Competition Law and Cartel Prohibition in Danish Markets

1. Introduction

Danish competition law adopts a strong prohibition against agreements and practices that restrict competition. The principal domestic provision is Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act (Konkurrenceloven), which corresponds closely to Article 101 TFEU at EU level.

A cartel generally involves cooperation between competitors that substitutes coordination for independent competitive behaviour. Typical cartel conduct includes:

• price fixing;
• bid rigging;
• market or customer allocation;
• output or supply restrictions;
• coordination of discounts or commercial conditions;
• exchange of competitively sensitive information; and
• indirect or facilitated coordination through an intermediary or platform.

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) describes price fixing, market sharing and bid rigging as common forms of cartel conduct.

2. Statutory Framework

Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act

Section 6 prohibits agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.

The prohibition covers, among other things:

1. directly or indirectly fixing purchase or selling prices;
2. limiting production, sales or technical development;
3. sharing markets or sources of supply;
4. applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions where this disadvantages competitors;
5. making contracts conditional upon unrelated supplementary obligations.

The Danish provision operates alongside Article 101 TFEU where the conduct is capable of affecting trade between EU Member States.

The current Danish Act expressly treats agreements concerning prices, production or sales restrictions, market/customer sharing and bid coordination as cartel agreements. Individuals can also face criminal sanctions for intentional or grossly negligent participation in prohibited conduct; serious intentional cartel participation can attract imprisonment of up to 1 year and 6 months under the current statutory framework.

3. What Constitutes a Cartel?

A cartel normally involves horizontal coordination, meaning coordination between actual or potential competitors.

A. Price Fixing

Competitors agree upon:

• minimum prices;
• fixed prices;
• price increases;
• discount levels;
• commissions;
• margins; or
• other important components of price.

The crucial concern is that businesses cease determining prices independently.

B. Bid Rigging

Competitors coordinate tender participation by deciding:

• who will win;
• what price the winner will submit;
• what prices other participants will submit;
• whether competitors will refrain from bidding;
• how contracts will subsequently be allocated.

C. Market Sharing

Competitors divide customers or territories.

For example:

Company A takes northern Denmark while Company B takes southern Denmark.

Customer allocation can be equally serious even where prices are never expressly discussed.

D. Output Restrictions

Competitors may agree to reduce:

• production;
• capacity;
• supply;
• investment; or
• sales.

Such arrangements can artificially increase prices or restrict consumer choice.

E. Sensitive Information Exchange

Exchange of information regarding future prices, discounts, costs, customers, capacity or bids can facilitate coordination.

However, the legal assessment depends upon the content, timing, frequency, market structure and competitive significance of the information.

4. “By Object” Restrictions

Many traditional cartel arrangements are regarded as restrictions by object.

This is important because authorities do not necessarily have to demonstrate actual price increases or measurable consumer harm where the nature of the agreement itself reveals a sufficient degree of competitive harm.

Classic examples include:

• price fixing;
• market sharing;
• customer allocation;
• bid rigging.

The Danish authorities have expressly applied this reasoning in recent cases.

For example, in the Effekthandel energy-sector proceedings, the conduct was found to constitute a restriction of competition by object.

5. Cartels and Trade Associations

A cartel does not become lawful merely because coordination occurs through:

• an industry association;
• purchasing organisation;
• professional body;
• trade federation; or
• joint commercial organisation.

An association can itself become the mechanism through which competitors coordinate their conduct.

This is particularly relevant in Denmark because numerous industries use trade and purchasing associations.

6. Major Danish Cartel Cases

Case 1: Effekthandel and 49 Power Plants — Energy Reserve Auctions

One of the most significant recent Danish cartel cases concerns Effekthandel ApS, 46 cogeneration plants and three power plants.

The Danish Competition Council found that the undertakings coordinated prices and bids in auctions for manual Frequency Restoration Reserve (mFRR) in Western Denmark.

The undertakings participated in a pool arrangement under which pricing was effectively entrusted to Effekthandel rather than independently determined by each undertaking.

The arrangement operated from approximately September 2019 until at least August 2022.

The Danish Competition Council found infringements of both:

• Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act; and
• Article 101(1) TFEU.

The case subsequently generated litigation concerning the participating undertakings. In 2025, the Maritime and Commercial High Court held in six test cases that Effekthandel and five CHP plants had unlawfully coordinated bids and prices and that the conduct constituted a restriction by object.

Legal significance

The case demonstrates that cartel coordination does not require competitors to communicate directly with one another about every individual price.

An intermediary can operate the coordination mechanism.

Case 2: Ageras — Algorithmic/Platform Price Coordination

The Ageras case demonstrates the application of cartel principles to a digital platform.

Ageras provided partners with information concerning an “estimated market price” and, in certain circumstances, minimum quotes.

The Danish Competition Council considered that these mechanisms could influence how participating partners determined their prices.

The authority concluded that the conduct infringed Section 6 and Article 101 and constituted a by-object restriction.

Importantly, the authority considered that the platform's information could function as a focal point reducing uncertainty concerning competitors' pricing behaviour.

Legal significance

The case is important for modern Danish competition law because it demonstrates that cartel concerns can arise through:

• algorithms;
• platforms;
• pricing prompts;
• automated information;
• common pricing benchmarks.

A traditional “meeting around a table” is therefore not necessary for competition law concerns to arise.

Case 3: ØnskeBørn — Retail Price Coordination

In ØnskeBørn A/S, the Danish Competition Council considered coordination among members of an association of undertakings operating in the baby and children's products sector.

The association communicated with members concerning pricing and price marketing for:

• private-label products;
• exclusive products; and
• non-exclusive products.

The Council concluded that the coordination infringed Section 6 and Article 101 TFEU.

The authority considered that the arrangements were capable of reducing price competition between competing retailers.

Legal significance

The case illustrates that a trade association cannot use its organisational structure to coordinate the commercial behaviour of competing members.

Case 4: AFA Decaux and Clear Channel — Outdoor Advertising Discounts

The AFA Decaux/Clear Channel litigation concerned coordination of discount rates between competitors in the outdoor advertising market.

The Maritime and Commercial Court found that the parties had infringed competition law during part of the relevant period through written agreements concerning discount coordination.

The court did not, however, accept the authority's case concerning a subsequent period of alleged concerted practice because the necessary evidence of relevant contacts was not established.

A later criminal proceeding resulted in AFA Decaux receiving a DKK 10 million fine in October 2025 for coordinating discount rates with Clear Channel for more than six years.

Legal significance

The case illustrates two important principles:

1. coordination of discounts can constitute price coordination; and
2. competition authorities must still establish the necessary evidentiary basis for each alleged period of infringement.

Case 5: Demolition Companies — Bid Rigging

Danish enforcement authorities prosecuted several demolition companies for exchanging prices in connection with tenders.

G. Tscherning A/S, for example, accepted a fine of DKK 5.9 million concerning 12 cases of price exchange associated with demolition bids.

Other undertakings also entered into settlement agreements concerning similar conduct.

Legal significance

The case demonstrates the seriousness with which Denmark treats bid-related information exchanges.

Tender participants must independently determine:

• whether to bid;
• their bid price;
• their commercial conditions; and
• their competitive strategy.

Case 6: Fredensborg VVS-Teknik — Plumbing Bid Rigging

In Fredensborg VVS-Teknik A/S, the company entered into a settlement concerning five cases of bid rigging in the Copenhagen area.

The conduct involved exchanging information about prices and other terms and coordinating prices with a competitor.

The infringement occurred between April 2012 and August 2013, and the company accepted a DKK 1 million fine.

Legal significance

The case demonstrates that even a relatively limited number of coordinated tenders can result in enforcement where the conduct concerns the competitive bidding process.

Case 7: Sanoterm Danmark — Individual Liability for Bid Rigging

In the Sanoterm Danmark matter, a former manager accepted a personal fine after the company and the manager exchanged price and other commercial information with a competitor in connection with a tender for plumbing work.

The individual accepted a DKK 100,000 fine.

Legal significance

The case demonstrates that Danish cartel enforcement is not confined to corporate liability.

Individuals involved in serious cartel conduct may also face personal sanctions.

Case 8: ECIT Account — Cartel Facilitation

A particularly important modern Danish case concerns ECIT Account A/S.

The company was found to have helped formalise and maintain a cartel involving nightclubs/discotheques and their joint purchasing organisation.

The Maritime and Commercial Court imposed a DKK 20 million fine on ECIT Account.

The case involved long-term facilitation of geographical market sharing.

Legal significance

The case demonstrates the concept of cartel facilitation.

Competition-law exposure can extend beyond the businesses directly competing in the affected market where a third party knowingly assists in establishing or maintaining an unlawful cartel.

7. European Dimension

Danish cartel law must be understood alongside Article 101 TFEU.

Where a Danish cartel is capable of affecting trade between EU Member States, Article 101 can apply in addition to Section 6.

This is particularly important where:

• Danish undertakings trade internationally;
• the market is Nordic or European;
• procurement involves cross-border suppliers;
• the cartel concerns products sold throughout the EU.

A classic illustration is the European Commission's district-heating-pipe cartel, which initially involved the Danish market and subsequently extended across the European market.

The Commission found conduct involving:

• market allocation;
• price fixing;
• project allocation;
• elimination of a competitor; and
• bid manipulation.

Danish producer Løgstør Rør A/S was among the undertakings fined.

8. De Minimis Rules and Cartels

An important distinction must be made between ordinary restrictive agreements and hard-core cartel conduct.

Danish competition law has mechanisms concerning agreements whose competitive effects are insufficiently appreciable. However, traditional hard-core restrictions such as:

• price fixing;
• market sharing;
• output restriction; and
• bid rigging

are treated much more strictly.

Historically, Danish competition-policy materials have expressly stated that the ordinary market-share/turnover thresholds do not provide a safe harbour for hard-core horizontal restrictions.

Therefore, a business should not assume:

“Our market share is small, therefore our price-fixing agreement is lawful.”

That is an unsafe approach.

9. Enforcement Authorities

Several institutions may become relevant.

Danish Competition and Consumer Authority

The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) investigates competition infringements and supports enforcement of the Competition Act.

Danish Competition Council

The Danish Competition Council makes important decisions concerning competition-law infringements.

Courts

Competition decisions and criminal proceedings can subsequently reach Danish courts, including:

• Maritime and Commercial Court;
• Copenhagen City Court; and
• appellate courts.

Criminal enforcement

Serious cartel behaviour can generate criminal consequences for both undertakings and individuals.

10. Evidence in Cartel Cases

Cartels are often secret, so Danish enforcement can rely on multiple forms of evidence.

Important evidence can include:

Documentary evidence

• emails;
• contracts;
• meeting notes;
• price lists;
• tender documents;
• internal memoranda.

Digital evidence

• messaging applications;
• electronic communications;
• platform records;
• algorithmic instructions;
• databases.

Economic evidence

• parallel pricing;
• unusual bidding patterns;
• identical bids;
• unexplained price movements;
• allocation patterns.

However, parallel conduct by itself does not automatically establish a cartel. Authorities generally need evidence capable of demonstrating the prohibited agreement, concerted practice or other legally relevant coordination.

11. Leniency and Self-Reporting

Cartels are particularly susceptible to leniency programmes because participants may have an incentive to disclose the cartel before competitors do.

A business involved in cartel conduct should consider promptly obtaining independent competition-law advice regarding:

• whether an infringement exists;
• whether it should stop participating;
• preservation of evidence;
• whether a leniency application is available;
• whether disclosure to Danish or EU authorities is appropriate.

Timing can be critical because the position of the first applicant can differ substantially from that of later applicants.

12. Sanctions

Possible consequences of cartel participation include:

1. Corporate fines

Companies may face substantial fines based upon factors including:

• seriousness;
• duration;
• turnover;
• role in the infringement;
• circumstances of the conduct.

2. Individual fines

Managers and other individuals may face personal sanctions where the statutory requirements are satisfied.

3. Imprisonment

Serious intentional cartel participation can result in imprisonment under the Danish Competition Act's criminal provisions.

4. Civil liability

Cartel victims may potentially seek compensation for losses caused by unlawful competition restrictions.

5. Reputational consequences

Businesses can suffer significant commercial and reputational damage even apart from formal sanctions.

13. Distinction Between Legal Cooperation and Cartel Conduct

Not every agreement between competitors is automatically prohibited.

Legitimate cooperation can potentially concern:

• research and development;
• production;
• logistics;
• standardisation;
• purchasing;
• technology development;
• sustainability initiatives.

The critical question is whether the cooperation produces or facilitates an unlawful restriction of competition and whether the arrangement satisfies applicable exemption conditions.

Particular care is required where a cooperation agreement involves the exchange of:

• future prices;
• customer information;
• output plans;
• strategic capacity;
• individual bids.

14. Key Principles Emerging from Danish Case Law

15. Practical Compliance Framework for Danish Businesses

A Danish undertaking should maintain a cartel-compliance programme based on the following principles:

Competitor contact
↓
Determine whether contact is commercially necessary
↓
Avoid exchange of competitively sensitive information
↓
Document legitimate purpose of meetings
↓
Do not discuss future prices, bids, customers or market allocation
↓
Train employees dealing with competitors
↓
Monitor trade-association participation
↓
Monitor algorithms and automated pricing systems
↓
Escalate suspicious communications immediately
↓
Preserve evidence
↓
Obtain specialist advice where potential cartel conduct is discovered

16. Conclusion

The Danish cartel prohibition is built principally around Section 6 of the Danish Competition Act, reinforced where applicable by Article 101 TFEU. The enforcement approach covers traditional cartels—such as price fixing, market sharing and bid rigging—but also extends to modern forms of coordination involving platforms, algorithms, associations, intermediaries and energy-market pooling arrangements.

The Danish cases involving Effekthandel, Ageras, ØnskeBørn, AFA Decaux/Clear Channel, demolition companies, Fredensborg VVS-Teknik, Sanoterm and ECIT Account demonstrate that cartel enforcement can arise across substantially different sectors and forms of conduct.

For examination purposes, the central proposition is:

Danish competition law requires competitors to determine their competitive strategies independently; agreements or coordinated practices that replace that independent decision-making with coordination of prices, bids, markets, customers or output are at the core of the cartel prohibition.