Competition Law and Governance of Resilient Digital Markets

1. Introduction

Resilient digital markets are digital markets capable of continuing to function, innovate, and provide meaningful choices to consumers and businesses despite technological disruption, cyber incidents, supply shocks, platform failures, changes in business models, or the emergence of new technologies such as artificial intelligence.

Competition law traditionally focuses on preventing conduct that reduces competition. In digital markets, however, resilience and competition are closely connected. A market dominated by one platform, one operating system, one cloud provider, one app store, or one data infrastructure may become vulnerable to lock-in, dependency, switching costs, interoperability restrictions and single points of failure.

Accordingly, governance of resilient digital markets involves:

• preventing durable monopolisation;
• preserving multi-homing and switching;
• ensuring interoperability;
• protecting access to essential data and infrastructure;
• preventing self-preferencing;
• controlling tying and bundling;
• maintaining contestable app ecosystems;
• facilitating data portability;
• scrutinising acquisitions of emerging competitors;
• preventing discriminatory access to platforms;
• ensuring that AI and cloud markets remain contestable.

The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA), India's Competition Act, 2002, the UK's digital-markets regime and US antitrust enforcement increasingly address these issues through a combination of ex-post antitrust enforcement and ex-ante digital regulation. The EU currently applies the DMA to seven designated gatekeepers and 23 core platform services.

2. Meaning of Resilience in Digital Competition

Digital-market resilience has several dimensions.

A. Structural resilience

A market is structurally more resilient when competition is not dependent upon a single dominant undertaking.

For example:

Several competing cloud providers + interoperable applications + portable data

creates greater competitive resilience than:

One dominant cloud provider + high switching costs + proprietary data formats.

B. Technological resilience

Competition can encourage multiple technological approaches.

If a dominant operating system prevents rival applications from accessing important functionality, technological alternatives may disappear.

C. Commercial resilience

Businesses should be able to change suppliers, platforms and distribution channels without disproportionate costs.

D. Data resilience

Data portability and interoperability reduce dependency on a single platform.

The EU specifically identifies data portability and interoperability as important aspects of making mobile ecosystems more contestable.

E. Innovation resilience

A resilient market allows new competitors to enter before the incumbent's ecosystem becomes permanently entrenched.

F. Consumer resilience

Consumers should retain meaningful choices rather than being effectively compelled to remain within one ecosystem because their data, applications, subscriptions or digital identity cannot easily be transferred.

3. Competition Law Issues in Resilient Digital Markets

3.1 Network Effects

Digital platforms frequently benefit from network effects.

The value of a platform may increase as more users join it.

For example:

More users → more data → better service → more users → more developers → more applications → stronger ecosystem.

This can produce a self-reinforcing competitive advantage.

Competition law therefore has to distinguish between:

• legitimate growth through superior products; and
• exclusionary conduct that artificially strengthens network effects.

4. Lock-In and Switching Costs

Lock-in is one of the central threats to digital-market resilience.

Users may remain with a platform because:

• their data is difficult to export;
• applications are ecosystem-specific;
• subscriptions are bundled;
• competitors cannot interoperate;
• hardware and software are technically integrated;
• business contracts impose switching costs.

Competition authorities may therefore consider switching costs as an entry barrier.

The EU's current work on mobile ecosystems expressly focuses on interoperability and data portability to make switching easier.

5. Interoperability as a Competition Remedy

Interoperability permits competing products to interact with infrastructure controlled by a dominant undertaking.

Examples include:

• messaging interoperability;
• operating-system functionality;
• cloud interoperability;
• payment-system interoperability;
• browser interoperability;
• AI-assistant access to operating-system functions.

The importance of this issue is illustrated by the EU's 2026 measures concerning Google's Android ecosystem. The Commission issued binding specification measures aimed at enabling competing AI services to access Android functionality on terms allowing them to compete with Google's own AI services.

Thus:

Interoperability → lower switching barriers → greater contestability → greater resilience.

6. Data Portability

Data can constitute a significant competitive advantage.

A dominant platform may accumulate:

• consumer behaviour data;
• transaction data;
• search data;
• social-graph information;
• advertising data;
• location information;
• business-user data.

If users cannot transfer their information to competing services, the incumbent's position can become entrenched.

The EU's DMA expressly incorporates data portability obligations, including Article 6(9), while Article 6(7) addresses interoperability.

7. Self-Preferencing

Self-preferencing occurs where a platform gives preferential treatment to its own products or services compared with competing third-party offerings.

It can undermine resilience because competitors may depend upon the platform for access to consumers.

Examples include:

• search engines ranking their own services more favourably;
• marketplaces promoting private-label products;
• app stores favouring their own applications;
• operating systems privileging their own services.

The European Commission's 2026 Google DMA decision concerned self-preferencing in Google Search and restrictions on steering consumers to alternative purchasing channels through Google Play.

8. Tying and Bundling

Bundling can create ecosystem dependency.

A dominant firm may combine:

dominant product + adjacent product

and thereby transfer market power from one market to another.

Digital examples include:

• operating system + browser;
• productivity suite + collaboration software;
• app store + payment system;
• search + specialised search services;
• cloud infrastructure + AI services.

The competition concern is not simply that products are sold together. The concern is whether bundling forecloses rivals or makes market entry substantially more difficult.

9. App Stores and Digital Gateways

App stores can operate as critical gateways between:

developers → consumers

A platform controlling the app store may control:

• admission;
• ranking;
• payment;
• commissions;
• advertising;
• technical functionality;
• access to consumer data.

The EU's DMA has therefore imposed specific obligations concerning app-store steering and related conduct.

In April 2025, the European Commission found Apple in breach of the DMA's anti-steering obligation and imposed a €500 million fine.

10. Cloud Infrastructure and Resilience

Cloud markets raise particularly important resilience concerns.

Cloud customers can face:

• high migration costs;
• proprietary architectures;
• data-transfer costs;
• contractual restrictions;
• technical dependency;
• ecosystem-specific services.

In June 2026, the European Commission announced preliminary views that Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure should potentially be designated as gatekeeper services under the DMA, citing entrenched positions, switching costs, lock-in effects and ecosystem characteristics.

This illustrates the movement of competition policy toward infrastructure-level resilience.

11. Six Major Case Laws

Case 1: Google Android — European Commission

Facts

The European Commission investigated Google's practices concerning Android mobile devices.

The concerns included agreements and practices involving:

• Google Search;
• Google Chrome;
• Google Play;
• Android licensing;
• restrictions affecting competing services.

Competition principle

The case demonstrated how control over an operating system can be leveraged into adjacent markets.

Relevance to resilience

If an operating-system provider can systematically favour its own services, competitors may lose access to users and eventually exit.

Therefore:

OS neutrality → application competition → ecosystem resilience.

Case 2: Google Shopping — European Commission

Facts

Google was investigated for favouring its own comparison-shopping service in search results.

The Commission found that Google had abused its dominant position by giving its own comparison-shopping service more favourable positioning and display treatment.

Legal significance

The case established the importance of examining platform-controlled ranking mechanisms.

Resilience significance

Search rankings can determine whether rival platforms receive sufficient traffic to survive.

Consequently, discriminatory ranking can create:

visibility disadvantage → reduced traffic → reduced users → reduced data → reduced competitiveness.

This can reinforce incumbent dominance.

Case 3: Google Android — Competition Commission of India

Facts

The Competition Commission of India found Google to have abused its dominant position in several Android-related markets.

In October 2022, CCI imposed a penalty of approximately ₹1,337.76 crore concerning anti-competitive practices relating to Android mobile devices.

Competition concerns

The case involved issues concerning:

• Android operating systems;
• app distribution;
• pre-installation;
• search services;
• contractual restrictions;
• ecosystem leverage.

Resilience significance

The case demonstrates how dominance in an operating-system ecosystem can influence downstream markets.

A resilient digital ecosystem requires:

• alternative applications;
• alternative search providers;
• contestable distribution;
• freedom for developers;
• meaningful user choice.

Case 4: Google Play Billing — CCI

Facts

CCI examined Google's Play Store policies concerning payment processing.

The Commission considered the requirement that developers use Google's billing system for certain transactions and examined Google's treatment of rival UPI payment applications.

CCI concluded that Google's conduct violated provisions of Section 4 of the Competition Act and imposed a penalty of approximately ₹936.44 crore.

Resilience significance

Payment infrastructure is critical digital infrastructure.

If one platform controls:

app distribution + payment processing + access to consumers,

it can potentially control several layers of the ecosystem simultaneously.

Competitive access to payment infrastructure therefore contributes to digital-market resilience.

Case 5: WhatsApp Privacy Policy — CCI

Facts

CCI investigated WhatsApp's 2021 privacy-policy update.

In its 18 November 2024 order, CCI considered whether WhatsApp's terms imposed unfair conditions and whether data-sharing practices strengthened Meta's position in adjacent markets.

CCI imposed a penalty of ₹213.14 crore and behavioural remedies.

Competition significance

The case is particularly important because it connects:

privacy → data → market power → entry barriers → competition.

Resilience significance

A platform that accumulates extensive data can potentially reinforce its competitive position in advertising and other markets.

Data governance can therefore become a component of competition governance.

Case 6: Microsoft Teams — European Commission

Facts

The European Commission examined Microsoft's integration of Teams into Microsoft 365 and Office 365.

The Commission raised concerns that bundling Teams with productivity suites could give Teams an advantage over competing collaboration platforms.

In September 2025, the Commission accepted legally binding commitments from Microsoft addressing the competition concerns. These included:

• versions of productivity suites without Teams;
• reduced pricing;
• switching possibilities;
• improved interoperability;
• data portability. 

Resilience significance

This is an especially clear example of competition remedies designed to increase resilience.

The remedies address:

bundling + interoperability + switching + data portability.

These mechanisms collectively reduce ecosystem dependency.

12. Additional Important Cases

7. Epic Games v Google

The US litigation concerning Google's Android app-distribution and billing ecosystem is another important illustration.

A jury found Google liable under federal and state antitrust laws concerning Android app distribution and in-app billing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the verdict and injunction in 2025.

The case demonstrates the importance of maintaining competitive alternatives in:

• app distribution;
• payment systems;
• developer access.

8. Apple App Store — European Union

The Apple App Store cases demonstrate the relationship between platform control and steering.

The EU's DMA requires gatekeepers to permit developers to communicate and steer consumers toward alternative purchasing channels.

The Commission's 2025 Apple decision therefore illustrates the use of ex-ante regulation to preserve contestability rather than waiting for market foreclosure to become irreversible.

13. Legal Framework

A. India

The primary framework is the Competition Act, 2002.

Important provisions include:

Section 3

Prohibits anti-competitive agreements.

Section 4

Prohibits abuse of dominant position.

Particularly relevant digital-market conduct includes:

• unfair conditions;
• discriminatory conditions;
• denial of market access;
• leveraging dominance;
• tying and bundling.

Sections 19 and 26

Provide the investigative framework for examining competition concerns.

Section 27

Provides remedial powers following findings of contravention.

14. European Union

The principal framework consists of:

Article 101 TFEU

Anti-competitive agreements.

Article 102 TFEU

Abuse of dominant position.

Digital Markets Act

The DMA adds ex-ante obligations for designated gatekeepers.

The Commission currently identifies seven gatekeepers and 23 designated core platform services.

Important DMA concepts include:

• anti-self-preferencing;
• anti-steering;
• interoperability;
• data portability;
• restrictions on combining certain personal data;
• access rights;
• contestability;
• acquisition notification obligations.

15. United Kingdom

The UK's digital-market regime uses the concept of Strategic Market Status (SMS).

The CMA has designated both Google's and Apple's mobile platforms for SMS treatment and has ongoing work concerning steering, interoperability and related conduct.

The UK model demonstrates a movement toward:

designation → conduct requirements → continuous regulatory supervision.

16. Governance Model for Resilient Digital Markets

A comprehensive governance structure can be represented as follows:

Digital Platform Dominance

↓

Network Effects

↓

Lock-in / Switching Costs

↓

Potential Exclusionary Conduct

↓

Competition Investigation

↓

Interoperability + Data Portability + Non-discrimination

↓

Lower Entry Barriers

↓

Greater Contestability

↓

Digital Market Resilience

17. Key Regulatory Tools

17.1 Interoperability

Competing services should be able to access relevant technical interfaces where necessary to preserve competition.

17.2 Data portability

Users and businesses should be able to transfer their data.

17.3 Non-discrimination

Platforms should not arbitrarily discriminate against competing business users.

17.4 Anti-self-preferencing rules

Gatekeepers should not systematically favour their own downstream services.

17.5 Anti-tying rules

Dominant platforms should not use control over one market to foreclose another.

17.6 Merger control

Acquisitions of emerging competitors should receive careful scrutiny because digital markets can be affected by acquisitions of firms with relatively small current revenues but strategically important technology or user bases.

17.7 Behavioural remedies

Examples include:

• access obligations;
• non-discrimination;
• data portability;
• steering;
• interoperability;
• transparency.

17.8 Structural remedies

In particularly serious cases, competition authorities may consider structural measures such as separation or divestiture where behavioural remedies cannot effectively restore competition.

18. Relationship Between Resilience and Competition

19. Challenges in Governance

1. Defining the relevant market

Traditional market definition becomes difficult when services are:

• free to consumers;
• multi-sided;
• data-driven;
• rapidly changing.

2. Measuring quality competition

Competition may occur through:

• privacy;
• security;
• innovation;
• reliability;
• speed;
• data protection.

Price alone may not capture competitive harm.

3. Dynamic competition

A firm that is dominant today may face technological disruption tomorrow.

Competition law must therefore avoid protecting inefficient competitors while preventing artificial foreclosure.

4. Cybersecurity concerns

Interoperability can generate legitimate security concerns.

Authorities must distinguish genuine security justifications from strategic restrictions designed to exclude competitors.

5. AI

AI may intensify concentration because leading models require:

• computing power;
• data;
• cloud infrastructure;
• specialised chips;
• distribution channels.

The European Commission's current competition case database includes investigations concerning Google AI/data practices and exclusion of AI competitors from WhatsApp, demonstrating the growing intersection between AI and digital competition.

20. Emerging Issue: AI and Resilient Digital Competition

AI ecosystems may create a new competitive chain:

Cloud → chips → foundation model → operating system → application → distribution → data

If one undertaking controls several layers, competitors may encounter cumulative barriers.

Competition authorities may therefore examine:

• exclusive cloud arrangements;
• preferential access to computing resources;
• interoperability restrictions;
• exclusive AI distribution;
• acquisition of AI startups;
• access to training data;
• preferential integration of proprietary AI;
• tying AI assistants to operating systems;
• discrimination against rival AI services.

The EU's 2026 Android interoperability measures are particularly significant because they address access by competing AI assistants to Android functionality.

21. Six Core Principles of Resilient Digital-Market Governance

Principle 1 — Contestability

Markets should remain open to new entrants.

Principle 2 — Interoperability

Dominant infrastructure should not unnecessarily prevent competing services from functioning.

Principle 3 — Portability

Consumers and businesses should not become permanently tied to a platform.

Principle 4 — Non-discrimination

Gatekeepers should not arbitrarily favour their own downstream services.

Principle 5 — Innovation

Competition law should preserve incentives for technological development.

Principle 6 — Decentralised Competitive Capacity

Digital ecosystems should contain sufficient independent competitors so that the failure or misconduct of one undertaking does not eliminate meaningful alternatives.

22. Conclusion

Competition law and resilient digital markets are increasingly interconnected. Digital resilience is not merely a question of cybersecurity or operational continuity. It also concerns whether market structures allow multiple independent competitors, technological alternatives, switching, interoperability, data portability and continuing innovation.

The Google Android, Google Shopping, Google Play, WhatsApp, Microsoft Teams and Epic Games cases demonstrate different dimensions of this relationship.

The emerging regulatory approach can therefore be summarised as:

Prevent artificial dependency → preserve contestability → enable switching and interoperability → maintain competitive alternatives → strengthen digital-market resilience.

Modern digital competition governance consequently moves beyond the traditional question of “Is there a monopoly?” toward the broader structural question:

“Can competitors realistically enter, expand, interoperate and survive within the digital ecosystem?”

That question is increasingly central to competition law in platform, cloud, app-store, data and AI markets.