Civil Law In United States (Usa) And Environmental Damage Compensation Claims

1. Introduction

Environmental damage compensation claims in U.S. civil law are legal claims seeking monetary recovery, restoration costs, cleanup expenses, property damages, natural-resource damages, economic losses, or other remedies arising from pollution or environmental harm.

Unlike some areas of civil law that have one dominant statute, environmental compensation in the United States is governed by a combination of federal statutes, state tort law, property law, contract law, and common-law doctrines.

Important federal statutes include:

  • Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) — hazardous-substance contamination and cleanup costs;
  • Oil Pollution Act (OPA) — oil-spill liability;
  • Clean Water Act (CWA) — certain water-pollution violations and civil penalties/remedial claims;
  • Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) — hazardous-waste regulation and certain citizen suits;
  • National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) — primarily procedural, not a general damages statute;
  • various state environmental statutes and common-law actions.

A central principle is that environmental harm does not automatically produce a private damages claim. The claimant must identify an applicable cause of action, establish standing and causation, and prove a legally recoverable form of injury.

2. What Constitutes Environmental Damage?

Environmental damage may involve:

A. Soil contamination

Examples include:

  • petroleum;
  • solvents;
  • pesticides;
  • industrial chemicals;
  • heavy metals;
  • hazardous waste.

B. Water contamination

Claims can involve:

  • rivers;
  • lakes;
  • groundwater;
  • wetlands;
  • coastal waters.

C. Air pollution

Claims may arise from:

  • industrial emissions;
  • toxic releases;
  • smoke;
  • chemical emissions.

D. Oil spills

Oil spills can damage:

  • beaches;
  • fisheries;
  • wildlife;
  • wetlands;
  • commercial property;
  • tourism.

E. Natural-resource damage

Environmental resources may include:

  • wildlife;
  • aquatic ecosystems;
  • groundwater;
  • forests;
  • public lands.

F. Property damage

Private landowners may claim diminution in property value or restoration costs.

G. Economic losses

Businesses may claim losses associated with:

  • fishing;
  • tourism;
  • agriculture;
  • commercial interruption;
  • loss of use.

3. Major Categories of Environmental Compensation

Environmental compensation litigation can generally be divided into:

  1. Cleanup and remediation costs
  2. Natural-resource damages
  3. Private property damages
  4. Personal injury
  5. Business and economic losses
  6. Restoration costs
  7. Government response costs
  8. Contribution claims among polluters
  9. Punitive damages where legally available
  10. Civil penalties and statutory remedies

4. CERCLA — The Central Federal Compensation Statute

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, commonly called CERCLA or Superfund, is one of the most important federal statutes for environmental compensation.

CERCLA is primarily concerned with hazardous-substance contamination and the allocation of cleanup costs.

CERCLA can impose liability upon certain categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs).

The principal categories include:

1. Current owners and operators

A person or entity currently owning or operating a contaminated facility may face liability.

2. Past owners and operators

A person who owned or operated the facility when hazardous substances were disposed of may be liable under the statutory requirements.

3. Arrangers

A party that arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances may be liable.

4. Transporters

Certain persons who accepted hazardous substances for transportation to disposal or treatment facilities may be liable.

CERCLA therefore focuses heavily upon who is legally responsible for contamination and who should bear the resulting response costs. The Supreme Court has described CERCLA as a statutory scheme addressing the fundamental question of "who pays."

5. Elements of a CERCLA Cost-Recovery Claim

A typical CERCLA §107 claim requires establishing several elements.

Generally, the claimant must demonstrate:

  1. The site is a facility;
  2. A hazardous substance was released or threatened to be released;
  3. The release caused the incurrence of response costs;
  4. The response costs are consistent with the National Contingency Plan where applicable;
  5. The defendant falls within one of CERCLA's categories of responsible parties;
  6. The statutory requirements for liability are satisfied.

CERCLA liability can be extremely significant because cleanup costs may involve:

  • soil excavation;
  • groundwater treatment;
  • containment;
  • monitoring;
  • disposal;
  • remediation;
  • long-term institutional controls.

6. Joint and Several Liability

One of the most important CERCLA principles is the potential for joint and several liability.

If environmental harm cannot reasonably be divided among responsible parties, a defendant may potentially be held responsible for the entire recoverable cleanup cost, subject to applicable statutory doctrines.

However, the Supreme Court significantly clarified the importance of divisibility in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States.

7. Case Law

Case 1 — Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States

Citation: 556 U.S. 599 (2009)

Facts

Brown & Bryant operated an agricultural chemical distribution facility in California.

Hazardous chemicals, including pesticides, were stored and handled at the site. Chemical spills and leaks contaminated the property.

The government sought recovery under CERCLA from:

  • Burlington Northern;
  • Union Pacific; and
  • Shell Oil.

Issues

The Supreme Court considered:

  1. whether Shell had CERCLA "arranger" liability; and
  2. whether liability could be apportioned rather than imposed jointly and severally.

Holding

The Supreme Court held that Shell's ordinary sale of a useful commercial product, without an intent to dispose of it, did not constitute arranger liability under the circumstances.

The Court also held that the railroads had established a reasonable basis for apportioning their responsibility.

Significance

This is a foundational environmental compensation case.

It demonstrates that CERCLA does not automatically impose unlimited liability on every business connected with a contaminated site.

The Court emphasized:

  • statutory causation principles;
  • intent in arranger liability;
  • divisibility;
  • apportionment.

 

Principle

CERCLA liability must satisfy the statutory requirements, and objectively reasonable divisibility can prevent joint-and-several liability.

8. Case 2 — United States v. Bestfoods

Citation: 524 U.S. 51 (1998)

Facts

The case concerned environmental contamination caused by an industrial facility operated by a subsidiary.

The government attempted to impose CERCLA liability on the parent corporation.

Issue

Can a parent corporation automatically be held liable for the environmental contamination caused by its subsidiary?

Holding

The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that corporate ownership alone automatically creates CERCLA liability.

Ordinary principles of corporate law generally preserve the separate legal identity of the parent and subsidiary.

However, a parent may potentially incur liability if it:

  • directly operates the facility; or
  • satisfies appropriate requirements for piercing the corporate veil.

Significance

Bestfoods is extremely important for corporate environmental liability.

It establishes that:

Parent corporation ≠ automatically liable for subsidiary's pollution.

The corporate structure remains relevant in environmental litigation.

Principle

Corporate separateness is respected unless an independent legal basis exists for imposing liability.

9. Case 3 — Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.

Citation: 543 U.S. 157 (2004)

Facts

Aviall purchased and maintained aircraft.

The aircraft had become contaminated with hazardous substances.

Aviall incurred cleanup costs and sought contribution from Cooper Industries under CERCLA.

Issue

Could a party seek CERCLA contribution under §113(f) even where it had not first been sued under CERCLA or entered into an administrative settlement?

Holding

The Supreme Court held that a party could not invoke §113(f)(1)'s contribution remedy merely because it had incurred cleanup costs; the statutory contribution mechanism required the circumstances specified by CERCLA.

Significance

The case is important because it distinguishes:

CERCLA cost recovery

from

CERCLA contribution.

This distinction can determine:

  • who may sue;
  • whom they may sue;
  • applicable limitations periods;
  • available remedies.

Principle

Environmental cleanup litigation requires careful selection of the correct CERCLA cause of action.

10. Case 4 — United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.

Citation: 551 U.S. 128 (2007)

Facts

Atlantic Research incurred costs cleaning up hazardous-substance contamination.

It sought recovery from other potentially responsible parties.

Issue

Could a party that voluntarily incurred cleanup costs pursue a CERCLA §107 cost-recovery action?

Holding

The Supreme Court held that a party that voluntarily incurs response costs may pursue a §107 cost-recovery action in appropriate circumstances.

Significance

Atlantic Research is the companion doctrine to Cooper Industries.

Together, the cases help establish the distinction between:

  • §107 cost recovery, and
  • §113 contribution.

Principle

A party's procedural position and the nature of the environmental costs it incurred are critical to determining the appropriate CERCLA remedy.

11. Case 5 — Territory of Guam v. United States

Citation: 593 U.S. 310 (2021)

Facts

Guam operated a major waste-disposal facility.

The Environmental Protection Agency and Guam entered into a consent decree resolving Clean Water Act litigation.

Guam later sought recovery from the United States under CERCLA.

Issue

Did the prior settlement create a CERCLA contribution right even though it resolved liability under the Clean Water Act rather than CERCLA?

Holding

The Supreme Court held that a settlement must resolve CERCLA-specific liability to trigger the contribution right under CERCLA §113(f)(3)(B).

Significance

The decision demonstrates that environmental compensation rights depend heavily upon the precise statutory basis of the underlying settlement.

Principle

Not every environmental settlement automatically creates a CERCLA contribution claim.

 

12. Case 6 — Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker

Citation: 554 U.S. 471 (2008)

Facts

The Exxon Valdez tanker grounded in Alaska in 1989, releasing millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound.

The spill caused enormous environmental and economic damage.

Environmental claims and claims by commercial fishermen and others followed.

Issue

Among other questions, the Supreme Court considered punitive damages associated with the oil spill.

Holding

The Court held that punitive damages were not barred simply because the Clean Water Act and other federal laws addressed the spill.

However, the Court imposed a significant limitation on the punitive award under federal maritime law.

Significance

The case is one of the most important U.S. authorities on environmental damages arising from a catastrophic oil spill.

It demonstrates the distinction between:

  • environmental cleanup;
  • economic losses;
  • compensatory damages;
  • punitive damages.

The underlying environmental claims and settlements exceeded $1 billion, illustrating the extraordinary financial scale of major environmental disasters.

Principle

Environmental pollution can generate multiple categories of civil damages, but each category must have an appropriate legal basis.

13. Case 7 — Exxon Corp. v. Hunt

Citation: 475 U.S. 355 (1986)

Facts

New Jersey established a Spill Compensation Fund financed through a tax imposed on certain petroleum and chemical facilities.

Exxon challenged the state scheme, arguing that it conflicted with CERCLA.

Holding

The Supreme Court rejected the broad preemption challenge.

The Court explained the limits of CERCLA's federal Superfund mechanism and recognized that states retain substantial authority to create environmental compensation mechanisms.

Significance

This case is important because environmental compensation in the United States is not exclusively federal.

States may establish:

  • spill compensation funds;
  • environmental taxes;
  • cleanup programs;
  • state damages regimes.

Principle

Federal environmental law does not necessarily eliminate state environmental compensation systems.

14. Case 8 — Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.

Citation: 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970)

Facts

A cement plant emitted:

  • dust;
  • smoke;
  • dirt;
  • vibrations.

Nearby landowners sued, alleging nuisance and property damage.

Issue

Whether the court should issue an injunction shutting down the plant or instead provide monetary relief.

Holding

The New York Court of Appeals allowed permanent damages to compensate property owners while avoiding an immediate injunction that would effectively shut down the plant.

Significance

Boomer is a classic environmental nuisance case.

It illustrates an important principle:

Environmental compensation can sometimes be used instead of an injunction where the social and economic consequences of stopping the activity are substantial.

Principle

Courts may balance environmental injury against broader economic consequences when determining the appropriate remedy under state nuisance law.

15. Additional Important Environmental Case — Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw

Citation: 528 U.S. 167 (2000)

Although this case primarily concerns standing rather than damages, it is extremely important to environmental civil litigation.

Facts

Laidlaw operated a facility that discharged pollutants into a river.

Environmental organizations brought a citizen suit.

Holding

The Supreme Court recognized standing where members demonstrated concrete environmental and recreational injuries.

Importance

Before a court can award environmental relief, the plaintiff must generally have standing.

This makes standing a threshold issue in environmental litigation.

16. Natural-Resource Damages

Environmental law recognizes a special category known as natural-resource damages (NRD).

Natural resources may include:

  • fish;
  • wildlife;
  • groundwater;
  • surface water;
  • land;
  • ecosystems.

Governmental entities and certain trustees can seek compensation for injury to natural resources.

The purpose is not necessarily to give private individuals a personal windfall.

Instead, the money can be directed toward:

  • restoration;
  • replacement;
  • rehabilitation;
  • acquisition of equivalent resources.

17. Private Property Damage

A private landowner may sue when pollution affects property.

Possible damages include:

Diminution in value

The difference between:

property value before contamination

and

property value after contamination.

Restoration costs

The reasonable cost of cleaning or restoring the property.

Loss of use

Compensation for the period during which the property could not reasonably be used.

Lost income

Where legally recoverable and sufficiently connected to the environmental injury.

18. Cleanup Costs

Cleanup costs are particularly important under CERCLA.

Examples include:

  • excavation;
  • removal;
  • transportation;
  • treatment;
  • disposal;
  • groundwater remediation;
  • monitoring;
  • environmental testing.

A plaintiff must establish that the costs are legally recoverable rather than simply every expenditure associated with the contaminated property.

19. Economic Loss Claims

Businesses affected by pollution may claim:

  • lost profits;
  • lost customers;
  • business interruption;
  • reduced productivity;
  • loss of access;
  • loss of commercial use.

However, economic-loss claims face important limitations.

The claimant may need to demonstrate:

  1. a recognized duty;
  2. causation;
  3. actual economic injury;
  4. foreseeability;
  5. legally recoverable damages.

The availability of pure economic damages varies considerably depending upon the legal theory and jurisdiction.

20. Environmental Nuisance Claims

A private plaintiff may bring a nuisance claim where pollution substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of property.

Two major categories are:

Private nuisance

Injury to an individual's property rights.

Public nuisance

Interference with rights common to the public.

Environmental nuisance claims can involve:

  • odors;
  • chemical releases;
  • noise;
  • smoke;
  • water contamination;
  • industrial emissions.

Possible remedies include:

  • damages;
  • injunctions;
  • restoration;
  • abatement.

21. Trespass and Environmental Contamination

Environmental contamination can sometimes be characterized as trespass when pollutants physically invade another person's property.

Examples include:

  • toxic chemicals entering neighboring land;
  • contaminated groundwater crossing property boundaries;
  • airborne particulate matter settling on property.

The availability of a trespass claim depends on state law and the nature of the intrusion.

22. Negligence-Based Environmental Claims

A traditional negligence claim generally requires:

Duty

The defendant owed a legally recognized duty.

Breach

The defendant failed to act reasonably.

Causation

The defendant's conduct caused the environmental injury.

Damages

The plaintiff suffered legally cognizable harm.

For example:

A chemical manufacturer knows that its storage tanks are deteriorating but fails to repair them, resulting in contamination of neighboring groundwater.

A plaintiff might argue:

knowledge + failure to act + contamination + property damage = negligence.

23. Strict Liability

Certain environmental activities may give rise to strict-liability theories, particularly under specialized statutes or state common law.

Strict liability means the plaintiff may not have to prove ordinary negligence.

CERCLA itself is often described as imposing a form of strict liability on qualifying potentially responsible parties, subject to statutory defenses and requirements.

This is one reason CERCLA litigation can be substantially different from ordinary negligence litigation.

24. Causation in Environmental Litigation

Causation is often one of the most difficult issues.

Suppose groundwater contains:

  • benzene;
  • solvents;
  • petroleum;
  • heavy metals.

Multiple businesses operated at the property over several decades.

The plaintiff must determine:

Which defendant caused which contamination?

Environmental causation can require:

  • historical records;
  • soil testing;
  • groundwater modeling;
  • chemical fingerprinting;
  • expert testimony;
  • site investigations.

25. Divisibility of Environmental Harm

Where multiple parties contributed to contamination, courts may ask whether the harm can reasonably be divided.

For example:

Company A → 20%

Company B → 30%

Company C → 50%

If reliable evidence supports those divisions, apportionment may be possible.

Burlington Northern is especially important because the Supreme Court recognized reasonable divisibility as a basis for avoiding joint-and-several liability.

26. Contribution Among Polluters

Suppose Company A pays $10 million to clean up a contaminated site but believes Companies B and C are also responsible.

A may seek contribution from B and C.

CERCLA's contribution mechanism allows appropriate parties to seek allocation of environmental costs among responsible parties.

However, Cooper Industries, Atlantic Research, and Guam demonstrate that the distinction between cost recovery and contribution is technically important.

27. Defenses to Environmental Compensation Claims

Defendants may raise several defenses.

A. No statutory liability

The defendant argues that it does not fall within a CERCLA liability category.

B. No release

There was no qualifying release or threatened release.

C. No hazardous substance

The material does not satisfy the statutory definition.

D. No causation

The defendant's conduct did not cause the claimed harm.

E. Divisibility

The defendant argues that its responsibility can be reasonably apportioned.

F. Innocent landowner defense

Under specified conditions, a landowner may avoid CERCLA liability.

G. Bona fide prospective purchaser defense

A purchaser may qualify for statutory protection under particular circumstances.

H. Third-party defense

The defendant may argue that the release was caused solely by an unrelated third party, subject to statutory requirements.

I. Statute of limitations

The claim was filed too late.

J. Economic-loss limitations

Certain common-law claims may be barred or restricted when the plaintiff alleges only economic loss.

28. Government Compensation vs. Private Compensation

A major distinction exists between governmental and private claims.

Government may seek:

  • cleanup costs;
  • response costs;
  • natural-resource damages;
  • civil penalties;
  • restoration costs.

Private parties may seek:

  • property damages;
  • cleanup expenses;
  • economic losses;
  • personal injury damages;
  • contract damages;
  • nuisance damages.

The exact remedies depend on the statute and cause of action.

29. Oil Pollution Act

Oil spills are treated differently from many hazardous-substance releases.

The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) establishes a federal liability regime for oil pollution.

Potentially recoverable categories can include:

  • removal costs;
  • natural-resource damages;
  • real or personal property damage;
  • subsistence-use losses;
  • lost revenues;
  • lost profits;
  • government response costs.

The Exxon Valdez litigation demonstrates the enormous scale that oil-pollution compensation can reach.

Importantly, CERCLA itself does not generally cover petroleum releases in the same way that it covers hazardous substances; Exxon Corp. v. Hunt discussed this distinction.

30. Environmental Damage and Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are designed to punish particularly wrongful conduct rather than simply compensate the victim.

Their availability depends upon:

  • applicable state law;
  • federal statutory law;
  • maritime law;
  • contractual limitations;
  • constitutional restrictions.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker is particularly important because the Supreme Court imposed a federal maritime limitation on punitive damages arising from the Exxon Valdez spill.

31. Climate-Change Damage Claims

Climate-change litigation presents a more difficult category.

Plaintiffs have attempted to seek damages against:

  • fossil-fuel companies;
  • energy companies;
  • manufacturers.

The legal issues include:

  • federal common-law displacement;
  • Clean Air Act preemption/displacement;
  • political-question arguments;
  • causation;
  • standing;
  • attribution;
  • interstate and international emissions.

The Supreme Court's American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) is particularly important because it held that federal common-law nuisance claims concerning greenhouse-gas emissions were displaced by the Clean Air Act's federal regulatory framework.

Therefore, climate-related compensation claims require careful distinction from traditional pollution claims.

32. Environmental Damage and Insurance

Environmental losses can also generate insurance disputes.

Potential policies include:

  • commercial general liability;
  • environmental impairment liability;
  • pollution liability;
  • property insurance;
  • business interruption insurance;
  • directors and officers insurance in certain circumstances.

Insurance litigation may ask:

  • Was the contamination sudden or gradual?
  • Does a pollution exclusion apply?
  • When did the property damage occur?
  • Which policy period applies?
  • Was the contamination known?
  • Does the policy cover cleanup costs?

These issues can create separate civil litigation between:

insured ↔ insurer

in addition to:

victim ↔ polluter.

33. Environmental Compensation and Corporate Successors

Environmental liability can also become an issue when a company:

  • merges;
  • acquires another corporation;
  • purchases contaminated property;
  • purchases an industrial facility.

Questions may include:

  • Did the buyer assume liabilities?
  • Does CERCLA independently impose liability?
  • Is the successor legally responsible?
  • Was the transaction structured to avoid environmental liability?
  • Does the corporate veil remain intact?

United States v. Bestfoods is particularly important for understanding the distinction between corporate ownership and direct operational responsibility.

34. Major Case Law at a Glance

CaseCitationMain Environmental Principle
United States v. Bestfoods524 U.S. 51 (1998)Parent/subsidiary liability and direct operation
Burlington Northern v. United States556 U.S. 599 (2009)Arranger liability and divisibility
Cooper Industries v. Aviall543 U.S. 157 (2004)CERCLA contribution requirements
United States v. Atlantic Research551 U.S. 128 (2007)§107 cost recovery
Territory of Guam v. United States593 U.S. 310 (2021)CERCLA-specific settlement required for §113(f)(3)(B)
Exxon Shipping v. Baker554 U.S. 471 (2008)Oil-spill damages and punitive damages
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt475 U.S. 355 (1986)Federal/state environmental compensation schemes
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970)Environmental nuisance and permanent damages
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw528 U.S. 167 (2000)Environmental standing

35. Practical Example

Assume a chemical company operates a manufacturing facility for 30 years.

It releases solvents into the soil and groundwater.

The contamination spreads to neighboring properties.

Potential claims could include:

Government:

  • CERCLA cleanup costs;
  • natural-resource damages;
  • regulatory penalties.

Neighboring landowners:

  • property diminution;
  • restoration costs;
  • nuisance;
  • trespass;
  • negligence.

Businesses:

  • lost profits;
  • loss of use;
  • business interruption.

Insurer:

  • subrogation.

Other polluters:

  • CERCLA contribution.

The court must then determine:

  1. Who released the hazardous substance?
  2. Who owned the property?
  3. Who operated it?
  4. Who arranged for disposal?
  5. What costs were incurred?
  6. Are the costs recoverable?
  7. Can the harm be divided?
  8. What defenses apply?
  9. Which statutory limitations period applies?
  10. What damages or remedies are legally available?

36. Key Legal Principles

Principle 1 — Polluter responsibility

Environmental statutes often attempt to place cleanup costs upon parties legally responsible for contamination.

Principle 2 — Liability is not automatic

A connection with a contaminated site does not necessarily establish liability.

Principle 3 — Causation remains important

The plaintiff must connect the defendant's conduct with legally cognizable environmental harm where the applicable cause of action requires it.

Principle 4 — CERCLA is highly technical

The difference between:

  • §107 cost recovery, and
  • §113 contribution

can determine the outcome of litigation.

Principle 5 — Divisibility can limit liability

A defendant may avoid joint-and-several liability when the environmental harm is reasonably divisible.

Principle 6 — Corporate structure matters

A parent corporation does not automatically become liable merely because it owns a polluting subsidiary.

Principle 7 — State law remains important

Nuisance, trespass, negligence and property-damage claims can coexist with federal environmental statutes.

Principle 8 — Remedy depends on the legal theory

Cleanup costs, property damage, natural-resource damages, economic losses and punitive damages are legally distinct categories.

37. Conclusion

Environmental damage compensation claims in U.S. civil law involve a complex interaction between federal environmental statutes and traditional civil-law doctrines.

The most important federal mechanism for hazardous-substance contamination is CERCLA, which seeks to ensure that appropriate responsible parties bear qualifying cleanup and response costs. The Supreme Court's decisions in Bestfoods, Burlington Northern, Cooper Industries, Atlantic Research, and Guam establish important rules governing corporate responsibility, arranger liability, divisibility, cost recovery and contribution.

For oil spills, the Oil Pollution Act provides a separate framework, while Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker illustrates the enormous financial and remedial consequences that can follow a catastrophic spill.

At the state-law level, cases such as Boomer v. Atlantic Cement demonstrate that environmental injury can also produce traditional civil remedies such as nuisance damages, while Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw shows the importance of standing before an environmental claim can proceed.

The fundamental structure can therefore be summarized as:

Environmental contamination

Identify applicable legal regime

Establish responsible party

Prove release/injury and required causation

Calculate legally recoverable loss

Apply defenses, divisibility and statutory limitations

Award cleanup costs, restoration, property damages, natural-resource damages or other authorized remedies

Thus, U.S. environmental compensation law does not operate on the simple principle that every polluter automatically pays every environmental loss. Instead, liability and compensation depend on the specific statute, type of environmental harm, identity of the responsible party, causal connection, divisibility of the damage, nature of the claimant's injury, and remedy authorized by law.

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