88. COMPETITION LAW AND DIGITAL ENERGY PLATFORMS

1. Introduction

Digital energy platforms are online or software-based systems that connect electricity generators, suppliers, aggregators, consumers, storage operators, electric-vehicle users, and traders. They may facilitate peer-to-peer electricity trading, demand response, virtual power plants, energy procurement, battery aggregation, smart-meter services, and electricity-market transactions. Their growth creates competition-law questions because a platform may simultaneously control access to data, determine transaction rules, rank participants, and influence prices.

In South Africa, these issues are principally governed by the Competition Act 89 of 1998, together with electricity-market legislation and regulatory rules. The Competition Act seeks, among other objectives, to promote competitive prices and consumer choice and to provide equitable opportunities for participation in the economy.

2. Competition Risks

Digital energy platforms can produce both pro-competitive efficiencies and competition concerns. A platform can reduce transaction costs, improve matching between supply and demand, facilitate renewable-energy integration, and enable smaller generators to participate.

However, competition concerns may arise through:

Exclusionary access rules preventing rival suppliers from using the platform;

Self-preferencing, where a platform favours its own electricity products;

Control of commercially sensitive energy data;

Algorithmic price coordination between competing traders;

Predatory or discriminatory platform pricing;

Exclusive agreements with generators or consumers;

Interoperability restrictions preventing switching between platforms; and

Mergers or acquisitions that concentrate digital infrastructure and energy-market power.

3. Market Power and Dominance

The Competition Act's dominance provisions become particularly relevant where a digital energy platform possesses substantial market power. A platform controlling essential data, customer interfaces, transaction infrastructure, or access to distributed-energy resources may become strategically important even where it owns relatively little physical electricity infrastructure.

The legal analysis should therefore examine the relevant product and geographic market, network effects, barriers to entry, switching costs, access to data, interoperability, and control over essential infrastructure.

4. Case Law

Case 1: Competition Commission v Telkom SA Ltd and Others [2009] ZASCA 155

Facts: The Competition Commission pursued competition-law proceedings concerning Telkom's conduct in the telecommunications sector.

Legal Issue: The case involved the application and enforcement of competition law within a regulated network industry.

Judgment: The Supreme Court of Appeal considered the relationship between competition-law enforcement and sector-specific regulation.

Legal Principle / Ratio Decidendi: Competition law can operate in regulated network industries, subject to the statutory allocation of regulatory jurisdiction.

Significance: Digital electricity platforms resemble telecommunications platforms because both may depend upon network access, interoperability and control over essential infrastructure. The case therefore provides a useful framework for analysing competition in digitally mediated electricity markets.

Case 2: eMedia Investments v MultiChoice [2023] ZACAC 3

Facts: eMedia challenged MultiChoice's exclusion of certain channels from its platform.

Legal Issue: Whether exclusion from a dominant platform could constitute anti-competitive conduct and whether objective justification existed.

Judgment: The Competition Appeal Court addressed the continuation of interim relief concerning access to the DStv platform.

Legal Principle / Ratio Decidendi: Platform exclusion must be assessed in light of its competitive effects and any objectively rational justification.

Significance: The reasoning is relevant to energy platforms where a dominant digital intermediary controls access to consumers, trading opportunities, or distributed-energy services.

Case 3: Competition Commission v Bank of America and Others [2026] ZACC 28

Facts: The case concerned alleged coordination among traders using electronic communications and chatrooms in the foreign-exchange market.

Legal Issue: The litigation concerned allegations of coordinated conduct and the use of electronic communication platforms in facilitating competition-law violations.

Judgment: The Constitutional Court considered issues arising from the Commission's competition-law proceedings.

Legal Principle / Ratio Decidendi: Electronic communication systems do not place commercially coordinated conduct outside the reach of competition law.

Significance: The principle is particularly important for algorithmic electricity trading, where competing firms could potentially use shared digital infrastructure or algorithms to facilitate coordination.

5. Regulatory Implications

South African regulators should consider platform access rules, data portability, interoperability, algorithmic transparency, cybersecurity, non-discrimination, and competition safeguards. Digital platforms operating in electricity markets should maintain auditable records of significant algorithmic decisions and establish controls preventing the exchange of competitively sensitive information.

Recent South African electricity-sector developments also demonstrate the increasing importance of competitive electricity trading arrangements and transparent market rules.

6. Conclusion

Competition law provides an important framework for governing digitalisation of electricity markets. The central challenge is to preserve the efficiency benefits of digital platforms while preventing market power, exclusion, discriminatory access, data advantages, and algorithmic coordination from undermining competition. Effective regulation therefore requires coordination between competition authorities, energy regulators, and market institutions, ensuring that digital innovation develops alongside openness, consumer choice, and fair market participation.