Competition Law and Future Reform of Danish Competition Enforcement

Introduction

Danish competition enforcement is based primarily on the Danish Competition Act (Konkurrenceloven), supplemented by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and EU competition principles. Enforcement is principally undertaken by the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA/Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen) together with the Danish Competition Council (Konkurrencerådet), subject to review by the Competition Appeals Tribunal and the Danish courts.

A significant reform took effect on 1 July 2024. It introduced, among other things, powers to investigate market-wide competitive problems, powers to require notification of certain mergers below ordinary turnover thresholds, and revised fine rules.

The future direction of Danish enforcement is therefore likely to move from a predominantly case-by-case model toward a combination of:

1. traditional antitrust enforcement;
2. proactive market investigations;
3. scrutiny of below-threshold acquisitions;
4. stronger digital-market enforcement;
5. more sophisticated economic and data analysis;
6. faster intervention against structural bottlenecks; and
7. closer coordination with EU competition and digital regulation.

I. Existing Legal Framework

1. Danish Competition Act

The Danish Competition Act broadly prohibits:

• anti-competitive agreements;
• concerted practices;
• abuse of dominance;
• anti-competitive public support;
• certain restrictive vertical arrangements; and
• concentrations that significantly impede effective competition.

The Danish framework substantially reflects EU competition law.

The ordinary merger thresholds currently include situations where at least two participating businesses each have Danish turnover of at least DKK 100 million, combined with Danish turnover of at least DKK 900 million, or alternative higher-turnover criteria.

2. Article 101 TFEU and Danish Competition Law

Article 101 TFEU remains particularly important for:

• cartels;
• price fixing;
• market sharing;
• bid rigging;
• information exchange;
• customer allocation;
• restrictions imposed through industry associations.

Danish enforcement therefore operates within a dual national-EU framework.

3. Article 102 TFEU

Article 102 is particularly important in Danish cases involving:

• exclusionary pricing;
• loyalty rebates;
• discriminatory conditions;
• refusal of access;
• tying;
• excessive or unfair terms;
• platform restrictions;
• self-preferencing and parity clauses.

The jurisprudence concerning Post Danmark has made Denmark particularly important in the development of EU abuse-of-dominance doctrine.

II. Major Recent Reform: 2024 Competition Act Amendment

The 2024 amendment is central to the future development of Danish enforcement.

It introduced a mechanism enabling the competition authority to investigate competitive conditions across an entire sector rather than being confined to a traditional infringement investigation.

Market investigation power

Where an investigation establishes circumstances that clearly weaken competition to the detriment of consumers or businesses, the Competition Council can, subject to statutory conditions and procedural safeguards, require relevant businesses to change their future conduct.

This represents a significant conceptual development.

Traditional model

Conduct → infringement → decision → sanction

Emerging Danish model

Market problem → market investigation → structural/behavioural diagnosis → remedy

This allows enforcement to address market failures that may not fit neatly into conventional Article 101 or 102 categories.

III. Below-Threshold Merger Control

One of the most important reforms concerns acquisitions falling below the traditional turnover thresholds.

The authority may require notification where:

1. the parties collectively have Danish annual turnover of at least DKK 50 million, and
2. the authority considers there to be a risk that the transaction could significantly impede effective competition, particularly through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. 

This is especially significant for:

• digital start-ups;
• technology companies;
• AI businesses;
• fintech;
• pharmaceutical companies;
• data-driven enterprises;
• innovative platform businesses.

These enterprises may have low present turnover but substantial competitive significance.

IV. Uber–Dantaxi: First Application of the New Merger Power

The practical importance of the reform became clear in 2025.

Uber International Holding B.V. / Greenfleet Holding A/S (Dantaxi), 2025

Uber acquired Greenfleet Holding, the parent company of Dantaxi.

The transaction was initially below the ordinary Danish turnover thresholds. Nevertheless, the DCCA required the transaction to be notified because of potential competition concerns.

The authority described this as the first use of Denmark's new power to require notification of a merger below the ordinary turnover thresholds.

Significance

The case demonstrates that future Danish merger enforcement cannot be assessed solely through turnover.

The relevant question increasingly becomes:

Does the transaction have competitive significance even if current revenue is modest?

This is particularly important for acquisitions of:

• emerging technology;
• AI companies;
• data-rich platforms;
• innovative start-ups;
• potential future competitors.

V. Important Case Laws

1. Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet — C-209/10

This is one of the foundational Danish competition cases.

Facts

Post Danmark occupied a dominant position in the Danish postal market. It offered selectively low prices to certain former customers of competitor Forbruger-Kontakt.

Issue

Whether selective low pricing and price discrimination constituted an abuse of dominance.

Decision

The CJEU held that price discrimination does not automatically constitute exclusionary abuse. The competitive effects, circumstances of the conduct and potential exclusion of an equally efficient competitor must be assessed.

Principle

A dominant undertaking's pricing conduct must be examined through its actual or potential effect on competition, rather than simply through formal differentiation between customers.

Future relevance

The principle is important for:

• digital platforms;
• algorithmic pricing;
• personalised discounts;
• AI-driven price discrimination;
• data-based customer segmentation.

2. Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet — C-23/14

The second major Post Danmark case concerned a retroactive rebate scheme.

Issue

Whether the rebate system was capable of producing exclusionary effects contrary to Article 102.

Principle

The CJEU emphasised that the assessment must consider the circumstances of the individual case, including the criteria governing the rebate and its potential exclusionary effects.

Importance

This case remains relevant to:

• loyalty rebates;
• platform incentives;
• marketplace commissions;
• subscription discounts;
• digital ecosystem incentives.

Future Danish enforcement can apply these principles to sophisticated algorithmically designed incentive systems.

3. Post Danmark — Danish Supreme Court, 15 February 2013

The Danish litigation also produced a subsequent Danish Supreme Court judgment following the CJEU reference.

The litigation demonstrates the interaction between:

• DCCA enforcement;
• Danish courts;
• preliminary references;
• EU competition-law interpretation.

The DCCA's case history records the Supreme Court judgment of 15 February 2013.

Future significance

Danish enforcement will increasingly require coordination between domestic procedural law and evolving EU standards.

4. Falck Danmark A/S — Ambulance Services

Facts

Falck held a dominant position in the Danish ambulance-services market.

The Competition Council found abuse of dominance relating to conduct connected with the competitive tendering process.

Enforcement

The matter resulted in criminal proceedings and, in December 2019, the Copenhagen City Court imposed a DKK 30 million fine on Falck for grossly negligent abuse of dominance. The Danish authority described it at the time as the largest fine imposed in Denmark for a competition-law infringement.

Significance

The case demonstrates that Danish competition enforcement can involve:

• administrative competition proceedings;
• referral to prosecutorial authorities;
• criminal sanctions;
• judicial enforcement.

Future reform relevance

A future enforcement framework may increasingly distinguish between:

• intentional cartel behaviour;
• negligent conduct;
• sophisticated compliance failures;
• deliberate exploitation of dominance.

5. Clear Channel Danmark / AFA JCDecaux

Facts

Clear Channel and AFA JCDecaux were competitors in the outdoor advertising market.

The Danish Competition Council found that they had agreed on discounts offered to customers.

Decision

The Competition Appeals Tribunal upheld the Competition Council's decision. The matter was subsequently referred for criminal enforcement.

Principle

Competitors cannot coordinate commercial conditions in a manner that suppresses competition even when the coordination concerns apparently narrow elements such as discounts.

Future significance

The principle is particularly important for:

• algorithmic pricing;
• automated discount systems;
• shared pricing software;
• AI-based price recommendations;
• digital information exchanges.

The future enforcement challenge is determining when machine-mediated coordination produces the functional equivalent of traditional cartel conduct.

6. Nets / Teller Contract Conditions

The Teller/Nets matter concerned contractual conditions in the payments sector and generated proceedings before Danish competition bodies and courts.

The case history includes decisions of the Competition Council, Competition Appeals Tribunal and subsequent court proceedings concerning confidentiality.

Significance

The case illustrates the importance of:

• procedural powers;
• access to investigative material;
• confidentiality;
• judicial review;
• enforcement in financial infrastructure markets.

Future relevance

Payment systems are increasingly dependent upon:

• APIs;
• interoperability;
• data portability;
• payment infrastructure;
• platform access.

Consequently, future Danish enforcement is likely to confront competition issues at the intersection of competition law and financial infrastructure regulation.

7. Coloplast Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet — 2026

A significant recent Danish development is the Coloplast matter.

The Competition Appeals Tribunal held in March 2026 that Coloplast had abused its dominant position by attempting to prevent competitors at the wholesale level from successfully competing for municipal contracts concerning ostomy products. The Tribunal upheld the Competition Council's 2025 decision.

Significance

The case demonstrates the continuing relevance of dominance enforcement where a powerful supplier can influence access to downstream public procurement.

Future relevance

The same analytical framework can become important in:

• healthcare procurement;
• pharmaceutical distribution;
• public tenders;
• essential inputs;
• technologically locked-in supply chains.

8. Wolt Denmark — 2026

The most recent major Danish dominance decision concerns Wolt Denmark.

On 26 August 2026, the Danish Competition Council found that Wolt abused its dominant position between 2022 and 2024.

The decision concerned, among other matters:

• a price-parity clause;
• restrictions affecting restaurants' ability to offer lower prices through their own channels;
• unfair trading conditions.

The authority characterised the conduct as involving both exclusionary and exploitative abuse.

Significance

This is highly relevant to the future of Danish competition enforcement because digital platforms create relationships involving:

platform → business users → consumers → competing platforms.

Traditional market-definition analysis may therefore need to account for:

• network effects;
• multi-sided markets;
• switching costs;
• data;
• platform dependency;
• algorithmic ranking;
• parity clauses.

VI. Future Reform Area 1: Digital Competition

Future Danish enforcement is likely to concentrate heavily on digital markets.

Important concerns include:

A. Platform self-preferencing

A platform may favour:

• its own products;
• affiliated services;
• preferred suppliers;
• internal payment systems.

B. Ranking manipulation

Competition authorities may investigate whether algorithms artificially disadvantage competitors.

C. Platform parity

The Wolt decision demonstrates the importance of contractual restrictions preventing businesses from offering better prices through alternative channels.

D. Data advantages

Large platforms can accumulate:

• consumer data;
• transaction data;
• behavioural information;
• pricing information.

Future enforcement may treat data access as a competitive parameter rather than merely a privacy issue.

VII. Future Reform Area 2: AI and Algorithmic Competition

AI presents several novel enforcement questions.

1. Algorithmic collusion

Competitors may use similar pricing algorithms.

The difficult question is:

When does parallel algorithmic behaviour become legally attributable coordination?

Traditional cartel doctrine focuses heavily on communication and agreement. AI systems may generate coordinated outcomes without conventional human communication.

2. AI-enabled exclusion

Dominant platforms may use AI to:

• rank competitors lower;
• personalise offers;
• discriminate between business users;
• identify customers vulnerable to switching;
• optimise exclusionary discounts.

Danish enforcement will increasingly require technical economic expertise.

VIII. Future Reform Area 3: Strategic Acquisitions

The 2024 reform directly addresses a problem associated with transactions below ordinary thresholds.

Future merger enforcement may therefore examine:

• acquisition of nascent competitors;
• start-up acquisitions;
• data acquisitions;
• AI acquisitions;
• killer-acquisition theories;
• vertical acquisitions;
• ecosystem acquisitions.

The Uber–Dantaxi decision provides the first practical demonstration of this expanded jurisdiction.

IX. Future Reform Area 4: Market Investigation

The new market-investigation mechanism could become one of the most important features of Danish competition enforcement.

The authority can examine structural competitive problems extending beyond a single undertaking's conduct.

Potential future applications could include:

• digital marketplaces;
• payment infrastructure;
• telecommunications;
• energy markets;
• pharmaceuticals;
• food retail;
• transport platforms;
• cloud services.

This allows enforcement to address structural weaknesses rather than only completed infringements.

X. Future Reform Area 5: Essential Facilities and Access

Competition concerns increasingly arise where one undertaking controls infrastructure necessary for competitors.

Examples include:

• digital platforms;
• payment systems;
• telecommunications networks;
• logistics infrastructure;
• energy grids;
• data infrastructures;
• cloud services.

Future Danish enforcement may therefore place greater emphasis on:

access + interoperability + non-discrimination + portability.

The Color Line matter in 2026 illustrates how access conditions and differential treatment of competitors can raise concerns under Danish competition law.

XI. Future Reform Area 6: Stronger Economic Evidence

The DCCA already emphasises legal and economic analysis in its enforcement work and prioritises cases according to seriousness, market importance, competition culture and broader economic significance.

Future enforcement is likely to rely increasingly upon:

• econometrics;
• counterfactual analysis;
• consumer surveys;
• switching-cost analysis;
• transaction data;
• algorithmic auditing;
• network-effect analysis;
• simulation models;
• natural experiments.

This will be especially important in digital markets where conventional market shares may provide an incomplete picture of competitive power.

XII. Future Reform Area 7: Remedies

A major future question is whether Danish enforcement should rely more heavily upon structural remedies.

A DCCA ex-post study of six Danish merger cases found that structural commitments had, in several cases, been effective, while behavioural commitments were generally less effective in preserving competition.

This suggests an important enforcement lesson:

Behavioural remedy

"Do not discriminate."

versus

Structural remedy

"Change the structure that creates the incentive or ability to discriminate."

Future enforcement may therefore increasingly consider:

• divestiture;
• access obligations;
• interoperability;
• separation requirements;
• data portability;
• licensing obligations;
• non-discrimination obligations.

XIII. Future Reform Area 8: Fine and Sanction Reform

The 2024 legislation also modified Danish rules on fines and limitation periods. For certain corporate competition infringements, the amended framework includes a civil fine ceiling linked to turnover, while rules concerning individual fines emphasise seriousness and duration and require effectiveness, proportionality and deterrence.

Future reform may therefore focus on achieving an appropriate balance between:

• deterrence;
• proportionality;
• corporate accountability;
• individual accountability;
• procedural fairness.

XIV. Future Reform Area 9: Procedural Efficiency

The Danish authority receives substantially more complaints and potential infringement matters than it can investigate fully, making prioritisation unavoidable.

Future enforcement could consequently develop:

1. risk-based case selection;
2. digital evidence screening;
3. automated detection of suspicious pricing;
4. sector-wide monitoring;
5. faster interim intervention;
6. improved leniency mechanisms;
7. stronger whistleblower channels.

The objective would be to identify serious competition problems earlier without unnecessarily expanding enforcement against economically harmless conduct.

XV. Future Reform Area 10: Interaction with EU Digital Regulation

Danish competition enforcement cannot operate in isolation.

Digital markets may simultaneously be governed by:

• Danish Competition Act;
• Articles 101 and 102 TFEU;
• EU Merger Regulation;
• Digital Markets Act;
• Data Act;
• GDPR;
• sector-specific regulation.

The future challenge will be institutional coordination.

For example:

Data access problem
↓
Competition law
↓
Digital regulation
↓
Privacy regulation
↓
Interoperability requirements

A coherent enforcement strategy will be required to avoid conflicting remedies.

XVI. Proposed Future Reform Framework

A future Danish competition-enforcement model could be organised as follows:

                 DANISH COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT                              │        ┌─────────────────────┼─────────────────────┐        │                     │                     │ Traditional Antitrust   Market Investigation   Merger Control        │                     │                     │   Art. 101/102          Sector-wide problems   Above threshold        │                     │                  Below threshold        │                     │                     │        └──────────────┬──────┴──────────────┬──────┘                       │                     │                Digital Economy       Strategic Markets                       │                     │              AI / Data / Platforms   Energy / Finance                       │                     │                       └──────────┬──────────┘                                  │                           Economic Evidence                                  │                    ┌─────────────┴─────────────┐                    │                           │             Behavioural Remedies       Structural Remedies                    │                           │                    └─────────────┬─────────────┘                                  │                           Effective Competition

XVII. Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Case Law

XVIII. Critical Issues for Future Danish Competition Law

The principal legal questions for future reform will include:

1. Market definition

Traditional market definition may become difficult where businesses compete through:

• ecosystems;
• data;
• attention;
• algorithms;
• interoperability.

2. Dominance

Market share alone may not capture:

• network effects;
• data advantages;
• switching costs;
• ecosystem dependency.

3. Causation

Authorities will need to demonstrate a credible connection between conduct and competitive harm.

4. Remedies

Remedies must prevent future harm without unnecessarily regulating legitimate competitive conduct.

5. Procedural safeguards

Broader investigative powers require:

• notice;
• proportionality;
• confidentiality;
• judicial review;
• effective appeal rights.

6. Technological expertise

Competition authorities will increasingly need specialists in:

• AI;
• machine learning;
• cybersecurity;
• data science;
• algorithms;
• digital economics.

XIX. Overall Future Direction

The trajectory of Danish competition enforcement can be understood as a transition:

From

infringement-centred enforcement

toward

market-centred, data-driven and structurally informed enforcement.

The 2024 reform is particularly important because it gives Danish authorities tools to intervene beyond traditional turnover-threshold merger control and individual infringement cases.

The Uber–Dantaxi matter demonstrates the practical use of below-threshold merger scrutiny, while Wolt illustrates the application of traditional dominance principles to modern platform economics.

At the same time, Post Danmark remains fundamental because it provides the analytical foundation for assessing exclusionary effects under Article 102.

Conclusion

Future reform of Danish competition enforcement is likely to be characterised by earlier intervention, broader market surveillance, closer scrutiny of strategically important acquisitions, stronger digital-market expertise, sophisticated economic analysis and greater attention to structural remedies.

The 2024 reforms have already moved Denmark toward a more proactive enforcement architecture. The subsequent application to Uber–Dantaxi and the recent Wolt and Coloplast decisions illustrate how this framework can operate in emerging digital and infrastructure-dependent markets.