Competition Law and Competition Governance for the Next Generation Economy

1. Introduction

The next generation economy refers to an economic environment increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, digital platforms, cloud computing, data ecosystems, robotics, blockchain, fintech, connected devices, quantum technologies, biotechnology, digital public infrastructure and highly automated supply chains.

Competition law in such an economy cannot be confined to the traditional question of whether two firms sell the same physical product. Competitive power may arise from control over data, algorithms, computing infrastructure, operating systems, app stores, cloud platforms, AI models, digital identities, payment rails, interoperability standards and ecosystem access.

The central governance challenge is therefore:

How can competition law preserve contestable markets when economic power is increasingly exercised through technology, data, infrastructure and ecosystems rather than through conventional price-based markets?

The European Union's Digital Markets Act (DMA), India's Competition Act framework and developments in the United States illustrate a movement toward more proactive competition governance. For example, the EU currently regulates several large technology companies as designated "gatekeepers," while India's Competition Commission has developed significant jurisprudence concerning Android, app stores, digital communications and online platforms.

2. Meaning of the Next Generation Economy

The next generation economy has several distinguishing characteristics.

A. Data-driven competition

Data may function simultaneously as:

• an input;
• an asset;
• a source of market intelligence;
• a barrier to entry;
• a means of personalisation; and
• a mechanism for algorithmic optimisation.

A firm possessing large datasets may improve its algorithms, attract more users, generate more data and thereby reinforce its competitive position.

This creates a possible data-network feedback loop:

Users → Data → Better Algorithms → Better Service → More Users → More Data

Competition law must therefore consider whether control over data prevents rivals from entering or expanding.

B. Algorithmic competition

Traditional competition assumes that human decision-makers determine prices and output.

The next generation economy increasingly involves:

• algorithmic pricing;
• AI-based recommendations;
• automated bidding;
• dynamic pricing;
• autonomous procurement;
• algorithmic advertising;
• machine-learning supply chains.

This creates difficult questions concerning:

• algorithmic collusion;
• tacit coordination;
• personalised pricing;
• discriminatory ranking;
• automated exclusion;
• self-preferencing; and
• responsibility for decisions made by autonomous systems.

C. Ecosystem competition

Competition may occur between entire ecosystems rather than individual products.

For example:

Operating System → App Store → Payment System → Cloud → Advertising → Data → AI Services

A firm controlling several layers may use advantages at one level to reinforce its position at another.

This is why competition authorities increasingly examine ecosystem power, interoperability and switching costs, rather than merely defining a single conventional product market.

3. Competition Governance

Competition governance means the institutional and regulatory mechanisms through which competitive markets are maintained.

It involves more than traditional antitrust enforcement.

A comprehensive model may include:

1. ex-post antitrust enforcement;
2. merger control;
3. ex-ante digital regulation;
4. interoperability requirements;
5. data portability;
6. access obligations;
7. algorithmic accountability;
8. transparency requirements;
9. regulatory cooperation;
10. competition compliance programmes; and
11. remedies capable of addressing ecosystem-level power.

The EU's DMA illustrates this movement. The Commission initially designated Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta and Microsoft as gatekeepers, and later designated additional services including Apple's iPadOS and Booking.com.

4. Major Competition Problems in the Next Generation Economy

4.1 Digital gatekeepers

A gatekeeper may control access between:

• businesses and consumers;
• developers and users;
• advertisers and audiences;
• merchants and payment systems;
• applications and operating systems.

The problem is not necessarily size alone. The concern is whether the platform can use its intermediary position to determine the conditions under which rivals compete.

4.2 Self-preferencing

A vertically integrated platform may operate both:

• the marketplace; and
• a competing product or service.

It may then give preferential treatment to its own service through:

• rankings;
• search results;
• recommendations;
• access to data;
• advertising placement;
• default settings.

The competition concern is that the platform effectively becomes referee and competitor simultaneously.

The EU's current DMA framework expressly addresses self-preferencing, and the Commission has continued enforcement in this area. In July 2026, the Commission announced findings that Google breached DMA obligations concerning self-preferencing in Search and restrictions on steering consumers to alternative purchasing channels on Google Play.

5. Six Important Case Laws

Case 1: Google Search (Shopping) — European Commission

Background

Google was investigated for allegedly giving preferential treatment to its own comparison-shopping service in search results while competing comparison-shopping services were disadvantaged.

Competition principle

The case demonstrates how control over a critical digital gateway can become a source of competitive power.

The traditional question—"Does Google sell the same product as comparison-shopping websites?"—was insufficient.

The more important question became:

Can a dominant search intermediary use its position in search to disadvantage competing services?

Significance

The case is important for:

• self-preferencing;
• search neutrality;
• platform dominance;
• ranking algorithms;
• digital gatekeepers; and
• access to consumer attention.

It provides an important foundation for understanding later digital-market regulation.

Case 2: Google Android — European Commission

Background

The European Commission examined Google's conduct concerning the Android mobile ecosystem, including arrangements involving:

• Google Search;
• Google Chrome;
• Google Play;
• Android device manufacturers; and
• mobile application distribution.

Competition principle

The case illustrates the possibility of leveraging dominance from one digital layer into another.

An operating system can provide a strategic gateway through which applications, search services, advertising and data are accessed.

Significance

The case demonstrates competition concerns involving:

• tying;
• exclusivity;
• defaults;
• ecosystem leverage;
• entry barriers; and
• network effects.

It is particularly relevant to next-generation markets because control over an infrastructure layer can influence competition in downstream markets.

Case 3: Google Play Store — Competition Commission of India

Background

The Competition Commission of India examined Google's Play Store policies and imposed a monetary penalty of ₹936.44 crore in October 2022 in relation to anti-competitive practices concerning Play Store policies.

Competition principle

The case demonstrates how an app-store operator may possess substantial power because application developers depend upon access to the platform's users.

Relevant issues include:

• payment processing;
• app distribution;
• developer access;
• commission structures;
• alternative payment systems; and
• platform dependency.

Significance

The case is especially relevant to the next generation economy because app stores are digital infrastructure, not merely ordinary commercial intermediaries.

India's subsequent digital-competition jurisprudence has continued to examine platform conduct involving app distribution and payment ecosystems.

Case 4: Google Android Mobile Devices — Competition Commission of India

Background

In October 2022, the CCI imposed a penalty of ₹1,337.76 crore on Google concerning anti-competitive practices relating to Android mobile devices.

Competition principle

The case illustrates the interaction between:

• operating systems;
• search;
• browsers;
• app stores;
• defaults;
• manufacturers; and
• consumers.

Significance

The Android case demonstrates that competition analysis in digital markets may need to examine an entire technological ecosystem.

The relevant competitive harm may arise not simply from one contract but from the cumulative effect of interconnected contractual and technological arrangements.

Case 5: Google AdSense / Digital Advertising — European Commission

Background

The European Commission examined Google's conduct in online advertising intermediation.

Digital advertising involves multiple interconnected participants:

Advertisers → Ad Exchanges → Publishers → Users

A firm controlling important technological layers can potentially influence how competitors obtain access to advertisers, publishers and advertising inventory.

Competition principle

The case illustrates the significance of:

• vertical integration;
• ad exchanges;
• data;
• advertising technology;
• exclusionary practices; and
• conflicts between platform and intermediary functions.

Significance

Digital advertising is a particularly important next-generation market because data and attention have become economically valuable inputs.

The modern ad-tech environment demonstrates why competition governance increasingly requires analysis of technological architecture rather than only prices.

Case 6: Apple App Store — European Commission / Digital Markets Act

The Apple App Store provides an important example of the movement from traditional antitrust toward ex-ante digital competition regulation.

Under the DMA, app developers must be able to inform consumers about alternative offers outside Apple's App Store and facilitate such steering.

In April 2025, the European Commission found Apple in breach of the DMA's anti-steering obligation and imposed a €500 million fine.

Competition principle

The central issue concerns whether a gatekeeper can restrict the ability of businesses to communicate alternative purchasing possibilities to users.

Significance

The case demonstrates a major shift:

Traditional model:

Prove abuse → investigate → decide → remedy.

Ex-ante model:

Identify gatekeeper → impose predetermined obligations → monitor compliance.

This is one of the defining characteristics of next-generation competition governance.

Case 7: Meta — Digital Markets Act

The Meta case concerns the relationship between competition, data and consumer choice.

In April 2025, the European Commission found that Meta's "consent or pay" approach did not comply with the DMA requirement concerning users' choices over the combination of personal data and imposed a €200 million fine.

Competition principle

The case illustrates the convergence of:

• competition law;
• privacy;
• data governance;
• platform design; and
• consumer choice.

Significance

The next generation economy increasingly makes it difficult to separate:

competition → data → privacy → consumer autonomy

A competition regulator may therefore have to understand how data practices affect market contestability.

6. Emerging AI Competition Issues

Artificial intelligence introduces a new layer of competition concerns.

A. Compute concentration

Advanced AI requires:

• GPUs;
• specialised chips;
• cloud computing;
• electricity;
• data centres;
• large datasets.

Control over these inputs can create entry barriers.

B. Foundation-model concentration

AI development may involve substantial economies of scale and scope.

Large firms may possess advantages in:

• training data;
• computing resources;
• model development;
• distribution;
• user feedback;
• cloud infrastructure.

C. Vertical integration

An enterprise may simultaneously control:

Cloud → Chips → AI Models → Applications → Distribution

This creates the possibility of leveraging market power between different levels.

D. AI partnerships

Competition authorities may need to examine whether exclusive or preferential arrangements between:

• AI developers;
• cloud providers;
• chip manufacturers; and
• distributors

foreclose competitors.

The EU has already begun examining cloud markets in this context; in June 2026, the Commission announced a preliminary position that Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure should be designated as DMA gatekeepers for cloud computing services, citing factors including entrenched positions, switching costs, ecosystems and the increasing importance of AI tools and partnerships in cloud procurement.

7. Data as an Essential Competitive Resource

The next generation economy may produce several forms of data power:

Competition governance may therefore require:

• data portability;
• interoperability;
• fair access;
• data-sharing mechanisms;
• safeguards against discriminatory access; and
• restrictions on abusive data combination.

The EU's DMA implementation has already produced work on interoperability and data portability, including mechanisms intended to make it easier for users to transfer data between device ecosystems.

8. Network Effects

Next-generation markets frequently exhibit network effects.

The basic model is:

More users → More data → Better service → More users

This can generate rapid market concentration.

Examples include:

• social networks;
• payment platforms;
• marketplaces;
• operating systems;
• messaging services;
• cloud ecosystems;
• digital identity platforms.

Competition law must therefore consider not merely current market share but whether a firm's position is reinforced by feedback loops and switching costs.

9. Switching Costs and Lock-In

Consumers may remain with a platform because leaving requires:

• transferring data;
• learning a new interface;
• abandoning applications;
• changing payment methods;
• losing social connections;
• replacing hardware;
• rebuilding business relationships.

Thus:

A nominally free digital service can still generate substantial economic lock-in.

Competition authorities may therefore examine interoperability and portability as potential competitive remedies.

10. Interoperability

Interoperability means allowing different systems to communicate or function together.

It can reduce:

• switching costs;
• entry barriers;
• network-effect advantages;
• ecosystem lock-in.

The DMA has increasingly focused on interoperability involving connected devices and digital ecosystems. The Commission reported in 2026 that DMA enforcement had produced new interoperability and data-portability features involving connected devices such as smartwatches and other peripherals.

11. Merger Control in the Next Generation Economy

Traditional merger thresholds based predominantly on turnover may not capture every strategically important digital acquisition.

A technology company may acquire:

• a start-up;
• an AI developer;
• a data-rich company;
• a promising technology;
• a potential future competitor.

The target may have:

• low current revenue;
• significant technological potential;
• valuable intellectual property;
• important datasets;
• a rapidly growing user base.

Consequently, competition governance increasingly considers innovation competition and potential competition, not simply present turnover.

12. Killer Acquisitions

A "killer acquisition" refers to an acquisition in which an established firm acquires an emerging competitor that could potentially develop into a significant competitive constraint.

The competition concern may involve:

Incumbent + Emerging Technology = Removal of Future Competitive Threat

The next generation economy makes this particularly relevant in:

• AI;
• biotechnology;
• fintech;
• cloud services;
• cybersecurity;
• digital platforms; and
• software.

13. Algorithmic Collusion

AI systems may independently monitor competitors and change prices.

This raises a difficult legal distinction:

Traditional cartel

Human competitors communicate and agree.

Algorithmic coordination

Algorithms may independently react to each other's pricing.

Competition law must determine when autonomous conduct becomes:

• legitimate adaptation;
• conscious parallelism;
• facilitating conduct; or
• unlawful coordination.

This requires careful treatment of human responsibility and algorithmic autonomy.

14. Autonomous Agents and Competition Law

Future AI agents may negotiate contracts, purchase goods and adjust prices without direct human intervention.

Possible questions include:

1. Who is legally responsible for an AI agent's conduct?
2. Can an AI agent enter an unlawful agreement?
3. Does training an algorithm constitute facilitating coordination?
4. Can algorithmic discrimination constitute exclusionary conduct?
5. Can competitors use common AI infrastructure without creating cartel risks?

Competition compliance therefore needs to move upstream into the design and governance of algorithms.

15. Digital Public Infrastructure

The next generation economy may also depend upon infrastructure operated or supported by governments.

Examples include:

• digital identity;
• instant payment systems;
• public data exchanges;
• electronic marketplaces;
• health-information networks;
• digital credential systems.

Competition governance must ensure that public infrastructure does not unnecessarily become a mechanism for:

• discriminatory access;
• exclusion;
• preferential treatment;
• closed ecosystems; or
• private monopolisation.

16. Competition Neutrality

Where governments and private firms operate simultaneously in a market, competition neutrality becomes important.

Comparable rules may be necessary regarding:

• taxation;
• access;
• procurement;
• subsidies;
• licensing;
• data access;
• infrastructure.

Otherwise, government-linked entities may receive structural advantages unrelated to efficiency.

17. Competition and Sustainability

The next generation economy also includes:

• renewable energy;
• electric vehicles;
• batteries;
• hydrogen;
• carbon markets;
• carbon capture;
• circular economy technologies.

Competition law must reconcile:

Competition + Innovation + Sustainability

Cooperation between competitors may sometimes be necessary for environmental objectives, but competition authorities must distinguish legitimate collaboration from arrangements that unnecessarily eliminate competition.

18. Competition Remedies for the Next Generation Economy

Traditional fines may be insufficient where the competitive problem arises from technological architecture.

Potential remedies include:

1. Interoperability

Require systems to communicate with competing systems.

2. Data portability

Permit users and businesses to transfer relevant data.

3. Access remedies

Require reasonable access to essential digital infrastructure.

4. Anti-steering obligations

Prevent platforms from prohibiting businesses from informing consumers about alternative offers.

5. Non-discrimination

Require platforms to apply equivalent conditions to comparable businesses.

6. Algorithmic transparency

Require appropriate information concerning ranking or recommendation systems.

7. Structural remedies

In exceptional cases, separation of business units may be considered.

8. Merger remedies

Authorities may impose behavioural or structural conditions on technology acquisitions.

19. Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Competition Governance

The EU's DMA is a prominent example of the second approach. The Commission's 2026 reporting confirms that enforcement is now extending into areas including cloud computing, interoperability, data portability and continuing gatekeeper compliance.

20. Institutional Governance Model

A future competition-governance framework could operate through five levels:

Level 1 — Market Monitoring

Continuous observation of:

• market concentration;
• acquisitions;
• platform conduct;
• algorithms;
• data practices.

Level 2 — Early Intervention

Identify emerging competition risks before they become irreversible.

Level 3 — Ex-Ante Regulation

Impose obligations on systemically important gatekeepers.

Level 4 — Antitrust Enforcement

Investigate:

• cartels;
• exclusionary conduct;
• exploitative conduct;
• anti-competitive agreements.

Level 5 — Structural Intervention

Where behavioural remedies are ineffective, stronger remedies may be considered.

21. Indian Legal Framework

In India, the principal framework remains the Competition Act, 2002, administered by the Competition Commission of India.

Important provisions include:

• Section 3 — anti-competitive agreements;
• Section 4 — abuse of dominant position;
• Section 5 — combinations;
• Section 19 — inquiry into agreements and dominance;
• Section 26 — investigation procedure;
• Section 27 — orders after inquiry;
• Section 31 — orders concerning combinations.

The Google Android and Google Play Store proceedings demonstrate how these provisions can be applied to digital ecosystems.

India's enforcement landscape has also continued to evolve through cases involving digital communications and major technology platforms, including the CCI's 2024 WhatsApp/Meta proceeding.

22. China and Other Jurisdictions

The next generation economy also requires international coordination.

China's competition framework has increasingly addressed:

• platform economy;
• algorithmic conduct;
• data;
• digital marketplaces;
• platform exclusivity;
• technological ecosystems.

Similarly, the EU, United States, India, UK, Japan, Australia and other jurisdictions are developing different combinations of:

• antitrust;
• digital regulation;
• data regulation;
• merger control;
• sector regulation.

This creates a major issue of regulatory interoperability.

A multinational technology company may therefore face different competition obligations in different jurisdictions.

23. Six Core Principles for Future Competition Governance

A durable framework can be built around six principles:

Principle 1 — Contestability

Markets should remain open to credible new competitors.

Principle 2 — Fair Access

Control over strategically important infrastructure should not automatically become a mechanism for exclusion.

Principle 3 — Interoperability

Technological incompatibility should not unnecessarily prevent switching or competition.

Principle 4 — Data Mobility

Data should not become an artificial barrier to market entry where portability or access is technically and legally appropriate.

Principle 5 — Algorithmic Accountability

Businesses should remain responsible for competition consequences generated through automated systems.

Principle 6 — Innovation Protection

Competition policy should preserve incentives for investment while preventing incumbents from suppressing emerging competitive threats.

24. Key Case-Law Principles — Consolidated

The recent EU developments also show that digital competition governance is no longer limited to traditional Article 102-style abuse cases: the DMA now creates direct obligations for designated gatekeepers, and the Commission has already issued non-compliance decisions against Apple and Meta.

25. Conclusion

Competition law for the next generation economy must move from a narrow "firm-versus-firm" model toward an ecosystem and infrastructure model.

The most important competitive resources of the future may not be factories or physical distribution networks but:

• data;
• algorithms;
• AI models;
• computing capacity;
• cloud infrastructure;
• operating systems;
• digital identity;
• payment networks;
• app stores;
• interoperability standards; and
• user ecosystems.

The central legal challenge is therefore not simply preventing monopoly prices. It is ensuring that technological architecture itself does not become an instrument for permanently excluding competitors.

The evolution from Google Android and Google Play Store enforcement to the EU's DMA demonstrates this transition from traditional ex-post antitrust toward a combination of antitrust, ex-ante regulation, interoperability, data governance and continuous platform supervision.

Accordingly, the future of competition governance can be conceptualised as:

Competition Law → Digital Competition → Ecosystem Governance → Algorithmic Governance → AI/Infrastructure Governance