Competition Law and Competition Implications of Digital Infrastructure Ownership

1. Introduction

Digital infrastructure ownership refers to ownership or control of the technological systems on which digital businesses, platforms, consumers and public institutions depend.

It can include:

cloud-computing infrastructure;

data centres;

operating systems;

mobile ecosystems;

app stores;

search engines;

payment infrastructure;

digital identity systems;

APIs and interoperability systems;

telecommunications networks;

digital advertising infrastructure;

online marketplaces;

data and analytics infrastructure;

AI computing infrastructure.

Digital infrastructure can be extremely important for competition because control over an infrastructure layer can give an undertaking the ability to influence businesses operating above or below that layer.

A simplified structure is:

Digital infrastructure → platform → applications → businesses → consumers

If one company controls several layers, it may obtain substantial competitive advantages.

The European Commission has recently treated cloud services as potentially important digital gateways because of entrenched positions, switching costs, lock-in effects and large ecosystems. In June 2026, the Commission announced a preliminary view that Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure should be designated as DMA gatekeepers for cloud services. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

2. Meaning of Digital Infrastructure Ownership

Digital infrastructure ownership means more than legal ownership of physical equipment.

A company may exercise economic or technological control through:

ownership;

exclusive contractual rights;

technical control;

operating-system control;

network access;

APIs;

proprietary standards;

data control;

interoperability restrictions;

ecosystem rules.

Thus:

Control can matter as much as formal ownership.

For competition law, the critical question is generally not simply:

"Who owns the servers?"

but:

"Who can determine the conditions under which competitors, complementary businesses and consumers can access and use the infrastructure?"

3. Why Digital Infrastructure Creates Market Power

Digital infrastructure can create several sources of competitive advantage.

3.1 Network effects

The value of a digital infrastructure can increase as more users join.

For example:

More users → more developers → more applications → more consumers → more users

This can create a self-reinforcing ecosystem.

3.2 Switching costs

Users may face significant costs in moving from one infrastructure provider to another.

Examples include:

data migration;

software redevelopment;

employee retraining;

contractual changes;

loss of historical data;

compatibility problems.

3.3 Economies of scale

Large digital infrastructures can spread enormous fixed costs over millions of users.

A new entrant may therefore find it difficult to reproduce the same infrastructure economically.

3.4 Data advantages

Infrastructure operators can potentially obtain extensive information concerning:

users;

developers;

transactions;

performance;

demand;

applications;

customer behaviour.

3.5 Ecosystem effects

An infrastructure owner can connect several markets.

For example:

Operating system
↓
App store
↓
Payment system
↓
Advertising
↓
Consumer data

This creates opportunities for leveraging market power between related markets.

4. Major Competition-Law Concerns

Digital infrastructure ownership can raise concerns involving:

abuse of dominance;

refusal of access;

interoperability restrictions;

self-preferencing;

tying and bundling;

discriminatory access;

exclusive dealing;

leveraging;

foreclosure;

excessive switching costs;

data advantages;

merger control.

5. Essential Facilities and Digital Infrastructure

One of the most important doctrines is the essential-facilities/refusal-to-deal principle.

A dominant company may generally have freedom to decide with whom it contracts.

However, exceptional circumstances can arise where refusing access to infrastructure harms competition.

The classic framework comes from Bronner and subsequent cases.

The important questions include:

Is the undertaking dominant?

Is the infrastructure indispensable?

Is there an actual or potential substitute?

Would refusal eliminate or substantially restrict competition?

Is there an objective justification?

The Court of Justice has emphasized that these conditions protect both competition and the dominant firm's freedom of contract and property rights. (Eur-Lex)

6. Case Law 1: Bronner v Mediaprint

Case

Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97 (1998)

Mediaprint operated a large newspaper home-delivery system in Austria.

Bronner, a competing newspaper publisher, wanted access to that system.

The Court considered whether refusing access constituted abuse of dominance.

Decision and principle

The Court adopted a restrictive approach to compulsory access.

A facility cannot be considered indispensable merely because access would make competition easier or more economically attractive.

The absence of realistic alternatives is particularly important.

Competition significance

Bronner establishes the basic tension:

Competition requires access in some circumstances, but compulsory access can weaken incentives to build infrastructure.

This principle remains important for:

cloud systems;

telecommunications networks;

payment infrastructure;

digital platforms;

data infrastructure.

7. Case Law 2: Magill

Case

RTE and ITP v Commission, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P (1995)

Television broadcasters controlled copyright-protected programme information.

They refused to license the information to a publisher seeking to produce a comprehensive television guide.

The Court recognized exceptional circumstances in which exercise of an intellectual-property right could constitute abuse of dominance.

Competition significance

Magill demonstrates that:

Intellectual-property ownership does not automatically place conduct outside competition law.

The case is particularly relevant to digital infrastructure where ownership may involve:

software;

databases;

APIs;

proprietary formats;

digital standards.

8. Case Law 3: IMS Health

Case

IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case C-418/01 (2004)

IMS developed a geographical structure used to organize pharmaceutical sales data.

The structure became widely used in the industry.

A competitor sought access to the structure.

Principle

The Court considered exceptional circumstances in which refusal to license intellectual property could amount to abuse.

The case is important because a privately created information structure had become an important industry infrastructure.

Competition significance

It demonstrates the transformation:

Proprietary information structure
↓
Industry-wide adoption
↓
Competitive dependence
↓
Potential bottleneck

This is highly relevant to modern:

data standards;

APIs;

digital classifications;

interoperability systems;

financial-data infrastructures.

9. Case Law 4: Microsoft v Commission

Case

Microsoft Corp. v Commission, Case T-201/04 (2007)

Microsoft controlled important operating-system technology and refused to provide certain interoperability information to competitors in the work-group server market.

The European courts upheld the Commission's findings concerning Microsoft's refusal to provide interoperability information.

Competition significance

The case demonstrates that technical knowledge can itself constitute competitive infrastructure.

The information allowed competing products to interoperate effectively with Microsoft's dominant operating-system environment.

Principle

Where a dominant technology owner controls interoperability information that competitors require to compete effectively, withholding that information can raise serious competition concerns.

This is particularly relevant today to:

APIs;

operating systems;

cloud services;

smart-device ecosystems;

payment networks;

AI platforms.

10. Case Law 5: Google Android

Case

Google and Alphabet v Commission, Case T-604/18, General Court (2022), concerning Google's Android practices

The European Commission found several practices involving Google's Android ecosystem to be abusive, including arrangements concerning mobile-device manufacturers and mobile-network operators.

The case involved Google's control over an important mobile ecosystem consisting of:

Android;

Google Play;

search;

mobile applications.

Competition significance

The case demonstrates the importance of ecosystem control.

An operating system can serve as infrastructure for:

application developers;

device manufacturers;

consumers;

advertisers;

search services.

Control over that infrastructure can therefore create opportunities to extend market power into adjacent markets.

11. Case Law 6: Google Shopping

Case

Google and Alphabet v Commission, Case C-48/22 P (Court of Justice, 2024)

The case concerned Google's general search service and its treatment of its own comparison-shopping service.

The Court of Justice upheld the essential finding that Google's conduct constituted an abuse of dominance.

The Court described Article 102 TFEU as addressing conduct by a dominant undertaking that hinders competition on the merits. (Eur-Lex)

Competition significance

Search infrastructure is itself commercially important infrastructure.

A dominant search engine controls:

ranking;

visibility;

traffic;

access to consumers.

If the infrastructure owner favours its own downstream service, competitors can potentially be disadvantaged.

Principle

Control over an important digital gateway can provide the ability to influence competition in downstream markets.

12. Case Law 7: Alphabet and Others v AGCM — Android Auto

Case

Alphabet Inc. and Others v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Case C-233/23 (2025)

This is one of the most directly relevant modern cases concerning digital infrastructure.

The case concerned Android Auto, Google's digital platform for integrating applications with vehicles.

A third-party app sought interoperability with Android Auto.

The Court considered whether refusal by a dominant platform operator to ensure interoperability could constitute abuse under Article 102 TFEU.

The Court's judgment specifically addressed digital platforms, interoperability, indispensability and objective justification. (Eur-Lex)

Important development

The Court explained that where a dominant undertaking has developed a digital platform, refusal to ensure interoperability may constitute abuse even though the platform is not necessarily indispensable to operating the downstream application, particularly where access can make the application more attractive to consumers. (Eur-Lex)

Competition significance

This is extremely important for digital infrastructure.

Traditional Bronner analysis cannot necessarily be mechanically applied to every digital-platform interoperability dispute.

The case recognizes that digital platforms can have competitive importance beyond traditional physical infrastructure.

13. Case Law 8: Deutsche Telekom

Case

Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, Case C-280/08 P (2010)

The case concerned pricing and access conditions in telecommunications markets.

The Court examined the relationship between dominance and access conditions.

Competition significance

Telecommunications networks demonstrate why digital infrastructure can become a bottleneck.

A network operator may simultaneously:

own infrastructure;

provide wholesale access;

compete downstream.

This creates the possibility of vertical foreclosure.

The same economic structure can occur in modern digital markets:

Infrastructure owner → wholesale platform → downstream service

14. Case Law 9: Slovak Telekom

Case

Slovak Telekom a.s. v Commission, Joined Cases C-165/19 P and C-166/19 P (2021)

The case concerned access to telecommunications infrastructure and exclusionary practices.

The Court considered the application of the refusal-to-deal principles in circumstances involving regulatory access obligations.

Competition significance

The case is important because competition-law analysis can differ where the infrastructure owner is already subject to regulatory obligations concerning access.

The Court has emphasized that the strict Bronner conditions are not automatically applicable in every access case, particularly where regulation has already required access. (OUP Academic)

15. Ownership Versus Control

An important examination issue is:

Does ownership itself create competition-law liability?

Generally, no.

A company may legitimately own:

servers;

software;

networks;

patents;

cloud infrastructure;

operating systems.

Competition law normally becomes relevant because of how market power is exercised.

Therefore:

Lawful ownership

Infrastructure ownership + competition on the merits

is generally not itself problematic.

Potentially problematic conduct

Infrastructure ownership + dominance + exclusionary conduct

may create competition concerns.

16. Vertical Integration

Digital infrastructure owners frequently operate in downstream markets.

Example:

Cloud infrastructure
↓
AI computing
↓
AI model
↓
AI application

If the infrastructure owner also competes in the downstream market, it may have incentives to disadvantage rival downstream firms.

Possible strategies include:

discriminatory access;

preferential pricing;

tying;

bundling;

technical restrictions;

data advantages;

interoperability restrictions.

17. Self-Preferencing

Self-preferencing occurs when an infrastructure operator gives its own downstream service preferential treatment.

Examples could theoretically include:

an app store favouring its own apps;

a search engine favouring its own service;

a marketplace favouring its own products;

a cloud provider favouring its own software.

Google Shopping provides an important competition-law example involving search infrastructure and a downstream comparison-shopping service.

18. Tying and Bundling

Digital infrastructure can make tying particularly powerful.

For example:

Operating system → search service

or:

Cloud service → proprietary software

or:

App store → payment system.

The infrastructure owner may make access to one service conditional on using another.

Competition authorities therefore examine whether tying:

forecloses rivals;

raises entry barriers;

restricts consumer choice;

extends dominance.

19. Interoperability

Interoperability means that different systems can communicate and function together.

Examples include:

smartphone ↔ vehicle;

cloud ↔ cloud;

payment system ↔ bank;

messaging platform ↔ messaging platform;

application ↔ operating system.

A dominant infrastructure owner can potentially restrict interoperability by:

withholding APIs;

restricting technical documentation;

limiting access;

changing technical standards;

imposing discriminatory conditions.

The Microsoft and Android Auto cases are particularly relevant.

20. Switching Costs and Lock-In

Digital infrastructure can create strong lock-in.

For example, a business using a cloud platform may have:

large quantities of stored data;

customized applications;

proprietary configurations;

long-term contracts;

employee expertise tied to the platform.

Switching becomes expensive.

The European Commission's recent cloud investigations specifically identify interoperability obstacles, conditioned access to data, tying/bundling and potentially imbalanced contractual terms as competition issues under examination. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

21. Cloud Infrastructure

Cloud infrastructure is increasingly important in competition law.

Major cloud providers can control:

computing resources;

storage;

databases;

AI computing;

software environments;

developer tools;

data processing.

The European Commission stated in June 2026 that AWS and Azure appear to benefit from entrenched positions, lock-in effects, switching costs and large ecosystems, and preliminarily considered them important gateways despite not meeting the DMA's quantitative designation thresholds. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

This illustrates the growing competition-law importance of infrastructure that is upstream from many digital services.

22. Data Infrastructure

Infrastructure ownership can also produce control over data.

For example:

Platform → collects data → analyses data → improves service → attracts users → collects more data.

This creates a feedback loop.

Data advantage

More data

↓

Better algorithms

↓

Better service

↓

More users

↓

More data

This can create substantial entry barriers.

However, possessing a large amount of data is not automatically an antitrust violation. Competition analysis must consider:

replicability;

relevance;

exclusivity;

network effects;

market power;

competitive effects.

23. Digital Infrastructure and Network Effects

Network effects can make digital infrastructure particularly difficult to challenge.

Direct network effects

The service becomes more valuable as more users join.

Example:

Messaging network

Indirect network effects

More users attract more complementary businesses.

Example:

Operating system → more developers → more apps → more users

The combination can produce a strong ecosystem.

24. Infrastructure and Entry Barriers

Digital infrastructure ownership can create several entry barriers.

Financial barriers

Building infrastructure can require enormous investment.

Technical barriers

New entrants may lack:

APIs;

data;

technical standards;

computing capacity.

Network barriers

Users may already be concentrated on the incumbent platform.

Switching barriers

Customers may find migration expensive.

Ecosystem barriers

Complementary developers may already be committed to the incumbent.

25. Digital Infrastructure and Innovation

Competition law must balance two objectives.

Objective 1: Preserve competition

Access may be necessary to prevent exclusion.

Objective 2: Preserve investment incentives

If every infrastructure owner must immediately share its infrastructure with competitors, investment incentives may decline.

The Court has expressly emphasized this balance in its case law: allowing access too easily can reduce incentives both for competitors to build alternative facilities and for dominant firms to invest in efficient infrastructure. (Eur-Lex)

26. Publicly Developed Infrastructure

An important distinction arises when infrastructure was developed using:

public funds;

government concessions;

regulated monopolies;

public-private arrangements.

The justification for exclusive control may be weaker where the infrastructure was not independently developed by the dominant undertaking.

Recent Court of Justice case law has distinguished infrastructure developed by a dominant undertaking for its own business from infrastructure subject to public-authority involvement and regulatory access obligations. (Eur-Lex)

27. Digital Infrastructure and Competition in India

For India, the principal competition-law framework is the Competition Act, 2002, particularly:

Section 3 — anti-competitive agreements;

Section 4 — abuse of dominant position;

Section 5 — combinations;

Section 19 — inquiry powers;

Sections 26 onward — investigation and adjudication framework.

Digital infrastructure issues can therefore arise under:

Section 4

Where a dominant infrastructure operator engages in conduct such as:

denial of market access;

discriminatory conditions;

tying;

leveraging;

exclusionary practices.

Section 3

Where competing businesses coordinate through:

information exchange;

platforms;

algorithms;

associations;

agreements.

Combination provisions

Where mergers combine:

datasets;

platforms;

cloud infrastructure;

digital ecosystems.

28. Competition Implications of Operating-System Ownership

An operating system can act as infrastructure for:

applications;

hardware;

payments;

search;

advertising.

The owner may potentially control:

application distribution;

default settings;

APIs;

technical access;

permissions.

Therefore, OS ownership can provide significant ecosystem power.

The Google Android litigation illustrates these issues at the EU level.

29. App-Store Infrastructure

An app store can control:

access to users;

application distribution;

payment mechanisms;

commissions;

ranking;

technical rules.

This creates a potential gatekeeper position.

Competition issues may involve:

self-preferencing;

commissions;

anti-steering restrictions;

payment-system tying;

discriminatory access;

app approval;

restrictions on alternative distribution.

30. Telecommunications Infrastructure

Telecommunications networks remain a classic infrastructure market.

Potential concerns include:

refusal of access;

discriminatory wholesale pricing;

margin squeeze;

exclusive agreements;

vertical foreclosure.

The principles developed in telecommunications cases such as Deutsche Telekom and Slovak Telekom remain useful for understanding modern digital infrastructure.

31. AI Infrastructure

AI creates a new form of infrastructure ownership.

The relevant infrastructure may include:

GPUs;

cloud computing;

AI training data;

foundation models;

model APIs;

inference infrastructure.

A company controlling several levels could potentially have:

Computing → model → application → distribution

This vertical integration can create competitive advantages.

Potential concerns include:

exclusive computing agreements;

preferential access;

tying cloud services to AI models;

discriminatory APIs;

acquisition of potential competitors;

data foreclosure.

32. Merger-Control Implications

Digital infrastructure mergers can raise concerns even where traditional market shares do not tell the whole story.

Authorities may examine:

network effects;

ecosystem control;

data;

interoperability;

switching costs;

potential competition;

innovation;

access to infrastructure.

The acquisition of an emerging infrastructure provider by a major platform may be important because the target could otherwise become a future competitor or important alternative infrastructure.

33. DMA and Digital Infrastructure

The EU Digital Markets Act complements traditional competition law by imposing obligations on designated gatekeepers.

The Commission designated six gatekeepers in 2023—Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta and Microsoft—for specified core platform services. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

The significance is that digital regulation increasingly addresses structural characteristics of digital ecosystems, rather than waiting for a conventional abuse-of-dominance case after harm occurs.

Cloud infrastructure is now also being examined under the DMA framework. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

34. Key Competition Risks

35. Positive Effects of Infrastructure Ownership

Ownership is not necessarily harmful.

Large-scale ownership can generate:

lower costs;

better reliability;

cybersecurity investment;

innovation;

economies of scale;

faster deployment;

interoperability improvements;

improved service quality.

Competition law therefore does not seek to prevent successful infrastructure investment merely because an undertaking becomes large.

The concern is the use of market power to restrict competitive processes.

36. Negative Effects

Potential negative effects include:

1. Foreclosure

Rivals cannot obtain meaningful access.

2. Higher switching costs

Customers become locked into one ecosystem.

3. Reduced innovation

Potential competitors cannot reach users.

4. Self-preferencing

The infrastructure owner favours its own downstream services.

5. Discrimination

Competitors receive worse access conditions.

6. Leveraging

Power is transferred from infrastructure into adjacent markets.

7. Data advantage

The infrastructure owner obtains information unavailable to rivals.

8. Entry barriers

New infrastructure becomes economically difficult to develop.

37. Competition Assessment Framework

For an examination or legal analysis, use the following sequence.

Step 1 — Identify the infrastructure

What is controlled?

cloud;

operating system;

network;

platform;

API;

data infrastructure?

Step 2 — Identify the owner/controller

Who controls:

technical access;

pricing;

interoperability;

data;

contractual conditions?

Step 3 — Define the market

Determine the relevant:

product market;

geographic market;

upstream market;

downstream market.

Step 4 — Establish market power

Consider:

market share;

network effects;

switching costs;

entry barriers;

user base;

ecosystem strength.

Step 5 — Identify conduct

Ask whether the owner:

refuses access;

discriminates;

ties products;

bundles services;

self-preferences;

restricts interoperability;

exploits data advantages.

Step 6 — Assess foreclosure

Could rivals realistically compete without access?

Step 7 — Examine justification

Are there:

security reasons;

privacy reasons;

technical limitations;

investment considerations?

Step 8 — Consider efficiencies

Does the conduct produce:

innovation;

lower costs;

improved security;

quality improvements?

Step 9 — Determine remedy

Potential remedies include:

access;

interoperability;

non-discrimination;

data portability;

behavioural restrictions;

divestiture in exceptional circumstances.

38. Comparison of Key Cases

39. Six Most Important Cases to Remember

If the examination requires only six cases, remember:

1. Bronner v Mediaprint

Essential-facilities/refusal-to-deal principles.

2. Magill

IP ownership versus competition law.

3. IMS Health

Industry-standard information infrastructure.

4. Microsoft

Interoperability information as a competitive resource.

5. Google Shopping

Digital gateway and downstream competitive effects.

6. Alphabet v AGCM — Android Auto

Modern digital-platform interoperability and access.

The Android Auto judgment is especially useful for a contemporary answer because the Court specifically addressed a digital platform as infrastructure and the relationship between interoperability and Article 102 TFEU. (Eur-Lex)

40. Conclusion

Digital infrastructure ownership is increasingly important to competition law because ownership or control of infrastructure can determine who gets access to users, data, applications, markets and complementary services.

The most important competition concerns arise when:

a dominant undertaking controls an important digital bottleneck;

competitors depend on interoperability;

switching costs create lock-in;

the infrastructure owner competes downstream;

the owner favours its own services;

access is discriminatory;

infrastructure is used to leverage dominance;

data obtained through infrastructure gives the owner a significant competitive advantage.

The traditional Bronner principle demonstrates why compulsory access must be approached cautiously: competition law must preserve incentives to invest in infrastructure. At the same time, Magill, IMS Health, Microsoft, Google Shopping and Android Auto demonstrate that infrastructure control can become a competition-law problem when it is used in ways that restrict effective competition. The Court's recent Android Auto judgment is particularly significant because it recognizes the special characteristics of digital platforms and interoperability. (Eur-Lex)

The emerging competition-law model can therefore be summarized as:

Infrastructure ownership → market power → access/control → interoperability → downstream effects → foreclosure or innovation → competition-law assessment

Quick Revision Points

Digital infrastructure includes cloud, operating systems, networks, app stores, APIs and digital platforms.

Ownership alone is generally not unlawful.

Control + dominance + exclusionary conduct creates the main competition concern.

Bronner = strict approach to compulsory access.

Magill = exceptional limits on IP-based refusal to license.

IMS Health = industry-standard information infrastructure.

Microsoft = interoperability information.

Google Android = ecosystem leveraging.

Google Shopping = digital gateway and self-preferencing concerns.

Android Auto = digital-platform interoperability.

Cloud infrastructure creates issues involving lock-in, switching costs and interoperability.

AI infrastructure may create new forms of vertical integration and bottleneck control.

Merger control increasingly considers ecosystems, data, network effects and potential competition.

The central policy balance is open competition versus incentives to invest in infrastructure.