Competition Law And Athlete Image Rights Centralisation
1. Introduction
Airline alliances are cooperation arrangements between two or more airlines designed to expand geographical coverage, improve operational efficiency, reduce costs and provide passengers with seamless international travel.
However, airline alliances can also create significant competition concerns, particularly when competing airlines coordinate fares, capacity, flight schedules, revenue management, market allocation or access to airport facilities.
In Switzerland, airline alliances are examined primarily under the Federal Act on Cartels and Other Restraints of Competition (Cartel Act or CartA) and the institutional framework administered by the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO/Weko).
Swiss competition review is particularly important because Switzerland is a major international aviation hub, with Zurich and Geneva serving as important gateways for European and intercontinental air transport.
The central legal question is:
Does an airline alliance produce genuine economic efficiencies and consumer benefits, or does it eliminate or substantially restrict effective competition?
Swiss review must also account for the relationship between Swiss competition law, international aviation agreements and European Union competition law.
2. Legal framework governing airline alliances in Switzerland
A. Federal Act on Cartels (CartA)
The Swiss Cartel Act of 6 October 1995 is the principal legislation governing restrictive agreements and abuses of market dominance.
Its important provisions include:
| Provision | Legal significance |
|---|---|
| Article 4 | Defines agreements affecting competition and dominant market positions |
| Article 5 | Prohibits unlawful agreements affecting competition |
| Article 6 | Provides for categories of agreements that may be justified on economic efficiency grounds |
| Article 7 | Prohibits abusive conduct by dominant undertakings |
| Article 9 | Establishes merger-notification requirements |
| Article 10 | Governs merger assessment and intervention |
| Article 11 | Provides the substantive framework for merger assessment |
| Article 49a | Provides for direct administrative sanctions in specified circumstances |
B. Article 5: Anti-competitive airline agreements
Article 5 is particularly important for airline alliances.
It covers agreements between undertakings that significantly restrict competition and cannot be justified on economic efficiency grounds.
Examples include:
Joint fixing of ticket prices.
Coordinated fuel surcharges.
Allocation of international flight routes.
Agreements restricting available flight capacity.
Coordination of corporate travel discounts.
Exchange of competitively sensitive future pricing information.
Agreements preventing independent competition on overlapping routes.
Certain particularly serious agreements may benefit from a rebuttable presumption that they eliminate effective competition.
Price-fixing and market-allocation arrangements are especially problematic.
C. Article 7: Abuse of dominant position
Article 7 becomes relevant when an airline or alliance possesses substantial market power.
Potential abuses include:
Predatory pricing against smaller competing airlines.
Refusal to provide access to essential airport facilities.
Discriminatory access to airport slots or infrastructure.
Unjustified loyalty rebates.
Exclusive dealing arrangements.
Bundling and tying of airline services.
Restricting competitors' access to reservation and distribution systems.
Dominance itself is not unlawful. The prohibition concerns abusive exploitation of that dominance.
D. Articles 9–11: Merger control
Airline alliances may sometimes involve transactions that amount to mergers or concentrations.
Examples include:
Acquisition of an airline.
Creation of a jointly controlled airline.
Transfer of decisive operational control.
Integration of competing businesses.
Joint ventures performing all functions of an independent economic entity on a lasting basis.
Not every cooperation agreement constitutes a merger. The legal substance, control arrangements and commercial independence of the parties must be examined.
E. EU–Switzerland Air Transport Agreement
A distinctive feature of Swiss airline competition review is the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (2002).
The Agreement provides a special framework for competition enforcement in aviation.
Its important provisions are:
Article 8: Prohibits anti-competitive agreements, decisions and concerted practices in air transport.
Article 9: Prohibits abuse of dominant positions in air transport.
Article 11: Provides for merger control by the competent European institutions under the applicable EU rules.
Article 13: Addresses state aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition.
Consequently, airline alliances involving Swiss airlines may be examined under both Swiss domestic competition law and the special EU–Swiss aviation framework. The allocation of jurisdiction depends on the conduct, transaction and relevant routes.
Competition Policy+1
3. Competition concerns arising from airline alliances
A. Price coordination
Airlines participating in an alliance may coordinate:
Base ticket prices.
Fuel surcharges.
Security surcharges.
Cancellation charges.
Corporate travel discounts.
Cargo transportation prices.
Such coordination can eliminate independent pricing decisions and reduce consumer choice.
For example, if two competing airlines operating Zurich–London services jointly determine their ticket prices, the arrangement may constitute an unlawful horizontal price-fixing agreement.
B. Market allocation
An alliance may divide routes between participating airlines.
For example:
Airline A operates Zurich–Paris.
Airline B operates Geneva–Paris.
Both airlines agree not to enter each other's principal routes.
Such an arrangement may restrict competition by preventing independent market entry.
C. Capacity coordination
Airlines may coordinate flight frequencies, available seats and aircraft deployment.
Although capacity coordination can improve aircraft utilisation, it may become anti-competitive when its purpose or effect is to artificially restrict supply and increase fares.
D. Code-sharing arrangements
Code-sharing allows one airline to sell tickets on flights operated by another airline under its own airline code.
What Is a Codeshare Flight? - Rustourismnews.com
Airport departures board displaying flight information. photo – Free Electronics Image on Unsplash
Terminal 2 ist weltweit bestes Terminal - Flughafen München
9
Code-sharing can generate significant benefits:
Increased connectivity.
Better passenger convenience.
Reduced operating costs.
Improved international network coverage.
Easier transfer arrangements.
However, competition concerns may arise where code-sharing:
Removes competition on overlapping routes.
Restricts access by independent carriers.
Facilitates coordinated pricing.
Creates discriminatory booking conditions.
Prevents independent schedule decisions.
E. Frequent-flyer programme coordination
Airline alliances commonly integrate loyalty programmes.
Passengers may earn and redeem miles across participating airlines.
However, competition concerns arise when loyalty benefits are used to discourage customers from choosing competing airlines or when competitors are denied access to commercially important loyalty arrangements on discriminatory terms.
F. Airport slot concentration
Airport slots are particularly important at congested airports such as Zurich.
If alliance members control a substantial proportion of available slots, they may create barriers to entry for independent airlines.
Potential concerns include:
Strategic slot retention.
Slot hoarding.
Preferential allocation.
Discriminatory airport access.
Exclusion of competing airlines.
G. Information exchange
Alliance members may exchange information about:
Future ticket prices.
Passenger demand.
Available aircraft capacity.
Planned routes.
Revenue management.
Corporate customer contracts.
Information exchange is not automatically unlawful. Its legality depends on its commercial sensitivity, timing, frequency, purpose and competitive effects.
The exchange of future pricing intentions between competing airlines is particularly risky.
4. Swiss review of airline alliances: assessment methodology
COMCO and the relevant authorities must examine the actual commercial effects of airline cooperation rather than relying exclusively on the contractual description of an alliance.
The principal assessment stages are:
Stage 1: Identification of the arrangement
Determine whether the cooperation involves code-sharing, joint pricing, revenue sharing, capacity coordination, a joint venture or an acquisition.
Stage 2: Relevant market definition
Identify whether competition takes place in:
Passenger air transport.
International business travel.
Domestic air transport.
Air cargo.
Airport services.
Airline distribution and reservation services.
Stage 3: Competitive relationship
Determine whether alliance members are actual or potential competitors.
Stage 4: Market power assessment
Examine market shares, available capacity, airport slots, network effects and entry barriers.
Stage 5: Competitive effects
Evaluate price increases, reduced frequencies, exclusion of competitors and diminished service quality.
Stage 6: Efficiency assessment
Determine whether the alliance produces verifiable improvements in efficiency, connectivity, service quality and cost savings.
Stage 7: Remedies
Consider whether competition concerns can be addressed through slot access, pricing commitments, independent route operations or restrictions on information exchange.
5. Important case laws and competition decisions
The following authorities are particularly relevant. Some are EU decisions or judgments under the EU–Swiss Air Transport Agreement rather than judgments of Swiss domestic courts. They are important to understanding the Swiss aviation competition framework.
Case 1. Swissair/Sabena – Commission Decision, Case IV/M.616 (1995)
Facts: Swissair proposed acquiring control of Sabena, the Belgian national airline. The transaction raised competition concerns concerning routes between Switzerland and Belgium.
Legal issues:
Market concentration.
Route monopolisation.
Barriers to market entry.
Airline cooperation and alliance formation.
Decision and significance:
The European Commission initially identified serious competition concerns arising from the proposed concentration.
The parties subsequently offered commitments, including measures facilitating market entry, interlining arrangements and changes to the regulatory restrictions on routes between Switzerland and Belgium.
The Commission accepted the commitments and cleared the transaction.
Principle: Airline consolidation and cooperation must not eliminate effective competition on individual routes. Market access commitments can be important remedies.
EUR-Lex+1
Case 2. Swissair/Air France – Commission Decision, Case M.1494 (1999)
Facts: The Commission examined the competitive implications of a concentration involving Swissair and AOM, alongside the competitive position of Air France.
The analysis included the Paris–Zurich route.
Legal issues:
Collective dominance.
Market transparency.
Price competition.
Excess capacity.
Differentiation of airline services.
Decision and significance:
The Commission considered whether the market conditions could facilitate parallel conduct between Swissair and Air France.
It examined published fares, corporate incentive programmes, demand growth, capacity and non-price competitive factors such as punctuality and reliability.
The decision illustrates that market shares alone cannot establish collective dominance.
Principle: Collective dominance requires an examination of market transparency, incentives and the ability of competitors to sustain coordinated behaviour.
EUR-Lex+1
Case 3. Lufthansa/SWISS – Commission Decision, Case COMP/M.3770 (2005)
Central Swiss aviation precedent
Facts: Lufthansa acquired control of Swiss International Air Lines.
The transaction raised concerns regarding competition on the Zurich–Stockholm and Zurich–Warsaw routes.
The Commission also considered the relationship between Swiss and other Star Alliance members, particularly SAS and LOT.
Legal issues:
Horizontal overlap.
Airline alliance effects.
Slot concentration.
Potential elimination of competition.
Route-specific market power.
Decision:
The Commission approved the acquisition subject to commitments.
These included:
Slot-related commitments.
Fare commitments.
Measures intended to facilitate entry by competing airlines.
The Commission considered the commercial relationships between alliance members when assessing the likely competitive effects of the acquisition.
Principle: Competition authorities must examine not only direct ownership links but also the commercial incentives created by alliance agreements and associated cooperation arrangements.
The decision is especially important because the EU–Swiss Air Transport Agreement provided the Commission with jurisdiction over relevant Swiss aviation competition issues.
EUR-Lex+1
Case 4. Deutsche Lufthansa AG v European Commission, Case T-712/16 (2018)
Facts: Lufthansa challenged the Commission's refusal to waive certain pricing commitments imposed during the Lufthansa/SWISS merger review.
The commitments concerned Zurich–Stockholm and Zurich–Warsaw.
Lufthansa argued that the competitive circumstances had changed, including changes in its cooperation arrangements with other airlines.
Legal issues:
Merger remedies.
Modification of commitments.
Competition between alliance partners.
Route-specific competitive assessment.
Judgment:
The General Court annulled the Commission's refusal decision insofar as it concerned Zurich–Stockholm, but dismissed Lufthansa's action concerning Zurich–Warsaw.
The Court's approach demonstrated that the continued necessity of a merger remedy must be examined in light of the actual circumstances and the terms of the original commitments.
Principle: Competition remedies should remain connected to the competitive concerns they address. However, their modification requires a proper assessment of the relevant market and the applicable review conditions.
Case T-712/16+1
Case 5. Swissair/Sabena – Commission Decision, Case 96/180 (1996)
Facts: The Commission examined cooperation arrangements between European airlines, including Swissair, Sabena, SAS and Austrian Airlines.
The concern was that overlapping cooperation arrangements could create competing airline groupings with reduced incentives to compete independently.
Legal issues:
Network integration.
Alliance exclusivity.
Competitive independence.
Overlapping airline cooperation agreements.
Decision and significance:
The Commission required certain cooperation agreements between airlines to be terminated to preserve competition between the emerging airline groupings.
It considered the need to maintain effective inter-network competition.
Principle: An airline's participation in multiple overlapping alliances can create competition problems where the arrangements weaken independent competitive incentives or facilitate coordination.
EUR-Lex+1
Case 6. COMCO Air Freight Cartel – Decision of 2 December 2013
Facts: COMCO investigated several international airlines for coordinating prices and surcharges in the air cargo transportation market between 2000 and 2005.
The investigation concerned airlines including British Airways, Air France-KLM, SAS, Singapore Airlines and other international carriers.
Swiss International Air Lines was also involved in the wider conduct but benefited from immunity because of cooperation with the authorities.
Legal issues:
Horizontal price-fixing.
Fuel surcharge coordination.
Security surcharge coordination.
Exchange of commercially sensitive information.
International jurisdiction over airline conduct.
Decision:
On 10 January 2014, COMCO announced fines totalling approximately CHF 11 million against several airlines.
The conduct included coordination of freight rates, fuel surcharges, war-risk surcharges and other charges.
Principle: Airlines cannot use international cooperation arrangements or industry contacts to coordinate commercially sensitive price components.
This is a particularly important Swiss domestic enforcement example under competition law.
admin.ch+1
Case 7. Air Freight Cartel Appeals – Swiss Federal Administrative Court (2022)
Facts: Several airlines appealed COMCO's air freight cartel decision.
The proceedings concerned evidence of coordination involving fuel surcharges and commissions on surcharges.
Legal issues:
Evidence of concerted practices.
Participation in international cartels.
Individual liability of airlines.
Administrative fines.
Procedural fairness.
Judgment:
On 16 November 2022, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court delivered judgments on nine appeals.
It upheld findings of unlawful price-fixing in five cases in principle, while reducing the fines. Three appeals were upheld in full and one in part.
Principle: Competition authorities must establish the participation and responsibility of individual undertakings through sufficient evidence. Participation in industry communications alone does not automatically establish cartel liability.
weko.admin.ch
Case 8. Lufthansa and Swiss International Air Lines – Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 24 July 2024
Facts: Lufthansa challenged the Federal Administrative Court's treatment of the COMCO air freight cartel proceedings.
The dispute concerned the findings and sanctions relating to the international coordination of air freight surcharges.
Legal issues:
Assessment of cartel evidence.
Liability of international airline groups.
Application of Swiss competition law.
Proportionality of sanctions.
Judgment:
On 24 July 2024, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court dismissed Lufthansa's appeal in its entirety.
The decision is significant because it demonstrates that international airline groups and their subsidiaries remain subject to Swiss competition enforcement where the statutory jurisdictional requirements are met.
Principle: International corporate structures do not provide immunity from competition law enforcement for anti-competitive conduct affecting the relevant Swiss market.
weko.admin.ch
Case 9. Deutsche Lufthansa and Others v Commission – Joined Air Freight Appeals, Case C-380/22 P (2026)
Facts: The proceedings concerned the European Commission's findings of coordination in the international air freight market.
The allegations involved fuel surcharges, security surcharges and refusal to pay commissions on surcharges.
Swiss International Air Lines and Lufthansa were among the undertakings involved.
Legal issues:
Territorial jurisdiction.
Article 8 of the EU–Swiss Air Transport Agreement.
Single and continuous infringement.
Individual participation in cartel conduct.
Evidence of awareness of different components of an infringement.
Judgment:
On 26 February 2026, the Court of Justice delivered judgment in Case C-380/22 P.
The judgment addressed the requirements for establishing participation in a single and continuous infringement and the territorial application of competition rules to international air freight conduct.
Principle: Participation in one component of a wider cartel does not automatically establish responsibility for every component. The authority must prove the relevant undertaking's knowledge and participation in the conduct attributed to it.
EUR-Lex+1
Case 10. Air Freight Cartel – Case C-379/22 P (2026)
Facts: This appeal arose from the European Commission's air freight cartel enforcement and involved allegations concerning coordination of freight surcharges.
Legal issues:
International cartel jurisdiction.
Commercial alliance arrangements.
Territorial application of the EU–Swiss Air Transport Agreement.
Limitation periods.
Liability for coordinated pricing.
Judgment:
On 26 February 2026, the Court of Justice examined issues concerning the Commission's jurisdiction over international air freight conduct, including conduct connected with commercial alliance arrangements.
Principle: Commercial alliance arrangements do not provide a defence to otherwise unlawful coordination of prices. Competition authorities must nevertheless establish the relevant territorial jurisdiction and individual responsibility.
EUR-Lex
6. Economic efficiency and justification of airline alliances
Not every airline alliance is unlawful.
Airline cooperation can create substantial economic benefits, particularly in international markets where independent operation may be commercially difficult.
A. Permissible efficiency justifications
| Efficiency | Explanation |
|---|---|
| Network expansion | Airlines provide access to additional international destinations |
| Cost reduction | Shared ground handling and operational facilities reduce expenses |
| Improved connectivity | Better connections between international flights |
| Aircraft utilisation | Improved use of available aircraft and capacity |
| Passenger convenience | Through-ticketing and coordinated baggage handling |
| Safety and technology | Shared technical systems and operational expertise |
| Environmental benefits | Reduced duplication and improved operational efficiency |
B. Conditions for justification
An alliance that restricts competition must satisfy the applicable legal requirements for an efficiency justification.
The parties should demonstrate:
Genuine economic benefits.
Verifiable efficiency improvements.
A causal connection between cooperation and those benefits.
Necessity and proportionality of restrictive provisions.
A fair share of benefits for consumers.
No elimination of effective competition.
An alliance cannot justify price-fixing merely by claiming that cooperation improves operational efficiency.
7. Merger review versus restrictive agreement review
An important distinction under Swiss competition law is that airline alliances may require different forms of legal assessment.
| Feature | Agreement review | Merger review |
|---|---|---|
| Main legal framework | CartA Article 5 | CartA Articles 9–11 |
| Main concern | Restriction of competition | Structural concentration |
| Typical example | Joint pricing | Acquisition of an airline |
| Evidence | Coordination and competitive effects | Control, market structure and competitive effects |
| Possible outcome | Prohibition or sanctions | Clearance, conditions or prohibition |
| Remedies | Removal of restrictive clauses | Structural or behavioural commitments |
A cooperation agreement does not automatically become a merger simply because it is commercially extensive. The existence of lasting joint control and the applicable full-function joint venture criteria must be examined.
8. Remedies available in Swiss airline alliance review
COMCO and other competent authorities may consider remedies addressing the specific competition concerns.
A. Structural remedies
Divestiture of overlapping airline businesses.
Release of airport slots.
Separation of competing operations.
Removal of structural barriers to entry.
B. Behavioural remedies
Independent pricing obligations.
Restrictions on commercially sensitive information exchange.
Non-discriminatory access to distribution systems.
Prohibition of exclusivity arrangements.
Fair access to interline facilities.
Restrictions on coordinated capacity decisions.
C. Access remedies
Authorities may also consider:
Airport slot access.
Ground-handling access.
Reservation system access.
Interline agreements.
Access to essential aviation infrastructure.
The Lufthansa/SWISS merger provides a particularly useful example of slot and fare commitments being used to address route-specific competition concerns.
9. Major challenges in reviewing airline alliances in Switzerland
A. Multi-sided market analysis
Airlines operate in interconnected markets involving passengers, cargo operators, travel agents, airports and online booking platforms.
Competition authorities must examine the effects of an alliance across these interconnected markets.
B. Network effects
An alliance with extensive international connectivity may attract more passengers because of its network coverage.
This can make it difficult for smaller airlines to compete, even when their individual ticket prices are competitive.
C. Hub dominance
Zurich Airport's importance as a hub may reinforce the competitive advantages of established airline groups.
Slot scarcity and network connectivity may create barriers to entry.
D. International jurisdiction
Airline alliances frequently involve undertakings incorporated in different jurisdictions.
The same conduct may affect Switzerland, the EU and other international markets.
The EU–Swiss Air Transport Agreement and competition cooperation arrangements therefore play an important role in enforcement coordination.
Competition Policy+1
E. Sustainability and environmental cooperation
Airlines increasingly cooperate on:
Sustainable aviation fuel.
Carbon-emission reduction.
Aircraft efficiency.
Waste reduction.
Sustainable airport infrastructure.
Such cooperation may be beneficial, but competitors should avoid using environmental initiatives as a mechanism for coordinating prices, restricting output or excluding rival airlines.
10. Practical hypothetical: Swiss airline alliance
Consider a hypothetical arrangement involving three airlines:
Airline A operates from Zurich.
Airline B operates from Geneva.
Airline C operates international connecting flights.
The three airlines enter into an alliance agreement involving joint ticket sales, coordinated schedules, code-sharing and revenue sharing.
However, the agreement also contains provisions requiring the airlines to:
Maintain identical ticket prices on overlapping routes.
Avoid competing for each other's corporate customers.
Coordinate fuel surcharges.
Restrict independent expansion into certain international destinations.
Legal assessment
| Conduct | Swiss competition assessment |
|---|---|
| Code-sharing | Generally permissible, subject to competitive effects |
| Joint ticketing | Generally permissible, subject to competitive effects |
| Coordinated schedules | Requires examination of competitive effects |
| Identical ticket pricing | Serious Article 5 concern |
| Corporate customer allocation | Potential unlawful market allocation |
| Joint fuel surcharges | Serious price-fixing concern |
| Exclusive route restrictions | Requires examination under Article 5 |
| Shared operational facilities | May be justified by efficiencies |
Likely legal outcome: COMCO could investigate the restrictive provisions under Article 5 of the Cartel Act. If the agreement creates dominance and the parties subsequently engage in exclusionary conduct, Article 7 may also become relevant.
If the arrangement constitutes a notifiable concentration, merger review must additionally be considered.
11. Critical evaluation of Swiss airline alliance regulation
The Swiss framework attempts to balance two competing objectives.
First: Aviation integration and efficiency.
International airline networks require cooperation. Without alliances, smaller airlines may struggle to offer global connectivity and compete with larger international carriers.
Second: Preservation of independent competition.
Extensive alliance integration can eliminate independent pricing, reduce route competition and create barriers to entry.
The Lufthansa/SWISS decision demonstrates why competition authorities must examine the commercial relationships between alliance partners rather than treating them as entirely independent competitors.
The air freight cartel proceedings also demonstrate that cooperation within the aviation industry cannot become a justification for coordinating prices.
An effective Swiss review therefore requires route-specific analysis, careful assessment of alliance agreements and international regulatory cooperation.
12. Conclusion
Airline alliances are an important feature of modern international aviation. They improve connectivity, reduce operational costs and facilitate international passenger and cargo transportation.
Nevertheless, alliances can also produce serious competition concerns through price coordination, market allocation, capacity restrictions, slot concentration and exclusionary practices.
Switzerland addresses these concerns through its Cartel Act, COMCO enforcement and the special EU–Swiss Air Transport Agreement.
The most important authorities include Swissair/Sabena, Swissair/Air France, Lufthansa/SWISS, Deutsche Lufthansa v Commission, the Swiss Air Freight Cartel proceedings and the 2026 air freight cartel judgments.
The fundamental principle is that commercial cooperation between airlines is permissible, but cooperation that unlawfully removes independent competitive decision-making or restricts effective competition remains subject to competition law scrutiny.
13. Important legal principles for examination
Airline alliances are not automatically anti-competitive.
Joint pricing between competing airlines can constitute unlawful price-fixing.
Route allocation can constitute a serious horizontal restriction.
Code-sharing requires an assessment of its actual competitive effects.
Slot concentration may create significant barriers to entry.
Frequent-flyer programmes may create exclusionary effects.
Information exchange must be assessed according to its competitive significance.
Efficiency justifications must be genuine and verifiable.
Merger review and restrictive-agreement review are legally distinct.
International airline cooperation remains subject to Swiss and applicable international competition rules.
Overall assessment: The Swiss approach seeks to preserve the economic benefits of international airline alliances without allowing those alliances to become mechanisms for market allocation, cartelisation or the elimination of effective route competiti

comments