Competition Law and Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading and Antitrust

1. Introduction

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading refers to arrangements in which electricity producers and consumers—often households, renewable-energy producers, businesses, or energy communities—trade electricity directly with one another, usually through a digital platform, blockchain system, aggregator, or local energy marketplace.

A typical P2P system may involve:

rooftop solar producers selling surplus electricity;

consumers purchasing electricity from nearby producers;

batteries participating in local electricity markets;

aggregators combining many small producers;

blockchain or smart-contract platforms matching buyers and sellers;

dynamic or algorithmic pricing;

distribution-system operators providing network access; and

payment, settlement and balancing services.

Competition law becomes important because the P2P model can reduce concentration and facilitate entry, but the digital infrastructure supporting P2P trading can itself become a new bottleneck. EU electricity-market legislation expressly pursues competitive, integrated markets, non-discriminatory access, consumer empowerment, demand response, storage and aggregation of distributed supply. (EUR-Lex)

The central competition-law question is therefore not merely whether consumers can trade electricity directly. It is also who controls the infrastructure through which that trading takes place.

2. Relevant Competition-Law Framework

P2P energy trading can potentially engage several areas of competition law.

A. Abuse of dominance

A platform, utility, distribution operator, aggregator, exchange, or payment provider may possess market power over an essential layer of the P2P ecosystem.

Potential concerns include:

refusal to provide access;

discriminatory access conditions;

exclusionary technical standards;

excessive or discriminatory platform fees;

tying;

self-preferencing;

margin squeezing;

foreclosure of competing P2P platforms;

discriminatory access to consumer or meter data; and

restrictions on switching.

Article 102 TFEU is particularly relevant where an undertaking has a dominant position in a relevant market.

B. Restrictive agreements

Article 101 TFEU can apply where competing energy producers, aggregators, platforms or other undertakings coordinate their conduct.

Examples include:

fixing electricity prices;

agreeing minimum P2P prices;

allocating geographic customers;

agreeing which households or communities each supplier will serve;

coordinating bidding algorithms;

restricting output;

exchanging commercially sensitive information; and

jointly excluding competing platforms.

P2P systems do not create an exemption from ordinary cartel rules merely because the participants are small renewable-energy producers.

C. Merger control

Concentration can occur even if the underlying electricity producers are numerous.

For example:

Platform A + major aggregator + battery operator + energy retailer

could produce substantial control over several layers of the P2P ecosystem.

Competition authorities may therefore examine:

generation concentration;

aggregation concentration;

platform concentration;

access to consumer data;

battery-storage concentration;

balancing-service concentration;

network access; and

control over interoperability standards.

The European Commission's energy cases illustrate that competition analysis can extend across generation, wholesale, distribution, retail and energy-related services. (EUR-Lex)

3. P2P Energy Trading Creates a Multi-Layer Market

A useful way to analyse competition is to divide the ecosystem into layers.

This layered structure is particularly important because competition at the electricity-generation level does not necessarily guarantee competition at the platform level.

4. Case Law

There is not yet a large body of reported judicial decisions dealing specifically with blockchain-based household P2P electricity trading. Consequently, the most useful authorities are cases concerning electricity trading, electricity-market access, energy infrastructure, wholesale markets and concentration.

Case 1: Bursa Română de Mărfuri SA v ANRE, Case C-394/21

This 2023 CJEU judgment is especially relevant to P2P energy platforms.

The case concerned Romanian legislation establishing a national monopoly for certain electricity-trading intermediation services.

The Court considered EU electricity-market rules concerning competition, market access and electricity trading. It held that EU legislation permitted an existing national legal monopoly for day-ahead and intraday electricity trading under the specific conditions established by Regulation 2015/1222. For forward wholesale trading, however, the assessment had to be undertaken under the applicable primary EU-law framework because the field was not exhaustively harmonised. (EUR-Lex)

Relevance to P2P trading

The case demonstrates that intermediation itself can constitute an important competitive layer.

A P2P platform that becomes the exclusive intermediary between distributed producers and consumers could potentially acquire significant market power.

The case also shows that competition analysis must distinguish between:

electricity generation;

electricity trading;

intermediation; and

network infrastructure.

This is directly relevant to digital P2P marketplaces.

Case 2: Hidroelectrica v ANRE, Case C-648/18

The CJEU examined Romanian rules requiring electricity producers to offer all available electricity through platforms operated by the designated electricity-market operator.

The Court concluded that requiring producers to sell all available electricity through the single designated operator could constitute a measure equivalent to a quantitative restriction on exports and was disproportionate to the objective relied upon by the Romanian authorities. (EUR-Lex)

Competition significance

The case is highly relevant to P2P energy trading because it illustrates the risks of mandatory concentration of electricity transactions through one platform.

Applied to a P2P ecosystem, similar concerns could arise if:

all distributed producers were required to use one marketplace;

competing P2P platforms were excluded;

consumers could not contract through alternative intermediaries; or

renewable generators were prevented from selling through alternative channels.

The underlying principle is that market integrity and energy security do not automatically justify unnecessary restrictions on alternative trading channels.

Case 3: ČEZ, Case AT.39727

The European Commission's Article 102 proceedings concerning ČEZ concerned the Czech electricity-generation and wholesale-supply market.

The Commission's preliminary assessment found ČEZ dominant in generation and wholesale electricity supply and raised concerns that it might have abused its position by pre-emptively booking transmission capacity, potentially preventing competitors from making investments necessary to enter the electricity-generation market. The case was ultimately resolved through commitments. (EUR-Lex)

Relevance to P2P markets

This is an important example of infrastructure foreclosure.

In a P2P environment, analogous conduct could potentially involve:

reserving scarce grid capacity;

blocking access to local distribution networks;

preventing rival aggregators from connecting distributed generators;

restricting battery access to balancing markets; or

controlling interoperability with smart meters.

The case demonstrates that control over infrastructure can be as important as control over the underlying commodity.

Case 4: RWE/E.ON Assets, Case M.8871

The European Commission reviewed RWE's acquisition of certain E.ON electricity-generation assets.

The transaction involved significant electricity-generation assets and was assessed under the EU Merger Regulation. The Commission considered, among other matters, the effects of the transaction on electricity-generation and wholesale markets. (European Commission)

A particularly relevant issue was the relationship between internal trading and wholesale-market liquidity. The Commission examined whether changes in trading behaviour could reduce market liquidity and impair competitors' ability to hedge their positions. (Livv)

P2P significance

This principle translates directly to decentralized electricity markets.

A P2P platform could become problematic if its acquisition or integration with:

a major generator;

retailer;

aggregator;

battery operator; or

trading platform

allows it to internalise a substantial volume of transactions.

Reduced liquidity can make it more difficult for smaller competitors to enter and hedge.

Case 5: E.ON/Innogy, Case M.8870

The Commission's review of E.ON's acquisition of Innogy examined a major restructuring of businesses active across electricity generation, distribution, retail supply and related energy services.

The Commission initially raised serious doubts and opened a Phase II investigation before ultimately clearing the transaction subject to commitments. (EUR-Lex)

P2P significance

This case illustrates the importance of vertical and ecosystem effects.

A P2P platform may not appear dominant if viewed solely as a software business. But its competitive position can change substantially if it is vertically integrated with:

electricity generation;

distribution;

retail supply;

metering;

electric mobility;

batteries; and

energy-management services.

The competition authority may therefore examine the entire ecosystem rather than the platform in isolation.

Case 6: Enercity v European Commission, Case T-321/20

Enercity challenged the Commission's decision concerning the RWE/E.ON transaction.

The General Court examined arguments concerning the Commission's assessment of the transaction, including whether the separate parts of the overall transaction had been properly analysed and whether the Commission had made errors in assessing competitive effects. (EUR-Lex)

Relevance to P2P energy trading

The case is useful for understanding transaction structure and market definition.

P2P-energy transactions may involve a complex combination of:

electricity generation;

distribution;

retail;

trading;

aggregation;

software;

data;

storage; and

balancing.

Competition authorities therefore need to consider whether apparently separate transactions or business relationships should be analysed together when they produce interconnected competitive effects.

Case 7: EVH and Others v Commission, Joined Cases C-171/24 P to C-177/24 P

In 2026, the Court of Justice dealt with appeals relating to the Commission's assessment of the RWE/E.ON electricity and gas concentration.

The proceedings concerned the Commission's merger-control analysis of the German electricity and gas markets and the acquisition of E.ON's distribution and trading assets by RWE/E.ON-related transactions. (InfoCuria)

P2P relevance

The case reinforces the importance of carefully analysing:

electricity generation;

distribution;

trading;

retail supply;

market structure; and

competitive effects of consolidation.

For P2P energy, this is important because decentralisation of generation does not necessarily prevent concentration in downstream infrastructure.

5. Algorithmic Pricing and P2P Energy Trading

One of the most important future competition issues is algorithmic pricing.

Suppose thousands of households use the same P2P platform.

The platform's algorithm could automatically determine:

selling prices;

purchasing prices;

matching;

priority of transactions;

battery charging;

battery discharge;

demand-response participation; and

allocation of scarce network capacity.

This creates a distinction between independent algorithmic pricing and algorithmically facilitated coordination.

If competing suppliers independently use algorithms, competition law does not automatically prohibit that conduct.

However, problems can arise where algorithms facilitate:

explicit coordination;

exchange of competitively sensitive information;

coordinated pricing;

market allocation;

output restrictions; or

implementation of an agreement between competitors.

6. Information Exchange

P2P systems generate unusually large quantities of data.

Examples include:

household consumption;

generation forecasts;

battery capacity;

future electricity demand;

reserve availability;

planned prices;

geographic demand;

charging behaviour; and

bidding strategies.

A platform controlling this information could potentially acquire a significant competitive advantage.

Competition concerns arise particularly where competitors receive access to commercially sensitive information that reduces strategic uncertainty.

The competition authority would need to distinguish between:

legitimate transparency

and

information exchange that facilitates coordination or exclusion.

7. Platform Self-Preferencing

Suppose a P2P platform is operated by a large electricity retailer.

The platform could theoretically:

allow independent households to sell electricity;

operate its own retail electricity business; and

determine which electricity offers appear first to consumers.

This creates a possible self-preferencing problem.

For example, the platform might:

rank its own electricity ahead of household sellers;

give its affiliated aggregator preferential access;

provide better transaction fees to its own business;

delay competitors' offers;

restrict access to consumer data; or

manipulate matching algorithms.

The competition question would depend upon market power, foreclosure effects, justification, and the relevant legal framework.

8. Refusal of Access to the Electricity Grid

P2P trading fundamentally depends upon physical electricity infrastructure.

A household cannot sell electricity merely because a digital platform matches it with another household.

The transaction may require:

distribution-grid access;

metering;

balancing;

settlement;

network capacity; and

system-management services.

Consequently, a distribution-system operator can become an important bottleneck facility.

Potential competition concerns include:

discriminatory connection charges;

unreasonable connection delays;

refusal to connect competing platforms;

discriminatory technical standards;

preferential treatment of affiliated suppliers; and

restrictions on distributed generation.

The ČEZ proceedings provide an important competition-law analogy because the Commission examined conduct involving transmission capacity and possible foreclosure of electricity-generation competitors. (EUR-Lex)

9. Data as a Competitive Asset

P2P energy platforms may accumulate a valuable dataset concerning millions of consumers.

Data can reveal:

consumption patterns;

solar-generation capacity;

household occupancy patterns;

battery ownership;

willingness to pay;

switching behaviour;

electricity preferences; and

future demand.

A dominant platform could potentially use this data to strengthen its position in adjacent markets.

Competition issues may therefore arise concerning:

data portability;

interoperability;

access to smart-meter information;

discriminatory data access;

tying of data services;

exclusion of competing aggregators; and

leveraging from platform services into electricity supply.

10. Blockchain and Decentralised Energy Markets

Blockchain can make P2P electricity transactions more decentralised, but blockchain does not automatically eliminate competition-law risks.

Competition law may shift from a traditional corporate intermediary to:

protocol developers;

validator groups;

governance organisations;

token holders;

dominant software providers;

oracle providers; and

infrastructure operators.

For example, if a supposedly decentralised energy protocol is controlled by a small group that determines:

transaction fees;

access rules;

validation;

trading eligibility;

interoperability; or

algorithmic pricing,

the governance layer itself may become a competition bottleneck.

11. Energy Communities and Collective Action

P2P energy trading frequently involves energy communities.

Collective activity can produce efficiencies by allowing households to:

pool generation;

share batteries;

negotiate network services;

purchase technology collectively;

coordinate demand response; and

aggregate electricity supply.

But competitors cannot use an energy community as a mechanism for traditional cartel conduct.

Competition authorities would therefore need to distinguish between:

pro-competitive cooperation

and

coordination that eliminates competition.

Potentially problematic conduct could include agreements among competing producers concerning:

minimum selling prices;

output;

customer allocation;

geographic markets;

bids; or

exclusion of non-members.

12. Merger and Acquisition Risks

P2P energy markets may experience consolidation at several levels.

For example:

Generator → Aggregator → Platform → Retailer → Distribution operator

If one company acquires businesses at several stages, competition authorities may investigate whether the transaction creates:

vertical foreclosure;

access discrimination;

data advantages;

increased switching costs;

control over interoperability;

reduced liquidity;

elimination of potential competitors; or

increased concentration in local energy markets.

The RWE/E.ON cases demonstrate why electricity transactions must sometimes be examined across multiple levels of the supply chain rather than solely by looking at generation capacity. (EUR-Lex)

13. Market Definition

Market definition will be particularly difficult in P2P energy trading.

Possible relevant markets could include:

Product markets

electricity generation;

electricity retail supply;

P2P electricity trading;

electricity aggregation;

demand-response services;

battery-storage services;

balancing services;

energy-management software;

electricity-market intermediation;

smart-meter services; and

payment/settlement services.

Geographic markets

Depending upon the issue, the relevant geographic market could be:

local;

regional;

national; or

cross-border.

Physical electricity-network constraints are particularly important.

Unlike an ordinary online marketplace, electricity cannot always be transported freely from one geographical location to another without regard to network capacity.

14. Network Effects

P2P energy platforms can experience strong network effects.

More sellers attract more buyers.

More buyers attract more sellers.

This can create:

More participants → greater liquidity → better matching → more participants

This positive feedback can eventually produce a highly concentrated platform.

A successful platform may therefore become a digital gatekeeper for distributed energy transactions even where electricity generation itself remains highly decentralised.

Competition law must consequently examine both:

market concentration; and

the mechanisms producing that concentration.

15. Interoperability

Interoperability is particularly important.

Consumers should potentially be able to move between:

P2P platforms;

aggregators;

energy suppliers;

battery-management services; and

demand-response providers.

If a dominant platform makes switching technically difficult, it may increase consumer lock-in.

Potential antitrust concerns include:

proprietary APIs;

incompatible smart meters;

closed battery-management systems;

exclusive data access;

refusal to interoperate; and

technical degradation of competing services.

The competition analysis may resemble issues traditionally associated with refusal to deal and essential infrastructure, although the exact legal test depends on the jurisdiction.

16. Role of REMIT

European P2P energy markets must also be considered alongside the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) framework.

REMIT establishes a sector-specific framework aimed at detecting and deterring market abuse in wholesale electricity and gas markets. Its objective includes maintaining confidence that prices reflect supply and demand rather than manipulation. (Energy)

This creates an important distinction:

Competition law primarily addresses conduct such as cartels, exclusionary abuse and anticompetitive concentrations.

Energy-market regulation may additionally address market manipulation, insider information and trading transparency.

A P2P platform may therefore be subject to several overlapping legal regimes.

17. India-Specific Perspective

For India, P2P energy trading should be analysed against the Electricity Act 2003, electricity-market regulations, open-access rules, renewable-energy regulations, distribution-licence structures and the Competition Act 2002.

The Competition Act framework potentially becomes relevant where conduct involves:

anti-competitive agreements under Section 3;

abuse of dominant position under Section 4;

combinations under Sections 5 and 6; and

competition concerns involving digital energy platforms.

Potential Indian P2P scenarios include:

Scenario 1 — Dominant distribution company

A distribution company refuses to provide equivalent network access to an independent P2P platform while favouring its affiliated platform.

Possible issues:

discriminatory access;

leveraging;

refusal to deal;

foreclosure.

Scenario 2 — Dominant P2P marketplace

A platform becomes the principal marketplace for rooftop-solar transactions and imposes exclusivity on participating households.

Potential concerns:

exclusion of rival platforms;

switching costs;

foreclosure;

platform dominance.

Scenario 3 — Coordinated solar aggregators

Several aggregators agree on minimum prices for electricity sold through P2P markets.

This could raise Section 3 concerns concerning price coordination.

Scenario 4 — Common algorithm

Several competing generators use a common pricing system that exchanges commercially sensitive information and automatically aligns their prices.

The competition assessment would need to examine whether the arrangement facilitates coordination beyond legitimate technological efficiency.

18. Key Antitrust Risks

The principal competition risks can be summarised as follows:

19. Pro-Competitive Effects of P2P Trading

Competition law should not treat P2P trading as inherently problematic.

It can generate substantial competitive benefits.

Entry

Small renewable generators can potentially enter electricity markets without establishing traditional large-scale retail infrastructure.

Consumer choice

Consumers can potentially select among different energy producers and service providers.

Decentralisation

P2P markets can reduce dependence upon highly concentrated generation structures.

Innovation

Blockchain, smart contracts, batteries and artificial intelligence can reduce transaction and balancing costs.

Demand response

Consumers can become active market participants rather than passive electricity users.

Storage

Battery owners can participate in electricity and flexibility markets.

Local competition

Local electricity production may create additional supply alternatives.

These potential benefits are consistent with the broader EU electricity-market objective of empowering consumers, facilitating aggregation of distributed demand and supply, and enabling demand response and storage. (EUR-Lex)

20. Important Legal Principle

A central principle emerging from the relevant electricity competition jurisprudence is:

Decentralising electricity generation does not necessarily decentralise market power.

Market power can migrate from traditional generators to:

trading platforms;

aggregators;

network operators;

software providers;

data intermediaries;

battery platforms;

payment providers; or

protocol-governance structures.

The Bursa Română de Mărfuri and Hidroelectrica judgments demonstrate the importance of competitive electricity trading channels and market access, while ČEZ illustrates the importance of preventing infrastructure-related foreclosure. The RWE/E.ON merger cases demonstrate the importance of examining concentration and liquidity across different stages of the electricity supply chain. (EUR-Lex)

21. Conclusion

Peer-to-peer energy trading is fundamentally a competition-enhancing innovation, but its digital and physical infrastructure can create new forms of market power.

The most important antitrust questions are likely to concern:

access to electricity networks;

control over P2P trading platforms;

aggregation and market liquidity;

smart-meter and consumer-data access;

algorithmic pricing;

interoperability;

platform exclusivity;

vertical integration;

mergers involving generators, platforms and aggregators; and

coordination among distributed energy producers.

The existing electricity jurisprudence does not yet provide a comprehensive body of case law specifically on household blockchain-based P2P energy trading. Nevertheless, at least six highly relevant authorities—Bursa Română de Mărfuri, Hidroelectrica, ČEZ, RWE/E.ON Assets, E.ON/Innogy, and Enercity v Commission—provide established principles that can be applied to emerging P2P markets. The 2026 EVH and Others appellate proceedings further demonstrate the continuing importance of electricity-market structure and concentration in EU competition law. (EUR-Lex)

Overall, competition law in P2P energy markets must preserve the ability of small producers and consumers to enter and switch, while ensuring that the platforms and infrastructure designed to decentralise energy do not themselves become new monopolistic bottlenecks.