Competition Law and Competition Concerns in Qualification Ecosystems

Competition Law and Competition Concerns in Qualification Ecosystems

1. Introduction

A qualification ecosystem is the network of institutions, rules, standards and services through which a person or business obtains, proves, verifies or maintains a qualification. It may include universities, professional bodies, accreditation agencies, examination providers, certification bodies, training institutions, testing laboratories, digital credential platforms, employers and government regulators.

Competition problems can arise when participation in an economic activity depends upon obtaining a particular qualification, accreditation, certificate or recognition from a limited number of providers. The qualification itself may serve a legitimate purpose—such as ensuring competence, safety or quality—but the system through which it is awarded can also become a gateway to a market.

Competition law therefore asks an important question: Are qualification requirements genuinely necessary to maintain standards, or are they being designed or applied in a manner that unnecessarily excludes competitors?

The issue can be examined under the Indian Competition Act, 2002, particularly Sections 3 and 4, while principles from EU competition and professional-regulation jurisprudence also provide useful comparative guidance.

2. Meaning of a Qualification Ecosystem

A qualification ecosystem usually contains several interconnected levels:

Qualification provider → accreditation or recognition body → regulator/procuring authority → qualified professional or business → customer/end user.

For example, a laboratory may require accreditation before it can provide testing services for government projects. If a government authority accepts accreditation from only one named organisation, access to the downstream testing market may effectively depend on access to that particular accreditation system.

Similarly, doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, accountants, financial professionals and other regulated occupations may require specified qualifications before they can legally provide certain services.

Competition concerns become stronger where one organisation controls an essential qualification while simultaneously participating in, influencing or favouring businesses operating in the downstream market.

3. Major Competition Concerns

3.1 Qualification Requirements as Barriers to Entry

Qualification standards can create legitimate barriers designed to protect consumers and maintain professional quality. Competition law does not automatically prohibit such requirements.

The difficulty arises when requirements are:

• unnecessarily restrictive;
• unrelated to genuine competence or quality;
• substantially more demanding than necessary;
• available only from a favoured organisation;
• excessively expensive;
• unnecessarily slow to obtain; or
• designed in a manner that existing firms can satisfy much more easily than new entrants.

A qualification requirement can therefore become an artificial entry barrier.

The competition analysis normally considers whether the restriction serves a legitimate objective and whether a less restrictive alternative could achieve substantially the same objective.

3.2 Exclusive Accreditation Requirements

One of the clearest competition risks arises when a regulator or purchaser says:

Only certificates issued by Accreditation Body X will be accepted.

The requirement may effectively exclude equally competent accreditation organisations.

The competitive question is not simply whether accreditation is necessary. Accreditation may be entirely justified. The important question is whether exclusive recognition of one accreditation provider is objectively necessary.

This distinction appeared directly in Indian competition proceedings involving laboratory accreditation.

In Prem Prakash v. Principal Secretary, Madhya Pradesh PWD & Others, CCI Case No. 50 of 2014, the dispute concerned requirements that construction materials be tested through laboratories accredited by NABL. The informant argued that recognising a single accreditation organisation disadvantaged laboratories accredited through alternative bodies. The CCI ultimately examined whether the eligibility condition constituted an unfair condition under the Competition Act. Later proceedings record that the CCI had found the mandatory NABL-related condition problematic under Section 4(2)(a)(i), while subsequent changes to the procurement arrangements affected the continuing competition concern.

The case illustrates that an accreditation requirement can become a competition issue where it determines access to a commercially important downstream market.

3.3 Denial of Market Access

Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act addresses conduct by a dominant enterprise that results in denial of market access in any manner.

Within qualification ecosystems, denial of market access can occur where a dominant qualification or accreditation organisation:

• refuses certification without objective reasons;
• discriminates between equivalent applicants;
• recognises only affiliated institutions;
• delays certification strategically;
• withdraws recognition selectively;
• imposes unnecessary eligibility requirements; or
• designs standards that competitors cannot realistically satisfy.

A particularly serious situation arises when certification is practically indispensable for competing in another market.

In that situation, exclusion from the qualification system can indirectly mean exclusion from the downstream commercial market.

4. Dominance in Qualification Markets

Dominance itself is not prohibited under Indian competition law. Section 4 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.

Qualification ecosystems may naturally produce concentrated markets because reputation, regulatory recognition and network effects matter considerably.

For example, employers may prefer certificates issued by the accreditation organisation they already recognise. More students or businesses consequently seek that organisation's qualification, making the qualification even more valuable.

This produces a reinforcing cycle:

More recognition → more applicants → greater market acceptance → stronger recognition → greater market power.

Competition authorities therefore need to examine whether alternatives are genuinely substitutable rather than merely technically available.

5. Network Effects and Qualification Ecosystems

Qualifications frequently have strong network effects.

A certificate is valuable because other institutions recognise it. If almost every employer, regulator or government department recognises only one certification system, alternative qualification providers may find entry extremely difficult.

Digital credentials can intensify this problem.

For example, a digital qualification platform could simultaneously control:

• examination infrastructure;
• identity verification;
• certification;
• credential storage;
• employer verification;
• professional databases; and
• continuing professional education.

Controlling several interconnected layers can produce ecosystem power even where the undertaking does not have an absolute monopoly at every individual level.

6. Tying and Bundling

Competition problems may also arise where qualification services are tied together.

Suppose an accreditation organisation requires applicants to purchase:

training + examination + certification + annual verification

from itself or affiliated organisations.

If the organisation possesses substantial market power in certification, requiring customers to purchase additional services may potentially constitute tying or bundling.

The competition concern is particularly significant where independent training or examination providers are foreclosed from the market.

A legitimate integrated qualification programme is not automatically unlawful. Authorities would examine market power, necessity, consumer benefits and foreclosure effects.

7. Discriminatory Qualification Rules

Qualification rules should ordinarily be based on objective criteria.

Competition concerns may arise where comparable applicants receive materially different treatment regarding:

• fees;
• examination requirements;
• processing periods;
• renewal conditions;
• accreditation requirements;
• recognition of experience;
• access to databases; or
• certification standards.

Under Section 4(2)(a) of the Competition Act, discriminatory conditions imposed by a dominant enterprise can become relevant where they concern the purchase or sale of goods or provision of services.

The important distinction is between legitimate differentiation and competitive discrimination. Different requirements can be justified where applicants genuinely present different risks or capabilities.

8. Self-Regulatory Organisations

Professional associations frequently perform both regulatory and commercial functions.

For example, an association might:

1. establish professional standards;
2. administer examinations;
3. issue qualifications;
4. maintain membership registers; and
5. represent existing professionals.

This creates potential conflicts of interest.

Existing professionals may benefit economically from restricting the number of new professionals entering the market.

Competition law therefore pays particular attention when rules established by market participants themselves determine who can compete with those same participants.

9. Public Procurement and Qualification Conditions

Government procurement is another important area.

Authorities commonly impose technical qualifications to ensure that suppliers can properly perform contracts. Such conditions are legitimate when proportionate to the contract.

Competition concerns may nevertheless arise from requirements such as:

• unnecessarily high turnover thresholds;
• excessive previous-experience requirements;
• acceptance of only one certification organisation;
• brand-specific certification;
• geographically restrictive experience;
• unnecessary membership requirements; or
• qualifications that favour incumbent suppliers.

Qualification conditions should therefore have a reasonable connection with the actual requirements of the contract.

10. Important Case Laws

Case 1: Prem Prakash v. Principal Secretary, Madhya Pradesh PWD & Others — CCI Case No. 50 of 2014

This is one of the most directly relevant Indian cases.

The dispute involved requirements concerning NABL-accredited laboratories for construction-material testing. The informant argued that several accreditation bodies existed and that requiring accreditation through one particular body adversely affected laboratories using alternatives.

The matter demonstrates how apparently technical procurement requirements can influence competition.

The CCI proceedings considered whether the accreditation requirement imposed an unfair eligibility condition. Subsequent litigation records that the CCI had found the relevant mandatory condition contrary to Section 4(2)(a)(i), although circumstances later changed, including modification of procurement requirements.

Competition principle

A purchaser or public authority with substantial market power should be cautious about making one specific accreditation system an exclusive gateway where equivalent alternatives can satisfy the legitimate quality objective.

Case 2: Accreditation Commission for Conformity Assessment Bodies Pvt. Ltd. v. Quality Council of India/NABCB, NABL & Others — CCI Case No. 51 of 2012

The informant provided accreditation services for certification and conformity-assessment organisations.

It alleged that NABCB and NABL received preferential recognition from government organisations and that government circulars effectively presented them as exclusive accreditation providers.

The allegations concerned Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, including claims concerning entry barriers, dominance and exclusion.

The CCI ultimately closed the information under Section 26(2), finding insufficient grounds for further investigation on the allegations before it.

Competition principle

Government recognition can significantly influence competition between accreditation organisations. Nevertheless, preferential recognition does not automatically establish a competition-law violation; dominance, conduct and competitive effects must still be demonstrated.

Case 3: Dushyant v. National Accreditation Board for Testing and Calibration Laboratories & Others — CCI Case No. 48 of 2021

This proceeding again concerned NABL accreditation.

The informant challenged requirements imposed by numerous government organisations and public bodies that referred to NABL accreditation. It was alleged that these arrangements effectively created exclusive supply conditions, foreclosed alternative accreditation bodies and denied market access.

The CCI closed the case under Section 26(2). An appeal before the NCLAT was also unsuccessful.

Competition principle

The mere existence of a commonly accepted accreditation standard does not establish anti-competitive conduct. Evidence is needed connecting the challenged requirements with an anti-competitive agreement or abuse of dominance.

The case also demonstrates the importance of determining whether the organisations imposing qualification requirements constitute enterprises for the relevant activity.

Case 4: Prem Prakash v. Bureau of Indian Standards & Others — Competition Appeal (AT) No. 16 of 2017

This dispute concerned the Bureau of Indian Standards' laboratory-recognition requirements.

Among the challenged conditions were compliance with ISO/IEC 17025 and requirements relating to membership of international laboratory-accreditation arrangements.

The appellant argued that these requirements were unjustified and restrictive.

The litigation illustrates an important distinction between technical standardisation and competition foreclosure.

Competition principle

Technical standards are not anti-competitive simply because they restrict participation. The legal issue is whether the standards have a legitimate objective, are applied objectively and proportionately, and constitute abusive conduct where the organisation concerned possesses relevant market power.

Case 5: Apaar Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India & Others — Competition Appeal (AT) No. 56 of 2022, decided 20 January 2026

This recent NCLAT decision concerned accreditation requirements associated with vendors supplying crystalline concrete admixture for a major infrastructure project.

The appellant argued that the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation's requirement concerning Indian Roads Congress accreditation restricted entry into the identified-vendor system and denied market access.

The NCLAT upheld the CCI's conclusion that the evidence did not establish the alleged Section 3 cartel arrangement or an abuse under Section 4 from prescribing the accreditation condition.

Competition principle

A restrictive-looking qualification requirement is not automatically an abuse of dominance. Competition law requires analysis of the market context, objective justification, actual eligibility arrangements and evidence of foreclosure or discriminatory treatment.

The case is particularly important because it demonstrates that qualification restrictions must be assessed on their actual competitive effects rather than merely their existence.

Case 6: Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten — Case C-309/99

This leading Court of Justice of the European Union case concerned professional rules governing lawyers.

The Dutch Bar prohibited certain multidisciplinary partnerships between lawyers and accountants. The restriction limited commercial freedom and potentially affected competition.

However, the Court considered the objectives and context of professional regulation and concluded that the restriction could be justified by requirements connected with the proper practice of the legal profession.

Competition principle

Not every professional qualification or regulatory restriction that limits competition is necessarily unlawful.

The analysis considers whether the restriction is genuinely connected with a legitimate regulatory objective and whether its restrictive effects are necessary for achieving that objective.

This principle is particularly relevant to qualification ecosystems because professional standards frequently restrict entry while simultaneously protecting consumers and professional integrity.

Case 7: Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission — Case C-519/04 P

Although this case arose from sports regulation rather than conventional professional accreditation, it provides an important competition-law principle applicable to qualification systems.

The Court rejected the idea that regulatory rules automatically fall outside competition law merely because they pursue a non-economic or regulatory objective.

Instead, the nature, objectives and proportionality of the restrictions must be examined.

Competition principle

Calling a requirement a "professional rule," "qualification standard," "quality requirement" or "regulatory condition" does not by itself remove it from competition-law scrutiny.

The actual economic effects and necessity of the restriction remain important.

Case 8: European Commission v. Czech Republic — Case C-75/22, judgment of 8 May 2024

This case concerned implementation of EU rules governing recognition of professional qualifications.

Among other matters, the Court considered obligations concerning adaptation periods, aptitude tests, professional titles and recognition procedures.

Although primarily an internal-market/professional-qualification case rather than a conventional antitrust infringement proceeding, it demonstrates the competitive importance of qualification portability and recognition.

Competition principle

Where professionals cannot obtain recognition of equivalent qualifications efficiently, regulatory barriers can restrict their ability to enter another geographic or professional services market.

Qualification recognition therefore interacts strongly with competition, mobility and market access.

11. Qualification Portability

Another major competition issue is whether qualifications can move between systems.

Suppose a professional has already obtained an equivalent qualification from Institution A but Institution B requires the professional to repeat substantially identical training before recognising it.

Such requirements increase:

• switching costs;
• entry costs;
• time required to enter the market; and
• dependence on incumbent institutions.

Recognition mechanisms can reduce these barriers.

Mutual recognition is therefore particularly important where qualifications are substantially equivalent.

12. Data and Digital Credentials

Modern qualification ecosystems increasingly depend on data.

Certification providers may maintain databases containing:

• examination results;
• professional histories;
• continuing education records;
• licences;
• verification records; and
• digital credentials.

Control over these databases can create another layer of market power.

For example, if employers rely on one verification database and competing certification organisations cannot connect to it, the database operator could potentially create an interoperability barrier.

Competition analysis may therefore consider data portability, interoperability and access alongside conventional accreditation issues.

13. Vertical Foreclosure

Qualification ecosystems often contain several vertically connected markets.

Consider:

Training → Examination → Certification → Professional registration → Employment platform

If one undertaking controls certification and professional registration, it might favour its own training provider.

For example, certification might technically remain available to everyone, but applicants trained by affiliated institutions could receive faster processing or reduced fees.

Such conduct can disadvantage independent training providers and potentially produce vertical foreclosure.

Competition authorities would examine whether the undertaking possesses sufficient market power and whether the conduct is capable of materially restricting competition.

14. Horizontal Coordination

Competition problems can also occur between competing qualification providers.

Several certification bodies could potentially agree on:

• examination prices;
• certification fees;
• territories;
• customer allocation;
• qualification capacity; or
• common restrictions on new entrants.

Such arrangements may fall within Section 3 of the Competition Act.

A legitimate industry standard-setting initiative must therefore be distinguished from coordination designed to reduce competition between the participating organisations.

15. Standard Setting and Competition

Standards can produce major economic benefits.

Common standards can improve:

• interoperability;
• consumer confidence;
• safety;
• qualification portability;
• comparability; and
• market efficiency.

However, standard-setting processes can become anti-competitive when incumbent firms control the process and design standards specifically to exclude competitors.

A competition-friendly standard-setting system generally benefits from:

transparency + objective criteria + reasonable access + non-discrimination + proportionality.

16. Relevant Market Analysis

Competition cases concerning qualification ecosystems require careful market definition.

Potential markets could include:

• professional certification services;
• laboratory accreditation services;
• professional examinations;
• vocational training;
• continuing professional education;
• credential verification;
• professional registration; or
• specialised accreditation services.

Geographic markets may be national, regional or international depending upon whether qualifications issued elsewhere are recognised.

Market definition is particularly important because an organisation may face several nominal competitors but still possess substantial market power if customers cannot realistically substitute another qualification.

17. Consumer Harm

Qualification restrictions do not affect only competing institutions.

They can ultimately affect consumers.

Unnecessary restrictions may produce:

• higher professional fees;
• fewer service providers;
• reduced geographical availability;
• less innovation;
• fewer training choices;
• higher qualification costs; and
• slower entry by new professionals.

At the same time, excessively weak qualification standards could harm consumers through lower quality or safety.

Competition policy therefore requires a balance between open markets and legitimate quality assurance.

18. Objective Justification

An organisation accused of imposing restrictive qualification conditions may argue that the requirements are necessary for:

• public safety;
• technical competence;
• consumer protection;
• professional independence;
• fraud prevention;
• service quality;
• regulatory compliance; or
• internationally recognised standards.

These objectives can be legitimate.

However, authorities may consider whether the restriction is appropriate and proportionate.

For example, requiring technical competence might be justified, while requiring that competence to be certified exclusively by one commercially active organisation could require additional justification if equivalent alternatives exist.

19. Competition-Law Assessment Framework

A useful method for analysing a qualification ecosystem is:

Step 1 – Identify the qualification.
Determine exactly which licence, certificate, accreditation or professional recognition is required.

Step 2 – Identify who controls it.
Determine whether control lies with government, a professional association, private certification provider or combination of organisations.

Step 3 – Define the relevant market.
Identify realistic alternatives available to applicants.

Step 4 – Examine market power.
Determine whether applicants can practically avoid the qualification provider.

Step 5 – Identify restrictive conduct.
Look for exclusivity, discrimination, tying, refusal of recognition, excessive requirements or preferential treatment.

Step 6 – Determine competitive effects.
Consider whether competitors are actually or potentially excluded.

Step 7 – Examine justification.
Identify legitimate safety, competence, quality or regulatory objectives.

Step 8 – Examine proportionality.
Ask whether the same legitimate objective could reasonably be achieved through a less restrictive mechanism.

20. Role of Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act

Section 3

Section 3 becomes relevant where qualification restrictions result from agreements between enterprises or associations.

Possible issues include:

• cartel arrangements;
• exclusive supply arrangements;
• exclusive distribution;
• tying;
• refusal-to-deal arrangements; and
• coordinated standard-setting restrictions.

The central question is whether the arrangement causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition where the statutory framework requires that assessment.

Section 4

Section 4 becomes particularly important where one qualification or accreditation organisation possesses a dominant position.

Potential concerns include:

• unfair conditions;
• discriminatory conditions;
• restriction of services;
• denial of market access;
• leveraging dominance into another market; and
• tying unrelated obligations to certification.

Again, dominance alone is lawful. It is the abuse of dominance that Section 4 prohibits.

21. Qualification Ecosystems and Innovation

Qualification systems can also influence innovation.

New technologies frequently create occupations that do not fit traditional qualification structures. Established professional organisations may respond by expanding existing licensing requirements.

This can protect consumers where genuinely necessary, but excessively broad requirements can prevent innovative businesses from entering the market.

The same problem can occur with digital education and online certification.

If regulators recognise only traditional classroom qualifications despite demonstrably equivalent digital alternatives, new educational business models may face substantial barriers.

Competition analysis therefore increasingly intersects with technological neutrality and regulatory innovation.

22. Key Lessons from the Case Law

The cases demonstrate several recurring principles.

First, qualification requirements are not inherently anti-competitive. Competence, safety and quality requirements can serve legitimate purposes.

Second, an accreditation requirement becomes more significant where it operates as a gateway to an economically important downstream market.

Third, naming one accreditation provider can potentially create foreclosure concerns, but exclusivity alone does not automatically prove infringement.

Fourth, the legal status and economic activity of the organisation imposing the requirement matter. Competition legislation applies according to the statutory concept of an enterprise and the nature of the relevant activity.

Fifth, allegations require evidence of market power, restrictive conduct and competitive effects.

Finally, courts and competition authorities generally examine the substance and proportionality of restrictions, rather than accepting labels such as "professional standard" or "technical requirement" as automatically decisive.

23. Conclusion

Competition law plays an important role in ensuring that qualification ecosystems protect quality without becoming unnecessary barriers to competition.

Qualifications, professional licences, accreditation systems and technical standards can produce substantial benefits by ensuring competence and building consumer confidence. Nevertheless, the organisations controlling these gateways can also acquire considerable economic power.

The principal competition risks include exclusive accreditation, denial of market access, discriminatory qualification requirements, tying and bundling, vertical foreclosure, restrictive professional rules, anti-competitive standard setting, data lock-in and unnecessary barriers to qualification recognition.

Indian cases involving NABL, BIS and procurement accreditation requirements demonstrate that qualification conditions can fall within competition-law scrutiny when they affect commercial market access. Comparative EU decisions such as Wouters and Meca-Medina further demonstrate that regulatory objectives do not automatically exempt restrictive rules from competition analysis.

The appropriate competition-law approach is therefore not to eliminate qualification requirements, but to ensure that they remain objective, transparent, proportionate, non-discriminatory and genuinely connected to legitimate quality or regulatory objectives.

A well-designed qualification ecosystem should protect competence and consumers while allowing qualified new entrants, alternative accreditation providers and innovative qualification models a reasonable opportunity to compete.