Future Of Structural Remedies In Platform Markets

Introduction

Structural remedies are interventions that change the structure of a market or the ownership/control relationships within it, rather than merely regulating conduct. In traditional competition law, they include divestiture, business-unit separation, ownership separation, access obligations combined with structural reorganisation, prohibition of acquisitions, and—in exceptional cases—break-up of an integrated undertaking.

Their importance is increasing in platform markets because digital platforms can accumulate several forms of power simultaneously:

• control over users and business customers;
• ownership of data;
• control over app stores or operating systems;
• access to advertising inventory;
• control over payment systems;
• cloud and computing infrastructure;
• default/pre-installation advantages;
• control over interoperability and APIs;
• vertically integrated AI and data ecosystems.

A major future question is therefore whether competition authorities should continue relying predominantly on behavioural remedies, or whether some digital platforms have become sufficiently structurally entrenched that structural remedies are necessary.

1. Meaning Of Structural Remedies In Platform Markets

A structural remedy changes the competitive architecture of a market.

Examples include:

1. Divestiture – requiring a platform to sell a business or asset.
2. Business separation – separating an intermediary from a vertically integrated business.
3. Ownership separation – preventing common ownership of competing platform layers.
4. Functional separation – placing legally or operationally distinct units behind internal firewalls.
5. Prohibition of acquisitions – preventing a dominant platform from acquiring emerging competitors.
6. Asset separation – separating data, infrastructure, payment systems, advertising technology or other strategically important assets.
7. Platform-layer separation – separating operating systems, app stores, search, advertising, cloud or other complementary layers.
8. Interoperability-oriented structural remedies – requiring technical architecture to permit effective competition.
9. Data separation – preventing a platform's competitive businesses from automatically combining datasets.
10. AI-stack separation – potentially separating foundation models, compute, data and downstream applications where vertical integration creates durable exclusionary power.

The distinction from behavioural remedies is fundamental.

2. Why Structural Remedies Are Becoming More Important

A. Network Effects

Platforms often become more valuable as more users participate.

A dominant platform can therefore benefit from a reinforcing cycle:

Users → data → better service → more users → more data → stronger ecosystem

Once this cycle becomes sufficiently powerful, behavioural remedies may not restore competitive conditions.

B. Multi-Sided Markets

A platform simultaneously intermediates several groups:

consumers + sellers + advertisers + developers + payment providers + complementary services.

A remedy addressing only one side may therefore leave the underlying source of power untouched.

For example, prohibiting discriminatory treatment of merchants may not solve a problem if the platform continues to control:

• the operating system;
• app distribution;
• payments;
• advertising;
• data;
• ranking;
• authentication.

C. Vertical Integration

Digital platforms frequently compete with businesses that depend upon their infrastructure.

This creates the classic problem:

Platform + infrastructure + downstream competitor

The platform may possess both the ability and incentive to disadvantage rivals.

Structural separation becomes attractive where behavioural rules would require regulators to supervise thousands of technically complex decisions.

3. The Main Future Models Of Structural Remedies

3.1 Platform–Commerce Separation

A platform could be separated from businesses that compete with its dependent merchants.

The basic principle would be:

An intermediary should not simultaneously control the market and compete against the participants dependent upon it.

This is particularly relevant to:

• online marketplaces;
• app stores;
• advertising exchanges;
• travel platforms;
• food-delivery platforms.

3.2 Search–Advertising Separation

Search engines can simultaneously control:

1. user access;
2. search rankings;
3. advertising inventory;
4. advertising technology;
5. advertising data.

A future structural remedy could separate search from particular advertising functions where vertical integration creates persistent conflicts of interest.

3.3 App Store Separation

The app-store ecosystem presents a particularly important structural question.

An integrated company may control:

operating system → app distribution → payments → developer rules → competing applications

Future remedies could therefore include:

• separation of app-store governance;
• independent payment infrastructure;
• independent app-review systems;
• restrictions on ownership of competing downstream applications.

4. Case Law

1. United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001)

Facts

Microsoft was found to have unlawfully maintained its monopoly in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems and engaged in exclusionary conduct concerning web browsers.

Importance

The case is central to structural-remedy theory in technology markets because the court considered separating Microsoft's operating-system business from other activities.

Although the final remedy did not ultimately impose the contemplated break-up, the litigation demonstrated that structural separation could be considered where behavioural conduct was deeply connected with a firm's market architecture.

Future significance

The case provides an important principle:

When exclusionary conduct is embedded within the organisation of a technology ecosystem, structural remedies may become relevant.

5. United States v. AT&T

2. United States v. AT&T (1982)

The AT&T litigation produced one of the most important structural remedies in competition-law history.

AT&T's telecommunications monopoly was divided through the creation of separate regional operating companies.

Platform-market relevance

Although telecommunications is not identical to today's digital platforms, the case provides a powerful structural-remedy analogy.

A vertically integrated infrastructure provider may possess the ability to disadvantage businesses dependent upon its infrastructure.

The structural response was essentially:

Separate control of essential infrastructure from competitive downstream activities.

Future application

This logic could become relevant to:

• cloud platforms;
• app stores;
• digital payment systems;
• advertising exchanges;
• AI infrastructure.

6. United States v. Google – Search

3. United States v. Google LLC, Search and Search Advertising Litigation

The Google search litigation represents a modern test of structural remedies in digital markets.

The underlying competition concerns include Google's distribution arrangements, default positions and relationships with device manufacturers and browsers.

Structural-remedy significance

The litigation demonstrates a movement beyond simple fines toward consideration of remedies capable of weakening the mechanisms that maintain search dominance.

Possible structural thinking includes:

• restrictions on default arrangements;
• separation of distribution incentives;
• limitations on tying search to other ecosystem components;
• potentially more fundamental separation if behavioural remedies prove inadequate.

Future significance

The case illustrates a central principle for platform markets:

A remedy should target the mechanism through which dominance is reproduced, not merely the individual instance of exclusionary conduct.

7. European Union Structural Thinking

4. Google Shopping – Google and Commission

In Google Search (Shopping), the European Commission found that Google had abused its dominant position by favouring its comparison-shopping service in general search results.

The Court of Justice ultimately upheld the Commission's core finding.

Importance for remedies

The case illustrates the limits of conduct-based intervention.

A platform controlling both:

• the infrastructure through which users discover information, and
• a competing downstream service,

creates an inherent structural conflict.

Future implication

The logical development may be toward remedies that prevent the platform from simultaneously exercising:

gatekeeping power + ranking control + downstream competitive advantage.

Structural or quasi-structural remedies therefore become increasingly conceivable.

8. Android

5. Google Android – European Commission

The Android case concerned Google's practices involving mobile operating systems, app stores and search.

The Commission identified several contractual arrangements that strengthened Google's position in mobile search.

Structural relevance

Android demonstrates how dominance can be maintained through an ecosystem rather than a single product.

The relevant competitive structure includes:

Android → Play Store → search → default settings → advertising → data

Consequently, regulating one contractual restriction may not necessarily dismantle the underlying ecosystem advantage.

Future lesson

Platform remedies increasingly need to examine the architecture of ecosystem power.

9. Amazon Marketplace

6. European Commission / Amazon Marketplace Investigation

Competition authorities have examined Amazon's dual role as:

• marketplace operator; and
• retailer competing on that marketplace.

The core concern is the possibility that Amazon could use marketplace information generated by independent sellers to strengthen its own retail operations.

Structural-remedy significance

This is a textbook example of the structural problem of:

intermediary + competitor

Behavioural regulation can prohibit particular forms of data use.

But a structural approach asks a deeper question:

Should the intermediary and competing retail business remain under common control?

That question is likely to become increasingly important in future platform regulation.

10. Meta / Facebook

7. FTC v. Facebook / Meta

The FTC's litigation concerning Facebook's acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp illustrates another dimension of structural remedies: acquisition-based structural intervention.

Instead of correcting conduct after dominance has developed, competition law can seek to prevent or reverse structural consolidation.

Future significance

This is particularly important for digital markets because:

a small acquisition can remove a future competitor before the competitive threat becomes measurable.

Therefore, future structural remedies may increasingly focus on portfolio structure, not merely present market share.

11. Intel

8. Intel v. Commission

The Intel litigation concerned exclusionary practices involving rebates.

The case is relevant because it illustrates the difficulties of determining whether conduct by a dominant technology firm actually forecloses competitors.

Structural lesson

Where a platform's conduct repeatedly produces exclusionary effects, authorities may eventually question whether behavioural regulation alone is capable of restoring competition.

This is particularly relevant where network effects make market recovery extremely difficult.

12. Structural Remedies Versus Behavioural Remedies

The central future debate can be represented as follows:

Behavioural model

Dominant platform

↓

Competition authority imposes rules

↓

No discrimination
No self-preferencing
Data restrictions
Interoperability
Transparency

↓

Continuous monitoring

Structural model

Dominant platform

↓

Identify conflict-producing businesses

↓

Separate ownership/control

↓

Independent competitive entities

↓

Reduced incentive and ability to exclude

The structural model seeks to reduce the opportunity and incentive for anticompetitive behaviour rather than continually policing it.

13. The Problem Of "Structural" Versus "Functional" Separation

Structural remedies should not necessarily mean a complete corporate break-up.

A spectrum exists:

Conduct remedy

↓

Data firewall

↓

Functional separation

↓

Accounting separation

↓

Business-unit separation

↓

Ownership separation

↓

Divestiture

↓

Complete break-up

This suggests that future competition authorities may increasingly use graduated structural remedies.

14. Structural Remedies And AI Platforms

AI could significantly expand the structural-remedy debate.

A dominant AI ecosystem may control:

• chips;
• cloud computing;
• training data;
• foundation models;
• model distribution;
• inference APIs;
• application stores;
• enterprise software;
• advertising;
• user data.

The resulting structure may resemble:

Compute → Model → API → Application → Distribution → Data

If one undertaking controls every layer, competitors may struggle to emerge even without conventional exclusionary conduct.

Future structural remedies could therefore include:

A. Compute separation

Separating infrastructure from downstream AI applications.

B. Model/application separation

Preventing a foundation-model provider from preferentially favouring its own downstream applications.

C. Data separation

Preventing unrestricted combination of datasets obtained from different ecosystem activities.

D. API neutrality

Separating model governance from downstream commercial competition.

E. Acquisition restrictions

Subjecting acquisitions of AI startups to especially stringent scrutiny.

15. Data As A Structural Asset

Traditional competition law focuses heavily on physical assets.

Digital competition requires greater attention to data assets.

A future structural remedy could require:

• separation of datasets;
• restrictions on cross-service data combination;
• independent data trustees;
• portability;
• interoperability;
• deletion or exclusion of competitively sensitive data.

The important conceptual shift is:

Structural remedies may increasingly separate information resources rather than merely corporate entities.

16. Structural Remedies And Network Effects

Structural remedies become especially attractive where network effects create an irreversible feedback loop.

Suppose:

Dominant platform

→ more users

→ more data

→ better algorithms

→ more users

→ more sellers

→ more advertising revenue

→ greater investment

→ even stronger platform.

A behavioural remedy may prohibit one exclusionary practice.

But the network effect remains.

A structural remedy instead attempts to weaken the feedback mechanism itself.

17. The Problem Of Innovation

Structural remedies also create significant risks.

Breaking up a platform may:

• reduce economies of scale;
• increase costs;
• duplicate infrastructure;
• reduce investment;
• undermine interoperability;
• slow innovation;
• weaken cybersecurity;
• reduce product quality.

This means competition authorities cannot assume:

more firms = more competition = better outcome.

The remedy must be proportionate to the demonstrated competitive harm.

18. Dynamic Efficiency

Digital markets are unusually dynamic.

A company dominant today may face competition from a technology that does not yet exist.

Structural intervention can therefore produce two opposite effects.

Positive

It may create space for new competitors.

Negative

It may prevent a platform from achieving efficiencies that generate future innovation.

The appropriate remedy therefore requires an assessment of:

• innovation incentives;
• economies of scale;
• economies of scope;
• interoperability;
• switching costs;
• network effects;
• entry barriers;
• data advantages;
• technological trajectories.

19. Structural Remedies And Merger Control

The future of structural remedies is closely connected with merger enforcement.

Authorities may increasingly focus on:

Killer acquisitions

Acquiring a potential future competitor.

Data acquisitions

Buying firms primarily for their datasets.

Ecosystem acquisitions

Buying businesses that strengthen an existing platform ecosystem.

Vertical acquisitions

Buying suppliers or infrastructure providers.

AI acquisitions

Buying model developers, compute providers or AI applications.

The structural remedy may therefore be imposed before market power becomes entrenched.

20. Role Of Ex Ante Digital Regulation

Traditional antitrust generally operates retrospectively.

Digital regulation increasingly operates prospectively.

This creates a combined model:

Ex ante regulation + antitrust + structural remedies

For example:

• digital-market legislation identifies gatekeepers;
• competition law investigates abuse;
• structural remedies address persistent market architecture.

The future therefore may not involve competition law acting alone.

21. Structural Remedies And Fundamental Rights

Structural remedies can affect:

• property rights;
• freedom of enterprise;
• contractual freedom;
• innovation;
• consumer choice;
• privacy;
• data protection.

Consequently, authorities will need to demonstrate:

1. legitimate competition objective;
2. evidence of structural harm;
3. causal connection;
4. necessity;
5. proportionality;
6. least-restrictive effective intervention.

This will become particularly important in constitutional systems such as Germany and the European Union.

22. German Competition Law Perspective

Germany's modern competition framework provides an important foundation for future structural intervention.

The strengthened powers concerning large digital undertakings—particularly under GWB §19a—reflect a movement away from waiting until traditional abuse has fully materialised.

This is significant because the authority can address firms whose importance extends across multiple markets and whose ecosystem position can create competitive advantages.

The future trajectory could therefore be:

market power

→ ecosystem power

→ cross-market structural power

→ structural intervention

23. Future Structural Remedy Test

A useful framework would ask six questions.

1. Is the platform structurally indispensable?

If yes, ordinary behavioural remedies may be insufficient.

2. Is there vertical integration?

If the platform competes with businesses using its infrastructure, structural concerns increase.

3. Are network effects exceptionally strong?

Strong network effects make market self-correction less likely.

4. Can behavioural monitoring realistically work?

If regulators would need to supervise millions of algorithmic decisions, structural remedies become more attractive.

5. Is there a less restrictive effective remedy?

Structural intervention should normally not be the first choice where effective behavioural regulation exists.

6. Will separation restore contestability?

The remedy should ultimately be evaluated by whether it creates sustainable competitive conditions.

24. Future Case-Law Direction

The next generation of cases is likely to move through three stages.

Stage 1 — Conduct

Authorities prohibit:

• self-preferencing;
• tying;
• discriminatory access;
• exclusionary contracts.

Stage 2 — Ecosystem regulation

Authorities regulate:

• data;
• interoperability;
• defaults;
• APIs;
• app stores;
• acquisitions.

Stage 3 — Structural intervention

Where these measures fail:

• business separation;
• ownership separation;
• divestiture;
• infrastructure separation;
• data separation;
• platform-layer separation.

Thus, structural remedies may become the remedy of last resort for systemic digital market power.

25. Key Principles For Future Structural Remedies

The emerging doctrine can be summarised through ten principles:

1. Target the source of structural power.
2. Distinguish platform neutrality from mere non-discrimination.
3. Treat data as a potential structural asset.
4. Consider ecosystem-wide rather than single-market effects.
5. Prevent acquisitions that eliminate nascent competition.
6. Use graduated separation rather than automatic break-up.
7. Consider innovation effects.
8. Integrate competition and digital regulation.
9. Use structural remedies where behavioural supervision becomes impracticable.
10. Apply proportionality and due process.

Conclusion

The future of structural remedies in platform markets is likely to involve a transition from the traditional question:

"What conduct should the dominant platform stop?"

to a deeper question:

"What market structure allows the platform to possess and reproduce this power?"

The experience of Microsoft, AT&T, Google, Amazon, Facebook/Meta and other major technology cases demonstrates why this distinction matters.

Structural remedies will probably not become the routine response to every digital-abuse case. Their strongest future application will arise where a platform possesses persistent network effects, vertical integration, control over essential digital infrastructure, enormous data advantages, ecosystem leverage and the ability to eliminate emerging competitors.

The most important future development may therefore be a graduated structural-remedy model:

behavioural remedy → functional separation → data/infrastructure separation → business separation → ownership separation → divestiture

The ultimate objective is not simply to punish a dominant platform. It is to restore contestable market structures capable of generating competition without permanent regulatory supervision.