1. Introduction

Alumni donation platforms are digital or institution-operated systems that facilitate financial contributions from former students, graduates, philanthropists and corporate sponsors to universities, colleges, schools and educational foundations.

These platforms may provide services such as:

Online donation collection and payment processing.

Alumni donor databases and donor relationship management.

Fundraising campaign management.

Scholarship and research funding.

Donation analytics and donor profiling.

Matching donations and corporate sponsorship programmes.

Digital fundraising marketplaces connecting donors with educational institutions.

Examples include independent fundraising platforms, university-operated donation portals, third-party payment intermediaries and multi-university alumni giving networks.

Although these platforms promote educational philanthropy, they can generate significant competition-law concerns where dominant platforms restrict access to donors, impose exclusivity arrangements, discriminate between educational institutions, manipulate fundraising visibility or impose excessive transaction charges.

Competition law is particularly relevant because alumni donation platforms operate as intermediaries connecting multiple groups: donors, educational institutions, payment providers and fundraising service providers.

The principal competition concern is whether a platform competes on the merits or uses its market power to prevent rival platforms and educational institutions from accessing donors.

2. Nature of the Relevant Markets

Competition analysis requires identifying the relevant product and geographic markets.

A. Online alumni fundraising platform market

This market includes digital services enabling educational institutions to collect, manage and administer alumni donations.

Potential competitors include:

Independent fundraising platforms.

University-specific donation portals.

Non-profit fundraising intermediaries.

Digital charitable contribution platforms.

B. Donor management software market

This includes software used to maintain donor records, analyse contribution histories, manage donor relationships and automate fundraising campaigns.

C. Payment processing market

Platforms may integrate payment gateways, digital wallets, card networks and bank transfers. Competition concerns arise when platform operators restrict access to alternative payment providers.

D. Alumni donor access market

A platform may possess extensive alumni contact databases, historical donation information and donor engagement records. Such assets may become strategically important where competing platforms cannot reasonably replicate them.

E. Geographic market

The geographic market may be national, regional or international depending on:

The location of donors.

The jurisdiction of educational institutions.

Currency and payment restrictions.

Fundraising regulations.

Data protection requirements.

Cross-border donation capabilities.

3. Major Competition-Law Issues

A. Abuse of dominant position

A large alumni donation platform may acquire substantial market power through its accumulated donor network, institutional relationships, transaction history and reputation.

Abuse may occur where the platform:

Charges excessive commissions to universities.

Prevents institutions from using competing fundraising services.

Restricts donors from contributing through alternative channels.

Discriminates between universities without objective justification.

Uses control over donor information to prevent competing platforms from entering the market.

A dominant position itself is not unlawful. The concern is exclusionary or exploitative conduct that harms competition.

B. Exclusive fundraising agreements

A platform may require universities to use its services exclusively for all alumni fundraising.

For example, a dominant platform may offer reduced transaction charges on condition that a university does not use competing donation portals.

Such agreements may:

Foreclose competing fundraising providers.

Increase switching costs.

Restrict university autonomy.

Prevent smaller platforms from obtaining institutional customers.

Reduce innovation in fundraising technology.

The legality depends on market power, duration, coverage, foreclosure effects and legitimate efficiencies.

C. Donor-data monopolisation

Alumni donation platforms frequently collect:

Donor identities and contact details.

Donation histories.

Preferred charitable causes.

Institutional affiliations.

Contribution frequency.

Donor engagement patterns.

A dominant platform may use this information to strengthen its competitive position.

Potential violations include:

Denying reasonable data portability.

Preventing universities from exporting donor information.

Imposing unreasonable data-access charges.

Using confidential donor information to compete against client institutions.

Restricting competing platforms from accessing necessary technical interfaces.

However, donor privacy, consent and confidentiality must be respected. Competition law does not automatically require disclosure of personal information.

D. Self-preferencing

A platform operating its own fundraising services alongside third-party fundraising campaigns may favour its own campaigns.

Examples include:

Ranking affiliated universities more prominently.

Giving preferential search visibility to institutions paying higher commissions.

Promoting its own payment-processing services.

Suppressing competing fundraising campaigns.

Providing superior donor analytics to affiliated institutions.

Self-preferencing becomes particularly concerning when a dominant intermediary controls access to donors and uses that position to disadvantage competing fundraising providers.

E. Tying and bundling

A platform may require universities to purchase several services together:

Donation collection.

Donor-management software.

Payment processing.

Fundraising analytics.

Marketing automation.

Alumni communication services.

Bundling may improve efficiency and reduce costs. However, it may become anticompetitive when a platform with market power in donation collection forces institutions to purchase unrelated services from it.

F. Excessive platform commissions

Platforms may charge universities transaction fees, subscription charges, donor acquisition fees and additional payment-processing charges.

Competition concerns arise where a dominant platform imposes excessive or discriminatory charges without a reasonable commercial justification.

Relevant indicators include:

Comparison with competing platform charges.

Profitability and cost structures.

Switching costs.

Availability of alternative fundraising channels.

The extent of institutional dependence.

G. Collusion between universities

Universities may compete for donations from the same alumni population.

Competition concerns arise where institutions coordinate:

Fundraising targets.

Donor allocation.

Commission arrangements.

Campaign timing.

Geographic fundraising territories.

Restrictions on approaching particular donors.

Legitimate cooperative fundraising, shared scholarship funds and joint charitable projects should be distinguished from agreements that improperly restrict independent competition.

H. Merger and acquisition concerns

A major donation platform may acquire:

Alumni management software providers.

Payment-processing businesses.

Independent fundraising portals.

Donor analytics companies.

University fundraising technology providers.

Such acquisitions may eliminate potential competitors or consolidate control over valuable donor databases.

Merger authorities should examine horizontal overlaps, vertical foreclosure, data concentration, innovation and potential competition.

4. At Least 6 Important Case Laws

The following cases are established competition-law authorities from the United States and European Union. They are not necessarily disputes involving alumni donation platforms themselves; their principles are applicable by analogy to fundraising intermediaries.

1. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001)

Citation: 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Facts and principles:

Microsoft possessed monopoly power in the personal computer operating-system market. The court examined exclusionary agreements and conduct designed to restrict competing browser technologies.

Competition-law significance:

The judgment established important principles concerning:

Maintenance of monopoly power.

Exclusionary contractual arrangements.

Technological restrictions.

Interoperability.

Protection of emerging competitors.

Application to alumni donation platforms:

A dominant fundraising platform that prevents universities from integrating rival donation software or payment gateways may raise similar exclusionary concerns.

2. Google Shopping (2021)

Citation: Case T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission, General Court, 10 November 2021.

Facts and principles:

The European Commission found that Google favoured its own comparison-shopping service in search results and disadvantaged competing services. The General Court upheld the Commission's decision.

Competition-law significance:

The case addresses:

Self-preferencing.

Discriminatory platform ranking.

Dominant intermediary power.

Exclusion of competing services.

Competition on the merits.

Application:

An alumni donation portal that systematically prioritises its affiliated universities or fundraising campaigns while suppressing competing campaigns may face similar scrutiny.

3. Oscar Bronner GmbH v Mediaprint (1998)

Citation: Case C-7/97, [1998] ECR I-7791.

Facts and principles:

The dispute concerned access to a newspaper home-delivery distribution system controlled by a competing newspaper publisher.

The European Court of Justice established stringent conditions for finding an abusive refusal to provide access to an essential facility.

Competition-law significance:

The judgment is important for:

Refusal to deal.

Essential facilities.

Indispensability of access.

Elimination of effective competition.

Objective justification.

Application:

A dominant alumni platform's refusal to provide access to essential technical interfaces or data portability could raise similar issues. However, mere refusal to share a donor database does not automatically constitute an infringement.

4. IMS Health GmbH v NDC Health (2004)

Citation: Case C-418/01, [2004] ECR I-5039.

Facts and principles:

The case concerned refusal to license intellectual property relating to pharmaceutical sales data structures.

The Court identified exceptional circumstances in which refusal to license intellectual property could constitute abuse of dominance.

Competition-law significance:

The case addresses:

Intellectual property licensing.

Data-related market power.

Refusal to supply.

Indispensability.

Competition in neighbouring markets.

Application:

A fundraising platform controlling a unique donor-management architecture may raise similar questions if it refuses access to an indispensable technical input and the strict legal conditions for intervention are satisfied.

5. Google Android (2018)

Citation: European Commission, Case AT.40099, Google Android, Decision of 18 July 2018.

Facts and principles:

The European Commission examined Google's contractual restrictions involving Android device manufacturers and mobile network operators, including tying and restrictions affecting competing search services.

Competition-law significance:

The case illustrates:

Tying and bundling.

Contractual restrictions.

Leverage of dominance.

Foreclosure of competitors.

Network effects.

Application:

A dominant donation platform that makes access to fundraising infrastructure conditional on using its own payment gateway or donor-management software may raise comparable concerns.

6. Ohio v. American Express Co. (2018)

Citation: 585 U.S. 529 (2018).

Facts and principles:

The US Supreme Court examined American Express's anti-steering contractual provisions in the credit-card industry.

It recognised the importance of analysing both sides of a transaction platform and considering the interconnected effects on cardholders and merchants.

Competition-law significance:

The judgment is especially relevant to multi-sided platform markets because it addresses:

Two-sided market definition.

Network effects.

Platform pricing.

Anti-steering restrictions.

Competitive effects across platform participants.

Application:

Alumni donation platforms connect donors and educational institutions. Their competitive effects should therefore be assessed by considering both sides rather than examining university commissions or donor charges in isolation. The case also cautions against assuming that every anti-steering restriction is unlawful.

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7. United States v. Apple Inc. (2013)

Citation: 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

Facts and principles:

Apple was found to have participated in a conspiracy with major publishers to raise ebook prices through coordinated agency agreements.

The court found that the arrangements facilitated horizontal price coordination.

Competition-law significance:

The case demonstrates the importance of examining:

Platform-facilitated collusion.

Vertical agreements facilitating horizontal coordination.

Price coordination.

Information exchange.

Market-wide competitive effects.

Application:

If competing alumni donation platforms coordinate transaction fees or fundraising commissions through a common intermediary, competition authorities may investigate whether the intermediary facilitates an anticompetitive agreement.

8. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. (1972)

Citation: 405 U.S. 596 (1972).

Facts and principles:

The Supreme Court considered territorial restrictions among competing supermarket operators associated with a cooperative purchasing organisation.

The case is an important authority on horizontal market allocation.

Competition-law significance:

It illustrates the danger of agreements between competitors that allocate territories or restrict independent competitive activity.

Application:

If competing universities agree to divide alumni donors geographically or allocate donors according to institutional affiliation, the arrangement may raise serious horizontal market-allocation concerns.

5. Additional Relevant Case Laws

The following authorities provide further guidance on exclusive dealing, tying and platform restrictions.

9. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. (1992)

Citation: 504 U.S. 451.

Principle: The Supreme Court examined market power and tying in the aftermarket for Kodak equipment parts and servicing.

Application: A fundraising platform might exploit control over an institution's donor-management system to force the institution to purchase additional services from the same provider.

10. United States v. Terminal Railroad Association (1912)

Citation: 224 U.S. 383.

Principle: The Supreme Court addressed discriminatory access to an essential railway terminal facility controlled by an association of competing railway companies.

Application: The case offers an analogy for examining discriminatory access to indispensable fundraising infrastructure controlled collectively by platform participants.

6. Applicable Competition-Law Frameworks

Because alumni donation platforms may operate internationally, several legal systems provide useful analytical frameworks.

A. India

Under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002, agreements that cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition may be prohibited.

Section 4 addresses abuse of dominant position, including:

Unfair or discriminatory conditions.

Limiting technical or scientific development.

Denial of market access.

Leveraging dominance into another market.

Unfair or discriminatory pricing.

Sections 5 and 6 govern combinations and merger control.

For example, if a dominant fundraising platform prevents universities from using rival payment processors, Section 4 may become relevant depending on market power and competitive effects.

B. United States

The Sherman Act provides two important provisions:

Section 1: Prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.

Section 2: Prohibits monopolisation, attempted monopolisation and conspiracy to monopolise.

A fundraising platform that coordinates commission rates with competitors or uses exclusionary arrangements to maintain monopoly power may attract scrutiny.

C. European Union

Article 101 TFEU prohibits anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices.

Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position.

Potentially relevant conduct includes:

Exclusive fundraising arrangements.

Discriminatory access conditions.

Tying and bundling.

Predatory exclusion.

Unjustified refusal to supply.

Anticompetitive data-access restrictions.

D. United Kingdom

The Competition Act 1998 prohibits anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant position.

The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 also provides a framework for regulating designated firms with strategic market status in respect of digital activities.

Its relevance depends on whether a particular platform and activity satisfy the statutory designation requirements.

7. Illustrative Hypothetical Situations

8. Economic Effects on Competition

A. Effects on donors

Anticompetitive conduct may:

Reduce donor choice.

Increase transaction costs.

Restrict access to alternative charitable projects.

Reduce transparency concerning donation deductions and charges.

Undermine confidence in online philanthropy.

B. Effects on universities

Smaller universities may become dependent on large fundraising intermediaries.

This may result in:

Reduced bargaining power.

Higher fundraising costs.

Restricted access to alumni networks.

Reduced technological independence.

Greater dependence on proprietary software.

C. Effects on competing platforms

New entrants may find it difficult to compete because established platforms possess accumulated donor data, brand recognition and institutional relationships.

Network effects can strengthen this advantage: more universities attract more donors, while more donors make the platform more attractive to universities.

D. Effects on innovation

Restrictive contractual arrangements may discourage the development of:

Open fundraising APIs.

Donor-management interoperability.

Transparent commission systems.

AI-based fundraising analytics.

Alternative payment technologies.

Cross-platform donation portability.

9. Competition Compliance Measures

Alumni donation platforms should establish the following safeguards.

1. Non-exclusive institutional agreements

Universities should ordinarily retain the freedom to engage competing fundraising service providers.

2. Transparent pricing

All transaction charges, subscription fees, commissions and additional charges should be disclosed clearly.

3. Donor-data portability

Institutions should receive appropriate access to their donor information, subject to privacy, consent and contractual requirements.

4. Non-discriminatory platform access

Comparable universities and fundraising providers should receive equivalent treatment unless objectively justified.

5. Interoperability

Platforms should support reasonable integration with competing payment providers and donor-management software.

6. Competition audits

Regular reviews should identify potentially exclusionary agreements, discriminatory rankings and inappropriate information exchanges.

7. Merger compliance

Acquisitions involving competing fundraising platforms should be assessed under applicable merger-control requirements.

8. Independent governance

Competition compliance officers should supervise pricing, platform access, commercial partnerships and relationships with competing institutions.

10. Important Legal Distinctions

Three distinctions are particularly important:

Large donor database versus unlawful monopoly: Possessing extensive donor information is not itself an infringement. The concern is its exclusionary use.

Exclusive agreement versus unlawful foreclosure: Exclusivity is not automatically illegal; its market effects and commercial justification must be assessed.

Platform cooperation versus collusion: Joint scholarship programmes and shared charitable initiatives can promote efficiency, whereas agreements restricting independent competition may be unlawful.

11. Suggested Competition Authority Investigation

A competition authority investigating an alumni donation platform should examine:

Whether the platform has substantial market power.

Whether universities have realistic alternative fundraising channels.

Whether donor databases are transferable.

Whether exclusive agreements foreclose competing platforms.

Whether commissions are excessive or discriminatory.

Whether the platform favours affiliated fundraising campaigns.

Whether mergers eliminate potential competitors.

Whether the alleged conduct produces demonstrable consumer or competitive harm.

Evidence may include platform contracts, commission schedules, internal emails, donor-data policies, ranking algorithms, university agreements and transaction records.

12. Conclusion

Competition law plays an important role in maintaining fairness, transparency and innovation in alumni donation platforms.

Although these platforms facilitate charitable contributions and educational development, their control over donor networks, fundraising technology, payment infrastructure and institutional relationships can create opportunities for anticompetitive conduct.

The cases of Microsoft, Google Shopping, Oscar Bronner, IMS Health, Google Android, Ohio v. American Express, United States v. Apple, Topco, Eastman Kodak and Terminal Railroad provide useful legal principles for evaluating these concerns.

The central objective should be to ensure that alumni donation platforms compete through better technology, lower costs, greater transparency and improved donor services rather than through exclusionary agreements, discriminatory access restrictions or exploitation of market power.

Overall legal proposition: Alumni donation platforms should remain open, interoperable and competitively neutral, while protecting donor privacy, institutional independence and the legitimate objectives of charitable fundraising.