1. Introduction

Event hall exclusivity in Morocco concerns contractual or commercial arrangements under which a venue owner, hotel, convention centre, wedding hall, exhibition space, or event organiser restricts access to competing suppliers or service providers. Such restrictions may involve catering, decoration, audiovisual equipment, ticketing, event management, photography, security, or beverage services.

Exclusivity is not automatically unlawful. A venue may legitimately require particular suppliers for safety, quality control, insurance, technical compatibility, or efficient event management. However, exclusivity can raise competition-law concerns where it forecloses rival suppliers, increases prices, restricts consumer choice, or allows a dominant venue operator to exploit its market position.

In Morocco, the principal legal framework is Law No. 104-12 on the Freedom of Prices and Competition, read alongside its implementing rules and the institutional framework established by Law No. 20-13 on the Competition Council, as amended. The analysis must distinguish prohibited anticompetitive conduct from ordinary commercial agreements that have legitimate business justifications.

A key qualification is that the case laws discussed below are principally comparative authorities from European Union and other jurisdictions. They illustrate the legal principles that may inform an analysis of Moroccan event-hall exclusivity; they should not be mistaken for six reported Moroccan judgments specifically concerning event venues.

2. Legal framework in Morocco

A. Law No. 104-12: Freedom of Prices and Competition

The main provisions relevant to event-hall exclusivity include the following.

Article 6 — Anticompetitive agreements

Article 6 addresses agreements, concerted practices, and arrangements that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition in a market. Depending on their terms and economic effects, agreements between venues, suppliers, event organisers, or competing service providers may fall within this prohibition.

Examples include:

Several event halls agreeing to use only one catering company and exclude competing caterers.

Competing venues agreeing not to accept events supplied by a particular rival.

A venue and supplier agreeing on restrictive arrangements that foreclose competing suppliers.

Competitors coordinating prices, customer allocation, or tender participation for major events.

Article 7 — Abuse of a dominant position

Article 7 addresses abuse of a dominant position in a market. A venue's market strength alone is not sufficient: the relevant question is whether dominance exists and whether the conduct constitutes an abuse.

For example, a venue that is indispensable for large exhibitions in a particular city might use its position to require organisers to purchase unrelated services exclusively from an affiliated company. The assessment would depend on market definition, available alternatives, contractual duration, foreclosure effects, and objective justifications.

Article 8 — Abuse of economic dependence

Where the statutory conditions are met, economic-dependence concerns may arise when a business lacks a commercially reasonable alternative to dealing with a powerful trading partner and that dependence is abused in a way that harms competition.

A small caterer may, for example, depend heavily on one prestigious venue because it controls access to a significant proportion of local wedding events. Dependence alone does not establish a violation; the legal conditions and competitive effects must be examined.

Merger control and institutional enforcement

If venue operators merge, acquire competing halls, or acquire businesses supplying essential event services, Moroccan merger-control rules may also be relevant. The Competition Council's powers and procedures are governed by the applicable competition legislation and institutional rules.

B. Article 9 — Exemptions and efficiency justifications

Article 9 is important because certain agreements that restrict competition may be exempt where the statutory conditions are satisfied. The parties must demonstrate economic or technical progress, a fair share of benefits for users, indispensable restrictions, and that the agreement does not eliminate competition for a substantial part of the relevant market.

For event halls, legitimate justifications might include:

Maintaining food hygiene and public-health standards.

Ensuring compatibility of sound, lighting, and electrical systems.

Meeting insurance, fire-safety, and capacity requirements.

Preventing operational conflicts between simultaneous contractors.

A restriction should be no broader than necessary. Requiring all caterers to comply with uniform hygiene standards is generally easier to justify than requiring every organiser to purchase catering exclusively from the venue owner's affiliated company.

3. How exclusivity can restrict competition

Hôtel Bélère Rabat

A. Exclusive catering agreements

A hall requires customers to use its own catering service or a single nominated caterer. This may foreclose independent caterers, particularly where the venue controls access to a large share of local events.

HALL 3 - Parc des Expositions de Colmar

B. Exclusive technical suppliers

A venue requires organisers to use one audiovisual, lighting, staging, or ticketing provider. The restriction becomes more concerning if rival providers cannot access the venue on reasonable terms.

Marrakech Venues: Grand Mogador Agdal Hotel

C. Portfolio-wide exclusivity

An operator controlling several prominent halls enters long-term exclusive contracts with the same suppliers across all venues. Rival suppliers may lose access to a substantial proportion of commercially viable events.

CWK Catering LLC | Luxury Full-Service Catering | Phenix City, AL

D. Collective exclusion

Competing halls jointly agree to boycott an independent event organiser or supplier, or coordinate the terms on which suppliers may enter their venues. This can raise serious concerns under Article 6.

4. Relevant case laws — at least 6 authorities

The following cases are comparative authorities, principally from EU competition law. They are useful for interpreting exclusivity, foreclosure, market access, and objective justifications, but do not constitute Moroccan precedents.

Case 1: Delimitis v Henninger Bräu GmbH (Case C-234/89, 1991)

Principle: Cumulative foreclosure caused by exclusive contracts

The Court of Justice of the European Communities examined an exclusive beer-supply arrangement and the effect of similar agreements on access to the market.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: One venue's exclusive catering agreement may have limited effects in isolation. However, if many leading halls enter similar contracts, independent caterers may lose access to most commercially viable venues.

The assessment should consider:

The proportion of relevant venues bound by exclusivity.

The duration and practical coverage of the contracts.

The availability of alternative venues.

The ability of competing caterers to establish a viable business.

Lesson: Market-wide foreclosure matters more than the mere presence of an exclusivity clause.

Case 2: Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission (Case 85/76, 1979)

Principle: Exclusive purchasing obligations and abuse of dominance

The Court examined loyalty-inducing arrangements used by a dominant undertaking and the risks they posed to competition.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: A dominant convention-centre operator might require corporate clients to purchase event management, catering, or technical services exclusively through an affiliated business.

Where the operator is dominant, such arrangements require careful scrutiny because they may deprive rival providers of opportunities to compete on the merits.

Lesson: Exclusive purchasing requirements imposed by a dominant undertaking may be abusive when they are capable of restricting competition.

Case 3: Michelin v Commission (Case 322/81, 1983)

Principle: Special responsibility of a dominant undertaking

The Court recognised that an undertaking holding a dominant position has a special responsibility not to impair effective competition.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: A leading venue with few realistic substitutes could use rebates, preferential access, or contractual conditions to discourage organisers from using competing venues or independent suppliers.

The authority would need to examine the venue's market position and the actual or potential exclusionary effects of its conduct.

Lesson: Commercial practices that may be ordinary for a business without market power can present different concerns when used by a dominant operator.

Case 4: Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique (Case C-439/09, 2011)

Principle: Restrictions require objective justification

The Court examined a distribution arrangement that effectively prohibited online sales and considered whether the restriction could be justified by the asserted need to preserve the product's prestige and image.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: A venue might prohibit all outside caterers, decorators, or audiovisual contractors on the ground that exclusive control is necessary to preserve its brand.

A general appeal to prestige or uniformity is not necessarily sufficient. The restriction should be assessed against its actual purpose, necessity, and competitive effects.

Lesson: A business objective does not automatically justify a restriction that limits alternative channels or suppliers.

Case 5: Intel v Commission (Case C-413/14 P, 2017)

Principle: Assessment of exclusionary effects

The Court clarified the importance of examining the circumstances of a case when assessing whether conduct by a dominant undertaking is capable of producing exclusionary effects, including where the undertaking advances evidence challenging that assessment.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: An investigation into exclusive venue contracts should examine evidence rather than assume that every exclusivity clause is harmful.

Relevant evidence may include market coverage, contract duration, barriers to entry, supplier capacity, the availability of substitute halls, and whether competitors can realistically reach customers.

Lesson: A sound competition assessment should be grounded in the actual circumstances and plausible effects of the conduct.

Case 6: Super Bock Bebidas (Case C-211/22, 2023)

Principle: Agreements restricting competition require a proper legal assessment

The Court considered vertical agreements and the legal assessment of restrictions in a distribution relationship, including the distinction between restrictions by object and restrictions requiring examination of their effects.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: An agreement between a venue and a catering company should not automatically be classified as unlawful merely because it grants exclusivity. Its purpose, terms, commercial context, and competitive significance must be assessed under the applicable legal test.

Where a restriction is not inherently anticompetitive, evidence of its likely market effects becomes especially important.

Lesson: The legal characterisation of a vertical agreement depends on the applicable competition rules and the substance of the arrangement.

Case 7: Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (Case 56/65, 1966)

Principle: Contextual assessment of restrictive agreements

The Court explained that the assessment of an agreement's restrictive character requires consideration of its economic and legal context.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: A restriction confined to technically complex events requiring integrated staging and safety systems may differ substantially from a blanket exclusivity clause covering every type of event.

The assessment should distinguish necessary coordination from restrictions that unnecessarily prevent other suppliers from competing.

Lesson: Contractual wording alone does not resolve the competition question; the arrangement's real economic context matters.

Case 8: Cartes Bancaires v Commission (Case C-67/13 P, 2014)

Principle: Restriction by object must be interpreted carefully

The Court emphasised that the category of restrictions by object is reserved for forms of coordination that reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition in their context.

Relevance to Moroccan event halls: A joint agreement between competing venues to exclude a rival supplier or divide customers may be much more concerning than an individual venue's technically justified supplier policy.

The distinction helps prevent legitimate operational arrangements from being treated as equivalent to serious collusion.

Lesson: Competition authorities should distinguish genuinely harmful coordination from agreements whose effects require a fuller economic assessment.

5. Applying Moroccan law to common scenarios

These are illustrative assessments, not findings that any particular Moroccan operator has infringed the law.

6. Market definition and economic analysis

A Moroccan competition assessment should identify the relevant product and geographic markets before determining whether exclusivity is restrictive.

A. Relevant product market

Possible markets include:

Wedding and celebration halls.

Corporate conference and convention venues.

Exhibition and trade-fair facilities.

Event catering services.

Audiovisual, lighting, and staging services.

Event ticketing and management services.

These services may form separate markets or overlapping markets, depending on substitution, customer preferences, and how the industry operates.

B. Relevant geographic market

The geographic market might be a city, a metropolitan area, a wider region, or potentially a national market for certain specialised facilities.

For example, a customer organising a wedding may regard halls within a manageable travel distance as substitutes. An international exhibition organiser may consider only a small number of large convention centres across several cities.

C. Factors indicating foreclosure

The authority should consider:

The market share and commercial importance of the venue operator.

The number of realistic alternative venues available to organisers.

The share of demand tied up by exclusive contracts.

Contract length, renewal provisions, and termination penalties.

Whether rival suppliers can access alternative venues.

Whether restrictions raise prices, reduce quality, or discourage entry.

Whether the claimed efficiencies can be achieved through less restrictive measures.

A high market share or long contract is not automatically unlawful. The overall competitive circumstances are decisive.

7. Possible defences and justifications

An event-hall operator may argue that exclusivity is necessary to maintain service standards, protect customers, coordinate complex technical installations, or ensure safety and liability coverage.

These arguments are strongest where the operator can demonstrate that:

The restriction addresses a genuine operational need.

Supplier qualifications are objective, transparent, and consistently applied.

Independent suppliers can qualify under the same conditions.

The restriction is limited in duration and scope.

Less restrictive alternatives would not adequately address the identified problem.

Any claimed efficiencies satisfy the applicable requirements of Article 9.

For example, a venue may require all lighting contractors to meet electrical-safety requirements without necessarily requiring all customers to use a single designated lighting company.

8. Enforcement and remedies in Morocco

Depending on the facts and the applicable statutory provisions, potential responses may include:

Investigation by the Competition Council.

An order to terminate or modify anticompetitive practices.

Acceptance of commitments designed to address competition concerns.

Interim measures where the statutory conditions for urgent intervention are met.

Financial penalties or other legal consequences provided for by law.

Merger remedies where a concentration creates or strengthens competition concerns.

Possible corrective commitments for event-hall exclusivity include limiting contract duration, removing automatic renewal provisions, permitting qualified alternative suppliers, making access conditions transparent, or separating venue rental from optional catering and technical services.

9. Compliance recommendations for event-hall operators

A practical compliance programme should include the following:

Review exclusivity clauses: Identify which services are tied to venue access and why.

Assess market power: Determine whether the operator controls particularly important venues or lacks effective competitors.

Document objective reasons: Record the safety, technical, or efficiency rationale for each restriction.

Avoid collective arrangements: Do not coordinate exclusion, prices, or supplier allocation with competing halls.

Use proportionate restrictions: Consider accreditation, insurance requirements, and safety standards as alternatives to blanket exclusivity.

Review contract duration: Ensure that long-term commitments do not unnecessarily prevent suppliers from competing.

Monitor market effects: Track prices, supplier entry, customer complaints, and access to alternative venues.

Seek Moroccan legal advice: Review agreements against the current text of Law No. 104-12, as amended, and the applicable implementing rules.

10. Conclusion

Event-hall exclusivity in Morocco is not prohibited merely because a venue chooses preferred suppliers. The central issue is whether the arrangement, in its legal and economic context, restricts competition contrary to Law No. 104-12.

Article 6 is particularly relevant to collusion between competing venues or suppliers, while Article 7 addresses abuse of dominance and qualifying situations of economic dependence. Article 9 may provide a route for qualifying agreements that produce verifiable efficiencies and satisfy the statutory safeguards.

The comparative cases — Delimitis, Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin, Pierre Fabre, Intel, Super Bock, Société Technique Minière, and Cartes Bancaires — illustrate the importance of market context, foreclosure, objective justification, and evidence of competitive harm.

The decisive question is whether exclusivity protects legitimate event operations or instead unnecessarily closes a significant part of the market to competing venues, caterers, technicians, and event-service providers.