Competition Law and Collective Boycotts Under Danish Law

1. Introduction

A collective boycott occurs when two or more undertakings, competitors, trade associations, professional bodies, or members of an industry coordinate their conduct so that they collectively refuse to deal with, supply, purchase from, advertise through, distribute through, or otherwise support a particular undertaking, platform, supplier, customer, or competitor.

Under Danish competition law, collective boycotts are principally examined under Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act (Konkurrenceloven), which corresponds substantially to Article 101(1) TFEU. Danish competition law therefore operates in close parallel with EU competition law. The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority expressly identifies agreements between competitors to boycott another undertaking as conduct capable of restricting competition.

The important principle is that competitors generally must make their commercial decisions independently. An agreement that removes that independent decision-making—particularly an agreement not to deal with a particular undertaking or sales channel—can constitute a serious restriction of competition.

2. Meaning of a Collective Boycott

A collective boycott may take several forms:

1. Customer boycott – competitors agree not to purchase from a particular supplier.
2. Supplier boycott – competitors agree not to supply a particular customer.
3. Platform boycott – businesses agree not to use a particular digital platform.
4. Distribution boycott – distributors collectively refuse to carry a product.
5. Market-access boycott – competitors coordinate to prevent a new entrant from accessing an important market.
6. Association-led boycott – a trade association recommends or requires members to cease dealing with a targeted undertaking.
7. Information-supported boycott – members exchange information to monitor whether participants are complying with the boycott.
8. Indirect boycott – the restriction is implemented through membership conditions, fees, contractual requirements, or other mechanisms rather than an express "boycott" agreement.

The Danish authority has specifically warned that competitors' agreements concerning whom they will or will not trade with can constitute serious infringements of Section 6.

3. Statutory Framework Under Danish Law

A. Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act

Section 6 prohibits agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition.

A collective boycott can therefore fall within Section 6 where:

• undertakings agree to boycott another undertaking;
• an association adopts a boycott decision;
• competitors coordinate their refusal to deal;
• competitors collectively withdraw from a platform;
• competitors agree to exclude a supplier or customer;
• the boycott is used to protect an existing competitive position; or
• the boycott prevents market entry or expansion.

The Danish authority has stated directly that competitors agreeing to boycott customers, competitors, or suppliers can fall within the prohibition.

B. Article 101 TFEU

Where the boycott may affect trade between EU Member States, Article 101 TFEU also becomes relevant.

Article 101 covers:

• agreements;
• decisions of associations of undertakings; and
• concerted practices.

Thus, a collective boycott can be examined simultaneously under:

Danish Competition Act §6 + Article 101 TFEU

where the EU-interstate-trade requirement is satisfied.

4. Why Collective Boycotts Are Particularly Serious

A collective boycott can eliminate an important dimension of competition: the individual freedom of each undertaking to choose its trading partners.

Suppose 100 independent retailers individually decide not to use Platform A. That may simply represent independent commercial choice.

But if the retailers agree:

"None of us will advertise on Platform A."

the commercial decision is no longer independent.

The agreement may:

• reduce competition between platforms;
• deprive the targeted platform of users;
• reduce consumer choice;
• prevent market entry;
• protect a competing platform;
• increase barriers to expansion;
• facilitate exclusion of competitors; and
• reduce competitive pressure on price, quality and innovation.

The Danish Peugeot case illustrates this particularly clearly: dealers collectively agreed not to advertise vehicles on Bilbasen.dk, thereby strengthening the alternative platform Biltorvet.dk.

5. Collective Boycott as a "Restriction by Object"

A central issue is whether the boycott is a restriction by object or must be demonstrated to have anticompetitive effects.

Where the conduct is inherently capable of restricting competition, authorities may treat the conduct as a by-object restriction.

This is significant because the authority does not necessarily have to establish extensive empirical effects in the market.

The Danish authority has explained in connection with boycott conduct that agreements between competitors concerning restrictions on sales or commercial dealings can constitute serious restrictions where the purpose itself is to restrict competition.

The precise classification still requires examination of the agreement's content, objectives and legal and economic context.

6. Collective Boycotts by Trade Associations

Trade associations create a particular risk.

An association may lawfully:

• represent members;
• communicate with regulators;
• establish legitimate technical standards;
• provide general information;
• conduct legitimate joint activities.

But it cannot become a mechanism through which competitors coordinate exclusion.

A boycott decision adopted by an association can be treated as a decision of an association of undertakings.

This was central to the Peugeot Forhandler Foreningen case.

7. Important Case Laws and Danish Decisions

Case 1 – Peugeot Forhandler Foreningen – Bilbasen.dk (2022)

Facts

The Danish association representing Peugeot dealers adopted a collective boycott of Bilbasen.dk, a digital platform used for advertising used cars.

Members were expected not to advertise vehicles on Bilbasen.dk and instead use competing services, particularly Biltorvet.dk.

Decision

The Danish Competition Council held that the collective boycott infringed Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act.

The association subsequently accepted a DKK 500,000 fine.

Significance

The case demonstrates that:

• a trade association can be liable for an anti-competitive boycott;
• a digital platform can be the target of a prohibited boycott;
• competitors cannot collectively decide which platform their members will use;
• the fact that the targeted platform is larger or commercially powerful does not automatically justify collective exclusion.

The case is especially important for digital-marketplace competition.

Case 2 – Dansk Ejendomsmæglerforening / Boliga.dk (2012)

Facts

A group of Danish estate-agent chains associated with Boligsiden.dk coordinated conduct against competing property portal Boliga.dk.

The estate agents agreed to restrict Boliga.dk's access to photographs of properties that they marketed.

Decision

The Danish Competition Council found that the conduct violated competition law and ordered the estate agents and association to cease the boycott.

The conduct was regarded as an attempt to protect the estate-agent-owned Boligsiden.dk against competition from Boliga.dk.

Subsequently, EDC-Gruppen A/S and Dansk Ejendomsmæglerforening were fined by the Copenhagen City Court for participation in the unlawful boycott.

Significance

This case establishes an important Danish principle:

A collective boycott can be unlawful even when the businesses imposing it and the targeted undertaking operate at different levels or in different product markets.

The Danish authority's Peugeot decision also discusses this earlier Boliga line of authority.

Case 3 – "Boykot Just Eat" / Pizzeria Association (2015)

Facts

A number of Danish pizzerias established an association called "Boykot Just Eat."

The stated objective was to persuade pizzerias to terminate their cooperation with Just Eat. The association's chairman was also understood to have submitted collective termination notices on behalf of numerous pizzerias.

Regulatory response

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority intervened and warned that agreements among undertakings to boycott a business such as Just Eat could violate Section 6.

The investigation was ultimately closed without a formal infringement decision because the authority considered that further investigation was not proportionate to the expected result.

Significance

This is an important warning decision rather than a final infringement judgment.

It establishes that:

• a collective refusal to deal can be problematic even where organized through an association;
• competitors must retain independent commercial freedom;
• merely describing conduct as a collective commercial strategy does not immunize it from Section 6.

Case 4 – Danish News Media / Music Group Boycott (2020)

Facts

Several news media organizations entered into a common arrangement concerning a music group.

The media organizations agreed that they would not review or report on the group's concerts and releases while the group refused accreditation to certain media organizations.

Regulatory response

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority stated that agreements or coordinated practices restricting competition could violate Section 6 and specifically identified agreements among competitors to boycott customers, competitors or suppliers as examples.

The authority ultimately decided not to pursue the matter further at that stage.

Significance

The case illustrates that collective boycotts are not confined to conventional commercial supply contracts.

They can also arise in:

• media;
• entertainment;
• accreditation;
• access arrangements;
• professional services; and
• platform relationships.

Again, this was an indskærpelse/warning rather than a final infringement finding.

Case 5 – Danish Marketplace / Possible Collective Boycott (2024)

Facts

In 2023 the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority conducted a dawn raid concerning an industry organization and related undertakings.

The authority obtained material indicating possible coordination concerning fees and membership conditions intended to exclude particular actors from operating on a marketplace.

The conduct was considered potentially capable of taking the form of a collective boycott or exclusionary membership conditions.

Regulatory response

In November 2024, the authority issued an indskærpelse concerning Section 6.

The authority warned that an industry organization participating in or facilitating agreements between members and third parties aimed at excluding particular market participants through collective boycott or exclusionary membership conditions could infringe competition law.

Importantly, the authority expressly stated that the indskærpelse was not a formal infringement decision.

Significance

This case is particularly important for modern competition-law analysis because it demonstrates that a boycott need not be an express statement:

"We will not deal with X."

It can potentially be implemented through:

• membership fees;
• platform access conditions;
• association rules;
• exclusionary contractual arrangements; or
• coordinated participation requirements.

Case 6 – Beef Industry Development Society (BIDS) v Commission, C-209/07

This is an important EU competition-law authority relevant to Danish law, because Danish Section 6 operates in close alignment with Article 101 TFEU.

Facts

Irish beef processors participated in the Beef Industry Development Society arrangements.

The scheme was designed to reduce excess processing capacity by inducing some processors to leave the market and imposing charges associated with remaining capacity.

Court's approach

The Court of Justice treated the arrangement as a restriction of competition by object.

Relevance to boycotts

BIDS is not a classic boycott case, but it is highly relevant to collective exclusion because it demonstrates the Court's willingness to treat coordinated arrangements among competitors that deliberately remove competitive constraints as serious Article 101 restrictions.

Principle

Where competitors collectively agree on conduct whose purpose is to eliminate or substantially reduce competitive rivalry, the arrangement may be prohibited without requiring detailed proof of actual market harm.

8. Delimitis v Henninger Bräu, C-234/89

Facts

The case concerned exclusive purchasing arrangements in the beer sector.

The contractual system could potentially make market entry difficult for competing breweries.

Principle

The Court developed an important framework for determining whether contractual arrangements collectively produce foreclosure effects.

The analysis considers:

1. the competitive structure of the market;
2. the number of similar agreements;
3. the cumulative effect of those agreements; and
4. whether access to the market is materially restricted.

Relevance to collective boycotts

A collective boycott may have an analogous cumulative effect.

A single refusal to deal may have limited significance. But when many market participants coordinate simultaneously, the combined effect may substantially foreclose access to the market.

Therefore, market-wide cumulative foreclosure is particularly important in Danish competition analysis.

9. Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission, T-65/98

Facts

The case involved arrangements concerning ice-cream freezers and access to retail outlets.

The European courts considered whether the arrangements, particularly when viewed cumulatively, could foreclose competing suppliers.

Principle

The case illustrates that exclusionary effects can arise not merely from one contract but from a network of arrangements covering a substantial part of the market.

Relevance to collective boycott law

It helps distinguish:

• an isolated independent refusal to deal; from
• coordinated exclusion involving a substantial portion of the market.

The greater the cumulative coverage, the greater the competition concern.

10. Jouvin v Commission, C-719/21 P

Facts

Jouvin complained to the European Commission about alleged anti-competitive conduct involving patents, licensing negotiations and what he described as a collective boycott of his patents.

The Commission rejected the complaint, considering that the likelihood of establishing an infringement was limited.

Significance

This authority is useful because it demonstrates an important qualification:

Not every allegation described as a "collective boycott" automatically establishes an Article 101 infringement.

The actual evidence, competitive relationship, conduct, market circumstances and likelihood of proving an infringement must still be examined.

This is particularly useful when analysing complaints involving:

• intellectual property;
• technology standards;
• licensing;
• patent pools; and
• coordinated refusal to license.

11. Six-or-More Case Law Summary

Note: The Danish authorities above are not all formal infringement judgments. The 2015, 2020 and 2024 matters were warnings/indskærpelser rather than final findings of infringement. This distinction is legally important.

12. Elements the Danish Competition Authority Would Examine

A collective boycott analysis can be structured through the following questions.

Step 1 – Are the participants "undertakings"?

Section 6 applies to undertakings and associations of undertakings.

The analysis therefore asks whether the participants engage in economic activity.

Step 2 – Is there an agreement, association decision or concerted practice?

Evidence may include:

• written agreements;
• association resolutions;
• emails;
• WhatsApp messages;
• meeting minutes;
• common announcements;
• coordinated termination notices;
• common pricing/access policies;
• monitoring arrangements; and
• communications encouraging members to comply.

The absence of a formal written agreement does not necessarily prevent a finding of coordination.

Step 3 – What exactly is being boycotted?

The target could be:

• a competitor;
• supplier;
• customer;
• platform;
• distributor;
• technology provider;
• payment system;
• marketplace;
• logistics provider; or
• new market entrant.

Step 4 – Is the boycott horizontal?

A boycott by competing undertakings is especially problematic.

For example:

A group of competing retailers agrees not to purchase from Supplier X.

This is fundamentally different from:

Retailer A independently decides not to purchase from Supplier X.

The first involves coordination between competitors.

Step 5 – Does the arrangement have an anti-competitive object?

Factors include:

• exclusion of a competitor;
• prevention of market entry;
• elimination of a sales channel;
• protection of an incumbent platform;
• reduction of consumer choice;
• suppression of competitive pressure; and
• coordinated refusal to supply or purchase.

Step 6 – If necessary, what are the actual effects?

Where an effects analysis is necessary, relevant factors include:

• market shares;
• number of participating undertakings;
• coverage of the boycott;
• duration;
• importance of the targeted undertaking;
• availability of alternative suppliers/platforms;
• switching costs;
• network effects;
• barriers to entry;
• consumer dependence; and
• ability of the target to compete elsewhere.

13. Trade Association Liability

Trade associations deserve special attention.

An association can create competition-law exposure where it:

• recommends a boycott;
• requires members to boycott;
• coordinates collective termination;
• monitors compliance;
• imposes sanctions on members who refuse to participate;
• exchanges information for boycott enforcement; or
• establishes exclusionary membership requirements.

The Peugeot and Boliga matters demonstrate the particular significance of association-led coordination in Denmark.

14. Digital Platforms and Collective Boycotts

The Danish cases are particularly relevant to digital markets.

A collective boycott of a platform may involve:

Competitors → Association → Common decision → Platform exclusion → Reduced platform liquidity → Reduced consumer choice

For example:

500 independent sellers collectively agree not to list products on Platform X and instead list exclusively on Platform Y.

Potential competition concerns include:

• foreclosure of Platform X;
• reduction of multi-homing;
• network-effect manipulation;
• increased barriers to entry;
• reduction in consumer choice;
• protection of the competing platform;
• restriction of innovation; and
• reduced competitive pressure.

The Bilbasen and Boliga matters show why platform boycotts can attract Danish competition-law scrutiny.

15. Difference Between Independent Refusal and Collective Boycott

The Danish authority's 2015 guidance emphasized that it should generally be left to each undertaking to decide independently with whom it wishes to conduct business.

16. Possible Defences and Justifications

A collective boycott is not automatically lawful merely because participants assert a legitimate commercial objective.

Potential arguments can include:

A. Legitimate quality standards

An association may establish genuinely objective technical or quality requirements.

However, those requirements should not merely disguise an agreement to exclude a competitor.

B. Genuine safety concerns

Restrictions objectively necessary to address legitimate safety risks may receive different treatment.

C. Legitimate joint venture

A genuine joint venture may require restrictions that are ancillary and necessary for its operation.

D. Article 101(3) / Section 8 exemption

Where the statutory conditions are satisfied, restrictive arrangements may potentially benefit from exemption.

The assessment generally requires consideration of:

1. efficiencies;
2. benefits to consumers;
3. indispensability of the restrictions; and
4. preservation of sufficient residual competition.

The existence of a claimed efficiency is not enough by itself.

17. Economic Effects of a Collective Boycott

The main economic theories of harm include:

1. Foreclosure

The target is denied sufficient customers, suppliers, or distribution channels.

2. Raising rivals' costs

The boycott may force the target to obtain more expensive alternatives.

3. Network-effect exploitation

In digital markets, excluding one platform's users can reduce its network value.

4. Entry deterrence

A new entrant may be prevented from obtaining the customers or suppliers needed to reach viable scale.

5. Consumer harm

Consumers may face:

• fewer products;
• fewer platforms;
• higher prices;
• reduced quality;
• reduced innovation; or
• fewer purchasing alternatives.

6. Coordinated market protection

Incumbent competitors may use the boycott to protect an existing market structure.

18. Enforcement Consequences in Denmark

Potential consequences include:

• orders to terminate the conduct;
• prohibition of continuing the boycott;
• fines;
• criminal enforcement in appropriate cases;
• liability for undertakings and potentially individuals;
• invalidity of prohibited agreements; and
• follow-on civil claims in appropriate circumstances.

The Peugeot matter demonstrates the practical enforcement consequences: the association accepted a DKK 500,000 fine after admitting the collective boycott.

The Boliga-related conduct likewise resulted in criminal fines against participants, including EDC-Gruppen and Dansk Ejendomsmæglerforening.

19. Collective Boycott and Market Power

A common misconception is that a boycott is unlawful only if the participants are dominant.

That is incorrect.

Section 6 does not require dominance.

A group of competitors without individual dominance can nevertheless create substantial collective market power through coordinated conduct.

For example:

Ten competitors each have only 8% market share, but together control 80%.

A collective refusal to supply or purchase may therefore have substantial exclusionary consequences.

This is why collective boycotts are principally analysed under the rules concerning anti-competitive agreements, rather than only under the abuse-of-dominance provisions.

20. Collective Boycott vs Abuse of Dominance

These are distinct legal theories.

Section 6 / Article 101

Focus:

Coordination between undertakings

Example:

Several competing retailers agree not to deal with a supplier.

Section 11 / Article 102

Focus:

Unilateral conduct by a dominant undertaking

Example:

A dominant digital platform independently refuses access to an essential distribution channel.

Both can potentially coexist

A particularly complex case may involve:

• competitors collectively boycotting an undertaking; and
• a dominant undertaking independently facilitating or enforcing the exclusion.

The legal analysis must then distinguish the separate forms of conduct.

21. Important Danish Principle: Cross-Market Boycotts

One of the most significant lessons from the Boliga and Peugeot cases is that a boycott does not become lawful simply because the boycotting undertakings and the target operate on different product markets.

The Danish Competition Appeals Tribunal has recognized that collective boycott measures can fall within Section 6 even where the target operates on a different product market from the undertakings adopting the boycott.

This is particularly important for:

• online platforms;
• payment systems;
• logistics platforms;
• marketplaces;
• advertising portals;
• data intermediaries;
• software providers; and
• other infrastructure providers.

22. Compliance Guidelines for Danish Businesses

Businesses and trade associations should avoid:

1. collective decisions not to deal with a competitor;
2. coordinated termination of contracts;
3. agreements not to use a particular platform;
4. association instructions requiring members to boycott;
5. monitoring compliance with a boycott;
6. penalties for members who refuse to participate;
7. exchanging commercially sensitive information to enforce a boycott;
8. coordinated exclusion of a new entrant;
9. discriminatory association membership rules designed to exclude a competitor; and
10. using a legitimate industry initiative as a mechanism for collective exclusion.

The safest compliance principle is:

Each undertaking should independently determine its own trading partners and commercial strategy unless a clearly lawful and objectively justified cooperation framework applies.

23. Exam-Oriented Legal Test

For a problem question, the following structure can be used:

Collective boycott → Section 6 Danish Competition Act → Article 101 TFEU where applicable → Agreement/association decision/concerted practice → Undertakings → Restriction by object or effect → Horizontal relationship → Target and market → Foreclosure/competitive harm → Section 8/Article 101(3) → Enforcement and sanctions.

24. Conclusion

Under Danish competition law, collective boycotts are a high-risk form of coordinated conduct. Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act, reinforced where applicable by Article 101 TFEU, can prohibit agreements, association decisions and concerted practices through which competitors collectively refuse to deal with or provide access to another undertaking.

The Bilbasen/Peugeot and Boliga cases are particularly important Danish authorities because they demonstrate that collective boycotts can be unlawful even when directed against digital platforms or undertakings operating at a different level of the market.

The 2015, 2020 and 2024 Danish authority interventions further demonstrate the breadth of the concern, including association-led exclusion, media coordination and exclusionary marketplace membership arrangements. Those matters should, however, be distinguished from formal infringement decisions because they involved warnings or indskærpelser rather than final findings of liability.

The central legal principle is therefore preservation of independent competitive decision-making: competitors may independently choose their commercial partners, but coordinating that choice collectively to exclude a target undertaking can constitute a serious violation of Danish and EU competition law.