Attention Economy and Competition Law Adaptation

1. Meaning of the Attention Economy

The attention economy is an economic environment in which companies compete not only for consumers' money but also for their limited attention, time, engagement and behavioural responses.

Digital platforms often monetise attention through:

advertising;

sponsored content;

subscriptions;

recommendations;

targeted advertising;

influencer content;

algorithmic ranking;

short-form video;

autoplay;

notifications;

personalised feeds;

search results.

The basic economic model is:

Users → attention → engagement → data → advertising/transactions → revenue

Competition law traditionally focused heavily on price, output and market shares. Digital attention markets require regulators to examine additional dimensions such as:

attention;

engagement;

data;

quality;

privacy;

recommendation systems;

switching costs;

network effects;

ecosystem power.

The EU's Digital Markets Act expressly seeks to make digital markets more fair and contestable, while continuing to apply EU competition law alongside it. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

2. Why the Attention Economy Creates Competition Problems

A traditional market can be represented as:

Firm → Product → Consumer → Price

An attention-economy platform can operate as:

Platform → Content → User attention → Data → Advertising → Revenue

The platform may therefore compete for time and engagement rather than simply selling a conventional product.

This produces several potential competition concerns.

Major concerns

Concentration of user attention

Network effects

Data accumulation

Algorithmic ranking

Self-preferencing

Advertising-market concentration

Switching costs

Default settings

Interoperability restrictions

Acquisitions of potential competitors

Exploitative use of user data

Artificial engagement mechanisms

3. Attention as an Economic Resource

Human attention is scarce.

A user has only a limited amount of:

time;

cognitive capacity;

willingness to consume information.

Therefore, platforms compete to obtain:

maximum attention per user per unit of time.

Examples include:

TikTok competing for viewing time;

Instagram competing for engagement;

YouTube competing for video consumption;

search engines competing for search activity;

streaming platforms competing for viewing time;

gaming platforms competing for play time.

The important competition-law question becomes:

Can control over user attention create or reinforce market power?

4. From Market Share to Attention Share

Traditional competition analysis may ask:

What percentage of sales does the company have?

In attention markets, additional metrics may matter:

Attention share

Percentage of total user time captured.

Engagement share

Percentage of interactions captured.

Query share

Percentage of searches controlled.

Recommendation share

Percentage of recommendations influencing users.

Advertising share

Percentage of advertising expenditure captured.

Data share

Amount of commercially valuable behavioural data accumulated.

A platform could therefore have significant competitive power even where its conventional revenue share does not fully reveal its strategic importance.

5. Attention and Network Effects

Attention platforms often exhibit network effects.

The relationship may look like:

More users

↓

More content creators

↓

More content

↓

More user engagement

↓

More advertising revenue

↓

More investment

↓

Better platform

↓

More users

This creates a feedback loop.

A successful platform may therefore become increasingly difficult for rivals to challenge.

6. Data–Attention Feedback Loop

The attention economy also produces a data cycle:

More attention

↓

More behavioural data

↓

Better personalisation

↓

Better recommendations

↓

More engagement

↓

More attention

This can create an entrenched competitive advantage.

The European Commission has recognised the competitive importance of data advantages. In 2026 it required Google, under the DMA, to share specified anonymised Search data with eligible competitors, including AI chatbots offering search functionality, partly to enable them to improve their services and compete with Google Search. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

7. Attention Economy and Article 102 TFEU

Where a platform is dominant, Article 102 TFEU may become relevant.

Potential theories include:

A. Self-preferencing

Giving the platform's own content or service preferential visibility.

B. Exclusionary ranking

Demoting competing services.

C. Leveraging

Using dominance in one market to strengthen a position in another.

D. Tying

Making access to one service dependent upon another.

E. Loyalty mechanisms

Creating incentives that make users or advertisers remain within the ecosystem.

F. Data-related exclusion

Using accumulated data to make competitive entry unnecessarily difficult.

G. Interoperability restrictions

Making it difficult for users or rivals to interact with competing services.

8. Article 101 TFEU

Attention markets can also involve agreements between undertakings.

Potential examples:

exclusive content arrangements;

restrictive advertising agreements;

exclusivity with creators;

contractual restrictions on advertisers;

agreements preventing multi-homing;

restrictive distribution agreements.

The legal analysis depends on the agreement's object, effects and the relevant market.

9. Digital Markets Act

The DMA represents an important adaptation of competition regulation to digital gatekeepers.

The legislation establishes obligations concerning matters such as:

self-preferencing;

interoperability;

data access;

data portability;

anti-steering;

advertising transparency;

user choice.

The DMA is specifically designed to address gatekeeper power and contestability problems that may be difficult to resolve through traditional antitrust cases alone. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

10. Digital Services Act and Attention Design

The attention economy also demonstrates that competition law cannot operate entirely in isolation from digital regulation.

The Digital Services Act addresses systemic risks associated with very large online platforms and search engines.

This includes scrutiny of:

recommender systems;

transparency;

systemic risks;

platform design;

user protection.

In July 2026, the European Commission preliminarily found that Meta's use of features such as infinite scroll, autoplay, push notifications and highly personalised recommender systems could constitute addictive design concerns under the DSA. (Digital Strategy)

Similarly, in February 2026 the Commission issued preliminary findings concerning TikTok's addictive design involving infinite scroll, autoplay, push notifications and personalised recommendation systems. (Digital Strategy)

These proceedings are particularly important because they illustrate the distinction between:

competition in attention

and

regulation of potentially harmful attention-optimisation design.

They are not automatically the same legal issue.

11. Case Law

Case 1 — Google Shopping

Google and Alphabet v Commission, C-48/22 P

Google Shopping is one of the most important precedents for the attention economy.

The case concerned Google's preferential treatment of its own comparison-shopping service within general search results.

The Court of Justice confirmed the relevance of examining the effects of Google's conduct on competing comparison-shopping services.

Importance for attention economy

Search results determine:

Where the user's attention goes.

If an intermediary controls the gateway and systematically gives its own service preferential prominence, it may influence the competitive distribution of user attention.

The modern DMA has gone further by expressly prohibiting designated gatekeepers from treating their own services more favourably in ranking than comparable third-party services. In July 2026, the Commission fined Google €460 million for a DMA infringement concerning self-preferencing on Google Search. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

Principle

Control over visibility and user attention can have competitive significance where a dominant or regulated gatekeeper uses that control to favour its own downstream services.

12. Case 2 — Google Android

Google and Alphabet v Commission, C-738/22 P

The Android litigation concerned Google's ecosystem of:

Android;

Google Play;

Google Search;

Chrome;

manufacturers;

mobile operators.

The case illustrates how an upstream platform can influence downstream competition through interconnected contractual and technological arrangements.

Attention-economy relevance

A platform controlling the operating system can influence:

which apps are visible;

which search service is used;

which browser is selected;

which services become default;

where users spend their digital time.

Thus:

Device control → user access → attention allocation → downstream market power

The EU's 2026 regulatory activity concerning Android interoperability and AI services further illustrates the continuing relevance of ecosystem access and contestability. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

13. Case 3 — Microsoft v Commission

T-201/04

Microsoft concerned, among other things:

interoperability;

Windows;

work-group server operating systems;

Windows Media Player.

The General Court examined how Microsoft's control over a major technological platform could affect neighbouring markets.

Attention-economy relevance

Modern platforms similarly control the infrastructure through which users encounter:

content;

applications;

advertisements;

competing services.

If the infrastructure operator restricts interoperability, rivals may lose opportunities to obtain user attention.

Principle

Control over an important technological platform can affect competition in downstream markets where access to that platform is commercially significant.

14. Case 4 — Intel v Commission

C-413/14 P

Intel concerned loyalty rebates provided by a dominant undertaking.

The Court emphasised the need to assess the circumstances relevant to the potential exclusionary effects of the rebates.

Attention-economy relevance

Attention platforms may use analogous incentives with:

advertisers;

creators;

publishers;

merchants;

content providers.

For example:

“Use our advertising ecosystem exclusively and receive preferential rates.”

or:

“Publish through our platform and receive preferential promotion.”

Such arrangements may potentially affect the ability of competing channels to obtain users or advertisers.

Principle

Economic incentives can be relevant to foreclosure analysis where their structure is capable of restricting effective competition.

15. Case 5 — Servizio Elettrico Nazionale

C-377/20

The Court considered whether a dominant undertaking could use advantages obtained from its historical position to restrict competition following market liberalisation.

The judgment emphasised the distinction between:

competition on the merits; and

conduct capable of excluding competitors.

Attention-economy relevance

A digital platform may have accumulated:

users;

data;

behavioural profiles;

creator relationships;

advertising infrastructure.

The question becomes whether the platform is using these legitimate advantages or employing exclusionary methods to prevent competitors from gaining scale.

Principle

An incumbent's existing advantages do not automatically justify conduct that restricts effective competition.

16. Case 6 — Meta Platforms / Commission

T-1078/23, General Court, 3 June 2026

The 2026 General Court judgment concerned Meta's designation under the DMA and the legal concepts surrounding:

online social-networking services;

number-independent interpersonal communications services;

online intermediation services;

important gateways between business users and end users.

The Court annulled one part of the Commission's designation decision while dismissing the remainder of Meta's action. An appeal is pending. (curia)

Attention-economy relevance

Social-networking platforms are classic attention intermediaries.

They connect:

Users ↔ content ↔ advertisers ↔ businesses

The case demonstrates the importance of correctly identifying the service and gateway function when applying digital-platform regulation.

17. Case 7 — Hoffmann-La Roche

85/76

Hoffmann-La Roche is a foundational Article 102 case involving loyalty-inducing arrangements.

The Court recognised that dominant firms cannot use certain loyalty mechanisms to tie customers to themselves and thereby restrict competition.

Attention-economy relevance

The modern equivalent may involve:

loyalty rewards;

platform-specific benefits;

exclusive content;

personalised recommendations;

ecosystem benefits.

The fundamental concern is similar:

Does the mechanism make customers less responsive to competing offers?

18. Case 8 — Bronner

C-7/97

Bronner concerned access to a newspaper home-delivery system.

The Court adopted a demanding approach to refusal-of-access claims.

Attention-economy relevance

A rival platform might argue:

“Users spend their attention on the incumbent platform, so I need access to the platform.”

Bronner demonstrates that commercial importance does not automatically create a legal right of access.

Competition law must satisfy the applicable conditions for intervention.

19. Case 9 — United Brands

C-27/76

United Brands is foundational for the concept of dominance.

The Court described dominance in terms of economic strength allowing an undertaking to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and consumers.

Attention-economy relevance

The concept can be adapted analytically to markets where power is reflected not merely in price but in control over:

users;

distribution;

advertising;

data;

attention;

digital gateways.

20. Case 10 — Ohio v American Express

585 U.S. 529 (2018)

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed a two-sided transaction platform involving merchants and cardholders.

The Court treated the interaction between the two sides as central to the antitrust analysis.

Attention-economy relevance

Social-media and advertising platforms similarly connect:

Users ↔ advertisers

or:

Users ↔ creators ↔ advertisers

The platform may provide a service to users while monetising their attention through advertising.

Therefore, analysing only one side can produce an incomplete economic picture.

21. The Special Problem of “Free” Services

Many attention-economy services appear to have:

Price = zero

But users pay indirectly with:

attention;

time;

behavioural data;

engagement;

exposure to advertisements.

Therefore, competition law must sometimes examine non-price competition.

Relevant parameters can include:

privacy;

advertising intensity;

recommendation quality;

content quality;

user control;

interoperability;

time costs.

22. Attention Quality as a Competitive Parameter

Two platforms may both be free.

Platform A:

fewer advertisements;

chronological feed;

strong privacy;

less intrusive recommendations.

Platform B:

intensive tracking;

highly personalised recommendations;

extensive advertising;

strong engagement optimisation.

Consumers may value these differences.

Therefore:

Quality can be a competition parameter even when monetary prices are zero.

23. The Problem of Engagement Maximisation

Platforms may have incentives to maximise:

time spent

rather than:

consumer welfare.

An algorithm may promote content likely to produce:

clicks;

comments;

shares;

repeated viewing;

longer sessions.

This can create tension between:

engagement optimisation

and

quality competition.

Competition authorities may therefore need to examine whether a platform's algorithmic advantage comes from genuine innovation or from mechanisms that disadvantage rival forms of content or competing platforms.

24. Algorithmic Self-Preferencing

Imagine an AI recommender controls 80% of user attention in a market.

It can choose:

whose content appears;

how frequently it appears;

where it appears;

whether it is recommended;

whether external links are suppressed.

If it favours the platform's own services, the competitive impact can be substantial.

The 2026 Google DMA enforcement demonstrates that ranking and visibility can be directly addressed through digital-platform regulation. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

25. Attention and Advertising Markets

Advertising creates a second market.

The structure becomes:

Users → attention → platform

and:

Advertisers → money → platform

The platform therefore monetises one side through another.

Potential competition issues include:

advertising-data advantages;

self-preferencing;

discriminatory ad access;

tying advertising services;

exclusive arrangements;

lack of measurement transparency;

leveraging user attention into advertising dominance.

The Commission's recent competition work has specifically identified Meta's strong position in national markets for online display advertising on social-media platforms, citing factors such as market shares, its role as an unavoidable trading partner, barriers to entry and its Business Tools. (European Commission)

26. Attention Economy and Data Advantage

Data can become a competitive asset because it improves:

recommendation algorithms;

advertising targeting;

user profiling;

search;

content selection.

A dominant attention platform can therefore have:

attention → data → algorithmic advantage → more attention

This is one reason data access has become an important element of digital-market regulation. The DMA's 2026 Google Search data-sharing measures explicitly aim to allow competitors to improve their services and contest Google's position. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

27. Multi-Homing

Multi-homing means users or advertisers use several competing platforms.

Example:

User uses Instagram + TikTok + YouTube.

Multi-homing can constrain platform power.

But platforms may create barriers through:

incompatible identities;

exclusive content;

restrictive APIs;

data lock-in;

contractual restrictions;

technical limitations.

Therefore:

Single-homing increases potential dependency; multi-homing can strengthen contestability.

28. Switching Costs

Attention platforms may create switching costs through:

accumulated followers;

social connections;

content history;

recommendation profiles;

reputation;

creator audiences;

saved content;

platform-specific purchases.

A creator with 10 million followers on one platform may not be able to transfer those relationships easily to a rival.

This creates creator-side dependency.

29. Creator Economy

Attention competition increasingly involves creators.

Creators supply:

content

Platforms supply:

distribution + recommendation + audience

If one platform controls the majority of audience attention, creators may become dependent upon its:

ranking algorithm;

monetisation programme;

advertising system;

recommendation system;

account access.

This can create a downstream dependency problem.

30. Attention Economy and Mergers

Traditional merger analysis may ask:

Will the merger increase prices?

In attention markets, regulators may instead need to examine:

loss of potential competition;

acquisition of emerging rivals;

data combination;

increased attention concentration;

creator lock-in;

advertising concentration;

reduced innovation.

This is particularly important where the target has:

low revenue but rapidly growing user attention.

31. Killer Acquisitions

A large platform may acquire a small competitor before it becomes a major threat.

The target may not have:

significant revenue;

large profits;

conventional market share.

But it may possess:

rapidly growing engagement;

innovative recommendation technology;

young users;

new forms of content;

a different business model.

Competition law therefore increasingly needs to consider potential competition and innovation, rather than only current sales.

32. Attention Economy and Consumer Welfare

Potential harms include:

Economic

higher advertising prices;

fewer alternatives;

reduced competition.

Quality

excessive advertising;

reduced privacy;

lower content diversity.

Innovation

weaker incentives for new platforms.

Choice

fewer meaningful alternatives.

Data

greater concentration of behavioural information.

However, high engagement is not itself evidence of an antitrust violation.

A platform can legitimately attract enormous attention because consumers genuinely value its service.

33. Competition Law Must Distinguish Four Situations

This distinction is essential.

34. Competition Law Adaptation

Traditional competition law can be adapted in several ways.

A. Broader quality analysis

Assess:

privacy;

advertising load;

content quality;

user control.

B. Data analysis

Consider:

data accumulation;

data portability;

access to important datasets.

C. Algorithmic analysis

Examine:

ranking;

recommendations;

self-preferencing;

discrimination.

D. Ecosystem analysis

Examine:

network effects;

lock-in;

interoperability.

E. Non-price competition

Assess competition even where services are free.

35. Ex Ante Regulation

Traditional antitrust generally operates after conduct has occurred.

Digital regulation can operate before harm becomes entrenched.

The DMA is an important example.

The Commission's current framework expressly describes the DMA as complementing EU competition law and establishing objective obligations for designated gatekeepers. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

This is particularly useful in attention markets because network effects can make later intervention difficult.

36. Ex Post Competition Enforcement

Article 101 and Article 102 remain important.

They can address:

exclusionary agreements;

dominance abuses;

foreclosure;

discriminatory conduct;

tying;

loyalty mechanisms;

refusal to deal;

leveraging.

The challenge is proving the relevant competitive effects.

37. Role of the Digital Services Act

The DSA addresses a different but complementary dimension.

The attention economy can generate:

systemic risks;

recommender-system concerns;

addictive design;

transparency problems.

The Commission's 2026 preliminary findings concerning Meta and TikTok demonstrate that algorithmic engagement design is now an active regulatory subject, although those proceedings concern DSA obligations rather than automatically establishing competition-law infringements. (Digital Strategy)

38. Competition vs Consumer Protection

These should be distinguished.

Competition law asks:

Is market power being acquired or maintained through exclusionary conduct?

Consumer law asks:

Is the individual consumer being misled or exploited?

Digital-services regulation asks:

Does platform design create systemic digital risks?

The same conduct can potentially implicate more than one legal framework.

39. Key Legal Test for Attention-Economy Cases

A useful analytical framework is:

1. Identify the market

Is it:

social networking?

online advertising?

search?

video?

content distribution?

creator services?

2. Identify the scarce resource

Usually:

user attention

3. Identify market power

Consider:

users;

attention share;

advertisers;

data;

network effects;

switching costs.

4. Identify conduct

For example:

self-preferencing;

exclusion;

tying;

exclusivity;

discriminatory ranking.

5. Examine effects

Does conduct:

foreclose rivals?

reduce innovation?

reduce quality?

increase dependency?

6. Examine justification

Could the conduct be justified by:

security;

privacy;

quality;

technical efficiency?

7. Examine remedy

Possible remedies include:

interoperability;

data portability;

ranking neutrality;

anti-steering;

access to data;

non-discrimination.

40. Current 2026 Developments

The legal adaptation is particularly visible in Europe.

Google Search

In July 2026, the Commission fined Google €460 million under the DMA for self-preferencing its own services in Search and required compliance with ranking-related obligations. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

Google Search data

The Commission adopted measures in July 2026 requiring Google to share specified anonymised Search data with eligible competitors, including qualifying AI chatbots offering search functions. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

Meta and TikTok

The Commission has also pursued preliminary DSA findings concerning addictive design and recommender systems. (Digital Strategy)

Cloud and AI ecosystems

In June 2026, the Commission preliminarily considered AWS and Azure to be potential DMA gatekeepers, citing entrenched user bases, lock-in, switching costs, ecosystems and the growing importance of AI tools in cloud procurement. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

These developments show that attention, data, AI, cloud infrastructure and digital gateways are increasingly interconnected in competition analysis.

41. Case-Law Summary

42. Important Distinction: Attention Monopoly vs Competition for Attention

An important exam point is:

High attention share does not automatically equal illegal monopoly power.

A platform may have a large attention share because:

its product is better;

consumers prefer it;

it innovated successfully;

network effects create legitimate value.

Competition law becomes concerned when market power is maintained or extended through legally prohibited conduct, or when specific ex-ante digital-market obligations apply.

43. Future Competition-Law Issues

The attention economy will increasingly raise questions concerning:

AI recommendation systems

Who controls what consumers see?

AI-generated advertising

Can AI optimise persuasion in ways that disadvantage competing advertisers?

Virtual assistants

Will AI assistants become gateways to commercial attention?

Wearable devices

Could glasses or other devices control what information users see?

Brain-computer interfaces

Could attention itself become technologically measurable and commercially monetised?

Digital twins

Could platforms predict consumer behaviour before consumers consciously act?

Synthetic media

Could AI-generated content increase concentration of user attention?

Algorithmic markets

Could algorithms coordinate strategies designed to capture attention?

These developments may require competition law to examine control over information flows and user decision-making, rather than merely control over physical goods.

44. Ultra-Short Revision Notes

Attention Economy

An economic system in which firms compete for scarce user attention and monetise engagement, data and advertising.

Main characteristics

User attention

Engagement

Data

Algorithms

Recommendations

Network effects

Advertising

Zero-price services

Switching costs

Ecosystem power

Main competition concerns

Self-preferencing

Ranking manipulation

Data advantage

Lock-in

Exclusive arrangements

Leveraging

Tying

Reduced multi-homing

Advertising concentration

Killer acquisitions

Important cases

Google Shopping — C-48/22 P

Google Android — C-738/22 P

Microsoft — T-201/04

Intel — C-413/14 P

Servizio Elettrico Nazionale — C-377/20

Meta Platforms — T-1078/23

Hoffmann-La Roche — 85/76

Bronner — C-7/97

United Brands — C-27/76

Ohio v American Express — 585 U.S. 529

45. Conclusion

Attention economy challenges traditional competition law because the competitive resource is often not money but human attention, time, engagement and behavioural data.

The modern competition analysis therefore has to consider:

market power + attention share + network effects + data + algorithms + ranking + switching costs + interoperability + advertising + ecosystem dependency.

Traditional Article 101/102 jurisprudence—particularly Google Shopping, Google Android, Microsoft, Intel, Servizio Elettrico Nazionale, Hoffmann-La Roche and Bronner—provides important analytical foundations.

But digital regulation is increasingly supplementing traditional antitrust. The DMA directly addresses gatekeeper practices such as self-preferencing, anti-steering, interoperability and data access, while the DSA addresses systemic and recommender-system risks. The 2026 European enforcement developments demonstrate that regulation is increasingly concerned with the relationship between user attention, algorithmic recommendation, data advantages and digital gatekeeper power. (Digital Markets Act (DMA))

Core principle for examination:

Competition law must evolve from analysing only who sells the most goods or charges the lowest price toward analysing who controls the digital gateways through which users discover, consume, choose and transact—while still distinguishing legitimate innovation and consumer preference from exclusionary conduct.