1. Introduction

Advanced competition law research examines the legal, economic, technological and institutional mechanisms through which markets remain competitive, accessible, innovative and fair. It goes beyond traditional antitrust issues such as price-fixing, cartels and monopolisation to investigate complex developments involving artificial intelligence, digital platforms, algorithmic pricing, data concentration, mergers, financial markets, essential facilities and cross-border corporate power.

Modern competition law increasingly addresses a fundamental question: How can competition authorities prevent private economic power from becoming an enduring barrier to market entry, innovation and consumer choice?

Advanced research should combine:

Substantive competition law and economic analysis.

Digital-market regulation and platform governance.

Merger control and structural market analysis.

Abuse of dominance and exclusionary conduct.

Competition compliance and corporate accountability.

International cooperation and regulatory convergence.

Innovation, sustainability and consumer welfare.

2. Major Advanced Competition Law Research Areas

A. Artificial Intelligence and Algorithmic Competition

This research area examines how AI systems affect market competition, particularly where competing businesses use common algorithms to determine prices, allocate customers, predict demand or coordinate commercial strategies.

Important research questions include:

Whether algorithmic pricing can facilitate tacit collusion.

Whether common pricing software creates indirect information exchange.

Whether autonomous AI systems can produce coordinated market outcomes.

Whether algorithmic discrimination constitutes an abuse of dominance.

Whether AI training datasets constitute essential competitive inputs.

Whether AI developers can restrict downstream competition through licensing arrangements.

Legal significance: Competition authorities must distinguish legitimate technological optimisation from algorithmically facilitated coordination and exclusionary conduct.

B. Digital Platform Dominance and Gatekeeper Regulation

Digital platforms may exercise substantial market power through network effects, data advantages, switching costs and control over essential commercial interfaces.

Research issues include:

Self-preferencing in search and marketplaces.

App-store commission structures.

Default-setting agreements.

Platform interoperability restrictions.

Data portability and switching barriers.

Multi-sided market definition.

Preferential access to platform infrastructure.

The central issue is whether platform owners use their intermediary position to disadvantage competing businesses.

C. Advanced Merger Control and Acquisition of Potential Competitors

Traditional merger review concentrates on market shares and existing competition. Advanced merger research examines transactions that may eliminate future competitors before they become significant market participants.

Key issues include:

Killer acquisitions.

Serial acquisitions.

Nascent competitor acquisitions.

Vertical and conglomerate mergers.

Data-driven acquisitions.

Acquisition premiums and competitive overvaluation.

Below-threshold merger investigations.

Innovation competition and dynamic efficiencies.

Research significance: A merger may reduce future innovation and potential competition even when its immediate effect on prices appears limited.

D. Essential Facilities and Access Pricing Regulation

Essential facilities research examines circumstances in which a dominant enterprise controls infrastructure or inputs that competitors cannot reasonably duplicate.

Examples include electricity grids, ports, telecommunications networks, payment systems, transport terminals, databases and digital infrastructure.

Major legal questions include:

Whether the facility is genuinely indispensable.

Whether access can technically and economically be provided.

Whether refusal to deal excludes effective competition.

Whether access prices are discriminatory or excessive.

Whether interoperability obligations are justified.

Whether access regulation undermines legitimate investment incentives.

E. Competition Economics and Market Definition

Advanced market-definition research investigates how competition authorities identify relevant product and geographic markets in complicated economic environments.

Research methods include:

SSNIP and SSNDQ tests.

Critical loss analysis.

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.

Diversion ratios.

Price correlation analysis.

Econometric market assessment.

Counterfactual analysis.

Multi-sided market evaluation.

The challenge is that market power may arise from data, ecosystem control, quality, innovation or network effects rather than simply high prices.

F. Cartel Detection, Bid Rigging and Information Exchange

Advanced cartel research focuses on identifying coordination that may be concealed through sophisticated commercial arrangements.

Topics include:

Bid rotation in public procurement.

Market allocation agreements.

Coordinated production restrictions.

Trade association information exchange.

Signalling through public announcements.

Hub-and-spoke cartel structures.

Leniency programmes and whistleblower protection.

Digital evidence and forensic investigation.

An important distinction is that parallel commercial conduct does not automatically establish an unlawful agreement. Authorities must examine evidence of coordination, communication, market structure and commercial incentives.

G. Predatory Pricing and Exclusionary Pricing Strategies

Predatory pricing research examines whether a dominant undertaking deliberately sacrifices short-term profits to eliminate competitors and subsequently recover its losses.

Advanced issues include:

Below-cost digital subscriptions.

Zero-price platform services.

Bundled discounts.

Loyalty rebates.

Cross-subsidisation.

Selective price reductions.

Dynamic algorithmic pricing.

Predation in emerging markets.

Research must distinguish aggressive but legitimate competition from exclusionary pricing strategies capable of producing durable market foreclosure.

H. Vertical Restraints and Supply-Chain Competition

This area examines agreements between manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, retailers and service providers.

Major research topics include:

Exclusive distribution agreements.

Resale price maintenance.

Territorial restrictions.

Most-favoured-nation clauses.

Exclusive purchasing obligations.

Tying and bundling.

Dual distribution.

Online marketplace restrictions.

The central legal issue is whether vertical restrictions improve distribution efficiency or unnecessarily prevent competing suppliers from accessing markets.

I. Data Concentration, Privacy and Competition Law

Data has become an important source of economic advantage. Enterprises controlling large datasets may develop stronger predictive systems, improve targeted advertising and establish barriers to entry.

Research questions include:

Whether exclusive access to data constitutes an entry barrier.

Whether refusal to share data can constitute exclusionary conduct.

Whether data portability improves competition.

Whether privacy restrictions create competitive advantages.

Whether combining datasets through acquisitions strengthens market power.

Whether data interoperability should be imposed as a regulatory remedy.

J. Competition Law and Sustainability

This research area examines the relationship between environmental objectives and competitive market structures.

Important topics include:

Green agreements between competitors.

Sustainable production standards.

Joint environmental investments.

Circular economy cooperation.

Green technology licensing.

Carbon-reduction collaborations.

Sustainability-related merger efficiencies.

Environmental claims and misleading competitive practices.

The principal challenge is determining when cooperation creates genuine environmental benefits and when sustainability is used to justify restrictive commercial coordination.

3. Additional Advanced Research Topics

4. Important Legal Framework: Morocco and Comparative Competition Law

For research involving Morocco, the principal statutory foundation is:

Moroccan Law No. 104-12 on Free Pricing and Competition, as amended by Law No. 40-21, together with the institutional framework under Law No. 20-13, as amended by Law No. 41-21.

The major provisions include:

The Competition Council is responsible for investigating and deciding competition matters within its statutory jurisdiction.

Three important research directions for Morocco are:

Digital-market enforcement: Applying traditional competition rules to platforms, AI systems and data concentration.

Merger-control modernisation: Improving the identification of acquisitions that threaten potential competition.

Effective remedies: Developing access, interoperability, non-discrimination and structural remedies that can be monitored and enforced.

The Moroccan framework should be analysed on its own statutory terms. European and American judgments discussed below are comparative authorities, not binding Moroccan precedents.

WIPO+2

5. Important Competition Law Case Laws

The following ten landmark decisions provide a comparative foundation for advanced competition law research. They cover cartel enforcement, algorithmic pricing, platform dominance, essential facilities, mergers and exclusionary conduct.

1. United States v. Apple Inc. (2015)

Court: United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Subject: E-book price-fixing and horizontal coordination.

Facts and principle: Apple facilitated coordination among major publishers concerning e-book retail prices through agency agreements. The court upheld the finding that the arrangements constituted unlawful horizontal price-fixing.

Research significance: This case is important for examining indirect coordination, intermediary liability and the use of contractual arrangements to facilitate cartel conduct.

2. Eturas UAB v. Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba (2016), Case C-74/14

Court: Court of Justice of the European Union.

Subject: Digital platforms and algorithmically facilitated coordination.

Facts and principle: The case concerned an online travel-booking platform that circulated a system notification restricting discounts available to travel agencies. The Court examined when platform participants could be considered to have participated in a concerted practice.

Research significance: It demonstrates how digital communications and platform-generated restrictions can become relevant evidence in cartel investigations. Awareness and participation must nevertheless be assessed individually.

3. Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India (2021), (2021) 3 SCC 136

Court: Supreme Court of India.

Subject: Algorithmic pricing and hub-and-spoke cartel allegations.

Facts and principle: The case concerned allegations that ride-hailing platforms facilitated coordination among drivers through algorithmically determined fares. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the issue of the informant's standing.

Research significance: It provides an important starting point for research into algorithmic pricing, digital intermediaries and the evidentiary challenges of proving cartel conduct. It should not be interpreted as a final judicial determination that algorithmic pricing is inherently lawful or unlawful.

4. Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. v. European Commission (Google Android), Case T-604/18 (2022)

Court: General Court of the European Union.

Subject: Digital ecosystems, tying and exclusionary agreements.

Facts and principle: The proceedings concerned Google's contractual arrangements involving Android, search applications, browser distribution, exclusivity payments and anti-fragmentation obligations.

The General Court largely upheld the Commission's findings concerning abusive practices.

Research significance: The decision is important for studying ecosystem dominance, distribution restrictions, network effects and the foreclosure of competing digital services.

5. Google LLC v. European Commission (Google Shopping), Case T-612/17 (2021)

Court: General Court of the European Union.

Subject: Self-preferencing and abuse of dominance.

Facts and principle: Google was found to have favoured its own comparison-shopping service in search results while disadvantaging competing comparison-shopping services.

The General Court upheld the Commission's infringement decision.

Research significance: This case provides an important foundation for investigating platform neutrality, ranking discrimination and the competitive responsibilities of dominant intermediaries.

6. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint, Case C-7/97 (1998)

Court: Court of Justice of the European Union.

Subject: Essential facilities and refusal to deal.

Facts and principle: The dispute concerned access to a newspaper distribution system operated by a competitor.

The Court established demanding conditions for treating refusal to provide access to infrastructure as an abuse of dominance, including indispensability and the absence of realistic alternatives.

Research significance: It is a foundational decision for examining access to essential infrastructure, interoperability, digital networks and infrastructure-sharing obligations.

7. Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04 (2007)

Court: Court of First Instance of the European Communities.

Subject: Interoperability and tying.

Facts and principle: Microsoft was found to have abused its dominant position through restrictions on interoperability information and the tying of Windows Media Player with Windows.

The court substantially upheld the Commission's decision.

Research significance: The case demonstrates how control over technological interfaces and interoperability information can create barriers to competing products.

8. Intel Corp. v. Commission, Case C-413/14 P (2017)

Court: Court of Justice of the European Union.

Subject: Loyalty rebates and exclusionary pricing.

Facts and principle: The Court addressed the assessment of Intel's conditional rebates and the importance of examining the potential anticompetitive effects of those arrangements.

Research significance: It is important for research into effects-based competition assessment, economic evidence, market foreclosure and the distinction between legitimate discounts and exclusionary rebate systems.

9. Towercast SASU v. Autorité de la concurrence, Case C-449/21 (2023)

Court: Court of Justice of the European Union.

Subject: Below-threshold acquisitions and abuse of dominance.

Facts and principle: The Court held that an acquisition falling outside the applicable EU merger-control thresholds may, in appropriate circumstances, be examined under Article 102 TFEU where the relevant conditions for abuse are established.

Research significance: The judgment is important for studying below-threshold acquisitions, killer acquisitions and the relationship between merger control and abuse-of-dominance enforcement.

10. Illumina Inc. and Grail LLC v. European Commission, Joined Cases C-611/22 P and C-625/22 P (2024)

Court: Court of Justice of the European Union.

Subject: Merger jurisdiction and regulatory referral powers.

Facts and principle: The Court examined the European Commission's ability to accept referrals of transactions under Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation, particularly where the referring national authorities lacked jurisdiction under their own merger-control rules.

The Court rejected the Commission's broad interpretation of that referral mechanism.

Research significance: This decision is essential for examining jurisdictional limits, below-threshold transactions, legal certainty and the development of merger-control systems.

6. Advanced Research Methodology

A strong advanced competition law research paper should combine legal interpretation with economic evidence.

7. Major Unresolved Legal Questions

The following questions offer particularly valuable opportunities for original legal scholarship.

Can autonomous AI systems independently facilitate unlawful market coordination?

Should dominant digital platforms have a statutory duty to provide interoperability?

Can acquisition premiums indicate the elimination of potential competition?

Should competition authorities investigate acquisitions below conventional notification thresholds?

Can access to commercially valuable datasets be regulated under essential-facilities principles?

How should competition law address common ownership among competing enterprises?

Can algorithmic discrimination constitute an independent theory of exclusionary abuse?

Should sustainability benefits justify otherwise restrictive agreements?

Can competition authorities impose structural separation on dominant digital ecosystems?

How should competition law regulate the market power of state-owned enterprises?

Should competition law recognise labour-market monopsony as a distinct enforcement priority?

How can regulators distinguish legitimate algorithmic price optimisation from coordinated pricing?

8. Suggested Advanced Dissertation and Doctoral Research Titles

These topics are suitable for LLM dissertations, PhD research, academic publications and comparative competition-law projects.

9. Conclusion

Advanced competition law research must move beyond traditional market-share analysis and examine the structural sources of economic power. AI, data, network effects, digital infrastructure, financial integration and strategic acquisitions are transforming the ways in which competition can be restricted.

The ten judgments discussed above provide a comparative foundation for analysing these developments. However, their principles must be applied according to the statutory language, institutional jurisdiction and evidentiary requirements of the relevant country.

For Morocco in particular, an important research opportunity is the development of a modern competition-enforcement framework that combines Law No. 104-12 with sophisticated economic analysis, digital-market investigation, effective merger review and proportionate remedies.

The most promising overarching research theme is the transformation of competition law from conventional cartel and monopoly control into comprehensive governance of structural, technological and algorithmic market power.