Competition Law and Future Governance of Hyperconnected Economic Systems

1. Introduction

A hyperconnected economic system is an economic environment in which businesses, consumers, devices, platforms, algorithms, cloud infrastructure, payment systems, data networks, artificial intelligence, digital identities and physical infrastructure are continuously interconnected.

Competition in such systems is no longer confined to a conventional market involving two sellers and consumers. A single undertaking may simultaneously operate:

• an operating system;
• an app store;
• a search engine;
• an advertising network;
• a payment system;
• a cloud service;
• an AI assistant;
• a marketplace; and
• a data ecosystem.

The resulting ecosystem power can therefore extend across several apparently separate markets.

EU competition law is increasingly supplemented by ex-ante digital regulation. The Digital Markets Act (DMA), for example, identifies designated gatekeepers and imposes obligations concerning interoperability, steering, data access and contestability while continuing to operate alongside Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.

The future governance problem is consequently not merely whether an undertaking is dominant, but whether the architecture of a hyperconnected ecosystem allows that undertaking to convert control in one layer into durable competitive advantages in other layers.

2. Meaning of Hyperconnected Economic Systems

A hyperconnected economic system has several characteristics.

A. Multiple-sided connectivity

Platforms simultaneously connect:

• consumers;
• suppliers;
• advertisers;
• developers;
• payment providers;
• data providers;
• logistics providers; and
• complementary service providers.

This creates strong network effects.

B. Continuous data generation

Every interaction may generate data concerning:

• searches;
• purchases;
• location;
• preferences;
• transactions;
• device usage;
• advertising responses; and
• behavioural patterns.

Data therefore becomes both an economic input and a competitive asset.

C. Algorithmic decision-making

Prices, rankings, recommendations, advertising and access conditions may be determined automatically.

This creates new competition-law questions concerning:

• algorithmic coordination;
• personalised pricing;
• ranking discrimination;
• automated exclusion;
• self-preferencing;
• algorithmic transparency; and
• AI-mediated market allocation.

D. Ecosystem integration

A firm controlling one layer can potentially leverage that position into another.

For example:

Operating system → app store → payment system → data → advertising → AI assistant

may function as one interconnected competitive ecosystem.

3. Traditional Competition Law versus Hyperconnected Markets

Traditional competition law generally asks:

1. What is the relevant market?
2. Who is dominant?
3. Has the undertaking abused that dominance?
4. What are the effects on competition?
5. What remedy should be imposed?

Hyperconnected markets require additional questions:

1. Who controls the ecosystem?
2. Which infrastructure is indispensable?
3. Can users realistically switch?
4. Can competitors interoperate?
5. Who controls the relevant data?
6. Can an undertaking transfer advantages across markets?
7. Can algorithms coordinate without explicit human communication?
8. Can acquisitions eliminate future competitors before they become significant?
9. Can an AI system independently reproduce exclusionary conduct?
10. Can competition authorities monitor continuously rather than intervene only after harm occurs?

Thus, future competition governance is likely to move from a purely market-by-market model toward an ecosystem-and-infrastructure model.

4. Major Competition Concerns

A. Ecosystem dominance

An undertaking may possess relatively modest market shares in individual markets while controlling a strategically important ecosystem.

The competitive advantage can arise from the combination of:

• data;
• infrastructure;
• users;
• interoperability;
• standards;
• algorithms;
• financial resources; and
• complementary services.

The Google Android litigation is particularly important because the EU General Court expressly addressed multi-sided platforms and the concept of an ecosystem in analysing Google's conduct involving Android, Play Store, Search and Chrome.

B. Self-preferencing

A platform may give preferential treatment to its own downstream services.

Examples include:

• ranking its own shopping service more prominently;
• giving its own payment system technical advantages;
• prioritising its own advertising products;
• favouring its own AI assistant;
• giving its own logistics services better access.

The Google Shopping litigation is the classic competition-law example.

The issue has subsequently moved into ex-ante regulation. In July 2026, the European Commission announced a €460 million DMA fine concerning Google's treatment of its own services in Search, including shopping, hotel, transport and sports results.

5. Interoperability as a Future Competition Remedy

In a hyperconnected economy, interoperability may become as important as price competition.

A dominant undertaking can potentially weaken competitors by denying them effective access to:

• operating-system functionality;
• APIs;
• hardware capabilities;
• communication protocols;
• data;
• payment infrastructure;
• cloud infrastructure; or
• technical standards.

The DMA has therefore developed explicit interoperability obligations.

For example, Article 6(7) concerns interoperability with certain operating-system features, while Article 6(9) addresses data portability.

This represents an important shift:

Competition governance can require a powerful ecosystem to become technically contestable rather than merely prohibit particular exclusionary transactions.

6. Data as a Competitive Infrastructure

Data can function as:

• an input;
• a source of network effects;
• a barrier to entry;
• an advertising asset;
• an AI-training resource; and
• a mechanism for improving products.

The future question is therefore not simply “Who owns the data?”

It is also:

Who has economically meaningful access to the data required to compete?

The EU's recent DMA developments illustrate this approach. In 2026, the Commission adopted binding specification measures concerning access by third-party search providers to anonymised Google Search data and interoperability between third-party AI services and Android.

7. AI and Hyperconnected Competition

Artificial intelligence may intensify ecosystem effects.

An AI assistant can potentially become the interface through which users:

• search;
• shop;
• book travel;
• communicate;
• make payments;
• access financial services;
• select software; and
• interact with other AI agents.

Consequently, control over an AI interface can become a gateway to multiple markets.

The future competition concern is therefore not simply AI-model market share but control over the economic interface through which transactions occur.

The European Commission's 2026 Android interoperability measures specifically addressed competition between third-party AI services and Google's AI services, including access to Android features.

8. Algorithmic Coordination

Hyperconnected markets can facilitate coordination through algorithms.

Potential mechanisms include:

• automated price adjustment;
• common pricing software;
• algorithmic monitoring of competitors;
• machine-learning-based demand prediction;
• autonomous repricing;
• AI agents negotiating with other AI agents.

The traditional requirement of proving an explicit agreement may become more difficult where humans merely establish the systems and algorithms subsequently interact.

Future enforcement may consequently focus on:

human design + algorithmic implementation + foreseeable competitive effects.

Competition authorities will need to distinguish legitimate algorithmic optimisation from conduct that facilitates unlawful coordination.

9. Network Effects and Switching Costs

Hyperconnected systems can create powerful network effects.

A consumer may remain inside an ecosystem because leaving requires:

• transferring data;
• replacing devices;
• changing payment methods;
• losing social connections;
• learning new software;
• changing subscriptions; or
• abandoning accumulated digital history.

Consequently, zero monetary price does not necessarily mean low switching costs.

Future competition analysis should therefore examine:

• data portability;
• interoperability;
• technical compatibility;
• contractual lock-in;
• ecosystem-specific benefits;
• user identity portability; and
• accumulated reputation.

10. Essential Facilities and Digital Infrastructure

The traditional essential-facilities doctrine may become increasingly relevant where digital infrastructure is genuinely indispensable.

Possible examples could include:

• critical cloud infrastructure;
• payment networks;
• dominant app distribution systems;
• important technical standards;
• identity infrastructure;
• interoperability interfaces; and
• strategically indispensable datasets.

However, not every successful platform should automatically be treated as an essential facility.

A careful assessment should examine:

1. indispensability;
2. lack of realistic alternatives;
3. feasibility of access;
4. competitive necessity;
5. investment incentives; and
6. proportionality of the proposed remedy.

11. Six Major Case Laws

Case 1: United Brands v Commission

United Brands Company v Commission, Case 27/76

Principle

The Court of Justice examined:

• dominance;
• barriers to entry;
• economic power; and
• exclusionary behaviour.

Relevance to hyperconnected systems

Although decided long before digital markets, United Brands provides the foundational concept of economic power capable of substantially restricting effective competition.

In future ecosystems, dominance analysis can similarly consider structural advantages beyond simple market share.

Case 2: Microsoft v Commission

Microsoft Corp. v Commission, Case T-201/04

Principle

The case concerned Microsoft's conduct involving interoperability information and the relationship between Windows and other software markets.

Importance

It demonstrates that control over an important technological interface can create competitive consequences in neighbouring markets.

Hyperconnected relevance

The case provides a conceptual foundation for analysing:

• interoperability;
• technological foreclosure;
• leveraging;
• ecosystem control; and
• access to technical information.

Case 3: Google Shopping

Google Search (Shopping), European Commission Decision AT.39740; Google and Alphabet v Commission, Case T-612/17

Principle

The case concerned Google's preferential treatment of its comparison-shopping service within general search results.

Competition significance

It established an important modern example of self-preferencing and leveraging through a digital platform.

Hyperconnected relevance

The underlying economic concern can arise whenever a platform simultaneously acts as:

gateway + infrastructure provider + competitor.

That structural conflict is likely to become increasingly important as platforms expand into AI, payments, cloud and commerce.

Case 4: Google Android

Google Android, European Commission Decision AT.40099; Google and Alphabet v Commission, Case T-604/18

The General Court's judgment examined Android, Play Store, Google Search and Chrome and expressly addressed the concepts of multi-sided platforms and ecosystems.

Relevance

The case illustrates how conduct concerning:

• mobile operating systems;
• app stores;
• search;
• browsers;
• device manufacturers; and
• network operators

can be assessed as interconnected competitive conduct.

It is particularly important for future hyperconnected-market governance.

Case 5: Meta Platforms / Bundeskartellamt

Bundeskartellamt v Facebook/Meta

Principle

The German competition authority examined the relationship between Facebook's market power and its collection and combination of user data.

The case demonstrates that data practices can have competition implications where they are connected with market power.

Hyperconnected relevance

Data is not merely a privacy issue.

It can simultaneously function as:

consumer information + competitive input + network-effect amplifier + advertising advantage.

Therefore, competition authorities may increasingly need cooperation with data-protection regulators.

Case 6: Booking.com / DMA

Booking was designated as a DMA gatekeeper in 2024. From November 2024, it became subject to relevant DMA obligations, including restrictions on parity clauses and requirements concerning access to certain data for business users.

Importance

This demonstrates the transition from:

ex-post antitrust enforcement

toward:

ex-ante ecosystem governance.

The regulatory model does not necessarily wait for a traditional abuse-of-dominance case before addressing certain conduct by designated gatekeepers.

12. Additional Important Authorities

Other cases that should be studied alongside the above include:

7. Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission

Case 85/76

Important for the foundational concept of dominance and exclusionary conduct.

8. Intel v Commission

Case C-413/14 P

Important for rebates, exclusionary effects and economic assessment.

9. Bronner

Case C-7/97

Important for refusal-to-deal and essential-facilities analysis.

10. Slovak Telekom

Case C-165/19 P

Important for access obligations and infrastructure-based competition.

11. Apple App Store / Spotify proceedings

Important for the emerging relationship between platform control, app distribution and steering.

12. Amazon Marketplace

The Commission's digital-market enforcement experience concerning Amazon demonstrates the importance of data generated by marketplace participants and the possibility of conflicts between platform operation and the platform's own retail activity.

13. Future Governance Model

A future governance framework for hyperconnected economies can be conceptualised as follows:

Layer 1 — Traditional competition law

Articles 101 and 102 TFEU / national equivalents

↓

Cartels, abuse of dominance, exclusionary conduct and anticompetitive agreements.

Layer 2 — Digital ex-ante regulation

DMA-type regulation

↓

Gatekeepers, interoperability, steering, data portability and contestability.

Layer 3 — Data governance

↓

Privacy, portability, data access, data sharing and restrictions on data combination.

Layer 4 — Technical governance

↓

APIs, interoperability, standards, cybersecurity and technical access.

Layer 5 — AI governance

↓

Algorithmic transparency, AI interoperability, autonomous agents and algorithmic coordination.

Layer 6 — Merger governance

↓

Acquisitions of:

• start-ups;
• datasets;
• AI developers;
• cloud infrastructure;
• interoperability technologies; and
• potential competitors.

Layer 7 — Continuous monitoring

↓

Regulators increasingly need technical monitoring rather than relying exclusively on periodic investigations.

14. Ex-Ante versus Ex-Post Governance

The DMA expressly complements rather than replaces EU competition rules.

15. Merger Control in Hyperconnected Economies

Traditional turnover thresholds can potentially miss strategically important acquisitions.

A dominant ecosystem might acquire:

• an emerging AI company;
• a promising cloud technology;
• an interoperability provider;
• a data-rich start-up; or
• a potential future competitor.

Future merger governance may therefore pay greater attention to:

A. Innovation competition

Would the target become a significant future competitor?

B. Data concentration

Would the transaction combine datasets that substantially increase entry barriers?

C. Ecosystem foreclosure

Could the acquiring platform prevent rivals from accessing the target's technology?

D. Killer-acquisition concerns

Could the acquisition eliminate a future competitive constraint?

E. Conglomerate effects

Could advantages from one ecosystem layer be transferred into another?

16. Regulatory Cooperation

Hyperconnected competition cannot be administered effectively by competition authorities acting alone.

Future governance may require coordination between:

• competition authorities;
• data-protection authorities;
• telecommunications regulators;
• financial regulators;
• consumer-protection authorities;
• cybersecurity agencies;
• AI regulators; and
• sectoral regulators.

This is particularly important because one conduct may simultaneously create:

competition + privacy + consumer + cybersecurity + AI-governance implications.

17. Remedies for Hyperconnected Markets

Potential remedies include:

Structural remedies

• divestiture;
• separation of business units;
• restrictions on acquisitions.

Behavioural remedies

• non-discrimination;
• prohibition of self-preferencing;
• fair ranking;
• restrictions on tying.

Technical remedies

• interoperability;
• API access;
• data portability;
• technical compatibility.

Data remedies

• data access;
• data sharing;
• anonymised datasets;
• restrictions on data combination.

Governance remedies

• independent compliance monitoring;
• algorithmic audits;
• reporting requirements;
• regulatory access to technical information.

18. The Emerging Importance of Interoperability

Interoperability is likely to become one of the central principles of future digital competition policy.

The EU's 2026 DMA enforcement illustrates this development particularly clearly. The Commission required Google to address interoperability between Android and third-party AI services and separately addressed access by third-party search providers to Google Search data.

This suggests an important evolution:

Future competition policy may increasingly regulate the architecture through which competition takes place, not merely the behaviour occurring inside that architecture.

19. Challenges

A. Over-regulation

Excessive intervention may reduce incentives to innovate.

B. Privacy versus competition

Data access may promote competition but simultaneously create privacy and cybersecurity risks.

C. Technological neutrality

Rules should avoid becoming obsolete as technologies change.

D. International fragmentation

Digital ecosystems operate across borders while competition laws remain substantially jurisdiction-specific.

E. Algorithmic opacity

Authorities may have difficulty understanding complex AI systems.

F. Regulatory speed

Technology can develop much faster than conventional legislative processes.

G. Remedy design

Interoperability and data-access remedies can themselves create cybersecurity, privacy and investment concerns.

20. Future Legal Principles

The following principles are likely to become increasingly important:

1. Contestability

Markets must remain open to meaningful entry.

2. Interoperability

Powerful ecosystems should not unnecessarily prevent technically feasible competitive alternatives.

3. Data mobility

Users and businesses should be able to transfer relevant data where legally and technically appropriate.

4. Non-discrimination

Gatekeepers should not systematically favour their own downstream services.

5. Ecosystem neutrality

Control of one infrastructure layer should not automatically produce exclusionary advantages in adjacent markets.

6. Algorithmic accountability

Automated systems should remain subject to competition-law scrutiny.

7. Dynamic merger review

Competition analysis should consider innovation and future competitive constraints.

8. Continuous regulatory supervision

Some digital markets may require continuing compliance monitoring rather than isolated enforcement actions.

21. Conclusion

Competition law for hyperconnected economic systems represents a movement from traditional market-centred antitrust toward ecosystem-centred governance.

The central competition problem is increasingly not merely:

“Is this undertaking dominant in this market?”

but:

“Does the undertaking control an economic ecosystem whose interconnected infrastructure, data, algorithms and network effects allow it to restrict contestability across multiple markets?”

The evolution from Microsoft, United Brands, Bronner, Google Shopping, Google Android and the Meta data case toward the DMA's gatekeeper and interoperability framework demonstrates this broader trajectory.

The current direction of EU digital governance is particularly significant: the Commission now combines conventional competition law with ex-ante gatekeeper regulation, interoperability obligations, data-access requirements and continuing compliance supervision. In 2026, this approach has extended directly into competition between third-party AI services and incumbent ecosystem AI services.

Accordingly, the future governance of hyperconnected economic systems is likely to rest on five interconnected pillars:

Competition + Data + Interoperability + AI Governance + Continuous Regulatory Oversight.

Together, these mechanisms seek to ensure that technological connectivity does not become competitive dependency, and that an interconnected economy remains sufficiently contestable, innovative and open to competing business models.