Competition Law and Collaborative Digital Infrastructure and Competition Concerns

1. Introduction

Collaborative digital infrastructure refers to digital infrastructure that is jointly created, operated, accessed, or relied upon by multiple firms or market participants. It may include:

• cloud and computing infrastructure;
• shared APIs and interoperability layers;
• digital identity and authentication systems;
• payment and settlement infrastructure;
• telecommunications and network infrastructure;
• data-sharing platforms and data pools;
• common technical standards;
• app and operating-system interfaces;
• digital advertising exchanges;
• AI and cloud infrastructure;
• digital public infrastructure; and
• shared logistics, mobility, energy or IoT platforms.

Collaboration can produce substantial efficiencies. Competitors may share infrastructure because duplicating networks, databases, authentication systems or technical standards can be expensive and inefficient. Competition law therefore does not automatically prohibit collaboration.

The principal concern arises when collaborative infrastructure becomes a bottleneck through which competitors must operate. A participant controlling that infrastructure may use it to exclude rivals, discriminate in access, impose excessive conditions, self-preference its own downstream products, obtain commercially sensitive information, or coordinate competitors.

Modern digital competition law increasingly focuses on interoperability, access, portability, data sharing, neutrality and contestability. The EU's Digital Markets Act, for example, specifically addresses interoperability with gatekeeper operating systems, while recent Commission measures concerning Android have extended the issue to competing AI services.

2. Meaning of Collaborative Digital Infrastructure

Collaborative digital infrastructure exists where infrastructure serves multiple independent businesses or ecosystems.

Examples

3. Competition-Law Framework

Several competition-law concepts become particularly important.

A. Agreements Between Competitors

Two or more competitors may jointly develop or operate infrastructure.

The arrangement can be legitimate where it:

• reduces infrastructure costs;
• improves interoperability;
• creates common technical standards;
• facilitates innovation;
• avoids unnecessary duplication; or
• creates efficiencies that benefit consumers.

However, cooperation becomes problematic where infrastructure collaboration is used to:

• fix prices;
• divide markets;
• exclude non-members;
• restrict output;
• exchange competitively sensitive information;
• coordinate future commercial strategies; or
• create a collective barrier to entry.

Thus, the legal question is not simply "Are competitors collaborating?" but "What is the purpose, structure and competitive effect of the collaboration?"

4. Essential-Facility and Access Issues

Collaborative infrastructure can become an essential or indispensable facility.

A dominant infrastructure operator may face competition-law scrutiny where:

1. the infrastructure is controlled by a dominant undertaking;
2. competitors require access to compete effectively;
3. duplication is technically or economically difficult;
4. access is refused or materially restricted;
5. the refusal is capable of eliminating effective competition; and
6. there is insufficient objective justification.

Digital infrastructure presents additional complications because infrastructure may consist of software, APIs, data, algorithms or network effects, rather than physical facilities.

5. Interoperability as a Competition Issue

Interoperability permits products or services belonging to different firms to communicate and function together.

A dominant digital ecosystem may weaken competition by deliberately restricting interoperability.

For example:

Operating System → API → Third-Party App → Consumer

If the operating-system owner provides its own app with privileged API access while denying equivalent access to competitors, competition may be distorted.

The EU's current DMA framework specifically requires designated gatekeepers to provide effective interoperability with relevant operating-system features. The Commission explains that Article 6(7) is intended to prevent gatekeepers from reserving important OS capabilities for their own services.

6. Data as Collaborative Infrastructure

Data increasingly functions as infrastructure.

Examples include:

• transaction databases;
• mobility data;
• payment data;
• search data;
• health datasets;
• industrial IoT data;
• mapping data;
• consumer identity data; and
• AI-training datasets.

A collaborative data infrastructure may create efficiencies, but it can also produce data concentration.

Competition concerns arise where participants:

• exclude non-members;
• collectively refuse access;
• share competitively sensitive information;
• use data to identify competitors' strategies;
• combine otherwise independent datasets to create market power;
• discriminate against downstream competitors; or
• make switching dependent on access to accumulated historical data.

The EU's 2026 DMA measures concerning Google illustrate the emerging approach: the Commission required arrangements concerning access by third-party search services to certain anonymised Google Search data, together with conditions concerning anonymisation, cybersecurity, access and pricing.

7. Network Effects

Collaborative digital infrastructure often produces powerful network effects.

The infrastructure becomes more valuable as more users or businesses participate.

For example:

More users → More data → Better service → More users → More data

This can create a feedback loop.

A dominant infrastructure provider can therefore possess an advantage that competitors cannot easily reproduce.

Competition authorities may examine:

• direct network effects;
• indirect network effects;
• economies of scale;
• switching costs;
• multi-homing;
• interoperability;
• data advantages; and
• ecosystem integration.

The EU specifically identifies network effects, economies of scale, user lock-in, business-user dependence and vertical integration as factors that can contribute to gatekeeper power in digital markets.

8. Self-Preferencing

A vertically integrated infrastructure provider may operate both:

1. the infrastructure; and
2. a downstream competing service.

This creates an incentive to prefer its own service.

Example

Suppose Platform A operates:

• the API;
• the app store;
• the cloud;
• the payment system; and
• a competing application.

If Platform A provides its own application with:

• better API access;
• superior data;
• faster technical integration;
• privileged ranking; or
• lower infrastructure costs,

competition may be distorted.

The central question is whether infrastructure control has been transformed into downstream competitive advantage through discriminatory treatment.

9. Information Exchange

Collaborative infrastructure can facilitate legitimate technical cooperation while simultaneously creating an information-exchange risk.

For example, competing firms using a common platform may obtain information concerning:

• prices;
• inventories;
• capacity;
• customers;
• production;
• future launches;
• discounts; or
• strategic plans.

The infrastructure operator must therefore consider whether the architecture permits unnecessary disclosure of competitively sensitive information.

Competition-law principle

Technical interoperability does not require unrestricted commercial transparency.

A well-designed collaborative infrastructure should use:

• data minimisation;
• access controls;
• anonymisation;
• aggregation;
• firewalls;
• role-based access; and
• independent governance.

10. Six Major Case Laws

Case 1: United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)

Facts

Microsoft possessed substantial power in the PC operating-system market and was alleged to have engaged in conduct designed to protect Windows from competing technologies, particularly Netscape's browser.

Competition issue

The case concerned the use of control over an important technological platform to restrict competing products.

Principle

The case demonstrates that a dominant technology platform cannot necessarily use control over an infrastructure layer to unlawfully protect an adjacent market.

Relevance to collaborative digital infrastructure

Modern platforms can similarly control:

• APIs;
• operating systems;
• app stores;
• cloud interfaces;
• authentication systems; and
• distribution channels.

The Microsoft case remains important for analysing platform leverage, interoperability and exclusionary conduct.

Case 2: Bronner v. Mediaprint, C-7/97, EU:C:1998:569

Facts

The case concerned access to a newspaper-delivery system controlled by a dominant undertaking.

Competition issue

The claimant argued that access to the dominant undertaking's distribution infrastructure was necessary to compete.

Principle

The Court of Justice established a demanding framework for treating refusal of access as abusive under Article 102 TFEU.

Among the important considerations was whether access was indispensable and whether duplication of the facility was realistically possible.

Digital relevance

The case provides a foundation for analysing whether:

• an API;
• cloud infrastructure;
• payment rail;
• authentication layer; or
• digital platform

is genuinely indispensable rather than merely convenient.

Case 3: IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P

Facts

The dispute concerned access to a pharmaceutical data structure used by competitors.

Competition issue

The case examined whether refusal to license an intellectual-property-related infrastructure could constitute abuse of dominance.

Principle

The Court developed the exceptional circumstances framework for compulsory access to protected infrastructure/intellectual property.

Digital significance

The reasoning is relevant where a company controls:

• proprietary datasets;
• technical standards;
• software interfaces;
• database structures;
• interoperability protocols; or
• other protected digital infrastructure.

Competition law must balance innovation incentives and exclusionary effects.

11. Case 4: Microsoft Corp. v Commission, Case T-201/04

Facts

The European Commission found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position, including through restrictions involving interoperability information.

Competition issue

The case involved Microsoft's refusal to provide sufficient interoperability information to enable competing work-group server products to interoperate effectively with Windows.

Principle

The case established the importance of interoperability in technology markets and demonstrated that technical compatibility can itself be a competition issue.

Relevance

It is particularly important for:

• cloud interoperability;
• enterprise software;
• APIs;
• operating systems;
• data portability; and
• platform ecosystems.

The case shows that technical incompatibility can function as a competitive barrier.

12. Case 5: Google LLC and Google Italy S.r.l. v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato — Android Auto / Enel X

Facts

Enel X operated an electric-vehicle charging application called JuicePass and sought interoperability with Google's Android Auto platform.

Google initially refused or delayed making the application available through Android Auto.

The Italian competition authority found an abuse of dominance and imposed a fine exceeding €100 million; the dispute ultimately reached the Court of Justice.

Principle

The Court of Justice clarified the circumstances in which refusal by a dominant digital-platform operator to ensure interoperability with a third-party application can constitute abuse.

Importance

This is particularly significant for modern collaborative digital infrastructure because it involves:

mobile operating system → digital interface → third-party application → downstream market.

The case demonstrates that infrastructure control can affect competition in a neighbouring market even where the infrastructure owner is not directly selling the competing downstream product.

13. Case 6: Slovak Telekom a.s. v European Commission, C-165/19 P and C-166/19 P

Facts

The case concerned access to telecommunications infrastructure controlled by a dominant operator.

Competition issue

The dispute involved exclusionary conduct concerning access to infrastructure and the application of Article 102 TFEU.

Principle

The case is important for understanding how competition law addresses exclusionary access conditions imposed by vertically integrated infrastructure operators.

Digital relevance

Telecommunications networks are foundational digital infrastructure. Similar questions arise with:

• fibre networks;
• mobile networks;
• cloud infrastructure;
• data centres;
• digital identity infrastructure;
• payment networks; and
• shared connectivity systems.

14. Case 7: Facebook, Inc. & Bundeskartellamt — Case C-252/21

Facts

The case concerned Facebook's collection and combination of user data across different services and its relationship with competition law.

Competition issue

The case demonstrated the interaction between:

• market power;
• personal data;
• data combination;
• platform services; and
• competition law.

Importance for collaborative infrastructure

Data aggregation can become an important source of competitive advantage.

Where multiple digital services contribute data to a common infrastructure, competition authorities may need to examine whether the arrangement:

• creates exclusionary data advantages;
• raises entry barriers;
• facilitates market power;
• creates dependency; or
• permits discriminatory treatment.

The case is therefore important for understanding data as a competitive asset and infrastructure.

15. Case 8: Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018)

Facts

American Express imposed contractual provisions restricting merchants from steering customers toward alternative payment methods.

Competition issue

The Supreme Court analysed competition in a two-sided transaction platform involving merchants and cardholders.

Principle

The case illustrates the importance of considering both sides of a platform when analysing digital or network markets.

Digital-infrastructure relevance

The same logic can arise in:

• payment networks;
• app stores;
• advertising exchanges;
• marketplaces;
• digital identity systems; and
• cloud marketplaces.

Competition cannot always be analysed solely from the perspective of one user group.

16. Case 9: NVIDIA/Arm — Competition and Collaborative Technology Infrastructure

Although not a conventional abuse-of-dominance case, the proposed NVIDIA–Arm transaction illustrates the competition concerns surrounding control over foundational technology infrastructure.

Arm's technology was widely used in semiconductor designs, making its neutrality and licensing arrangements strategically important to multiple downstream competitors.

Competition concern

A vertically integrated owner of foundational infrastructure may possess the ability to:

• restrict access;
• discriminate among licensees;
• increase licensing costs;
• obtain sensitive information;
• favour its own downstream operations; or
• reduce interoperability.

Lesson

Competition authorities may examine infrastructure transactions before exclusion actually occurs, particularly where infrastructure is strategically important to an entire ecosystem.

17. Collaborative Infrastructure and Joint Ventures

Competitors may establish a joint venture to create digital infrastructure.

For example:

Competitor A + Competitor B + Competitor C
↓
Shared Data/Cloud/API Platform
↓
Common Infrastructure
↓
Independent downstream competition

The arrangement may be lawful if the joint venture genuinely provides efficiencies.

However, competition concerns arise where the venture becomes a mechanism for:

• price coordination;
• exclusion of outsiders;
• exchange of strategic information;
• collective refusal to deal;
• market allocation; or
• control over essential infrastructure.

18. Standard-Setting and Competition Law

Collaborative digital infrastructure frequently requires technical standards.

Examples include:

• 5G standards;
• IoT protocols;
• payment standards;
• cybersecurity standards;
• charging protocols;
• AI interoperability standards;
• cloud standards.

Standards can increase competition by making systems interoperable.

But standard-setting can also produce exclusion.

Risks

A dominant group may:

• exclude competing technologies;
• manipulate standard-setting;
• impose discriminatory licensing conditions;
• conceal essential technical information;
• engage in coordinated exclusion; or
• use intellectual property rights strategically.

Therefore, standard-setting organisations require transparent and non-discriminatory governance.

19. Cloud Infrastructure

Cloud infrastructure presents particularly significant competition concerns.

A large cloud provider may control:

• computing resources;
• storage;
• databases;
• AI processors;
• APIs;
• developer tools;
• cybersecurity;
• identity systems; and
• marketplace distribution.

This creates possible vertical leverage.

Example

Cloud Provider A operates:

Cloud infrastructure
↓
AI infrastructure
↓
Marketplace
↓
SaaS applications

If competitors depend upon the same infrastructure while competing with the cloud provider's own services, discriminatory access can become a competition issue.

20. Digital Payment Infrastructure

Collaborative payment infrastructure may generate efficiency through:

• common standards;
• instant settlement;
• interoperability;
• fraud prevention;
• shared authentication; and
• lower transaction costs.

However, competition concerns arise if infrastructure participants:

• exclude rival payment providers;
• impose discriminatory access fees;
• restrict interoperability;
• tie infrastructure access to other services;
• share sensitive transaction information; or
• collectively disadvantage emerging competitors.

21. Digital Identity Infrastructure

Digital identity systems can become gateways to entire digital ecosystems.

Control over authentication may enable an infrastructure operator to determine:

• who can access services;
• what information is transferred;
• which applications can authenticate users;
• which security standards are accepted.

A refusal to provide reasonable interoperability could therefore create substantial entry barriers.

22. AI Infrastructure

AI creates a new form of collaborative infrastructure competition.

The ecosystem can be represented as:

Data → Compute → Foundation Model → API → Applications → Users

A company controlling multiple layers can potentially leverage power across the chain.

Competition concerns include:

1. exclusive access to training data;
2. preferential access to computing resources;
3. discriminatory API terms;
4. tying cloud services to AI models;
5. exclusive distribution agreements;
6. interoperability restrictions;
7. acquisition of emerging AI competitors;
8. preferential treatment of affiliated applications; and
9. control over AI developer ecosystems.

The EU's current Android interoperability proceedings illustrate how competition law is increasingly addressing infrastructure access at the intersection of mobile platforms and AI services.

23. Digital Advertising Infrastructure

Digital advertising often contains multiple infrastructure layers:

Advertiser → Ad Exchange → Ad Server → Publisher

If one company controls multiple layers, it may possess incentives to discriminate against competing infrastructure.

Competition authorities may investigate:

• self-preferencing;
• discriminatory auction rules;
• preferential access;
• tying;
• data advantages;
• exclusionary contracts; and
• conflicts of interest.

This demonstrates why competition analysis must increasingly examine the architecture of digital markets, rather than merely individual products.

24. Data-Sharing Collaborations Between Competitors

Competitors sometimes create common data platforms for legitimate reasons.

Legitimate purposes

• fraud detection;
• cybersecurity;
• safety;
• research;
• interoperability;
• industry standards;
• logistics optimisation.

Risks

However, unrestricted data sharing can facilitate:

• price coordination;
• customer allocation;
• output coordination;
• monitoring of competitors;
• coordinated responses to market changes.

Consequently, a collaborative data infrastructure should ideally implement:

• anonymisation;
• aggregation;
• independent governance;
• restricted access;
• purpose limitation;
• audit mechanisms; and
• strict separation of commercially sensitive information.

25. Merger Control and Digital Infrastructure

Competition concerns can arise when infrastructure operators merge.

Particular attention may be required where a transaction combines:

• cloud + AI;
• payment infrastructure + wallet;
• search + data;
• operating system + AI;
• marketplace + logistics;
• telecom infrastructure + digital platform.

Authorities may examine whether the merger creates:

Horizontal effects

Reduction in the number of infrastructure competitors.

Vertical effects

Ability to foreclose downstream rivals.

Conglomerate effects

Ability to leverage infrastructure power across adjacent markets.

Data effects

Combination of datasets that competitors cannot reproduce.

Ecosystem effects

Creation of an integrated system that increases switching costs.

26. Refusal to Deal vs Reasonable Access

Not every refusal to provide access violates competition law.

A digital infrastructure operator may have legitimate reasons relating to:

• cybersecurity;
• privacy;
• technical integrity;
• capacity;
• intellectual property;
• safety;
• reliability; or
• legitimate commercial considerations.

The critical question is whether the restriction is objectively justified and proportionate.

The Android Auto litigation demonstrates the importance of examining objective justification where interoperability with a dominant platform is denied.

27. Interoperability Remedies

Competition authorities can impose remedies such as:

1. API access

Competitors receive access to relevant technical interfaces.

2. Data portability

Users can transfer data to competing services.

3. Non-discrimination

Infrastructure providers must treat competing services on equivalent terms.

4. FRAND access

Access is provided on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

5. Structural separation

Infrastructure and downstream competitive activities may be separated.

6. Data firewalls

Sensitive information obtained through infrastructure operations cannot be used to advantage downstream services.

7. Transparency

Infrastructure operators must disclose access criteria and technical requirements.

The DMA illustrates a regulatory model in which interoperability obligations can be specified in considerable technical detail rather than relying exclusively on traditional ex-post abuse-of-dominance proceedings.

28. Indian Competition-Law Perspective

Under India's Competition Act, 2002, collaborative digital infrastructure can implicate both:

Section 3

Anti-competitive agreements, including agreements among competitors that cause or are likely to cause appreciable adverse effect on competition.

Section 4

Abuse of dominant position.

Relevant conduct can include:

• denial of market access;
• discriminatory conditions;
• unfair conditions;
• leveraging dominance;
• tying;
• exclusionary practices; and
• restricting access to infrastructure.

India's digital economy makes these principles particularly relevant to:

• UPI and payment ecosystems;
• digital lending;
• e-commerce;
• app stores;
• cloud services;
• digital advertising;
• telecom infrastructure;
• ONDC-type interoperable networks; and
• data-driven platforms.

29. Competition Assessment Framework

A competition authority examining collaborative digital infrastructure can proceed through the following framework:

Step 1 — Identify the infrastructure

What exactly is being shared?

API / data / cloud / network / payment rail / OS / identity / marketplace

Step 2 — Identify participants

Who owns, controls and uses it?

Step 3 — Define the relevant market

Determine the relevant:

• product/service market;
• geographic market;
• upstream market;
• downstream market.

Step 4 — Assess market power

Consider:

• market share;
• network effects;
• switching costs;
• data advantages;
• economies of scale;
• interoperability;
• entry barriers.

Step 5 — Examine the collaboration

Determine whether the arrangement involves:

• legitimate technical cooperation;
• information exchange;
• standard-setting;
• joint purchasing;
• joint infrastructure;
• exclusive arrangements.

Step 6 — Examine access

Ask:

Can competitors access the infrastructure on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms?

Step 7 — Examine foreclosure

Could the infrastructure owner disadvantage competitors?

Step 8 — Examine efficiencies

Identify:

• cost savings;
• innovation;
• improved interoperability;
• quality improvements;
• consumer benefits.

Step 9 — Consider less restrictive alternatives

Could the same efficiency be achieved through:

• open access;
• anonymisation;
• licensing;
• interoperability;
• independent governance?

Step 10 — Determine remedy

Possible remedies include:

access + interoperability + non-discrimination + data portability + governance safeguards.

30. Key Competition Concerns — Summary

31. Overall Legal Position

Collaborative digital infrastructure presents a dual competition-law problem.

On one side, collaboration can be pro-competitive because shared infrastructure can reduce duplication, lower costs, promote interoperability and accelerate innovation.

On the other side, infrastructure can become a strategic bottleneck. Once competitors depend upon the infrastructure, its controller may possess the ability to influence downstream competition.

The major doctrinal tools are therefore:

1. anti-competitive agreement rules;
2. abuse-of-dominance rules;
3. essential-facility principles;
4. refusal-to-deal doctrine;
5. interoperability obligations;
6. data-access and portability rules;
7. standard-setting rules;
8. information-exchange rules;
9. merger control; and
10. sector-specific digital regulation.

The movement from traditional infrastructure competition law toward digital infrastructure regulation is particularly visible in the EU's current DMA enforcement. In 2026, the Commission has moved beyond general interoperability principles to detailed requirements concerning Android access for competing AI services and access by third-party search providers to certain Google Search data.

Key cases to remember

1. United States v. Microsoft Corp. — platform leverage and technological exclusion.
2. Bronner v. Mediaprint — indispensability and refusal to provide access.
3. IMS Health v. NDC Health — access to protected data/infrastructure and exceptional circumstances.
4. Microsoft v. Commission — interoperability and access to technical information.
5. Google/Enel X (Android Auto) — interoperability of a dominant digital platform.
6. Slovak Telekom v. Commission — infrastructure access and exclusionary conduct.
7. Facebook v. Bundeskartellamt — data combination and competition.
8. Ohio v. American Express — two-sided platform economics.

Core proposition: Collaborative digital infrastructure is generally compatible with competition law where it facilitates interoperability and efficiency, but competition concerns arise when control over the shared infrastructure becomes a mechanism for exclusion, discrimination, coordination, data concentration or leveraging of market power.