Competition Law and Future-Oriented Competition Frameworks for Denmark and the European Union

1. Introduction

Competition law in Denmark and the European Union is moving from a predominantly ex-post model—where authorities intervene after anticompetitive conduct occurs—towards a more future-oriented framework capable of addressing digital ecosystems, artificial intelligence, data concentration, cloud infrastructure, platform dependency, sustainability, algorithmic coordination, and rapidly changing market structures.

Denmark operates within the EU competition-law architecture while maintaining its own Danish Competition Act, national enforcement institutions and merger-control mechanisms. The Danish Competition Council and Danish Competition and Consumer Authority enforce national competition rules and also participate in EU-level digital and competition enforcement.

At EU level, the traditional framework remains centred on:

• Article 101 TFEU – anticompetitive agreements and concerted practices;
• Article 102 TFEU – abuse of dominance;
• EU Merger Regulation;
• State-aid rules;
• Foreign Subsidies Regulation;
• Digital Markets Act (DMA);
• sector-specific regulation;
• and increasingly coordinated digital, data and technology regulation.

The DMA is particularly important because it complements rather than replaces Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, introducing ex-ante obligations for designated digital gatekeepers.

2. Meaning of a Future-Oriented Competition Framework

A future-oriented competition framework asks not merely:

"Has competition already been harmed?"

but also:

"What structural conditions could make effective competition impossible in the future?"

This changes the analytical emphasis towards:

1. contestability;
2. market entry and expansion;
3. switching costs;
4. data accumulation;
5. network effects;
6. interoperability;
7. ecosystem power;
8. algorithmic coordination;
9. AI-enabled competitive advantages;
10. control over essential digital infrastructure;
11. innovation competition; and
12. dynamic effects of mergers and acquisitions.

The EU's current regulatory direction illustrates this shift. The DMA expressly seeks to make digital markets more fair and contestable, while the Commission's 2026 review has identified cloud computing and AI as important future competition areas.

3. Danish Competition-Law Framework

A. Danish Competition Act

The Danish Competition Act broadly reflects the EU distinction between:

• prohibited agreements;
• abuse of dominant position;
• merger control;
• public enforcement; and
• sanctions/remedies.

The Danish Competition Council has responsibility for major decisions and principle cases, while the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority undertakes investigations and prepares cases.

The future-oriented interpretation of Danish competition law is particularly relevant to:

• digital platforms;
• food and retail;
• transport platforms;
• fintech;
• telecommunications;
• energy;
• cloud computing;
• AI;
• online marketplaces; and
• infrastructure.

4. EU Digital Markets Act as a Future-Oriented Competition Instrument

The DMA represents one of the clearest departures from traditional antitrust.

Traditional Article 102 analysis generally requires questions concerning:

• relevant market;
• dominance;
• abusive conduct;
• effects or potential effects; and
• appropriate remedies.

The DMA instead identifies designated gatekeepers according to statutory criteria and imposes specified obligations and prohibitions.

These include rules addressing:

• self-preferencing;
• anti-steering;
• interoperability;
• data use;
• combining personal data;
• app-store restrictions;
• business-user access;
• switching;
• default settings; and
• platform openness.

The Commission describes the DMA as establishing objective criteria for identifying gatekeepers and obligations designed to make digital markets more contestable and fair.

5. Denmark–EU Institutional Model

Future competition governance in Denmark therefore operates at several levels:

Level 1 – Danish Competition Act

National competition rules remain important for markets whose effects are principally Danish.

Level 2 – EU Articles 101 and 102 TFEU

Cross-border or EU-level competition problems remain governed by traditional EU antitrust principles.

Level 3 – EU Merger Regulation

Large concentrations may fall within EU merger control.

Level 4 – Digital Markets Act

Designated gatekeepers face ex-ante obligations.

Level 5 – Platform-to-Business Regulation

The P2B framework addresses transparency and fairness between digital platforms and business users.

A 2026 Danish decision involving Meta illustrates this additional layer: the Danish Competition Council found violations of P2B requirements concerning reasons for suspension and effective complaint handling involving a Danish business user.

Level 6 – Other Digital Regulation

Competition analysis increasingly interacts with:

• Data Act;
• GDPR;
• Digital Services Act;
• AI Act;
• cybersecurity regulation;
• consumer protection;
• electronic communications regulation; and
• financial-sector regulation.

6. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 1: Contestability

The central future-oriented concept is contestability.

A market may have only a few competitors without necessarily being unlawful. The deeper question is whether new competitors can realistically:

• enter;
• obtain users;
• access data;
• interoperate;
• scale;
• obtain distribution;
• switch infrastructure;
• and compete on comparable terms.

This is especially significant in digital ecosystems where network effects can cause markets to "tip" toward one dominant ecosystem.

7. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 2: Ecosystem Power

Traditional market definition can become difficult when a company operates simultaneously across:

• search;
• advertising;
• operating systems;
• app stores;
• cloud;
• payments;
• AI;
• hardware;
• data services.

The future-oriented approach therefore considers ecosystem leverage.

For example, control over an operating system may affect:

• app distribution;
• advertising;
• payment services;
• AI assistants;
• device interoperability.

This makes conglomerate effects and ecosystem foreclosure increasingly important.

8. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 3: Data as a Competitive Asset

Data may function as:

• an input;
• a competitive advantage;
• a switching barrier;
• a source of network effects;
• an AI-training resource;
• or an entry barrier.

Future competition analysis therefore asks:

Who controls the data required to compete?

and:

Can competitors realistically obtain equivalent data?

The issue becomes especially significant where data generated by consumers or business users is concentrated inside one ecosystem.

9. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 4: AI and Algorithmic Competition

AI changes competition in at least five ways.

1. Algorithmic pricing

Competitors may use automated systems that independently adjust prices.

2. Algorithmic coordination

Algorithms can potentially make coordination more persistent or sophisticated.

3. AI infrastructure concentration

Competition may depend upon access to:

• computing capacity;
• cloud infrastructure;
• advanced chips;
• foundation models;
• training datasets.

4. AI distribution

A dominant operating system, browser, search engine or cloud platform may control access to AI services.

5. AI ecosystem integration

An incumbent may combine:

cloud + operating system + search + data + AI model + distribution.

This creates a future-oriented competition question concerning vertical and ecosystem foreclosure.

The Commission's 2026 DMA review specifically identified AI and cloud computing as areas requiring continued attention.

10. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 5: Cloud Competition

Cloud computing illustrates the move from conventional product markets toward infrastructure competition.

Potential competition concerns include:

• high switching costs;
• data migration difficulties;
• interoperability limitations;
• contractual restrictions;
• technical lock-in;
• preferential treatment of affiliated services;
• bundling;
• cloud credits;
• AI/cloud integration.

In June 2026, the European Commission announced a preliminary position that Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure should be designated as DMA gatekeepers for cloud computing services, citing factors including entrenched positions, lock-in, switching costs and ecosystem effects.

This is an important illustration of how future competition law may move upstream into digital infrastructure markets.

11. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 6: Dynamic Merger Control

Future merger control increasingly asks not only:

"What is the market share today?"

but also:

"What competitive structure will exist after the acquisition?"

Important questions include:

• acquisition of potential competitors;
• acquisition of innovative start-ups;
• elimination of future entrants;
• access to strategic datasets;
• AI capabilities;
• cloud infrastructure;
• interoperability;
• ecosystem expansion;
• innovation competition.

The European Commission published draft revised Merger Guidelines in April 2026 after a broad review designed to account for transformations including digitalisation and decarbonisation.

12. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 7: Interoperability

Interoperability can become a competition remedy where market power is sustained through technical isolation.

Examples include:

• messaging services;
• payment systems;
• operating systems;
• cloud services;
• smart devices;
• digital identity;
• APIs;
• data portability.

The objective is not necessarily to make every system identical, but to prevent technical architecture from becoming an artificial barrier to competition.

The DMA already contains interoperability mechanisms, while the Commission's 2026 review identified interoperability and technical implementation as continuing areas of importance.

13. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 8: Algorithmic Transparency

Future competition authorities may increasingly investigate:

• ranking algorithms;
• recommendation systems;
• pricing algorithms;
• advertising auctions;
• automated allocation;
• search algorithms;
• AI-based discrimination;
• algorithmic exclusion.

The central legal difficulty is distinguishing:

legitimate independent optimisation

from

algorithmically facilitated exclusion or coordination.

This will require stronger technical evidence, audit mechanisms and economic analysis.

14. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 9: Sustainability

Competition law increasingly interacts with:

• climate transition;
• green technologies;
• renewable energy;
• carbon markets;
• circular economy;
• energy infrastructure;
• sustainable supply chains.

Future frameworks must balance:

competition

against

legitimate sustainability cooperation.

The principal challenge is preventing sustainability objectives from becoming a mechanism for:

• cartelisation;
• exclusion;
• discriminatory standards;
• foreclosure of innovative technologies;

while permitting genuine cooperation that produces demonstrable benefits.

15. Future-Oriented Competition Principle No. 10: Essential Facilities and Digital Infrastructure

The traditional essential-facilities concept becomes relevant to:

• cloud infrastructure;
• payment networks;
• app stores;
• search data;
• interoperability interfaces;
• telecommunications networks;
• energy grids;
• digital identity systems.

Future competition law may increasingly focus on whether control over a critical infrastructure layer permits a company to exclude competitors operating at downstream levels.

16. Important Case Laws

The following cases provide the doctrinal foundations for future-oriented competition analysis.

Case 1 – Continental Can v Commission

Case: Case 6/72, Continental Can Co Inc v Commission

Principle

The Court recognised that dominance analysis could take account of the ability of a dominant undertaking to eliminate competition through expansion or acquisition.

Future relevance

The case is important for understanding the evolution from purely static market-share analysis toward concern with future competitive structure.

It supports the broader proposition that competition law must sometimes consider how market power can be used to alter the structure of competition itself.

17. Case 2 – United Brands v Commission

Case: Case 27/76, United Brands v Commission

Principle

The Court examined:

• dominant position;
• market definition;
• barriers to entry;
• economic strength;
• dependence of customers.

Future relevance

United Brands remains important because future digital markets similarly require examination of:

• dependence;
• switching;
• entry barriers;
• economic power;
• commercial alternatives.

A platform can potentially become an unavoidable commercial intermediary without necessarily having a traditional monopoly.

18. Case 3 – Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission

Case: Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission

Principle

The Court established the importance of loyalty-inducing arrangements and exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.

Future relevance

The doctrine is highly relevant to modern:

• platform exclusivity;
• ecosystem incentives;
• default arrangements;
• loyalty schemes;
• rebates;
• contractual restrictions.

It demonstrates why apparently commercial arrangements can become problematic where they strengthen exclusionary dominance.

19. Case 4 – Microsoft v Commission

Case: Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp v Commission

Principle

The case addressed:

• interoperability;
• tying;
• technological leverage;
• refusal to provide interoperability information;
• protection of competition in neighbouring markets.

Future relevance

This is one of the most important precedents for future digital competition.

Its principles resonate with contemporary issues involving:

• operating systems;
• cloud services;
• AI;
• APIs;
• interoperability;
• ecosystem leverage.

It demonstrates how dominance in one technological layer can potentially be leveraged into another.

20. Case 5 – Intel v Commission

Case: Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp v Commission

Principle

The Court clarified the importance of examining the circumstances and economic effects of allegedly exclusionary rebates where relevant.

Future relevance

The case is significant for the development of effects-based analysis.

Future competition cases involving:

• cloud discounts;
• platform incentives;
• AI-computing credits;
• loyalty arrangements;
• ecosystem rebates;

may require sophisticated economic analysis rather than reliance solely on formal classification.

21. Case 6 – Google Shopping

Case: Case T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v Commission

Principle

The case concerned Google's preferential treatment of its own comparison-shopping service in general search results.

Future relevance

It is directly relevant to:

• self-preferencing;
• ranking;
• platform neutrality;
• search dominance;
• vertically integrated ecosystems.

The issue has subsequently moved beyond traditional Article 102 enforcement into the DMA framework.

The contemporary importance of this doctrine is illustrated by the Commission's July 2026 DMA decision concerning Google's treatment of its own services in Google Search.

22. Case 7 – Slovak Telekom

Case: Case C-165/19 P, Slovak Telekom

Principle

The Court considered exclusionary conduct involving access to telecommunications infrastructure.

Future relevance

The case provides useful principles for future disputes concerning:

• network access;
• infrastructure bottlenecks;
• interoperability;
• vertically integrated infrastructure;
• access conditions.

Its logic is particularly relevant to digital and telecommunications infrastructure.

23. Case 8 – Towercast

Case: Case C-449/21, Towercast

Principle

The Court recognised that a concentration potentially falling outside EU or national merger-control thresholds may nevertheless be examined under Article 102 TFEU in appropriate circumstances.

Future relevance

Towercast is especially important for future-oriented merger control.

It demonstrates that:

merger thresholds do not necessarily define the entire universe of competition-law scrutiny.

This matters where an incumbent acquires a smaller undertaking possessing:

• emerging technology;
• AI capabilities;
• valuable datasets;
• innovative products;
• potential competitive significance.

24. Danish Case Example 1 – Wolt

In August 2026, the Danish Competition Council decided that Wolt Denmark had abused a dominant position between 2022 and 2024, applying the Danish Competition Act and Article 102 TFEU.

Future significance

The case illustrates the increasing importance of:

• platform economics;
• digital intermediation;
• network effects;
• platform dependency;
• digital distribution.

It is particularly relevant to the future regulation of platform-mediated markets.

25. Danish Case Example 2 – Uber/Dantaxi

In August 2026, the Danish Competition Council intervened in the Uber/Dantaxi transaction and required divestment commitments involving a significant part of Dantaxi.

Future significance

This illustrates the importance of merger control in markets undergoing:

• digital transformation;
• platformisation;
• consolidation;
• multi-sided competition.

It demonstrates that competition analysis must consider not only current market shares but also the future competitive structure created by a transaction.

26. Danish Case Example 3 – Meta / Clothing By Ros

In June 2026, the Danish Competition Council found that Meta violated P2B requirements concerning:

• reasons for suspension;
• effective internal complaint handling;
• timely handling of the business user's complaint.

The case concerned a Danish clothing business using Facebook as an important marketing and sales channel.

Future significance

The case illustrates a broader movement toward regulating platform dependency.

The competition issue is no longer limited to:

"Does the platform have monopoly power?"

It can also concern:

"What rights should business users have when their economic activity depends heavily upon the platform?"

27. Traditional Antitrust v Future-Oriented Competition Framework

28. Future Danish Competition Framework

Denmark's future competition system is likely to become increasingly characterised by institutional coordination.

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority already works across competition and digital regulatory issues and assists the European Commission in DMA enforcement.

Important future areas include:

A. AI competition

• foundation models;
• AI assistants;
• AI distribution;
• training data;
• cloud-AI integration.

B. Platform ecosystems

• app stores;
• marketplaces;
• social media;
• mobility platforms;
• food-delivery platforms.

C. Data markets

• data access;
• portability;
• interoperability;
• data monopolisation.

D. Cloud infrastructure

• switching costs;
• migration;
• interoperability;
• contractual restrictions.

E. Green markets

• renewable-energy platforms;
• carbon markets;
• environmental technologies;
• green certification.

F. Digital mergers

• killer acquisitions;
• nascent competitors;
• strategic datasets;
• AI start-ups.

29. EU Future Competition Architecture

The EU framework can increasingly be understood as a multi-layer competition constitution:

Layer 1 — Articles 101 and 102 TFEU

Traditional antitrust.

Layer 2 — EU Merger Regulation

Structural control over concentrations.

Layer 3 — DMA

Ex-ante regulation of gatekeeper conduct.

Layer 4 — P2B Regulation

Business-user fairness and transparency.

Layer 5 — DSA

Digital-platform governance and systemic risks.

Layer 6 — Data Regulation

Data access, portability and interoperability.

Layer 7 — AI Regulation

Rules affecting AI deployment and market development.

Layer 8 — Foreign Subsidies Regulation

Protection against distortive subsidies affecting the internal market.

This creates a regulatory environment in which competition law increasingly operates alongside technology regulation, data regulation and market-structure regulation.

30. Article 102 TFEU and the Future

A particularly important recent development is the European Commission's adoption, on 3 September 2026, of its first Guidelines on exclusionary abuses under Article 102 TFEU. The Guidelines seek to provide greater legal certainty and consistency concerning exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings.

This is significant for future competition law because it attempts to create a coherent bridge between:

• traditional dominance doctrine;
• economic effects analysis;
• digital markets;
• exclusionary strategies;
• and modern market realities.

31. Future Merger Regulation

The future merger framework will increasingly need to assess:

Horizontal effects

Whether competitors are removed.

Vertical effects

Whether an undertaking controlling an upstream input can disadvantage downstream rivals.

Conglomerate effects

Whether control over one ecosystem can strengthen another.

Innovation effects

Whether an acquisition eliminates future innovation.

Data effects

Whether a transaction creates excessive data concentration.

AI effects

Whether acquisition of an AI developer strengthens an existing technological bottleneck.

Infrastructure effects

Whether a transaction increases control over cloud, payment, telecommunications or digital infrastructure.

The Commission's 2026 merger-guideline review expressly responds to major economic changes including digitalisation and decarbonisation.

32. Remedies in Future Competition Law

Traditional remedies include:

• fines;
• divestitures;
• access obligations;
• licensing;
• behavioural commitments.

Future-oriented remedies may additionally involve:

• interoperability;
• data portability;
• API access;
• algorithmic transparency;
• non-discrimination;
• technical separation;
• choice screens;
• default-setting restrictions;
• data-use restrictions;
• structural separation.

The DMA demonstrates the movement toward standardised ex-ante obligations, rather than requiring authorities to construct a remedy from scratch after every individual infringement.

33. Major Legal Challenges

1. Rapid technological change

Competition law develops more slowly than technology.

2. Market-definition difficulty

AI ecosystems and digital platforms can operate across multiple interconnected markets.

3. Evidence problems

Authorities increasingly need access to:

• source code;
• algorithms;
• internal documents;
• datasets;
• technical architecture;
• economic models.

4. Regulatory overlap

Competition authorities must coordinate with:

• data regulators;
• AI regulators;
• telecom regulators;
• consumer authorities;
• cybersecurity authorities.

5. Risk of over-enforcement

Excessive intervention may discourage:

• innovation;
• investment;
• interoperability experimentation;
• legitimate vertical integration.

6. Risk of under-enforcement

Insufficient intervention may allow:

• irreversible concentration;
• ecosystem lock-in;
• exclusion of emerging competitors;
• data accumulation;
• technological tipping.

34. A Future-Oriented Test for Denmark and the EU

A useful analytical framework can be expressed as:

Market → Ecosystem → Infrastructure → Data → Network Effects → Switching Costs → Innovation → Contestability → Remedy

Competition authorities can ask:

1. Who controls the relevant ecosystem?
2. What infrastructure does the undertaking control?
3. What data advantages exist?
4. Are there network effects?
5. What are switching costs?
6. Can new entrants scale?
7. Can users multi-home?
8. Can competitors interoperate?
9. Can the undertaking leverage power into adjacent markets?
10. Could the conduct eliminate future competition?
11. Is the transaction removing a potential competitor?
12. What remedy preserves future contestability?

35. Conclusion

The future of competition law in Denmark and the European Union is likely to involve a combination of traditional antitrust and ex-ante market regulation.

The fundamental transformation is from a narrow concern with existing market power toward a broader concern with future contestability, ecosystem control, infrastructure dependence, data concentration, AI, interoperability and innovation.

The most important legal foundations remain the classical EU cases such as Continental Can, United Brands, Hoffmann-La Roche, Microsoft, Intel, Google Shopping, Slovak Telekom and Towercast. Their principles provide much of the doctrinal foundation for analysing new forms of economic power.

At the same time, contemporary Danish developments involving Wolt, Uber/Dantaxi and Meta demonstrate how these principles are being applied alongside newer regulatory instruments.