and applying the enforcement mechanisms provided by legislation.

In scooter-sharing markets, the Council may examine agreements involving competitors, platform operators, municipalities, property owners, and infrastructure providers.

E. Exemptions and Legitimate Cooperation – Article 9

Not every cooperation agreement between scooter-sharing companies is unlawful.

Article 9 provides a framework for recognising certain agreements that contribute to economic or technical progress, improve production or distribution, or promote economic development, subject to the statutory conditions and safeguards.

For example, scooter-sharing companies may legitimately cooperate on:

Shared battery-charging infrastructure.

Common safety standards.

Interoperable payment systems.

Joint maintenance facilities.

Environmental improvements.

Common technical standards for vehicle safety.

However, an agreement cannot automatically become lawful merely because it is described as an infrastructure-sharing or sustainability initiative. The parties must demonstrate the relevant efficiencies and satisfy the statutory requirements.

3. Understanding Market Allocation in Scooter Sharing

Market allocation can occur in several different forms.

A. Geographic market allocation

Competing operators agree to divide cities, districts, or neighbourhoods.

Example:

A scooter operator in Casablanca agrees not to enter Rabat, while its competitor agrees not to enter Casablanca.

This removes independent competition and may violate Article 6.

B. Customer allocation

Operators divide customers according to categories.

For example:

Company A serves tourists.

Company B serves university students.

Company C serves business commuters.

Such allocation becomes problematic where competitors agree not to compete for customers in these categories.

C. Infrastructure allocation

Companies agree to divide access to:

Public scooter parking areas.

Charging stations.

Transport terminals.

Commercial shopping districts.

University campuses.

Tourist destinations.

The allocation may restrict competition if it prevents rival operators from accessing important infrastructure.

D. Platform-based allocation

Scooter-sharing companies may use digital applications to coordinate operating areas, customer allocation, or geographical restrictions.

Potentially problematic practices include:

Dividing app-based service territories.

Coordinating customer acquisition.

Restricting cross-platform availability.

Agreeing not to compete through promotional discounts.

Exchanging commercially sensitive information to enforce territorial divisions.

E. Municipal contract allocation

Operators competing for municipal concessions may agree that each company will bid for a different geographical area.

This may constitute bid rigging or market allocation, particularly where the agreement eliminates genuine competition for public contracts.

4. Relevant Market Definition

A proper competition-law investigation must identify the relevant product and geographic markets.

A. Relevant product market

The possible product market may include:

Electric scooter-sharing services.

Conventional scooter-sharing services.

Dockless micro-mobility services.

Docked scooter rental services.

Short-term urban mobility services.

Whether bicycles, taxis, ride-hailing, public transport, or private vehicle rentals belong in the same market depends on consumer substitution and competitive conditions.

B. Relevant geographic market

The relevant geographic market may be:

A particular city.

A neighbourhood.

A tourist district.

A university area.

A transport corridor.

Several interconnected urban areas.

The analysis should consider customer travel patterns, operating permissions, charging infrastructure, parking restrictions, and the ability of operators to expand into neighbouring territories.

C. Multi-sided platform considerations

Scooter-sharing platforms connect several groups:

Riders.

Scooter operators.

Municipal authorities.

Property owners.

Charging and maintenance providers.

The investigation should consider direct and indirect network effects, platform switching costs, data advantages, and multi-homing.

A company may possess substantial competitive advantages because its application has more users, better parking access, or a larger operating fleet.

5. Six Major Competition-Law Case Laws

COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES

Important qualification: The following are established foreign competition-law decisions, not six Moroccan scooter-sharing judgments. They provide persuasive comparative principles for analysing territorial allocation under Morocco's Article 6. No claim is made that Moroccan courts have already decided these specific scooter-sharing disputes.

Case 1. United States v. Sealy, Inc. (1967)

388 U.S. 350

Facts:

Sealy operated a licensing arrangement under which manufacturers received exclusive territories to manufacture and sell branded mattresses.

The participating licensees were involved in controlling the licensing organisation and restricting competition between themselves.

Legal issue:

Whether the territorial restrictions amounted to unlawful horizontal market allocation.

Judgment:

The US Supreme Court held that the territorial restrictions were horizontal restraints because the licensees themselves participated in the arrangement. The restrictions formed part of an unlawful combination.

Principle established:

Competitors cannot use a licensing organisation or common commercial arrangement to disguise territorial market allocation.

Application in Morocco:

If scooter-sharing operators establish a joint platform and use it to divide Casablanca, Rabat, and Marrakech among themselves, the Competition Council could examine whether the arrangement constitutes horizontal coordination prohibited by Article 6.

Case 2. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. (1972)

405 U.S. 596

Facts:

Independent supermarket chains participated in an association that allocated exclusive geographical territories for the sale of private-label products.

The association argued that territorial restrictions were necessary to compete against larger supermarket chains.

Legal issue:

Whether territorial allocation between competing businesses was permissible because it supported commercial efficiency.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court treated the horizontal territorial allocation as a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Principle established:

Competitors cannot ordinarily justify dividing territories simply by arguing that doing so improves their ability to compete against larger businesses.

Application in Morocco:

Scooter-sharing operators cannot automatically defend an agreement dividing urban territories by claiming that the arrangement reduces operational costs or allows smaller companies to survive.

Legitimate infrastructure cooperation must be distinguished from eliminating competition between the participants.

Case 3. Consten and Grundig v. Commission (1966)

Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64

Facts:

Grundig entered into an exclusive distribution agreement with Consten in France. The arrangement sought to protect Consten's exclusive territorial position against parallel imports.

Legal issue:

Whether agreements protecting exclusive geographical territories could restrict competition within the European common market.

Judgment:

The European Court of Justice held that the arrangements infringed Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, now Article 101 TFEU.

Principle established:

Commercial arrangements designed to create absolute territorial protection can seriously restrict competition.

Application in Morocco:

An agreement preventing competing scooter-sharing companies from operating in each other's allocated cities could restrict market access and eliminate cross-territorial competition.

The case is particularly relevant where operators attempt to enforce territorial exclusivity through digital applications or contractual restrictions.

Case 4. T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others (2009)

Case C-8/08

Facts:

Mobile telecommunications operators participated in a meeting during which commercially sensitive information concerning dealer remuneration was exchanged.

Legal issue:

Whether information exchange between competitors could constitute a concerted practice restricting competition.

Judgment:

The European Court of Justice explained that a concerted practice may infringe competition law where coordination replaces independent competitive decision-making and the relevant legal requirements are satisfied.

A single meeting may be sufficient in appropriate circumstances.

Principle established:

Competitors need not sign a formal written agreement to engage in unlawful coordination.

Application in Morocco:

Scooter-sharing operators could violate Article 6 by exchanging information concerning:

Future city-entry plans.

Fleet expansion.

Promotional campaigns.

Customer acquisition.

Proposed municipal bids.

Operating territories.

If the exchange facilitates market allocation, it may constitute evidence of a prohibited concerted practice.

Case 5. Cartes Bancaires v. Commission (2014)

Case C-67/13 P

Facts:

The French banking payment network introduced pricing measures affecting different categories of members.

The European Commission considered whether the arrangements restricted competition by object.

Legal issue:

How should competition authorities determine whether an agreement has an anti-competitive object?

Judgment:

The Court of Justice clarified that the concept of restriction by object must be interpreted narrowly. The authority must examine the content, objectives, and economic and legal context of the arrangement.

Principle established:

Not every commercial restriction automatically constitutes a restriction of competition by object. Its competitive nature must be properly established.

Application in Morocco:

An agreement to share scooter maintenance facilities should not automatically be treated as an unlawful market-allocation cartel.

The Competition Council should examine whether the arrangement genuinely improves efficiency or instead facilitates the division of customers and geographical markets.

Case 6. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc. (1990)

498 U.S. 46

Facts:

Two bar-review course providers agreed to divide the geographical market in Georgia. One provider agreed not to compete in Georgia, while the other agreed to pay for the arrangement.

Legal issue:

Whether competitors could lawfully divide geographical markets through an agreement not to compete.

Judgment:

The US Supreme Court treated the arrangement as unlawful horizontal market division under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Principle established:

An agreement between competitors not to enter each other's territories is a classic form of market allocation.

Application in Morocco:

If one scooter-sharing company agrees not to launch services in Marrakech in exchange for another company staying out of Casablanca, the arrangement presents a strong Article 6 concern.

Case 7. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States (1899)

175 U.S. 211

Facts:

Manufacturers of iron pipes coordinated bidding arrangements for municipal and other contracts.

The companies agreed on which participant would receive particular contracts, with mechanisms to protect the agreed allocation.

Legal issue:

Whether agreements allocating commercial opportunities and coordinating bids violated competition law.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court upheld the finding that the arrangements violated the Sherman Act.

Principle established:

Competitors cannot eliminate independent bidding through agreements allocating customers or commercial opportunities.

Application in Morocco:

If scooter-sharing operators coordinate their bids for municipal concessions, parking concessions, or public charging-station contracts, their conduct could constitute unlawful market allocation or bid rigging under Article 6.

6. Economic Analysis of Scooter-Sharing Market Allocation

Competition authorities should evaluate the actual economic consequences of territorial agreements.

A. Market foreclosure

Market foreclosure occurs when competitors are prevented from entering or expanding in a particular geographical market.

For example, if established operators divide all major Moroccan cities, new entrants may struggle to obtain access to commercially attractive operating zones.

The authority should examine:

Percentage of urban territory covered by the agreement.

Number of competing operators excluded.

Availability of alternative parking locations.

Cost of obtaining municipal authorisations.

Possibility of entering neighbouring cities.

B. Reduction of price competition

Market allocation can eliminate incentives to reduce rental prices.

For example, if Company A exclusively serves Casablanca and Company B exclusively serves Rabat, neither company faces direct competitive pressure from the other in its allocated territory.

This may result in:

Higher rental prices.

Reduced promotional discounts.

Increased subscription fees.

Less attractive customer packages.

Reduced incentives to improve service quality.

C. Network effects

Scooter-sharing businesses depend on the relationship between fleet size, geographical coverage, and user numbers.

A larger operating network may attract more customers, while increased demand encourages further fleet investment.

Territorial allocation can protect established operators from competition and reinforce their positions.

D. Innovation foreclosure

Competition in scooter-sharing services encourages technological development.

Examples include:

Better battery management.

Improved GPS tracking.

Smart parking systems.

Automated safety monitoring.

More efficient fleet allocation.

Integrated payment solutions.

Territorial agreements may reduce the incentive to innovate because operators are protected from competing services.

E. Consumer welfare

Consumers may experience:

Fewer available scooters.

Higher rental charges.

Reduced geographical coverage.

Lower service reliability.

Fewer payment options.

Reduced technological innovation.

Consequently, market allocation can affect both price and non-price dimensions of competition.

7. Application to Different Moroccan Scooter-Sharing Scenarios

8. Role of Municipal Authorities and Public Infrastructure

Moroccan municipalities can influence scooter-sharing competition through the allocation of public spaces, parking permissions, concessions, and operating authorisations.

This creates an important distinction between public regulation and private market allocation.

A. Legitimate municipal regulation

Municipal authorities may establish:

Safety requirements.

Maximum fleet limits.

Parking restrictions.

Operating zones.

Environmental standards.

Licensing conditions.

These measures may pursue legitimate urban-planning and public-safety objectives.

B. Potentially anti-competitive municipal arrangements

Problems may arise where commercial operators use their influence to secure exclusive access to public infrastructure or prevent competing businesses from entering the market.

For example, a municipality may award an exclusive scooter-parking concession to one operator without sufficient competitive justification.

The relevant questions include:

Was the concession awarded transparently?

Was competition between potential providers preserved?

Was exclusivity necessary for the legitimate public objective?

Were competing operators given reasonable alternatives?

Was the duration and geographical scope of exclusivity proportionate?

Article 1 of Law No. 104-12 is particularly relevant because it covers economic activities conducted by public-law entities when they act as economic operators, rather than exercising public powers or performing public-service missions.

9. Investigative Powers and Enforcement

The Competition Council can examine suspected anti-competitive conduct under the Moroccan competition framework.

An investigation into scooter-sharing market allocation could involve the following stages.

Stage 1: Identification of suspected coordination

The authority identifies suspicious geographical patterns, common commercial restrictions, or unusual arrangements between competitors.

Stage 2: Collection of evidence

Relevant evidence may include:

Commercial agreements.

Emails and internal communications.

Board meeting minutes.

Platform operating records.

Geographic service-area data.

Pricing and customer-allocation information.

Municipal concession documents.

Stage 3: Economic investigation

The authority examines market shares, entry barriers, consumer substitution, geographical restrictions, and the competitive impact of the arrangement.

Stage 4: Legal assessment

The conduct is examined under Articles 6 and 7, together with any applicable exemption provisions.

Stage 5: Enforcement measures

Depending on the legal findings and procedural requirements, possible measures include:

Termination of unlawful agreements.

Removal of territorial restrictions.

Interim measures where legally justified.

Acceptance of appropriate commitments.

Financial penalties.

Merger-control remedies where applicable.

The Competition Council's statutory framework also provides investigative and procedural safeguards. Law No. 20-13 governs the institutional framework of the Council.

10. Defences Available to Scooter-Sharing Companies

Companies accused of market allocation may raise several arguments. Their success depends on the evidence and applicable statutory requirements.

A. Operational efficiency

Companies may argue that allocating certain operational responsibilities reduces maintenance costs.

However, sharing maintenance responsibilities does not necessarily justify dividing customers or geographical markets.

B. Environmental protection

Operators may claim that territorial coordination reduces unnecessary vehicle movements and battery transportation.

The environmental benefit must be demonstrable, and the restriction must satisfy the applicable legal requirements.

C. Public safety

Companies may argue that limited operating zones are necessary to reduce accidents or congestion.

A genuine public-safety requirement may justify proportionate operational restrictions, but it does not automatically justify an agreement between competitors to eliminate rivalry.

D. Small-market participation

Smaller companies may argue that cooperation enables them to compete with larger mobility platforms.

The relevant question is whether the cooperation improves competition or instead removes competition between the participating companies.

E. No appreciable competitive effect

Companies may argue that their agreement has no significant impact on competition.

However, an explicit agreement between competitors to divide markets presents a particularly serious concern under Article 6. The statutory conditions and any applicable exemption must be considered carefully.

11. Compliance and Governance Framework for Moroccan Scooter-Sharing Companies

Scooter-sharing businesses should implement a competition compliance programme.

Recommended contractual safeguards

Agreements involving scooter-sharing companies should include:

No allocation of customers or territories between competitors.

Independent determination of prices and commercial strategies.

Transparent infrastructure-access arrangements.

Objective and proportionate operating restrictions.

Appropriate information-exchange safeguards.

Periodic competition-law compliance reviews.

12. Emerging Competition Policy Developments in Morocco

An important development directly relevant to this subject is the Moroccan Competition Council's draft guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements between competitors, published on 16 October 2026.

The draft addresses cooperation between competitors, including joint purchasing and shared storage infrastructure. The public consultation is scheduled to remain open until 9 November 2026.

Conseil de la concurrence du Maroc

This development is significant for scooter-sharing businesses because it may help distinguish legitimate cooperation from arrangements that restrict independent competition.

The guidelines are still a draft, not binding final rules.

Potential areas of application include:

Joint charging infrastructure.

Shared scooter maintenance facilities.

Battery storage and replacement systems.

Interoperability agreements.

Joint procurement of electric scooters.

Data-sharing arrangements.

Cooperation in sustainable urban mobility.

The central policy challenge is to encourage infrastructure investment without permitting competitors to divide markets.

13. Recommendations for Reform and Market Governance

Morocco could strengthen competition governance in scooter-sharing markets through the following measures.

1. Transparent municipal licensing

Municipalities should use transparent and competitive procedures for allocating operating permissions and public parking concessions.

2. Non-discriminatory infrastructure access

Charging stations and designated parking facilities should be accessible under objective conditions where infrastructure is commercially indispensable and access regulation is appropriate.

3. Digital market monitoring

The Competition Council could develop methods to identify suspicious geographical allocation patterns using fleet-location and operating data, subject to applicable privacy and data-protection requirements.

4. Independent commercial decisions

Operators should independently determine prices, customer acquisition strategies, fleet deployment, and geographical expansion.

5. Proportionate cooperation

Joint infrastructure agreements should be limited to what is necessary for genuine efficiency gains and should not contain unnecessary territorial or customer restrictions.

6. Competition compliance audits

Operators should periodically review commercial agreements, municipal concessions, platform restrictions, and communications with competitors.

14. Critical Legal Issues

Several important questions arise when applying Moroccan competition law to scooter-sharing market allocation.

15. Conclusion

Scooter-sharing market allocation presents an important competition-law challenge for Morocco's developing urban mobility economy.

Law No. 104-12 provides the principal legal framework for addressing agreements between competing scooter-sharing companies. Article 6 is particularly important because it expressly prohibits agreements and concerted practices that restrict competition, including market allocation.

Article 7 provides additional protection against abuses of dominant positions, particularly exclusionary conduct by powerful mobility platforms.

The comparative decisions in Sealy, Topco, Consten and Grundig, T-Mobile Netherlands, Cartes Bancaires, Palmer v. BRG, and Addyston Pipe provide useful judicial principles for understanding territorial restrictions, information exchange, bid allocation, and legitimate commercial cooperation.

Ultimately, Morocco should encourage cooperation that improves charging infrastructure, vehicle safety, technological innovation, and environmental sustainability while preventing competitors from dividing cities, customers, and commercial opportunities.

The fundamental principle is that cooperation may improve scooter-sharing services, but competitors must not use cooperation as a mechanism for eliminating competition.

16. Key Legal Authorities – Revision Summary

Final academic qualification: The seven judicial decisions are comparative authorities from US and EU competition law. They should not be represented as Moroccan judgments or as binding interpretations of Moroccan legislation. Morocco-specific enforcement must be established through the relevant Competition Council decisions and Moroccan judicial authorities.