1. Introduction

An autonomous consumer economy is an economic environment in which AI agents, digital assistants, smart devices, or other autonomous software systems make purchasing and commercial decisions on behalf of consumers with limited or no real-time human intervention.

Instead of a consumer manually comparing products, negotiating prices and completing transactions, an autonomous agent may:

• search for products;
• compare prices;
• select suppliers;
• negotiate terms;
• make purchases;
• switch between platforms;
• manage subscriptions;
• arrange transportation;
• procure financial or insurance products;
• purchase household supplies;
• negotiate recurring contracts.

This development has major implications for competition law and antitrust law because autonomous agents may simultaneously increase consumer choice and create new mechanisms for coordination, discrimination, foreclosure and market concentration.

The central competition question is:

Will autonomous consumer agents make markets more competitive by searching and switching efficiently, or will control over those agents become a new source of market power?

Existing competition-law principles concerning algorithms, platforms, tying, refusal to deal, vertical restraints, price coordination, information exchange, dominance and mergers provide the principal legal framework.

2. Meaning of Autonomous Consumer Economies

A conventional consumer transaction is:

Consumer → searches → compares → chooses → purchases

An autonomous consumer economy could instead operate as:

Consumer → gives objective → AI agent → searches → evaluates → negotiates → purchases

For example:

“Buy my monthly household supplies at the lowest total cost, subject to my quality requirements.”

The agent might independently:

1. search several marketplaces;
2. compare prices;
3. examine delivery charges;
4. evaluate seller reputation;
5. negotiate discounts;
6. select a supplier;
7. complete payment;
8. monitor future prices;
9. switch suppliers automatically.

This creates a fundamental change in the competitive process because the entity making the immediate purchasing decision may no longer be the human consumer.

3. Autonomous Agents as New Economic Intermediaries

Autonomous agents may become a new intermediary layer between consumers and suppliers.

The structure could become:

Consumers

↓

AI Consumer Agent

↓

Agent Platform

↓

Marketplaces / Suppliers

↓

Products and Services

The agent may therefore control the consumer's access to numerous suppliers.

This creates a potential competition problem:

Whoever controls the consumer's autonomous agent may control access to consumer demand.

If a dominant AI agent determines which sellers are visible, which products are recommended, and which transactions are executed, the agent may acquire substantial gatekeeper power.

4. Relevant Market Definition

Competition authorities would have to determine what constitutes the relevant market.

Possible markets include:

A. Autonomous consumer-agent services

Consumers may use competing:

• AI assistants;
• shopping agents;
• banking agents;
• travel agents;
• personal procurement agents.

B. Agent-distribution markets

An autonomous agent may be distributed through:

• smartphones;
• operating systems;
• browsers;
• search engines;
• messaging applications;
• smart speakers.

C. Underlying transaction markets

The agent may operate in:

• retail;
• food delivery;
• transportation;
• hotels;
• insurance;
• financial services;
• telecommunications;
• energy.

The same autonomous agent can therefore operate across many downstream markets.

5. Market Power of Autonomous Agents

Traditional market share may not fully capture the power of an autonomous agent.

Relevant indicators may include:

• number of users;
• number of transactions;
• percentage of consumer purchasing decisions mediated by the agent;
• access to consumer data;
• control over defaults;
• switching costs;
• integration with payment systems;
• access to suppliers;
• algorithmic recommendation power.

A consumer-agent provider could become powerful even if it does not directly sell the products being purchased.

6. The Gatekeeper Problem

An autonomous agent may become a gatekeeper between suppliers and consumers.

Suppose an AI agent controls a large proportion of household purchases.

A supplier might become dependent upon:

access to the agent's recommendation system.

The agent could then influence:

• ranking;
• visibility;
• price comparison;
• supplier selection;
• transaction fees;
• consumer reviews.

This resembles traditional platform competition concerns but introduces a new element:

The platform may make the purchasing decision itself rather than merely displaying information to the consumer.

7. Self-Preferencing

One of the most significant risks is self-preferencing.

Suppose an AI agent is owned by a company that also sells:

• groceries;
• cloud services;
• travel;
• financial products;
• consumer electronics.

The agent might systematically recommend the owner's products.

For example:

Consumer asks: “Buy the cheapest compatible printer.”

The agent may technically search multiple sellers but consistently place the platform's own printer first.

Potential competition theories include:

• abuse of dominance;
• discriminatory ranking;
• leveraging;
• self-preferencing;
• exclusionary conduct.

8. Google Shopping and Autonomous Agents

The principles arising from the European Commission's Google Shopping decision are particularly relevant.

The competition concern involved preferential treatment of Google's own comparison-shopping service within its dominant general search platform.

The autonomous-agent context could produce an analogous situation:

dominant AI agent → preferential treatment → affiliated products → reduced visibility for competitors.

The important question would not simply be whether the agent recommends its owner's products, but whether the conduct:

• exploits a dominant position;
• disadvantages equally efficient rivals;
• restricts competition;
• reduces consumer choice;
• produces objectively justified efficiencies.

9. United States v. Microsoft Corp.

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) is another important precedent.

Microsoft concerned exclusionary conduct involving a dominant operating-system platform and competing browser technologies.

Relevance to autonomous consumer economies

An operating-system provider could potentially:

1. control the device;
2. control the default AI agent;
3. control access to users;
4. operate its own marketplace;
5. operate its own payment service.

If competing agents are denied equivalent access, Microsoft-type platform foreclosure analysis could become relevant.

10. Tying and Bundling

Autonomous consumer systems may create new forms of tying.

For example:

Smartphone + mandatory proprietary shopping agent

or:

Operating system + exclusive payment agent

or:

Enterprise software + compulsory AI procurement agent.

If the firm has substantial market power in the tying product, competition authorities could examine whether the arrangement improperly forecloses competing agents.

Relevant precedent includes:

Microsoft

The Microsoft case demonstrates how technological integration and contractual restrictions can be analysed where a dominant platform may disadvantage competing products.

European Commission v. Google Android

The Android decision provides important principles concerning tying and contractual arrangements within an integrated digital ecosystem.

11. Algorithmic Price Coordination

Autonomous consumer economies could also create problems on the seller side.

Suppose thousands of sellers use autonomous pricing agents.

Each agent may:

• monitor competitors;
• predict demand;
• adjust prices;
• detect deviations;
• respond immediately.

If agents are programmed or designed to coordinate, the result could be supra-competitive pricing.

This raises the possibility of:

algorithmic collusion.

The fact that the price changes are implemented by AI does not automatically remove the conduct from competition law.

12. Eturas v Lietuvos Respublikos Konkurencijos Taryba

Eturas UAB v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba, Case C-74/14 is highly relevant to algorithmic coordination.

The case involved an electronic booking system through which a centrally implemented technical mechanism could facilitate coordinated discounting among participating businesses.

The Court of Justice considered whether businesses could be held responsible where they were aware of the system's anticompetitive mechanism and failed to distance themselves from it.

Autonomous-agent relevance

A future system could involve:

common AI pricing infrastructure → multiple sellers → coordinated price responses.

The case demonstrates that technological implementation does not necessarily make coordinated conduct legally neutral.

13. United States v. Apple Inc.

The U.S. antitrust litigation concerning Apple's treatment of competing technologies and developers provides another useful analogy.

An autonomous consumer economy could involve an integrated ecosystem consisting of:

• operating system;
• app store;
• payment system;
• AI assistant;
• marketplace.

Control over these interconnected components can create opportunities to disadvantage competitors.

The relevant competition-law issue is whether contractual and technical restrictions protect legitimate ecosystem functions or instead exclude competing services.

14. Booking Platforms and Price-Parity Clauses

Autonomous agents will probably compare prices across multiple platforms.

That creates an important issue involving most-favoured-customer or price-parity clauses.

A platform might require sellers to promise:

“You will not offer a lower price through another channel.”

If multiple autonomous agents depend upon the same platform, such clauses could reduce price competition.

Potential effects include:

• higher consumer prices;
• reduced platform competition;
• reduced incentives for new intermediaries;
• protection of incumbent platforms.

The competition analysis depends heavily upon the market structure and the particular type of parity clause.

15. Online Hotel Booking Cases

European competition authorities have investigated hotel-booking platforms and parity clauses in several jurisdictions.

These matters provide useful precedents for autonomous consumer economies because an AI agent could automatically compare:

• hotel prices;
• cancellation terms;
• loyalty benefits;
• room availability.

If contractual restrictions prevent suppliers from offering different prices through alternative channels, autonomous agents may have fewer competitive options to exploit.